Page 1 of 7. IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK WP(C) No. 5691 of 2022 Khageswar Apat ..... Petitioner Mr. K.P. Mishra, Sr. Advocate along with Mr. A. Mishra, Advocate -versus- MD And CEO, CANARA Bank, Karnataka & Ors. ..... Opposite Parties Mr. D.N. Mohapatra, Advocate CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY ORDER 22.04.2026 Order No.12 1. This matter is taken up through hybrid mode. 2. Heard Mr. K.P. Mishra, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Petitioner along with Mr. A. Mishra, learned counsel and Mr. D.N. Mohapatra, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Opp. Party-Bank. 3. Pursuant to order dtd.11.03.2026, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Opp. Party-Bank fairly contended that against similar proceeding initiated against the Petitioner and another co-delinquent employee, though both were imposed with the punishment of dismissal, but the other employee was imposed with the punishment of reduction in rank by the reviewing authority vide order dtd.02.08.2022. 3.1. However, it is contended that since Petitioner at the relevant point of time, was continuing as a Probationary Officer and on probation, no such lenient view can be taken against the Petitioner in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of United Bank of India vs. Bachan Prasad Lal (Civil Appeal No. 2949 of Page 2 of 7. 2011. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para 9 to 11 of the said judgment has held as follows:- “9. The nature of allegation against the respondent employee was of fraudulently preparing nine credit transfer vouchers on various dates on the pretext of payment of interest towards fixed deposits and crediting the whole amount to one saving account opened in the name of one Smt. Asha Devi (admittedly the fake account prepared by respondent employee). In order to adjust the said amount, he manipulated the other book records of the Bank using forged signatures. After such nature of allegations stood proved. the disciplinary authority, after taking into consideration the record of inquiry and the post held by the respondent employee, punished him with the penalty of dismissal from service. 10. The finding of guilt recorded by the inquiry officer in his report was confirmed at all later stages by the disciplinary/appellate authority and even after judicial scrutiny by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment but still refrained from interference on the premise that the employee had superannuated in the year 2007. 11. In our considered view, looking into seriousness of the nature of allegations levelled against the respondent employee, the punishment of dismissal inflicted upon him in no manner could be said to be shockingly disproportionate which would have required to be interfered with by the Tribunal in exercise of its power under Section 11A of the Act 1947. At the same time, merely because the employee stood superannuated in the meanwhile, will not absolve him from the misconduct which he had committed in discharge of his duties and looking into the nature of misconduct which he had committed, he was not entitled for any indulgence. The Page 3 of 7. Bank employee always holds the position of trust where honesty and integrity are the sine qua non but it would never be advisable to deal with such matters leniently.” 4. Mr. K.P. Mishra, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Petitioner on the other hand placing reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jagdish Singh Vs. Punjab Engineering College & Ors. reported in (2009) 7 SCC 301 and B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1996) SC 484 as well as a decision of this Court in the case of Nirakar Sahoo vs. Neelachal Gramya Bank represented Through its Chairman & Anr. reported in 2012 (2) ILR-CUT 632, contended that since the punishment of dismissal imposed on the Petitioner so upheld by the appellate authority is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct and so also the punishment imposed after modifying the order of dismissal on the delinquent employees, the impugned order passed on 06.02.2021 under Annexure-10, confirmed by the appellate authority vide order dtd.17.06.2021 under Annexure-12 as well as by the reviewing authority vide order dtd.29.11.2021 under Annexure-14 requires interference of this Court. 4.1. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para 6 of the decision in the case of Jagdish Singh has held as follows:- “6. The courts and the tribunals can interfere with the decision of the disciplinary authority only when they are satisfied that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the charges alleged and proved against a delinquent employee and not otherwise. Reference can be made to the decision of this Court in V. Ramana v. A.P. SRTC [(2005) 7 SCC 338 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 69] wherein it is stated: (SCC p. 348, paras 11-12) “11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers Page 4 of 7. from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision for that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. 12. To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.”” 4.2. Similarly, Hon’ble Apex Court in relevant extract of Para 12, 18 & Para 22 of the decision in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi has held as follows:- “12. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. xxx xxx xxx 18. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the Page 5 of 7. disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. xxx xxx xxx 22. The aforesaid has, therefore, to be avoided and I have no doubt that a High Court would be within its jurisdiction to modify the punishment/penalty by moulding the relief, which power it undoubtedly has, in view of a long line of decisions of this Court, to which reference is not deemed necessary, as the position is well settled in law. It may, however, be stated that this power of moulding relief in cases of the present nature can be invoked by a High Court only when the punishment/penalty awarded shocks the judicial conscience.” 4.3. This Court in Para 7 of the decision in the case of Nirakar Sahoo has held as follows:- “7. Since the Petitioner is not involved in misappropriation of the Bank's fund, we are of the view that only on the ground of negligence in duty, order of punishment of dismissal from service is not only disproportionate, but shockingly disproportionate considering the nature of charges levelled proved against him. Since law does not permit this Court to substitute a punishment, ordinarily we would have remitted the matter back again to the Appellate authority for reconsideration of the quantum of punishment. We find that the order of punishment was passed by the disciplinary authority in March, 1997 & in the meantime, fifteen years have passed. In the case of Ms. G. Vallikumari v. Andhra Education Society & ors reported in AIR 2010 Supreme Court 1105, under similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court instead of remitting the matter back for reconsideration on the question of punishment, substituted a punishment. In the said reported case, the employee had been removed from service by way of punishment & her case was taken up by the Hon'ble Supreme Page 6 of 7. Court thirteen years after the said order of removal from service was passed. Considering the same, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph17 of the Judgment held that ends of justice will be met by substituting the punishment of removal from service & imposed some other punishment.” 4.4. Making all these submissions, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Petitioner contended that since the co-delinquent employee who was dismissed on similar charges and the reviewing authority modified the order by imposing the punishment of reduction of rank, Petitioner being similarly situated is also eligible and entitled to get some other punishments, save and except the punishment of dismissal. 5. Mr. D.N. Mohapatra, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Opp. Party-Bank on other hand contended that since Petitioner by the time he was imposed with such punishment, was continuing in the rank of Probationary Officer, which is the lowest rank, no order in reducing the rank can be passed. 5.1. It is also contended that since the other employee who has been imposed with the punishment of reduction in rank is the supervising authority and Petitioner being the principal authority, who is liable for the alleged charges, he is not liable to get any benefit of the punishment so imposed on the other employee. 6. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties, considering the submissions made and placing reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Jagdish Singh & B.C. Chaturvedi and the decision of this Court in the case of Nirakar Sahoo, this Court is of the view that since the co-delinquent employee on the face of the order of dismissal so confirmed by the Page 7 of 7. appellate authority as well as reviewing authority, was imposed with punishment of reduction of rank by the reviewing authority and taking into account the fact that Petitioner was at the entry level of his career, this Court is of the view that the punishment of dismissal imposed on the Petitioner is also required to be reconsidered by the reviewing authority and by taking a sympathetic view of the matter. 6.1. While quashing the order passed by the reviewing authority under Annexure-14 for the time being, this Court directs Opp. Party No. 2 to pass a fresh order, save and except imposing the punishment of dismissal. The reviewing authority is directed to pass a fresh order within a period of six (6) weeks from the date of receipt of this order. However, it is observed that for the break period of service, Petitioner will not get claim benefit, save and except notional financial and service benefit. 7. The writ petition accordingly stands disposed of. (BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY) Judge Sneha