IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.1833 of 2022 In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. ……………… Niranjan Behera and Another …. Petitioners -versus- State of Odisha & Others …. Opposite Parties For Petitioner : Mr. S.K. Singh, Advocate For Opp. Parties : Mr. C.K. Pradhan, AGA PRESENT: THE HONBLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date of Hearing:05.02.2026 and Date of Judgment:05.02.2026 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J. 1. Heard Mr. S.K. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. C.K. Pradhan, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate for the State. 2. The present Writ Petition has been filed inter alia challenging the impugned order dated 04.08.2021, so issued under Annexure-11 by Opp. Party No.1. Vide the said order, claim of the petitioners for regularization of their services, has been rejected inter alia on the ground that since petitioners continued in their services because of the interim order passed by the Tribunal in O.A. No.4031(C) of 1997 and 3469(C) of 1997, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi (3), (2006) 4 SCC-1, petitioners are not eligible to get the benefit. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that petitioners were engaged as against the post of Peon on 44 days basis vide order of appointment issued on 22.02.1996 and 22.01.1996 under Annexure-1 series. It is contended that such order of appointment issued under Annexure-1 series was extended from time to time. 3.1. On the face of such continuance, when they were not regularized, they approached the Tribunal by filing O.A. No.4031(C) of 1997 and 3469(C) of 1997. The Tribunal vide order dated 10.12.1997 and 28.01.1998 under Annexure-12 series, while admitting the matters passed the following interim order:- “As regards the interim prayer not to terminate his services, in case he is working against a post which is earmarked for the category to which he belongs according to the model roster and his further continuance will not violate section 3(h) of the O.R.V. Act and there is necessity for manning the post, then he may be allowed to continue till 31.12.97. ” 3.2. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that interim order passed on 10.12.1997 and 28.01.1998 was further modified with passing of a fresh order on 04.08.1998 under Annexure-12 series and the said order reads as follows:- “Heard. The interim order has expired on 30.06.98. Though there was a direction to list it before that date, the O.A. had not been listed. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that he is still continuing and as such, an order may be passed for his further continuance. If the respondents have retained him after the period specified in the interim order of the Tribunal is over, then it is not clear why he wants a further order from the Tribunal for his continuance. Hence all that can be directed is that if the respondents are utilizing his services as on today as submitted by learned counsel for the applicant, then pendency of this application will not be a bar to let him continue subject to the following conditions:- (i) There is necessity for manning the post and availability of funds. The ban order issued by the Finance Department should be kept in mind. (ii) His continuance in that post will not violate Section 3(h) of the O.R.V. Act. (iii) His continuance in that post will not come in the way of a regularly selected candidate being appointed against that vacancy.” 3.3. Learned counsel for the petitioners taking into account the nature of order passed by the Tribunal initially on 10.12.1997 as well as 28.01.1998 and subsequently on 04.08.1998, contended that petitioners were never protected with any interim order and no order was passed by the tribunal directing the Opp. Parties to allow the petitioners to continue in their services. In the alternate, the Tribunal gave liberty to the Opp. Parties to continue with the services of the petitioners, if such continuance of the petitioners are required in the establishment in question. 3.4. It is further contended that the original applications so filed were disposed of along with a batch of original application vide order dated 05.04.2016 under Annexure-3, inter alia directing Opp. Party No.3 to take a decision on the grievance of the petitioners with regard to their claim for regularization in service. 3.5. It is contended that on the face of such order passed by the Tribunal, when claim of the petitioners was not considered, they approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No.6928 of 2021. This Court vide order dated 24.02.2021 under Annexure-10, when directed for consideration of the petitioners’ claim taking into account the decision in the case of Uma Devi so cited (supra), vide the impugned order dated 04.08.2021 under Annexure-11, petitioners’ claim was rejected on the ground that petitioners since continued because of the interim order passed by the Tribunal, they are not eligible to get the benefit of regularizationm in the light of the decision rendered in the case of Uma devi. 3.6. It is contended that since the Tribunal never passed any interim order so available under Annexure- 12 series directing the authorities to allow the petitioners to continue and in the alternate liberty was given to the Opp. Party No.3 to take the services of the petitioners, if it is required, it cannot be held that petitioners continued in their service because of the interim order passed by the Tribunal in O.A. No.4031(C) of 1997 and 3469(C) of 1997. 3.7. It is further contended that on the face of such rejection of their claim, petitioners are continuing as Peons on adhoc basis till date. Since even after rejection of the petitioners’ claim, petitioners are continuing in their services, in view of the recent decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaggo vs. Union of India & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; Shripal & Anr. vs. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221, as well as Dharam Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Anr. (Civil Appeal No(s).8558 of 2018, petitioners are eligible and entitled to get the benefit of regularization. 4. Even though no counter affidavit has been filed by the State on the face of the notice issued by this Court on 21.01.2022, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate basing on the Para Wise Comment so received, contended that since petitioners were allowed to continue because of the interim order passed by the Tribunal in O.A. No.4031(C) of 1997 and 3469(C) of 1997, their claim is not covered by the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Uma devi. 4.1. It is accordingly contended that while complying the direction of this Court so passed in W.P.(C) No.6928 of 2021, petitioners’ claim was rightly rejected vide the impugned order dated 04.08.2021 under Annexure-11. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considering the submissions made, this Court finds that petitioners were appointed on adhoc basis for a period of 44 days basis as Peons in the establishment of Opp. Party No.3 vide order dated 22.02.1996 and 22.01.1996 under Annexure-1 series. Petitioners claiming benefit of regularization, when approached the Tribunal by filing O.A. No.4031(C) of 1997 and 3469(C) of 1997, the Tribunal vide order dated 10.12.1997 and 28.01.1998 under Annexure-12 series, while admitting the applications, passed an interim order to the effect that petitioners may be allowed to continue, if their further continuance will not violate ORV Act and there is necessity for manning the posts. 5.1. The said order was further clarified vide order dated 04.08.1998 under Annexure-12 series and in the said order, Opp. Party No.3 was given liberty to allow the petitioners to continue and by holding that pendency of the application will not be a bar, in allowing the petitioners to continue. This Court taking into account the nature of order passed by the Tribunal on 10.12.1997 as well as 28.01.1998 and on 04.08.1998, is of the view that the Tribunal never passed any interim order directing Opp. Party No.3 to allow the petitioners to continue. In the alternate liberty was given to the said authority to allow the petitioners to continue, if continuance of the petitioners is required. 5.2. Therefore, it is the view of this Court that the ground on which petitioners’ claim has been rejected vide the impugned order dated 04.08.2021 under Annexure-11, is not sustainable in the eye of law. Not only that on the face of such rejection of their claim vide order dated 04.08.2021, since petitioners as on date are continuing on adhoc basis, this Court is of the view that claim of the petitioners to get the benefit of regularization needs a fresh consideration in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Jaggo vs. Union of India & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; Shripal & Anr. vs. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221, as well as Dharam Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Anr. (Civil Appeal No(s).8558 of 2018. 5.3. View expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaggo in Para-22 to 25 and 27 reads as follows:- “22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that adversely affects workers' rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig economy has led to an increase in precarious employment arrangements, often characterized by lack of benefits, job security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour standards. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment practices. When public sector entities engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in governmental operations. 23. The International Labour Organization (ILO), of which India is a founding member, has consistently advocated for employment stability and the fair treatment of workers. The ILO's Multinational Enterprises Declaration6 encourages companies to provide stable employment and to observe obligations concerning employment stability and social security. It emphasizes that enterprises should assume a leading role in promoting employment security, particularly in contexts where job discontinuation could exacerbate long-term unemployment. 24. The landmark judgement of the United State in the case of Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation7 serves as a pertinent example from the private sector, illustrating the consequences of misclassifying employees to circumvent providing benefits. In this case, Microsoft classified certain workers as independent contractors, thereby denying them employee benefits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that these workers were, in fact, common-law employees and were entitled to the same benefits as regular employees. The Court noted that large Corporations have increasingly adopted the practice of hiring temporary employees or independent contractors as a means of avoiding payment of employee benefits, thereby increasing their profits. This judgment underscores the principle that the nature of the work performed, rather than the label assigned to the worker, should determine employment status and the corresponding rights and benefits. It highlights the judiciary's role in rectifying such misclassifications and ensuring that workers receive fair treatment. 25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long- term obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways: • Misuse of "Temporary" Labels: Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution are often labeled as "temporary" or "contractual," even when their roles mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks. • Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service. • Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often find themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development, promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally significant. • Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment. • Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees are often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx 27. In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it is imperative for government departments to lead by example in providing fair and stable employment. Engaging workers on a temporary basis for extended periods, especially when their roles are integral to the organization's functioning, not only contravenes international labour standards but also exposes the organization to legal challenges and undermines employee morale. By ensuring fair employment practices, government institutions can reduce the burden of unnecessary litigation, promote job security, and uphold the principles of justice and fairness that they are meant to embody. This approach aligns with international standards and sets a positive precedent for the private sector to follow, thereby contributing to the overall betterment of labour practices in the country.” 5.4. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shripal in Para-14, 15, 17 & 18(IV) has held as follows:- “14. ...... More importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a shield to justify exploitative engagements persisting for years without the Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment. 15. ……. Indian labour law strongly disfavors perpetual daily-wage or contractual engagements in circumstances where the work is permanent in nature. xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx 17. Indeed, bureaucratic limitations cannot trump the legitimate rights of workmen who have served continuously in de facto regular roles for an extended period. 18.(IV) The Respondent Employer is directed to initiate a fair and transparent process for regularizing the Appellant Workmen within six months from the date of reinstatement, duly considering the fact that they have performed perennial municipal duties akin to permanent posts. In assessing regularization, the Employer shall not impose educational or procedural criteria retroactively if such requirements were never applied to the Appellant Workmen or to similarly situated regular employees in the past. To the extent that sanctioned vacancies for such duties exist or are required, the Respondent Employer shall expedite all necessary administrative processes to ensure these longtime employees are not indefinitely retained on daily wages contrary to statutory and equitable norms.” 5.5. Placing reliance on the decision in the case of Jaggo and Shripal, Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dharam Singh, in Paragraph-13, 14, 15 & 17, 18, 19 & 20 has held as follows: “13. As we have observed in both Jaggo (Supra) and Shripal (Supra), outsourcing cannot become a convenient shield to perpetuate precariousness and to sidestep fair engagement practices where the work is inherently perennial. The Commission’s further contention that the appellants are not “full-time” employees but continue only by virtue of interim orders also does not advance their case. That interim protection was granted precisely because of the long history of engagement and the pendency of the challenge to the State’s refusals. It neither creates rights that did not exist nor erases entitlements that may arise upon a proper adjudication of the legality of those refusals. 14. The learned Single Judge of the High Court also declined relief on the footing that the petitioners had not specifically assailed the subsequent decision dated 25.11.2003. However, that view overlooks that the writ petition squarely challenged the 11.11.1999 refusal as the High Court itself directed a fresh decision during pendency, and the later rejection was placed on record by the respondents. In such circumstances, we believe that the High Court was obliged to examine the legality of the State’s stance in refusing sanction, whether in 1999 or upon reconsideration in 2003, rather than dispose of the matter on a mere technicality. The Division Bench of the High Court compounded the error by affirming the dismissal without engaging with the principal challenge or the intervening material. The approach of both the Courts, in reducing the dispute to a mechanical enquiry about “rules” and “vacancy” while ignoring the core question of arbitrariness in the State’s refusal to sanction posts despite perennial need and long service, cannot be sustained. 15. Therefore, in view of the foregoing observations, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained. The State’s refusals dated 11.11.1999 and 25.11.2003,in so far as they concern the Commission’s proposals for sanction/creation of Class-III/Class-IV posts to address perennial ministerial/attendant work, are held unsustainable and stand quashed. xxx xxx xxx 17. Before concluding, we think it necessary to recall that the State (here referring to both the Union and the State governments) is not a mere market participant but a constitutional employer. It cannot balance budgets on the backs of those who perform the most basic and recurring public functions. Where work recurs day after day and year after year, the establishment must reflect that reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices. The long-term extraction of regular labour under temporary labels corrodes confidence in public administration and offends the promise of equal protection. Financial stringency certainly has a place in public policy, but it is not a talisman that overrides fairness, reason and the duty to organise work on lawful lines. 18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that “ad- hocism” thrives where administration is opaque. The State Departments must keep and produce accurate establishment registers, muster rolls and outsourcing arrangements, and they must explain, with evidence, why they prefer precarious engagement over sanctioned posts where the work is perennial. If “constraint” is invoked, the record should show what alternatives were considered, why similarly placed workers were treated differently, and how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human consequences of prolonged insecurity is not sentimentality. It is an institutional discipline that should inform every decision affecting those who keep public offices running. 19. Having regard to the long, undisputed service of the appellants, the admitted perennial nature of their duties, and the material indicating vacancies and comparator regularisations, we issue the following directions: i. Regularization and creation of Supernumerary posts: All appellants shall stand regularized with effect from 24.04.2002, the date on which the High Court directed a fresh recommendation by the Commission and a fresh decision by the State on sanctioning posts for the appellants. For this purpose, the State and the successor establishment (U.P. Education Services Selection Commission) shall create supernumerary posts in the corresponding cadres, Class-III (Driver or equivalent) and Class-IV (Peon/Attendant/Guard or equivalent) without any caveats or preconditions. On regularization, each appellant shall be placed at not less than the minimum of the regular pay-scale for the post, with protection of last-drawn wages if higher and the appellants shall be entitled to the subsequent increments in the pay scale as per the pay grade. For seniority and promotion, service shall count from the date of regularization as given above. ii. Financial consequences and arrears: Each appellant shall be paid as arrears the full difference between (a) the pay and admissible allowances at the minimum of the regular pay-level for the post from time to time, and (b) the amounts actually paid, for the period from 24.04.2002 until the date of regularization /retirement/death, as the case may be. Amounts already paid under previous interim directions shall be so adjusted. The net arrears shall be released within three months and if in default, the unpaid amount shall carry compound interest at 6% per annum from the date of default until payment. iii. Retired appellants: Any appellant who has already retired shall be granted regularization with effect from 24.04.2002 until the date of superannuation for pay fixation, arrears under clause (ii), and recalculation of pension, gratuity and other terminal dues. The revised pension and terminal dues shall be paid within three months of this Judgment. iv. Deceased appellants: In the case of Appellant No. 5 and any other appellant who has died during pendency, his/her legal representatives on record shall be paid the arrears under clause (ii) up to the date of death, together with all terminal/retiral dues recalculated consistently with clause (i), within three months of this Judgement. v. Compliance affidavit: The Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh, or the Secretary of the U.P. Education Services Selection Commission or the prevalent competent authority, shall file an affidavit of compliance before this Court within four months of this Judgement. 20. We have framed these directions comprehensively because, case after case, orders of this Court in such matters have been met with fresh technicalities, rolling “reconsiderations,” and administrative drift which further prolongs the insecurity for those who have already laboured for years on daily wages. Therefore, we have learned that Justice in such cases cannot rest on simpliciter directions, but it demands imposition of clear duties, fixed timelines, and verifiable compliance .As a constitutional employer, the State is held to a higher standard and therefore it must organise its perennial workers on a sanctioned footing, create a budget for lawful engagement, and implement judicial directions in letter and spirit. Delay to follow these obligations is not mere negligence but rather it is a conscious method of denial that erodes livelihoods and dignity for these workers. The operative scheme we have set here comprising of creation of supernumerary posts, full regularization, subsequent financial benefits, and a sworn affidavit of compliance, is therefore a pathway designed to convert rights into outcomes and to reaffirm that fairness in engagement and transparency in administration are not matters of grace, but obligations under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.” 5.6. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court while quashing office order dated 04.08.2021 under Annexure-11, directs Opp. Party No.1 to take a decision on the entitlement of the petitioners to get the benefit of regularization, taking into account their long continuance w.e.f. 22.02.1996 and 22.01.1996 on adhoc basis in the light of the decision in the case of Jaggo, Shripal and Dharam Singh so cited (supra). This Court directs Opp. Party No.1 to take a fresh decision as directed within a period of 3(three) months from the date of receipt of this order and communicate the result thereof. 6. The Writ Petition stands disposed of accordingly. (Biraja Prasanna Satapathy) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated the 5th February, 2026/Basudev