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2022 DAILYLAW 720 (CHH)

AASHIYA BEGAM v. SANDEEP BENARJEE

WPC/2861/2022 · 2026-05-11

Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad

Transfer Petitionbody2022

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 2861 of 2022 1 - Aashiya Begam W/o Late Enayam Husain Aged About 64 Years R/o Near Post Office Belpahad, District Jharsugada (Odisa) 2 - Ahmad Raj Husain S/o Late Enayam Husain Aged About 42 Years R/o Near Post Office Belpahad, District Jharsugada (Odisa) 3 - Aktar Raza Husain S/o Late Enayam Husain Aged About 40 Years R/o Near Post Office Belpahad, District Jharsugada (Odisa) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Sandeep Benarjee S/o Late Shivkumar Benarjee, Aged About 45 Years R/o Village - Jagatpur Near Karmel School, Tahsil And District - Raigarh Chhattisgarh. 2 - The Revenue Board Bilaspur, District - Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 3 - The Add. Commessioner, Bilaspur Division Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. 4 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Raigarh, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from the Case Information System) VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Ahmad Raj Hussain, Petitioner No. 2 is present. For State :- Mr. R.K. Gupta, Addl. A.G. For Respondent No.1 :- Mr. Parag Kotecha, Advocate ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SB-Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 12.05.2026 1. The present petition is against the order dated 05.05.2022 passed by the learned President, Chhattisgarh Revenue Board Bilaspur Division Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.), whereby the learned Board of Revenue has dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioner/applicant and affirmed the order dated 12.01.2022 passed by the learned Commissioner, Bilaspur and order dated 31.10.1986 passed by the learned Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Raigarh (C.G.), holding that the appeal has been preferred before SDO(R) after 48 years of delay. 2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the land bearing Khasra No. 249/1, area 0.35 acre, situated at Village Laxmipur, Jagatpur, Tahsil and District Raigarh (C.G.), was originally recorded in the name of Rahat Hussain S/o Afzal Hussain, who was the grandfather of petitioner Nos. 2 and 3, in the revenue records. According to the petitioners, the said disputed land was never sold or transferred by the grandfather of the petitioners in favour of any person. It is the case of the petitioners that the ancestor of respondent No. 1, namely S.C. Banerjee, through his predecessor 3 Chapla Bala Banerjee, got the disputed land mutated in his favour on the basis of an alleged fake and fabricated sale deed dated 07.07.1944 purportedly executed by one Arjun Singh, though the said Arjun Singh never had any right, title or interest over the aforesaid land. On the basis of the said sale deed, the Assistant Superintendent of Land Records, Raigarh passed an order dated 16.05.1972 directing mutation in Entry Register No. 115. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 16.05.1972, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Raigarh along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. However, the said appeal came to be dismissed on 31.10.1986 on the ground of limitation. Thereafter, the petitioners preferred a further appeal before the learned Additional Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, but the learned Appellate Authority also dismissed the appeal vide order dated 12.01.2022 on the ground of limitation. Against the said order, the petitioners preferred a revision petition before the Board of Revenue, Bilaspur (C.G.), however, the learned Board of Revenue also dismissed the revision vide order dated 05.05.2022 on the ground of limitation. According to the petitioners, the impugned orders passed by the revenue authorities are illegal, arbitrary, contrary to the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code and opposed to the settled principles governing mutation 4 proceedings and limitation, and therefore the present writ petition has been filed challenging the aforesaid orders. 3. The petitioner has filed this Writ Petition seeking following reliefs:- “10.1 That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the case of the petitioner for perusal of this Hon'ble Court. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set- aside the impugned order dated 05.05.2022 (AnnexureP/1) and by allowing the petition preferred by the petitioners, direct the respondent authorities to take steps for giving the suit land to the petitioners. 10.3 That the cost of the petition may kindly be awarded in favour of the petitioner. 10.5 That, any other writs and direction which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case be granted to the petitioner.” 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the courts below have committed grave illegality in dismissing the appeal and revision merely on the ground of limitation without appreciating that the dispute pertains to ancestral Khudkast/proprietary land and the alleged mutation was effected on the basis of a fraudulent and fabricated unregistered sale deed dated 07.07.1944/07.07.1972 allegedly executed by one Arjun Singh, who never had any right, title or interest over the land in question. 5 It is further submitted that the petitioners and their predecessors had no knowledge of the mutation proceedings or the order dated 31.10.1986 and came to know about the fraudulent entries only upon obtaining certified copies of the revenue records in the year 2019/2024. Therefore, the provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation Act would apply and limitation would commence from the date of knowledge. Learned counsel further submits that the land originally belonged to Gountia Badrinath and thereafter stood allotted and recorded in the name of Rahat Hussain, predecessor of the petitioners, under the provisions of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950, and the petitioners’ family remained in peaceful possession while paying revenue and malguzari for several decades. It is contended that the courts below failed to appreciate that mutation entries based upon fraud confer no title and can be challenged at any stage. It is further submitted that the courts below ignored the settled legal position laid down in the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in relation to Khudkast land and proprietary rights. Learned counsel submits that the concurrent findings recorded by the revenue authorities are perverse, contrary to law and liable to be set aside.Reliance has been placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sukh Dutt Ratra vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2022) 7 SCC 508 wherein it has been held that the right to property though no longer a fundamental right, continues to be 6 a valuable constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and a person cannot be deprived of his property save by authority of law. It has further been observed that the State cannot dispossess a person from his property without following due process of law and payment of lawful compensation. 5. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 submits that the present writ petition is wholly misconceived, not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed on the ground of gross delay and laches alone. It is submitted that the petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Court after an inordinate and unexplained delay without assigning any sufficient cause for such belated approach. Learned counsel further submits that the order impugned herein has already been assailed before the competent revenue authorities and the same stood dismissed on the ground of limitation. The petitioner, instead of diligently pursuing the remedy within the prescribed period, remained indolent and inactive for a considerable length of time and, therefore, cannot invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as a matter of right. It is contended that the writ jurisdiction being discretionary and equitable in nature cannot be exercised in favour of a litigant who is guilty of negligence, acquiescence and unexplained delay. Learned counsel further submits that the doctrine of laches is founded upon considerations of public policy, justice and equity and once the petitioner, by his own conduct, permits the matter to attain 7 finality, it would be inequitable and unjust to reopen settled issues after lapse of considerable time, particularly when third party rights and administrative consequences have intervened during the interregnum. It is further argued that the word “laches” denotes negligence, remissness and slackness in asserting a legal right and the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 ought to consider the conduct of the party, length of delay and surrounding circumstances. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Others vs. N. Murugesan and Others (2022) 2 SCC 25, State Bank of India and Another vs. M.J. James (2022) 2 SCC 301, Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board and Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108 and Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and Others 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 to contend that stale claims and belated petitions ought not to be entertained in exercise of writ jurisdiction and that delay defeats equity. It is thus prayed that the present writ petition being barred by delay and laches deserves to be dismissed. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and having perused the record of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that no interference is warranted in the present writ petition. 7. At the outset, it is evident that the challenge raised by the petitioners pertains to mutation proceedings initiated on the basis 8 of an unregistered sale deed dated 07.07.1944, which ultimately culminated in an order dated 16.05.1972 passed by the Assistant Superintendent, Land Records, Raigarh, followed by rejection of appeal on 31.10.1986 and further affirmation thereof by the Commissioner on 12.01.2022 and the Board of Revenue on 05.05.2022. The record clearly reflects that the initial order was passed nearly five decades ago and the first statutory challenge itself was raised after an inordinate and unexplained delay of about 48 years. 8. This Court finds that the explanation offered by the petitioners regarding alleged lack of knowledge and discovery of fraud at a belated stage is wholly vague, unsupported by cogent material and does not inspire confidence, particularly in view of the fact that mutation entries had attained finality decades ago and were never challenged within a reasonable period. The plea sought to be raised under Section 17 of the Limitation Act is also found to be misconceived in the facts of the present case, as no credible material has been placed on record to demonstrate continuous concealment or fraud of such nature as would justify reopening settled revenue entries after an extraordinary lapse of time. 9. It is further noticed that the revenue courts, including the Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue), the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue, have concurrently held that the appeal and revision were barred by limitation and no sufficient cause was shown for 9 condonation of such inordinate delay. The said findings cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to law so as to warrant interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. This Court is also of the view that mutation proceedings are fiscal in nature and do not confer title, and any challenge thereto must be raised within a reasonable period. Allowing such stale claims to be agitated after several decades would not only unsettle settled revenue records but would also open floodgates of litigation affecting third-party rights and administrative stability. 11. The reliance placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. N. Murugesan (supra), State Bank of India v. M.J. James (Supra), Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu (Supra), and Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley (Supra) further fortifies the settled principle that writ courts ought not to entertain stale claims and that delay defeats equity. The law is well-settled that laches and acquiescence are sufficient grounds for declining discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present petition suffers from gross delay and laches, lacks merit, and does not call for any interference. 10 13. Accordingly, the writ petition is hereby dismissed. 14. No order as to costs. sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Vishakha