17-FA(ST)-690-2022.doc Sayali IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 690 OF 2022 Defence Estate Officer Gujarat Circle, Ahmedabad … Appellant V/s. Gijubhai Bhulabhai Patel And Ors … Respondents WITH INTERIM APPLICATION (ST) NO. 694 OF 2022 WITH INTERIM APPLICATION (ST) NO. 695 OF 2022 WITH INTERIM APPLICATION (ST) NO. 19658 OF 2022 Mr. R. G. Govilkar, Senior Advocate with Mr. Shailesh S. Pathak, for Appelant-Applicant. CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J. DATED : SEPTEMBER 8, 2026 P.C.: INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 19658 OF 2022 1. I have considered the averments made in the application for condonation of delay, the submissions advanced on behalf of the Applicant, and the material placed on record. The present application seeks condonation of delay in filing the Appeal against the judgment and Award passed by the Reference Court. 2. The judgment and Award under challenge is dated 17th December 2014. It is stated that the Applicant initially applied for a Certified Copy of the judgment and Award on 22nd May 2017 1 17-FA(ST)-690-2022.doc and that the Certified Copy was made ready on the very same day. It is stated that the Applicant again applied for a Certified Copy on 24th February 2020 and the said copy was made ready on 25th February 2020. Thereafter, according to the Applicant, an Appeal was filed before the High Court of Gujarat. The said Appeal was subsequently withdrawn on 17th March 2021 on the ground that the High Court of Gujarat did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The Applicant has stated that the present Appeal came to be filed after receipt of the warrant of attachment. However, the application itself states that the present Appeal was filed on 24th November 2020. Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the chronology pleaded in the application, particularly regarding the date on which the Appeal before the High Court of Gujarat was withdrawn and the date on which the present Appeal was filed. This aspect also assumes significance while considering whether the entire period of delay has been satisfactorily explained. 3. Even assuming, for the sake of consideration, that the period during which the Applicant was prosecuting the proceedings before the High Court of Gujarat is liable to be excluded and that the Applicant is otherwise entitled to the benefit of the applicable provisions relating to exclusion of time spent in bona fide prosecution of proceedings before a Court without jurisdiction, that by itself does not explain the substantial period preceding such proceedings. The judgment and Award was passed on 17th December 2014, whereas the second Certified Copy was applied for only on 24th February 2020 and was made ready on 25th 2 17-FA(ST)-690-2022.doc February 2020. Thus, there remains a period of about five years from 17th December 2014 to 25th February 2020 which has not been satisfactorily accounted for. 4. The mere fact that a Certified Copy was applied for on 22nd May 2017 does not explain the period from the date of the judgment and Award till the date of such application. More importantly, no sufficient particulars have been placed on record to show what prevented the Applicant from taking appropriate steps to challenge the judgment and Award within the prescribed period. The application is required to disclose the circumstances which constitute sufficient cause for the entire period of delay. A vague or incomplete explanation for a substantial part of the delay cannot be treated as sufficient cause merely because some part of the subsequent period may otherwise be capable of exclusion. 5. The burden upon an applicant seeking condonation of delay is to place before the Court facts and circumstances which reasonably explain the delay and demonstrate that there was sufficient cause for not approaching the Court within the prescribed period. The Court cannot condone the delay merely on the basis of sympathy or on the ground that the Applicant may have a case on merits. The question at this stage is confined to whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained. In the present case, the material placed before the Court does not furnish any satisfactory explanation for the substantial period commencing from 17th December 2014 and extending up to 25th February 2020. 3 17-FA(ST)-690-2022.doc 6. It was submitted, on instructions of the concerned officer, namely Nayan Patel, who is present in Court, that the Applicant has deposited the amount awarded by the Reference Court before the Executing Court from its account. The fact of such deposit has been taken into consideration. However, the deposit of the awarded amount cannot constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the Appeal. 7. I have also considered the circumstance that the Applicant claims to have prosecuted proceedings before the High Court of Gujarat. Even if the Applicant is given the benefit of the period during which such proceedings were prosecuted bona fide before a Court which was subsequently found to lack territorial jurisdiction, the Applicant must still explain the period which preceded such prosecution. Exclusion of one period does not automatically explain the remaining period. In the present case, the substantial period between 17th December 2014 and 25th February 2020 remains unexplained. The explanation offered therefore does not disclose continuous circumstances which prevented the Applicant from filing the Appeal within the prescribed period. There is also no sufficient material to establish that the Applicant acted with reasonable diligence throughout the relevant period. The delay is substantial, and the absence of a satisfactory explanation for a material portion of the delay assumes importance. In such circumstances, the discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be exercised merely because the Applicant has deposited the Award amount or because the Applicant seeks an opportunity to challenge the Award on merits. 4 17-FA(ST)-690-2022.doc 8. Considering the averments in the application as a whole, I am unable to hold that the Applicant has established sufficient cause for the delay in filing the Appeal. The material period of delay remains unexplained. The subsequent prosecution of proceedings before the High Court of Gujarat, even if taken into consideration in favour of the Applicant, does not remove this fundamental deficiency in the explanation. Consequently, the statutory requirement of establishing sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been satisfied. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, I find that the Applicant has failed to make out sufficient cause for condonation of the delay. The application therefore deserves to be dismissed. The issue regarding the deposit of the Award amount, if any, shall remain open for consideration by the Executing Court in accordance with law. 10. The Application for condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the Appeal, being barred by limitation, shall not be entertained. 11. The Appeal and Interim Application do not survive. (AMIT BORKAR, J.) 5