SHRI. MAHIPATI BHIVA POWAR (DECEASED THR.LRS) SHRI. SARJERAO MAHIPATI POWAR ANDORS v. SMT. DAGADUBAI VISHNU PATIL AND ORS
IA/17701/2022 · 2026-07-02
Shri Mehroz Ashraf Khan Pathan
body2022
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2022 DAILYLAW 2863 (BOM) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2022 DAILYLAW 2863 (BOM) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
ia-17701-2022 .doc IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION INTERIM APPLICATION NO.17701 OF 2022 IN SECOND APPEAL STAMP NO. 14734 OF 2022 Shri. Mahipati Bhiva PowaR (Deceased Thr.Lrs) Shri Sarjerao Mahipati Powar And ors ...Applicants Vs Smt. Dagadubai Vishnu Patil And Ors ...Respondents —————— Mr. Dheeraj Patil, learned counsel for the applicants. ——————
Coram : MEHROZ K. PATHAN, J., Date : JULY 02, 2026.
P. C. : Heard Shri. Patil, learned counsel for the appellants/applicants.
1. The present application seeks condonation of delay of 5 years and 40 days in filing the present Second Appeal against the judgment and
order dated 10th February 2017 passed by the learned First Appellate Court. 2. Perusal of the application would show that absolutely no satisfactory explanation has been offered by the applicants for adn 1 of
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ia-17701-2022 .doc condonation of the inordinate delay of 5 years and 40 days in filing the present Second Appeal. One of the grounds stated in the application is that the original plaintiff, Mahipati Powar, expired on 18th June 2016 and that the applicants, being his legal heirs, were not aware of the pendency of the litigation. The said contention, however, appears to be wholly incorrect. A perusal of the record of the First Appeal shows that the present applicants were already brought on record as the legal heirs of the original plaintiff during the pendency of the First Appeal itself, and the appeal thereafter came to be finally decided by judgment and decree dated 10th February 2017. The applicants, therefore, cannot take advantage of the death of the original plaintiff, which had occurred prior to the disposal of the First Appeal. 3. The further contention of the applicants that they had no knowledge of the litigation also appears to be false and is not substantiated by any material on record. The applicants have also sought to explain the delay by contending that they could not file the Second Appeal during the period of lockdown on account of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Covid-19 lockdown started in March 2020 however, there is no explanation as to why the appeal could not be filed from 10th February 2017 till March 2020 t is true that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by its order dated 10th January 2022 passed in the Suo Motu Writ adn 2 of
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ia-17701-2022 .doc Petition (Civil) relating to limitation, directed that the period from 15th March 2020 to 28th February 2022 shall stand excluded while computing the period of limitation. However, even after excluding the said period, there still remains an inordinate and unexplained delay of about 5 years and 40 days in filing the present Second Appeal. The reasons assigned by the applicants are flimsy in nature and do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of such an inordinate delay. 4.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Shivamma (dead) By Lrd V/s. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors reported in 2025 INSC 1104 September 2025, has deprecated the practice of condoning inordinate delay, particularly in Second Appeals, and has observed as under:
“262……………………………………………………….. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law. 263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations adn 3 of
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ia-17701-2022 .doc deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.”
5. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, I do not find any sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 5 years and 40 days in filing the present Second Appeal. The delay is inordinate and remains wholly unexplained. 6. If such an inordinate delay is condoned in the absence of any satisfactory explanation, the same would amount to defeating the valuable rights which have accrued in favour of the respondent over a period of time.
Thus, even on merits, the applicants have failed to make out any case for condonation of the inordinate delay. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is, therefore, devoid of merits and is accordingly rejected. 7. In view of the disposal of the Interim Application, Second Appeal adn 4 of
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ia-17701-2022 .doc (ST) No.14734 of 2022 and all pending Interim Applications, if any, also stand disposed of. [MEHROZ K. PATHAN, J] adn 5 of
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