RSA-525-2022 (O&M) - 1 - IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH 116 RSA-525-2022 (O&M) Date of decision: 12.02.2026 Aliman ...Appellant(s) Vs. Abdul Hannan and others ...Respondent(s) CORAM: HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE NIDHI GUPTA Present:- Mr. Tanmoy Gupta, Advocate for the appellant. ****** NIDHI GUPTA, J. Plaintiff is in Second Appeal against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the ld. District Courts; whereby suit filed by the appellant for declaration and permanent injunction, has been dismissed by both the District Courts. 2. Brief facts of the case of the plaintiff as pleaded in the plaint are that one Sh. Noor Mohd son of Sh. Hasandeeen resident of village Malai, Tehsil Hathin, District Palwal, the father of defendant no.1 was co- sharer in joint possession to the extent of 1/4th share of the agricultural land comprising of khewat /khatoni no. 489/566, rect no. 11, killa no. 27(0-4), rect no. 8, killa no. 21/1 (5 - 15) rect no. 9, killa no. 22(2 - 4) rect no. 10, killa no. 1/1/1(1-11), 10/2/1(3-12), 11/1 (0 – 9), rect no. 11, killa no. 5/1 (7 – 9), rect no. 17, killa no. 3/1/1 (1 – 16), 8/2/ 1 (2 – 18), rect no. 19, killa no. 2(5-13), 9(9-10), 12(8-0), 13(5-11), 17(1-16), 18/1 (0 – 3), 23/1 (5 – 3), 23/2(2-17), 24(2-0) total measuring 67 Kanal -00 Marlas situated DIVYANSHI 2026.02.13 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-525-2022 (O&M) - 2 - within the revenue estate of village Malai, Tehsil Hathin, District Palwal, vide Jamabandi for the year 1998-1999. It was further averred that vide Jamabandi for the year 1998-1999 Noor Mohd sold away the area of 3 Kanal -18 Marlas to Sh. Allaha Bux son of Ramjan (defendant no.2) bearing khewat/khatoni no. 446/528, rect no. 19, killa no. 12(8-0), 13(5-11), 17(1- 16), 18/1(0-3) total measuring 15 Kanal -10 Marlas to the extent of 1/4th share which comes to 3 Kanal -18 Marlas by getÝng recited the specific killa numbers 12, 13, 17, 18/1 to the extent of 1/4th share and got the mutation of sale bearing No. 3819 dated 14.10.1999 of these specific killa numbers as per sale deed dated 14.5.1999. Allaha Bux further sold away the area in the form of specific killa numbers to Juhuruddin son of Noor Mohd (defendant no.3) 1/4th share in killa no. 19/13(5-11), 17(1-16), 18/1(0-3), 12/2(1-7), to the extent of 1/4th share and killa no. 9/22(2-4), 19/2(5-13), 9 (9-10) to the extent of 1/12th share vide sale deed dated 4.5.2011 vide mutation no. 4197 of 18.7.2011. Subsequently Late. Sh. Noor Mohd son of Hassanddin got suffered an admissive decree dated 10.1.2000 in favour of his son Sh. Abdul Hannan son of Noor Mohd (defendant no.1) getÝng recorded also specific killa numbers to the extent of 19/12 share i.e. 14 Kanal -7 Marlas and the consequent mutation no. 3829 dated 23.5.2000 was also got sanctioned of specific killa numbers bearing rect no. 8, killa no. 21/1(5-5), 9/22(2-4), rect no. 10, killa no. 1/1/1(1-11), 10/2/1(3-11), 11/1(0-9), 11/27(0-4), 17/3/1/1(10-16), (8/2) / 1 (2 – 19), 19/2 (5 –13), 19/9(9-10), 18/2(7-17), 23/1(5-3), 23/2(2-17), 24(2-0), 694(0-2), 695(0-2), 704(0-2), 705(0-2), 20/3(9-15), 10/9 (8-0), DIVYANSHI 2026.02.13 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-525-2022 (O&M) - 3 - 10/1 (4 - 7) total measuring 73 Kanal -19 Marlas vide mutation no. 3829 as given in the decree in favour of Abdul Hanan, defendant no.1. It is further submitted that the defendant Abdul Hanan son of Sh. Noor Mohd., i.e. the defendant no. 1 further sold away specific killa numbers to the plaintiff by getÝng recited khewat/khatoni no. 489/586 rect no. 19, killa no. 9(9-10), 12(8-0) to the extent of 17 Kanal-10 Marlas to the extent of 80 /350 prime share and which comes to 4 Kanal 00 Marlas vide sale deed dated 21.7.2004. But the mutation of sale was declined by Revenue Authorities as killa no. 19/12 (8-0) has already been sold and mutated in favour of Allah Bux. 3. It was further contended that in fact Noor Mohd son of Hassandin was only co-sharer to the extent of 1/4th share in khewat no. 489/ 446 khatoni no. 566 measuring 67 Kanal-00 Marlas vide jamabandi for the year 1998-1999, so he was not competent to sale away the specific killa numbers either to Allha Bux son of Ramjan and suffer decree in favour of son Sh. Abdul Hanan son of Sh. Noor Mohd. Further sale by Sh. Allaha Bux to Sh. Juhruddin son of Noor Mohammad was nothing but a sale of share qua the whole khewat and the consequent mutation of sale should have sanctioned against the whole area in khewat as proportionate and not of specific killa numbers as got recited in the sale deed. Likewise the decree of specific killa numbers suffered by Sh. Noor Mohd son of Hassandin in favour of defendant no.1 Abdul Hannan son of Sh. Noor Mohd should also be treated as share against whole khewat no. 446/489 and not of specific numbers, since Sh. Noor Mohd, was only co-sharer and DIVYANSHI 2026.02.13 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-525-2022 (O&M) - 4 - one of the co-sharer was not competent to sale away the land in specific killa numbers. So, the consequent mutation of decree also should have been entered and sanctioned as proportionate share qua the whole area of khewat. These sales by Sh. Noor Mohammad son of Hassandin to Sh. Abdul Hannan son of Sh. Noor Mohd and decree by Noor Mohd in favour of Abdul Hanan were actually a proportionate share against the area of whole khewat and not of specific killa numbers in khewat without getÝng it partitioned and the mutations in the revenue record should have affected as share against whole khewat and not against specific killas. It is alleged that the mutation entries of sales and Civil Court decree are erroneous and illegal and liable to be ignored qua other co-sharers. Moreover, by sanctioning a mutation of specific killa number also result into illegality, since by sanctioning mutations in favour of specific killa numbers also amount to effecting a coercive and illegal partition of khewat, since it generate new khewat, which contrary to law and without jurisdiction, as it only ACIG who is competent to effect partition of khewat, that too in compliance with the procedure laid down in Punjab Land Revenue Act Act after due notice and opportunity to all co-sharers in khewat. Now on the basis of illegal revenue entries the defendants are asserting right on specific killa numbers and of sale of the plaintiff share qua khewat and the plaintiff has come to know of these erroneous and illegal revenue record on 11.10.2017, where the plaintiff is in actual physical possession of area of 4 Kanals in khewat, since it was delivered aft the time of sale. The entries are not binding on the plaintiff’s rights. The DIVYANSHI 2026.02.13 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-525-2022 (O&M) - 5 - defendants on the basis of the illegal revenue records are claiming themselves to be exclusive owners of specific killa numbers specially killa no.19/12 and want to interfere in the possession of the plaintiff on suit land and if the defendants succeeded in their illegal motive, the plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss and injury. The plaintiff has requested the defendants not to make such assertion and interfere in possession of the plaintiff but defendants are adamant and refused to do so, firstly on 24.3.2015 and lastly on 11.10.2017, when the plaintiff has withdrawn her appeal with permission to file fresh suit, which is the date of cause of action. The plaintiff has earlier filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the defendant no.1 qua the suit land which was withdrawn with permission to file fresh on same cause of action v.o.d 11.10.2017. With these pleadings, present suit was filed on 05.12.2017. 4. Upon appraisal of the pleadings and the evidence led by the parties, the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hathin, had dismissed the suit of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 29.04.2019. The Civil Appeal filed by the plaintiff was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Palwal vide judgment and decree dated 24.08.2021. Hence, the present second appeal by the plaintiff. 5. It is inter alia submitted by learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant that ownership of the appellant is not disputed. It is submitted that singular grouse of the appellant is that impugned mutation entries No. 3819 dated 14.10.1999 and 3829 dated 23.05.2000 could not have been entered in name of the defendants as admittedly suit land is DIVYANSHI 2026.02.13 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-525-2022 (O&M) - 6 - joint in nature; and, therefore, suit land could have been sold only to the extent of respective shares of the parties, and specific killa numbers in khewat could not have been sold without getÝng the suit land partitioned. It is reiterated that the vendors/defendants could only have sold proportionate share against the area of whole khewat and not of specific killa numbers. Thus, the mutations in the revenue record should have reflected as shares against the whole khewat - and not against specific killa. Whereas the impugned mutations reflect ownership of the defendants in respect of specific killa. However, the aforesaid aspect of the matter has not at all been dealt with by the learned District Courts, while passing the impugned judgments and decrees. It is submitted that sanctioning of mutations in respect of specific killa numbers results into effecting coercive and illegal partition of khewat, which is contrary to law as only ACIG is competent to effect partition of khewat in conformity with the provisions of Punjab Land Revenue Act after affording due notice and opportunity to all co-sharers in the khewat. However, on the basis of illegal revenue entries, defendants are asserting their rights on specific killa numbers. It is submitted that therefore the impugned judgments are unsustainable. 6. Learned counsel further contends that the plaintiff came to know of these erroneous and illegal revenue records only on 11.10.2017; immediately whereafter suit was filed on 05.12.2017. It is submitted that the plaintiff is in actual physical possession of specific area of 4K in khewat, which was delivered to the plaintiff at the time of sale. However, DIVYANSHI 2026.02.13 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-525-2022 (O&M) - 7 - the defendants on the basis of illegal revenue records are claiming themselves to be the exclusive owners of specific killa number 19/12 and want to interfere in the possession of the plaintiff. Defendants have also denied the ownership of appellant due to which he was constrained to seek declaration as well. 7. It is accordingly prayed that the present Second Appeal be allowed; and the impugned judgments and decrees of the learned District Courts be set aside. 8. No other argument is raised on behalf of the appellant. I have heard learned counsel and perused the case file in detail. I find no merit in the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant. 9. The plaintiff had previously filed Civil Suit No. 81 of 2015 qua the present suit land, and seeking almost identical relief as prayed for in the present suit. Prayer of plaintiff in the said Civil Suit No. 81 of 2015 was:- "That the plaintiff, therefore, prays that a decree for declaration that the plaintiff is owner in possession of the agricultural land vide sale deed dated 21.7.2004 and deficiency of land is liable to be make from other land of the defendant mentioned in para no,.1 of the plaint and the revenue entries are liable to be corrected accordingly showing the plaintiff owner in possession to the share of 4 Kanal land, may kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant and further the defendant may kindly be restrained from interfering in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff by way of decree of permanent injunction and may kindly be restrained from alienating the suit land on the DIVYANSHI 2026.02.13 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-525-2022 (O&M) - 8 - basis of wrong revenue entries by way of decree of permanent injunction may kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant with coats of the suit. Or any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper may also be awarded" 10. The said suit was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hathin vide judgment dated 05.04.2016 (Ex.D2) primarily on the ground of limitation. The Civil Appeal No. 77 of 2016 filed by the plaintiff against the above said judgment dated 5.4.2016, was dismissed as withdrawn by the learned District Judge, Palwal vide order dated 11.10.2017. However, vide the said order dated 11.10.2017, plaintiff was granted permission to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action, subject to law of limitation. Thus, the plaintiff has filed the present suit. 11. By way of the present suit dated 05.12.2017, the appellant is seeking to challenge mutation No. 3819 dated 14.10.1999 and 3829 dated 23.05.2000. During the course of argument, it has been admitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff had knowledge about the defective title 3 months after execution of the Sale Deed dated 21.07.2004. This fact has been admitted by the plaintiff during her cross- examination (Ex.D5) in the previous Civil Suit No. 81 of 2015 that she had got knowledge about the defective title and the impugned mutations in the month of October 2004. Yet plaintiff has filed the present suit 13 years after gaining knowledge, only on 5.12.2017. The present suit was not filed DIVYANSHI 2026.02.13 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-525-2022 (O&M) - 9 - within 3 years. Suit of the plaintiff is, therefore, clearly barred by limitation. 12. Contention of the appellant that defendants could have executed sale deeds only qua their respective share and could not have sold specific killa Numbers has been dealt with by the learned first Appellate Court in para 30 of the judgment dated 24.8.2021, as follows: – “30. It is further trite proposition of law that any sale of specific killa by a co-sharer out of joint land amounts to sale of share. In this case, though the sale of specific killas by Noor Mohd to various persons out of joint land and further by defendant No.1 to plaintiff did not amount to sale of that particular portion. So there was no justification for carving out of separate khewats by the Revenue OfÏcers. But the plaintiff ought to have been vigilant about her right and must have been moved into matter promptly within the period of limitation of three years from the date of coming to know about the incorrect revenue record.” 13. In any event, the said contention/right of the plaintiff has been rendered nugatory in view of the fact that plaintiff has chosen to sleep over her rights. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (SC) : Law Finder Doc Id # 2537649, decided on 03.04.2024, the relevant para of which are as under:- “25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time pre- scribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he DIVYANSHI 2026.02.13 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-525-2022 (O&M) - 10 - cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litig- ation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the re- spondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limita- tion. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufÏcient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the `Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generos- ity.Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.” (Emphasis added) DIVYANSHI 2026.02.13 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-525-2022 (O&M) - 11 - 14. Again, in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs and others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), Law Finder Doc Id # 2542600, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recently held as under: - “26.On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evid- ent that: (i)Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to rem- edy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal ap - proach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Sec- tion 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufÏcient cause had been explained, but that ex- ercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be ex - ercised even if sufÏcient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same be- nefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been im- posed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provi- sion.” (Emphasis added) DIVYANSHI 2026.02.13 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-525-2022 (O&M) - 12 - 15. In the present case, appellant has admitted that she had knowledge of the impugned mutations as far back as in October 2004. No reason whatsoever is forthcoming as to why the same were not challenged by the appellant for this long intervening period. This is deliberate inaction on part of the plaintiff. In such a situation, the Courts cannot come to her rescue; as to do so, would be gravely prejudicial to the rights of the respondents. Furthermore, plaintiff had been granted permission to file the present suit, subject to law of limitation. Plaintiff has failed to satisfy this Court that there was sufÏcient cause for the inordinate delay in filing the present suit. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant is unable to controvert or dispute the above said factual and legal position. 17. In view of the above, no ground is made out to interfere in the concurrent judgments and decrees of the learned District Courts. The present Regular Second Appeal is hereby dismissed. 18. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. 12.02.2026 (NIDHI GUPTA) Divyanshi JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No Whether reportable: Yes/No DIVYANSHI 2026.02.13 16:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document