APHC010580212022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI WRIT PETITION NO: 35289 of 2022 Bench Sr.No:-19 [3579] I. S. Subba Rao ...Petitioner Vs. Union of India and others ...Respondents ********** Advocate for Petitioner : Ms. Sodum Anvesha Advocates for Respondents : Mrs. S. Pranathi, learned Special GP, Mr. Vivek Chandra Sekhar S CORAM : THE CHIEF JUSTICE LISA GILL SRI JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA DATE : 4th May, 2026. LISA GILL, CJ. (Oral) Prayer in this Writ Petition reads as under: “…this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate Writ order or direction mostly one which is in the nature of a Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the Respondents in abolition of Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal by way of Notification in G.S.R. 30(E) dt.14-01-2020 of the 1st Respondent published in G.O.Ms.No.7 (GAD) dt.20-1-2020 of the 2nd Respondent and its subsequent amendment in S.O.886(E), dated 27.02.2020 of the 1st Respondent published in G.O.Ms.No.24 (GAD) dated 09-03-2020 of the 2nd Respondent as illegal, unconstitutional, arbitrary, unsustainable and set-aside the same and consequently direct the Respondents to reconstitute Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal and pass” 2. Petitioner, who is stated to be a retired Administrative Officer, V.M.R.D.A., has filed this Writ Petition being aggrieved of abolition of Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal (for short, "A.P.A.T.") by way of notification, HCJ & NJSJ WP_35289_2022 dated 14.01.2020, and subsequent amendment dated 27.02.2020, published on 09.03.2020. 3. It is stated that A.P.A.T. was constituted in terms of provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, to provide redressal to the litigants in respect of their service-related grievances, instead of requiring such litigants to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. A.P.A.T. remained functional from 01.11.1989 to 13.01.2020. Vide communication dated 09.09.2019, respondent No.2 had requested respondent No.1 to abolish A.P.A.T. Subsequently, vide G.S.R.30(E) dated 14.01.2020, respondent No.1 rescinded its notification of 1989 by invoking its powers under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner vehemently argues that the decision to abolish A.P.A.T. is not only flawed, but is illegal and arbitrary. There existed no power to abolish A.P.A.T. in exercise of power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Once the State Government had taken a decision to establish the Tribunal, it could not have been abolished until and unless the legislation itself is withdrawn. 6. Furthermore, the reason for withdrawal has not been specifically or clearly mentioned. There is no publication as to how respondent No.2 arrived at an opinion for recommending abolition of A.P.A.T. Citizens of the State are entitled to derive solace from beneficial legislation providing for HCJ & NJSJ WP_35289_2022 establishment of the Tribunal, which in fact was established. It is thus prayed that this petition be allowed as prayed for. 7. Learned counsel for respondents has opposed the arguments as raised while submitting that the controversy as sought to be raised is no longer res integra. The matter stands conclusively decided in favour of respondent-State and against petitioner by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association v. Union of India and ors., 2023 SCC Online SC 309. All issues as sought to be raked up in the present Writ Petition have been discussed in detail by Hon'ble the Supreme Court and the matter is set to rest. 8. It is stated that notification in question abolishing A.P.A.T., was correctly issued by respondent No.1, in exercise of powers under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. It is denied that there was no application of mind preceding decision of the State to request Union of India for abolition of Tribunal. 9. It is further submitted that after decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261, all decisions rendered by State Administrative Tribunals were subject to challenge before the respective High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the given facts and circumstances, decision to abolish the Tribunal is in public interest and is in consonance with applicable provisions of law. Dismissal of the Writ Petition is sought. HCJ & NJSJ WP_35289_2022 10. We have heard learned counsel for parties and have perused the file with their able assistance. 11. Factual aspects as narrated above are not in dispute. It is further a matter of record that Hon'ble the Supreme Court dealt with the very issue as is sought to be raised in present proceeding, in the case of Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association (Supra). 12. Hon'ble the Supreme Court was seized of appeals challenging a judgment of the High Court of Orissa, wherein challenge to the abolition of Orissa Administrative Tribunal was rejected by High Court on similar grounds. In the said matter, Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that Article 323-A does not preclude Union Government from abolishing State Administrative Tribunals. 13. It was concluded that the word "may" in Article 323-A of the Constitution cannot assume character of the word "shall." Article 323-A was held to be a directory, enabling provision which confers upon Union Government the discretion to establish an Administrative Tribunal, but does not act as a bar to the Union Government from abolishing an Administrative Tribunal once created. 14. It was specifically held therein that there is no bar to applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to an administrative order establishing a State Tribunal. It was specifically held in this respect as under: “61. The Union Government was not acting in a judicial capacity when it set up the OAT. On the establishment of the OAT, pending cases before the High Court were transferred to the OAT. Indeed, HCJ & NJSJ WP_35289_2022 the decision to establish an SAT is based on policy and expediency. It is up to each State Government to evaluate the need for an SAT within their state, to consider the advantages and disadvantages as well as the financial, administrative, and other practical aspects of establishing an SAT. The Union Government may then establish the SAT upon receiving a request, in terms of Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. The decision to establish an SAT is undoubtedly an administrative decision. Administrative decisions, unlike quasi-judicial decisions, may be reversed by the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act does not stand excluded in the present case.” 15. Furthermore, argument that an amendment to Administrative Tribunals Act is a prerequisite for State Government to tender a request was rejected as under: “68. The Administrative Tribunals Act does not contain a provision and a corresponding procedure for the abolition of an SAT once it is established. However, this does not mean that the abolition of an SAT, once it is set up, is impermissible. First, the Administrative Tribunals Act does not proscribe the abolition of an SAT by the Union Government, upon the latter receiving a request from the concerned State Government. Second, nothing in the scheme of the statute implies or suggests that such an abolition would be incompatible with the objective sought to be achieved. To the contrary, if the concerned State Government is of the considered view that the SAT is failing to meet the objectives of the Administrative Tribunals Act or that an alternate route for meeting the same objectives is preferable to that of operating an SAT, it is free to act upon its view and request the Union Government to abolish the SAT. An amendment to the Administrative Tribunals Act is not a prerequisite for the State Government to make a request to the Union Government. 69. As noticed above, the object of the Administrative Tribunals Act is to reduce arrears and enable the provision of speedy justice to litigants. Abolishing an SAT would not frustrate this objective because SATs are not the only method by which the object is capable of being achieved. Further, the effect of such an abolition would not be to deprive litigants of a remedy because the cases before the SAT would stand revived in the forum in which they were pending prior to the establishment of that SAT. The subject matter and the context of the Administrative Tribunals Act, too, do not militate against the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. There is therefore nothing in the Administrative Tribunals Act which is repugnant to the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The relevant State Government has the HCJ & NJSJ WP_35289_2022 implied power to issue a request to abolish the SAT in its state to the Union Government. The Union Government in turn has the implied power to rescind the notification by which that SAT was established, thereby abolishing the SAT. 70… 71… 72… 73. The appellants have also argued that the Union Government’s power to abolish SATs must flow from the same legislation that vests it with the power to establish them. It is their contention that the Union Government does not have the power to abolish SATs because the Administrative Tribunals Act does not provide for it. This argument fails for the simple reason that the very purpose of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is to provide for contingencies such as the instant case when the statute in question does not explicitly provide for the power to add to, amend, vary, or rescind a notification (or order, rule, or by-law) which has been issued. Of course, the application of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is subject to the test laid down in D N Ganguly (1959 SCR 1191) as discussed previously as well as the other requirements mentioned in the provision itself. 74. If the argument of the appellants were to be accepted, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act would be rendered otiose. It would not apply to any statute which does not explicitly provide for the power to add to, amend, vary, or rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws. On the other hand, if the statute itself conferred the power to add to, amend, vary, or rescind notifications, orders, rules or by-laws, there would be no need to rely on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. This is not a conceivable position because courts must interpret statutes so as to give effect to their provisions rather than to render them futile.” 16. In the instant case, it is the specific case of respondents that following reasons also weighed with the State while forwarding recommendation for abolition of Tribunal: “i. Initially the constitution of the Tribunal was as a part of the resolution of the 6-point formula in pursuance of Article 371(D) of the Constitution. ii. The orders of the Administrative Tribunal being subject to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Page 7 of 9 HCJ & NJSJ WP_35289_2022 iii. The decision of the State of Telangana to abolish the Tribunal in relation to the service matters of the government servants and other notified entities by notification dated 15.09.2016. iv. The composition of the Tribunal as on the date of the decision making process, the nature of litigation, the pendency of cases.” 17. It is to be noted at this stage that argument raised by learned counsel for respondents was that above-said factors were in addition to decision of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), which had the result of adding another tier of litigation, among other factors. 18. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that decision to abolish A.P.A.T. was irrelevant, extraneous, or absurd in any manner. Clearly, the purpose of establishment of the Tribunal, in conjunction with expenditure incurred to operate the Tribunal and rate of disposal of cases was considered. 19. Similarly, argument that there is a violation of Fundamental Right of citizens to have access to justice is devoid of merit. This issue has also been concluded by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association (supra) as under: “135. The fundamental right of access to justice is no doubt a crucial and indispensable right under the Constitution of India. However, it cannot be interpreted to mean that every village, town, or city must house every forum of adjudication created by statute or the Constitution. It is an undeniable fact that some courts and forums will be located in some towns and cities and not others. Some or the other litigants will be required to travel some distance to access a particular forum or court.” HCJ & NJSJ WP_35289_2022 20. Finally, the conclusion of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association (supra) is reproduced hereunder: “152. In view of the discussion above, we hold that the abolition of the OAT was constitutionally valid for the following reasons: a. The Writ Petitions instituted before the Orissa High Court were maintainable because the appellants claimed that their constitutional rights had been violated. They were therefore entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution; b. Article 323-A does not preclude the Union Government from abolishing SATs because it is an enabling provision which confers the Union Government with the power to establish an administrative tribunal at its discretion (upon receiving a request from the relevant State Government in terms of the Administrative Tribunals Act). The legal and factual context of the power to establish administrative tribunals, the purpose of this power and the intention of the legislature establish that there is no duty to exercise the power conferred by the Administrative Tribunals Act, such that the enabling provision becomes a mandatory provision; c. The Union Government acted in valid exercise of its powers when it invoked Section 21 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act to rescind the notification establishing the OAT because the decision to establish the OAT was an administrative decision and not a quasi-judicial decision. Moreover, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is not repugnant to the subject-matter, context and effect of the Administrative Tribunals Act and is in harmony with its scheme and object; d. The notification dated 2 August 2019 by which the OAT was abolished is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The State Government did not consider any irrelevant or extraneous factors while arriving at the decision to request the Union Government to abolish the OAT. The decision to abolish the OAT is itself not absurd or so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken it; e. The principles of natural justice were not violated because the class of people who were affected by the decision to abolish the OAT did not have a right to be heard. The public at large (or some sections of it) did not have a right to be heard before the policy decision was taken; f. The Union Government did not become functus officio after establishing the OAT because the doctrine cannot ordinarily be applied in cases where the government is formulating and implementing a policy; g. The notification dated 2 August 2019 is valid though it is not expressed in the name of the President of India because non- HCJ & NJSJ WP_35289_2022 compliance with Article 77 of the Constitution does not invalidate a notification or render it unconstitutional; h. The abolition of the OAT is not violative of the fundamental right of access to justice because the Orissa High Court will hear cases which were pending before the OAT prior to its abolition; i. The State Government did not take advantage of its own wrong because it stopped filling the vacancies of the OAT only after deciding to abolish it. It did not rely on the vacancies (and the consequent increase in pendency) created by its inaction to abolish the OAT; and j. The failure of the Union Government to conduct a judicial impact assessment before abolishing the OAT does not vitiate its decision to abolish the OAT because the directions in Rojer Mathew [AIRONLINE 2019 SC 1514] were of a general nature and did not prohibit the abolition of specific tribunals such as the OAT in the absence of a judicial impact assessment. However, the Ministry of Law and Justice is directed to conduct a judicial impact assessment as directed by this Court in Rojer Mathew (supra).” 21. Matter at hand is squarely covered against the petitioner and in favour of respondents. No other ground is raised. Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of accordingly. LISA GILL, CJ. NINALA JAYASURYA, J. SSN