- 1 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K WRIT PETITION NO. 22817 OF 2022 (S-KSAT) BETWEEN: SRI. KAMALAKAR B.HEGDEKAR S/O LATE SRI BALA HEGDEKAR, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, WORKING AS INSPECTOR OF EXCISE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF EXCISE, 10TH CROSS, K.R.PURAM, HASSAN. C/O NO.379, AS MANGE GOWDA. KALPATHARU NILAYA. OPP. VIDHYANAGARA PARK, HASSAN – 573 202. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. C.M.NAGABUSHANA.,ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY, FINANCE DEPARTMENT, VIDHANA SOUDHA, BANGALORE-560001. 2. THE COMMISSIONER OF EXCISE 2ND FLOOR, TTMC A BLOCK, BMTC BUS STAND, K.H ROAD, SHANTHINAGAR, BANGALORE - 27. Digitally signed by NANJUNDACHARI Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 3. THE REGISTRAR, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA, M.S. BUILDING, BANGALORE – 560 001 AMENDMENT IS CARRIED OUT AS PER ORDER OF THIS HON’BLE COURT DATED 27.03.2025 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. HARISHA, A.S, AGA FOR R1 & R2; SRI. V. S. ARABATTI, ADVOCATE FOR R3) ++++ THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH OR CALL FOR RECORDS PERTAINING TO IMPUGNED ORDER NO.AA E 86 EPS 2014 BANGALORE DATED 05.03.2021 (ANNEXURE-A21) PASSED BY THE FIRST RESPONDENT AND ALLOW THE APPLICATION FILED BY THE APPLICANT / PETITIONER BEFORE THE HON’BLE KSAT AND ALSO TO DROP ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THE MATTER AND CONSEQUENTLY QUASH / SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 20.07.2022 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL VIDE ANNEXURE-A IN A.NO-1592/2021 AND TO EXTEND ALL THE PROMOTIONAL AVENUE WHICH LOST BY THE PETITIONER DUE TO THE AFORESAID PROCEEDINGS. THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDER ON 10.06.2026 COMING ON THIS DAY, S.G.PANDIT J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K - 3 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 CAV ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT) Petitioner is before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, questioning the order dated 20.07.2022 in Application No.1592/2021 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at Bengaluru (for short “the Tribunal”) by which, petitioner’s prayer challenging the order of penalty dated 05.03.2021 (Annexure-A21) imposing penalty of postponement of promotion for a period of 2 years when his promotion becomes due and also withholding of one increment for a period of one year, is rejected. 2. The brief facts of the case are that: While the petitioner was working as Inspector of Excise, based on the complaint of one Smt.Suma dated 23.09.2009, in respect of CL-7 licence granted on 23.10.2002, Upa-Lokayukta submitted report under Section 12(3) of Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984. Based - 4 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 on the said report, the Government by its order dated 27.09.2014 entrusted enquiry to the Upa-Lokayukta and in turn the Enquiry Officer nominated by Upa-Lokayukta issued Articles of Charge dated 27.10.2014 (Annexure- A13). In sum and substance, the charge against the petitioner was that, while the petitioner was working as Inspector of Excise, one Sri.Y.Venkatesh filed an application before the Deputy Commissioner of Excise dated 15.07.2002 for grant of CL-7 licence. On the same day, the petitioner visited the spot; prepared the mahazar and over written the name of panch witness in the mahazar and date “15” was written by erasing with the whitener and address of one of the witnesses was falsely shown; forged the signature of witnesses; obtained false Population Certificate from the Secretary, Grama Panchayat, Bommasandra and without properly verifying the documents, recommended for grant of CL-7 licence on the basis of forged and false documents; thereby committed misconduct. Not being satisfied with the reply submitted by the petitioner, enquiry was conducted by - 5 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 examining two witnesses i.e., Smt.Suma, the complainant and the Accounts Assistant of Karnataka Lokayukta, Investigating Officer. Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 09.01.2020 (Annexure-A15) holding that the charges against the petitioner are proved. The Upa- Lokayukta by his recommendation dated 05.02.2020 recommended imposing punishment of postponement of promotion for a period of 2 years when the petitioner becomes eligible and also withholding of one increment for a period of one year and forwarded the enquiry report to the first respondent-State Government. The petitioner was issued with second show-cause notice dated 04.05.2020. The petitioner submitted a detailed explanation dated 27.07.2020 (Annexure-A18) inter alia contending that the complaint is barred by time as provided under Section 8(2)(d) of 1984 Act. At this stage, the petitioner approached the Tribunal in Application No.5338/2020 praying for a direction to consider his representation before passing the final order. The said application was disposed of on 27.01.2021 directing - 6 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 consideration of reply submitted by the petitioner before passing any order by the Disciplinary Authority. Thereafter, the first respondent-Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order dated 05.03.2021 imposing above stated penalty. Questioning the said penalty, the petitioner was before the Tribunal in above stated Application No.1592/2021 and the Tribunal under Order dated 20.07.2022 rejected petitioner’s prayer to quash the order of penalty. Questioning the impugned order passed by the Tribunal as well as the impugned order of penalty, petitioner is before this Court in this writ petition. 3. Heard learned counsel Sri.C.M.Nagabhushana for petitioner, learned Additional Government Advocate Sri.A.S.Harisha for respondents No.1 and 2 as well as Sri.Venkatesh S Arbatti for respondent No.3. Perused the entire writ petition papers. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri.C.M.Nagabhushana would contend that the Tribunal as well as the Disciplinary Authority-State Government failed - 7 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 to appreciate whether the complaint is barred by time in terms of Section 8(2)(d) of 1984 Act and also failed to examine as to whether it is a case of no evidence. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that one Smt.Suma submitted complaint to the Lokayukta on 23.09.2009 (Annexure-A6) alleging grant of CL-7 licence to one Y.Venkatesh on forged and concocted documents. It is submitted that grant of CL-7 licence was on 23.10.2002 and in respect of the said grant of CL-7 licence, complaint was filed nearly after 7 years which would be opposed to Section 8(2)(d) of 1984 Act. Learned counsel referring to the above provision would submit that the provision makes it clear that the Lokayukta or Upa- Lokayukta shall not investigate any complaint involving allegation made after expiry of 5 years from the date on which the action complained against is alleged to have taken place. It is submitted that the action complained against the petitioner has taken place on 23.10.2002 and in respect of the said action, complaint is submitted on 23.09.2009 which is more than 5 years from the date of - 8 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 action complained against, as such, the Upa-Lokayukta could not have investigated. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that it is a case of no evidence. Both the witnesses examined on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority have not spoken anything about the role of the petitioner. Further, learned counsel inviting attention to the disputed mahazar-Ex.P6 submitted that the mahazar is drawn by one Gangarangaiah, Excise Guard. Further, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was Excise Inspector and he has only forwarded the report and he has no role in issuance of CL-7 licence. Thus, he would pray for allowing the writ petition and to set aside the order of penalty. 6. Per contra, learned Additional Government Advocate Sri.Harisha as well as learned counsel Sri.Venkatesh S Arbatti for respondent No.3/ Lokayukta would support the order passed by the Tribunal. Learned counsel Sri.Arbatti would contend that the time line or limitation prescribed - 9 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 under Section 8(2)(d) of 1984 Act would have no application to the present case, since CL-7 licence continued as on the date of submitting the complaint. As such, the said contention by the petitioner regarding limitation is liable to be rejected. Learned counsel Sri.Arbatti would further submit that the contention of limitation is taken up for the first time before this Court and the same was not taken up when the petitioner submitted his reply to the observation note or during the course of enquiry. It is his submission that if the petitioner had taken up the said contention earlier while submitting his reply to the observation note or during the course of enquiry, the complainant would have explained the circumstances under which, she submitted the complaint in the year 2009. As there is no opportunity to the complainant to explain the delay, he submits that the said contention need not be entertained at this stage. Further, learned counsel would submit that there is sufficient material, based on which, the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Tribunal passed the impugned - 10 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 orders. Thus, he would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the entire writ petition papers, the following points would arise for our consideration: (i) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the complaint dated 23.09.2009 in respect of CL-7 licence granted on 23.10.2002 is barred under Section 8(2)(d) of 1984 Act? (ii) Whether the impugned order of penalty as well as the impugned order passed by the Tribunal warrant interference by this Court.? 8. Answer to the above points would be in the affirmative for the following reasons: Admittedly, one Smt.Suma lodged a complaint against the Commissioner of Excise alleging illegal grant of CL-7 licence to one Sri.Y.Venkatesh on 23.10.2002. A bare perusal of the complaint (Annexure-A6) dated 23.09.2009 indicates that the complaint relates to - 11 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 issuance of CL-7 licence to one Sri.Y.Venkatesh on 23.10.2002. 9. Section 8 of 1984 Act reads as follows: “Matters not subject to investigation :- Except as hereinafter provided, the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta shall not conduct any investigation under this Act in the case of a complaint involving a grievance in respect of any action, - a) if such action relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule; or b) if the complainant has or had, any remedy by way of appeal, revision, review or other proceedings before any tribunal, Court officer or other authority and has not availed of the same. 2) The Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta shall not investigate, - a) any action in respect of which a formal and public enquiry has been ordered with the prior concurrence of the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta, as the case may be; b) any action in respect of a matter which has been referred for inquiry, under the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 with the prior concurrence of the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta, as the case may be; c) any complaint involving a grievance made after the expiry of a period of six months from the date on which the action complained against become known to the complainant; or - 12 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 d) any complaint involving an allegation made after the expiry of five years from the date on which the action complained against is alleged to have taken place: Provided that he may entertain a complaint referred to in clauses (c) and (d) if the complainant satisfies that he had sufficient cause for not making the complaint within the period specified in those clauses. (3) In the case of any complaint involving a grievance, nothing in this Act shall be construed as empowering the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta to question any administrative action involving the exercise of a discretion except where he is satisfied that the elements involved in the exercise of the discretion are absent to such an extent that the discretion can prima facie be regarded as having been improperly exercised. 10. For the purpose of present lis, Section 8(2)(d) of 1984 Act would be relevant. A reading of the above provision would make it clear that the Lokayukta or Upa- Lokayukta shall not investigate any complaint involving an allegation after the expiry of 5 years from the date on which the action complained against is alleged to have taken place. The proviso to sub-Section (2) empowers the Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta to investigate a complaint or entertain a complaint filed beyond five years referred to in - 13 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 clause (c) and (d), if the complainant satisfies that he had sufficient cause for not making the complaint within the period specified in those clauses. As noted above, the complaint dated 23.09.2009 relates to issuance of CL-7 licence granted on 23.10.2002. Admittedly, the complaint relates to an action beyond 5 years from the date of action complained and no explanation whatsoever is forthcoming from the complaint dated 23.09.2009. Sufficient cause for not making complaint within the period specified shall be indicated in the complaint itself and if there is no sufficient cause or explanation in the complaint, the Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta would not get jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. In other words, in the absence of sufficient cause or explanation in the complaint, the proviso bars entertainment of such complaints. 11. The contention that the complaint is opposed to or barred under Section 8(2)(d) of 1984 Act is a legal ground which can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. A perusal of the reply submitted to the second show-cause notice indicates that the complaint of Smt.Suma dated - 14 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 23.09.2010 is hopelessly barred by limitation as per the provision of Section 8(2)(d) of 1984 Act. When the complaint has not mentioned or explained or shown cause for submitting a delayed complaint, providing opportunity subsequently would not arise, since, Section 8 is a protection provided to the government servants against frivolous or delayed complaints. The purpose of prescribing limitation might be to protect the government servants, if delayed complaint is entertained by passage of time, the government servant might be defenseless or he might have lost material to defend himself. 12. The above view of ours is supported by the decisions of the Co-ordinate Benches of this Court and the relevant paragraphs of one such decision dated 26.06.2023 in W.P.No.102499/2022 and Connected Matters, wherein Sections 8 and 9 of the Act, 1984 was considered, read as follows: “14. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Kumaraswamy Mineral Exports Private Limited, Bangalore Vs. State of Karnataka and Others (2015 (6) Kar.L.J. 381), has held that - 15 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 Section 8 is a mandatory provision. Section 8(2)(a) makes it abundantly clear that Lokayukta or UpaLokayukta shall not investigate any action in respect of which a formal and public inquiry has been ordered with the prior concurrence of the Lokayukta or Upa-lokayukta, as the case may be; under Section 8(2)(c), the Lokayukta or Upa- Lokayukta shall not investigate any complaint involving a grievance made after the expiry of a period of six months from the date on which the action complained against becomes known to the complainant; and Section 8(2)(d) makes it clear that Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta shall not investigate any complaint involving an allegation made after expiry of five years from the date on which the action complained against is alleged to have taken place. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act empowers the Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta to entertain the complaint referred to in clauses (c) and (d) if the Lokayukta or Upa- Lokayukta is satisfied with the sufficient cause shown for not making the complaint within the period specified in the above stated clauses. From the above, it is clear that, for exercising the power to entertain the complaint filed beyond the period stated above, Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta is to be satisfied with regard to sufficient cause shown by the complainant. Unless sufficient cause is shown, the Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta would not get - 16 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 jurisdiction to entertain a complaint when it is filed beyond five years, in terms of Section 8(2)(d) of the Act. Proviso to Section 8(2) protects the interest of a government servant from facing a belated complaint. When a complaint is filed belatedly, the person against whom a complaint is made would not be in a position to defend himself and delay itself prejudices the defence of the accused persons. 15. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sri.V.M.Narayana Swamy & Another Vs. The State of Karnataka rep. by its Secretary, Department of Education (Primary) and Another (ILR 2021 KAR 45), considered Sections 7 to 9 of the Act. In a similar fact situation of submitting complaint beyond five years, at paragraph-17, it is held as follows: “17. However, to put to rest, the contentious issues, it would be necessary for us to further observe that allegations made in the complaint dated 6.11.2014 Annexure-K are all relating to period 2009-2010 and the complaint in question has been filed before the Lokayukta on 6.11.2014 Annexure-K. A perusal of Section 8(2)(d) would indicate that where allegation is made after expiry of five years from the date on which the action complied against is alleged to have taken place, should not be investigated under Section 9 by the Lokayukta. However, Lokayukta, can entertain a complaint referred to in Clause (d) if he is satisfied that complainant had sufficient cause for not lodging the complaint within the period specified under Clause (d) in the light of proviso to Clause (d) of Section 8(1). In other words, it all depends on the facts and circumstances obtained in each - 17 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 case to entertain the complaint beyond prescribed period.” In other words, stale claim shall not be subject matter of investigation by Lokayukta or Upa- lokayukta. 17. In terms of proviso to Section 8(2) of the Act, Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta would get jurisdiction to entertain or to extend the time in a belated complaint, if the complainant satisfies that he had sufficient cause for not making the complaint within the period specified under Section 8(a) to (d) of the Act. The complainant, in the present case, has not mentioned or stated anything with regard to not making the complaint within the period specified. There is not even a prayer to entertain the belated complaint. Unless the complainant satisfies the Lokayukta or Upa- Lokayukta that complainant had sufficient cause for not making the complaint within the period specified, the Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta would not get jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. No cause, much less sufficient cause, is shown in the complaint dated 19.06.2018. When the complainants have failed to mention any reason for not making the complaint within the time prescribed under Section 8(2)(a), (c) & (d) of the Act, the Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta could not entertained the complaint. Proviso to Section 8(2) - 18 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 is in the nature of check and balance, protecting a government servant/public servant from facing belated complaint. 18. The contention that Lokayukta or UpaLokayukta could have passed order only under Section 9 of the Act, and the Upa-Lokayukta could not have rejected the complaint under Section 8 cannot be accepted. Section 9 would come into play only if the complaint satisfies the requirement of Section 8(2) of the Act. If the complainant fails to satisfy the conditions of Section 8(2) of the Act, the question of examining the said complaint under Section 9 of the Act would not arise at all. Only if a complaint passes through the test or criteria of Section 8(2), then the complaint could be examined under Section 9 of the Act.” 13. The scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of challenge to the penalty imposed in a departmental proceedings is very limited. This Court would only examine the process of decision making and would not look into the decision itself. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions has laid down principles when to interfere or not to interfere with the order passed in the departmental proceedings. - 19 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 Normally, this Court would interfere in the order of Disciplinary Authority if it is passed by any incompetent authority, if there is violation of principles of natural justice or if it is a case of no evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER (APPELLATE AUTHORITY) AND OTHERS VS. AJAI KUMAR SRIVASTAVA reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612, while dealing with an identical fact situation has laid down the principles in respect of interference by this Court with an order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, which reads as under: “22. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has been earlier examined by this Court in State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan [State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan, (1994) 6 SCC 302 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 1385] and - 20 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 later in State of T.N. v. A. Rajapandian [State of T.N. v. A. Rajapandian, (1995) 1 SCC 216 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 292] and further examined by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] wherein it has been held as under : (B.C. Chaturvedi case [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , SCC pp. 759-60, para 13) “13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] this Court held at SCR p. 728 (AIR p. 369, para 20) that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 23. It has been consistently followed in the later decision of this Court in H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya [H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 297] and recently by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India [Pravin Kumar v. Union - 21 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 103] . 24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the - 22 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 public servant, the court is to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. 26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry. 27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting - 23 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings. 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.” 14. In the instant case, before the Enquiry Officer, on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority, two witnesses were examined i.e., one is complainant Smt.Suma and the other is Accountant Superintendent of the Karnataka Lokayukta, the Investigating Officer. Upon perusal of the deposition of - 24 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 PW1 – complainant, it is seen that nothing is stated or deposed about the petitioner and on the other hand, PW1 has specifically stated that she has not mentioned the name of the petitioner in the complaint. PW2 has also not specifically stated anything about the petitioner. 15. Be that as it may. The petitioner has forwarded the mahazar and the population certificate to the authority competent to sanction CL-7 license. When the petitioner was not the authority to sanction CL-7 license, only petitioner cannot be held responsible for issuance of CL-7 licence on the alleged concocted documents. It is the joint responsibility of the officers from the cadre of Excise Inspector up to the authority which issues the CL-7 license. In the matter of initiation of enquiry against the petitioner, on the incident of issuance of CL-7 license, the petitioner is singled-out. The action of the respondents is discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable. 16. For the reasons recorded above, writ petition deserves to be allowed. Hence, the following: - 25 - WP No. 22817 of 2022 ORDER a) Writ petition is allowed. b) Order passed by the Tribunal in application No.1592/2021 dated 20.07.2022 as well as the punishment order passed by the Disciplinary Authority bearing No.DE 86 E¦J¸ï 2014, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ dated 05.03.2021 (Annexure-A21) are quashed and the petitioner would be entitled to all consequential benefits. SD/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE SD/- (RAJESH RAI K) JUDGE MPK/NC CT:RK