- 1 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE CRL.RP NO.1525 OF 2022 BETWEEN: CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (ANTI CORRUPTION BRANCH), NO.36, BELLARY ROAD, GANGANAGAR, BENGALURU-560032. ...PETITIONER (BY SRI P PRASANNA KUMAR, SPL.PP WITH SRI RAHUL KRISHNA REDDY P, ADVOCATE) AND: P POTHURAJAN, S/O V PONNUSWAMY, AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS, C/O SHIVARAJ, R/A NO.15, PWD MAIN ROAD, AKASHNAGAR, NARAYANAPURA, BENGALURU-560016. ...RESPONDENT (BY SRI GANESH KUMAR R, ADVOCATE) THIS CRL.RP IS FILED U/S.397 R/W 401 CR.P.C BY THE ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER PRAYING THAT THIS HON'BLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 07.11.2022 PASSED BY THE LEARNED XXI ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND PRINCIPAL SPECIAL JUDGE FOR CBI CASES, BENGALURU (CCH-4) IN CRL.MISC.NO.7811/2022 ARISING OUT OF Digitally signed by PRAMILA G V Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 SPL.C.C.NO.17/2017 AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE REVISION PETITION FILED BY THE PROSECUTION U/S.308 OF CODE AND. THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 09TH FEBRUARY, 2026 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE CAV ORDER In the present Criminal Revision Petition, the following questions arise for consideration: (i) Whether the certificate issued by the Public Prosecutor under Section 308(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, would result in automatic cancellation/forfeiture of the pardon tendered under Section 306 of the Code? (ii) Whether examination of the accused turned approver under Section 306(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is mandatory in case the pardon is tendered by the Special Court which is competent to take cognizance of the offence and to try the accused? (iii) Whether the respondent has violated the terms and conditions of the pardon? 2. Criminal Revision Petition is filed assailing the order dated 07.11.2022, passed in Crl.Misc.No.7811/2022, by which - 3 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 the petitioner’s application under Section 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘Code’) to prosecute the respondent of this petition (the accused No. 4 in RC 07(A)/2016) was rejected. 3. The application under Section 308 of the Code, filed in Spl.C.C.No.17/2017 on the file of the XXI Sessions Judge & Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Bengaluru, is numbered as Crl.Misc.No.7811/2022. 4. The petitioner, the Central Bureau of Investigation, filed the aforementioned application to prosecute PW-1 (accused No.4 turned approver) for not having complied with the terms and conditions of the order granting pardon. 5. The XVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, on 23.08.2016, had recorded the confession statements of accused No.4 under Section 164(1) of the Code. The respondent, during the course of the investigation, volunteered to be approver and sought pardon. On an application under Section 306 of the Code, the Special Judge granted pardon to the said accused, subject to the condition that accused No.4 should make a full and true disclosure and depose the truth before the Court. - 4 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 6. The respondent (who was by then cited as CW-9 in the charge sheet) was examined as PW-1 by the prosecution. Witness was cross-examined by the remaining accused. 7. When the case was posted for final arguments, the Public Prosecutor filed an application under Section 308(1) of the Code to prosecute the respondent, alleging that the approver has given false evidence and violated the terms of the pardon. The respondent contested the application. 8. The Trial Court framed two points for consideration as follows: (i) Whether the prosecution establishes that the respondent has not complied with the terms of the pardon? (ii) What order? 9. The Trial Court, after hearing both sides, dismissed the petition. 10. Initially, the application under Section 308(1) of the Code was not accompanied by a Public Prosecutor’s certificate, and the respondent opposed the application on that count. Subsequently, the Public Prosecutor’s certificate was filed, and the Court proceeded to hear the matter, holding that the defect - 5 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 was cured. The Trial Court was right in holding that such an omission is curable. 11. The Special Court considered the statement of PW-1 and concluded that the respondent had not violated the terms of the pardon. Hence, the prosecution is before this Court assailing the said order. 12. Before going into the merits of the petition, it is necessary to record certain facts: (a) The prosecution had registered an FIR in R.C.No.07(A)/2016 on 17.03.2016 against Shri Visweswara Bhat and Shri V.Prem Kumar and Sri. K.R. Somasunder, the Superintendents of Customs at the Import Section of Customs at Bengaluru International Airport. The case was registered for offences under Sections 7, 8, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and ection 120B of IPC. (b) The prosecution alleged that accused No.1 to 3, the Customs officials, were demanding and accepting illegal gratification from Clearing House Agents, and accused - 6 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 No.4, collected the bribe from other agents and paid the same to accused No.1 to 3 for clearing files for the release of imported goods. (c) During the investigation, accused No.4 (the present respondent) under Section 164(1) of the Code before the 17th Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate admitted the accusations. (d) Accused No. 4 filed application under Section 306(1) of the Code to become approver and sought pardon. The CBI filed a memo supporting the said application to treat accused No. 4 as approver. (e) Acting on the application under Section 306(1) of the Code, the Special Judge granted the pardon on the conditions which are extracted below: “He must make full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned in the commission of the offences whether as principal or abettor. Accused no.4 is also cautioned that if it is disclosed that he has willfully concealed anything essential or - 7 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 giving false evidence and not complied with the condition on which the tender of pardon was made he would be tried for the offences in respect of which the pardon was tendered and accepted by him or for any other offences of which he appears to have been guilty in connection with the same matter and also for the offence of giving false evidence. xxxxxxxxxx." (f) Later in the trial, accused No. 4 was examined as PW-1. In cross-examination, according to the prosecution, the said approver supported the case of the defence. (g) In this background, the application under Section 308(1) of the Code was filed to revoke the pardon and the same was dismissed. The said order of dismissal is questioned in this petition. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner raised the following contentions: (i) While tendering pardon, conditions were imposed on the respondent that he should make full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and the persons concerning the offence, whether as principal or abettor. However, the evidence - 8 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 of PW-1 demonstrates that the respondent has not complied with the terms and conditions of the pardon; (ii) The respondent supported the prosecution's version in his statements under Section 164(1) of the Code. However, in cross-examination, accused supported the case of the defence, and thereby violated the terms and conditions; (iii) The statements in the cross-examination of the respondent are contrary to the statement made under Section 164(1) of the Code; as such, a case is made out for revoking pardon under Section 308 of the Code; (iv) The Trial Court, on a certificate issued by the Public Prosecutor under Section 308(1) of the Code, should have proceeded to hold the trial against the approver, as the revocation of pardon is automatic upon the issuance of such a certificate by the Public Prosecutor. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent raised the following contentions: (i) The revocation of pardon is not automatic upon a certificate being filed by the Public Prosecutor. The Court has to hear the approver before passing orders on a certificate for revocation of pardon; - 9 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 (ii) In both the Section 164(1) statement, examination-in- chief, and cross-examination, the respondent narrated the truth as known to him; merely because the statements in cross-examination do not support the prosecution's case, that does not mean the approver violated the terms of the pardon; (iii) In the examination-in-chief, the respondent answered specific questions where there was no scope for further elaboration, and similarly in cross-examination. In such a situation, if the answers do not tally for any reason, that by itself is not a ground to say pardon conditions were violated; (iv) It is quite possible that the prosecution's theory itself is false and what is stated in the cross-examination is true; therefore, the prosecution cannot file an application under Section 308 merely because the evidence is not to their liking; (v) If any explanation was needed after cross-examination, the petitioner could have re-examined the witness, but the prosecution chose not to do so. - 10 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of State of Maharashtra vs. Abu Salem Abdul Kayyum Ansari and Others1 in support of his contentions. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied on the following judgments in support of the contention: (i) Emperor v. Kothia Navalya Bhil2 (ii) Dip Chand v. Emperor3 (iii) Faguna Kanta Nath v. State of Assam4 (iv) Ex.Sepoy Hardhan Chakrabarty v. Union of India (UOI) and Anr.5 (v) Madan Raj Bhandari v. State of Rajasthan6 (vi) B.H. Narashima Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh7 (vii) Rammi Alias Rameshwar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh8 (viii) Directorate of Enforcement vs. Rajiv Saxena9 17. Section 308(1) of the Code reads as under: “Where, in regard to a person who has accepted a tender of pardon made under section 306 or section 1 (2010) 10 SCC 179 2 1906 SCC Online Bom 50 3 1934 SCC Online Lah 264 4 1959 SCC Online SC 41 5 AIR 1990 SC 1210 6 1970 SCR(1) 688 7 1999 Supp(4) SC 704 8 AIR 1999 SC 3544 9 2020 SCC OnLine Del 719 - 11 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 307, the Public Prosecutor certifies that in his opinion such person has, either by wilfully concealing anything essential or by giving false evidence, not complied with the condition on which the tender was made, such person may be tried for the offence in respect of which the pardon was so tendered or for any other offence of which he appears to have been guilty in connection with the same matter, and also for the offence of giving false evidence: Provided that such person shall not be tried jointly with any of the other accused: Provided further that such person shall not be tried for the offence of giving false evidence except with the sanction of the High Court, and nothing contained in section 195 or section 340 shall apply to that offence.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. Section 308(1), which provides for the trial of an approver who violates the terms of the pardon, uses the expression “...may be tried for the offence...”. In other words, the Court has the discretion as to whether the approver has to be tried or not. Of course, the discretion is not unfettered or absolute. The Court exercising the discretion has to apply its mind to be prima facie satisfied as to whether case is made out for revocation. 19. The reasons are as follows: - 12 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 (i) The process of tendering and accepting pardon is through a judicial order, which confers a certain concession/relief to the approver. Once the pardon is accepted, he is no longer the accused and is not liable for punishment for the alleged offence. Thus, the pardon granted which is a judicial order cannot be revoked simply by the issuance of a certificate by the Public Prosecutor. While the Public Prosecutor is enabled to issue a certificate, the pardon cannot be revoked unless the Court forms an opinion on prima facie consideration that there is a violation of conditions. (ii) If the Court were to take the view that a mere certificate is sufficient to revoke pardon, it would have the effect of unilaterally setting aside a judicial order. While the accused is entitled to establish later that he did not violate the terms, the contention that pardon is revoked solely on a certificate does not align with the scheme of Sections 306 to 308 of the Code, which aims to secure the best evidence. Unilateral revocation without hearing the approver may dissuade others from coming forward, to be approvers defeating the purpose of Section 306. - 13 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 (iii) If Parliament intended revocation to be mandatory on the mere issuance of a certificate without a hearing, it would likely have used the expression “...shall be tried...” instead of “...may be tried...” in Section 308. 20. Thus, this Court is of the view that for the Public Prosecutor to urge for the forfeiture of pardon and a consequent trial, must point out that a prima facie case; at that stage, the approver is also required to be heard. However, the scope of the inquiry is limited to: (i) Whether the certificate prima facie points out violations of the conditions of the tender of pardon? (ii) Whether the evidence recorded under Sections 164(1) or 306(4) of the Code, or during trial, “prima facie appears to be” lacking a true and full disclosure of the circumstances relative to the offence, principal or abettor, within the person's knowledge? 21. The Delhi High Court in Directorate of Enforcement vs. Rajiv Saxena10 held that an application under Section 308 with a certificate is not tenable if the evidence of the approver has not yet been recorded under Section 306(4). The High Court upheld the Special Judge’s 10 2020 SCC OnLine Del 719 - 14 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 power to judicially review the certificate and reject the prayer for revocation and a trial. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Abu Salem (supra) held that pardon stands forfeited on a certificate issued by the Public Prosecutor. The Court has considered said judgment; however, in that case, the Court was not determining if revocation was automatic or if the approver must be heard first. It held that if the approver suppresses material facts and a certificate is issued, the pardon is lifted, but the specific procedural requirement of a hearing was not the primary question decided. On the procedure for hearing an application/ certificate under Section 308 of the Code: 23. The Court does not entirely agree with the procedure adopted by the Trial Court in converting the application under Section 308 into a miscellaneous petition. While forfeiture is not automatic, the elaborate procedure adopted before this Court was uncalled for. - 15 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 24. The Trial Court registered the application as a separate miscellaneous petition, which is not a legal requirement. Although a person whose pardon is recalled must be tried separately for the main offence, the application/ certificate under Section 308 itself does not require a separate trial. 25. On an application under Section 308, the Court is only required to consider the prima facie materials after hearing both sides. If the certificate points out a violation, and prima facie it is established then pardon can be revoked and Section 308 procedures follow. If application is rejected, the accomplice remains a prosecution witness. Whether the Special Judge is required to examine the accused/approver when the accused accepts the tender: 26. In this case, evidence was recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 164(1). It is settled law that if a Magistrate tenders pardon, the examination under Section 306(4) is mandatory before committing the matter. 27. In the instant case, the evidence was recorded on 23.08.2016 under Section 164(1), but that Magistrate did not - 16 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 tender the pardon. Because the case is registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act ('PC Act'), the application under Section 306 was filed before the Special Court. Under Section 5(2) of the PC Act and Section 307 of the Code, the Special Judge has the power to tender pardon on the same conditions. 28. Although respondents argue the Court did not examine the accused under Section 306(4), the Apex Court in Deivendran vs. State of Tamil Nadu11 held such examination is not required if the Court trying the offence tenders pardon after committal. In the instant case, the Court taking cognizance is also the Court empowered to try the case. Thus, Section 307 of the code would apply. The expression “same conditions” in Section 307 refers to Section 306(1) and, not the procedures in the subsequent sub-sections. Thus, the Special Judge was not required to examine the approvers under Section 306(1) of the Code. 11 AIR 1998 SC 2821 - 17 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 Whether the evidence on record calls for revocation of pardon and warrants a trial against the approvers. 29. The Court has examined the case with reference to the statement of approver recorded under Section 164(1), the examination-in-chief, and the cross-examination. 30. In the application under Section 308 (Paragraph No. 6), the following statement of Pothurajan P.(respondent) are noted: “i. Now I see Ex.P-8, I do not know the contents of Ex.P-8 as I do not know to read Kannada. The said Ex.P-8 was his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. ii. It is true to suggest that as I could not tolerate the harassment of CBI I request them to get me out of this case. iii. It is true to suggest that in order to get rid of this case I have acted as per the instruction of CBI officers. iv. It is true to suggest that the said CBI officers have told me to give same statements before the Magistrate which I have already given to the CBI officers. v. It is true to suggest that Ex.P-12 to Ex.P-16, Ex.P-18 and Ex.P-21 now shown to me does not bear my signature. It is pertinent to note that earlier during - 18 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 his examination in chief he has stated as below regarding the said exhibits.” 31. Referring to the aforementioned statements, it is urged that the conditions of the pardon have been violated. 32. Respondent, in his statement under Section 164(1), stated that after collecting the amount (from Custom House Agents), he used to give it to Officers of the Customs Department, which is extracted as follows: ¥Àæ±Éß 2: xxx GvÀÛgÀ: xxx ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆj£À CAvÀgÀ gÁ¶ÖçÃAiÀÄ «ªÀiÁ£À ¤¯ÁÝtzÀ°è ¸ÀĪÀiÁgÀÄ 150 d£À ¹JZïJ UÀ¼ÀÄ EzÀÄÝ CªÀgÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ ¥ÉÊQ ¸ÀĪÀiÁgÀÄ d£ÀjAzÀ ¥Àæw¢ªÀ¸À ºÀt PÀ¯ÉPïÖ ªÀiÁr ¸ÀAeÉ PÉÆqÀĪÀAvÉ ¸ÀzÀj ªÀÄÆgÀÄ d£À £À£ÀUÉ w½¹zÀÝgÀÄ. CzÀgÀAvÉ £Á£ÀÄ ªÁgÀzÀ°è ªÀÄÆgÀÄ ¢ªÀ¸À ¸ÀĪÀiÁgÀÄ 80 ¹JZïJUÀ½AzÀ ¥Àæw ©°èUÉ gÀÆ.50 gÀAvÉ ºÀt PÀ¯ÉPïÖ ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛzÉÝ£ÀÄ. ¥Àæw ¨Áj gÀÆ.10 ¸Á«gÀ¢AzÀ 13 ¸Á«gÀ ºÀt PÀ¯ÉPïÖ DUÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ £Á£ÀÄ ¸ÀAeÉ ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ ºÉÆÃUÀ¨ÉÃPÁzÀgÉ D ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß ¸ÀzÀj ªÀÄÆgÀÄ d£ÀgÀ ¥ÉÊQ AiÀiÁgÀÄ ¹UÀÄvÁÛgÉÆà CªÀjUÉ PÉÆlÄÖ ºÉÆÃUÀÄwÛzÀÝ£ÀÄ." 33. In paragraphs No.5 and 6 of the examination-in- chief, PW-1 (respondent) has stated as under: "5. I was asked by the Superintendent of Excise who so ever in charge on that day to collect Rs.50 from each of - 19 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 the CHAs on each bill submitted by the said CHAs. At the end of day, I used to make payment of the said collected amount to said Superintendent of Excise who so ever in charge on that day. I used to collect said amounts on two or three occasions in a week. 6. I used to collect the said Rs.50 from each CHA, it may be from about 50 CHAs. In this regard I used to prepare slip for having collected Rs.50 from the CHAs. Some times, I used to hand over the said chit to Superintendent of Customs and some times I used to retain the said chit with me". (Emphasis supplied) 34. In the cross-examination, the witness has stated as extracted above in paragraph No.31. 35. It is noticed that referring to Ex.P8, the respondent states that he does not know the contents of Ex.P8. It is a statement under Section 164(1) of the Code. The statement that he does not know the contents of Ex. P8 cannot be termed as violation of the terms and conditions of the tender. It may amount to a false evidence if it is established that he understood contents of Ex.P8 when it was recorded. 36. It is to be noticed that when the statement under Section 164(1) of the Code was recorded, the application for tendering the pardon had not yet been filed. The Magistrate did - 20 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 not record the statement under Section 164(1) of the Code with a view to tendering a pardon. Admittedly, no conditions were imposed while recording the statement under Section 164(1) of the Code. 37. Hence, if the statement under Section 164(1) (which was recorded before the tendering of the pardon) does not disclose all facts concerning the offence or the principal or abettor, it does not amount to a violation of the terms and conditions of the pardon, as those conditions were imposed subsequent to the statement under Section 164(1) of the Code. 38. It is to be noticed that pardon was tendered by the Special Judge and not by the Magistrate who recorded the statement under Section 164(1). Moreover, under Section 306(1) of the Code, the accused-turned-approver is required to disclose facts relative to the commission of the offence or facts concerning the principal or abettor. The prosecution is complaining about a subsequent event, viz., the alleged false statement regarding the pressure or inducement by the CBI officials to confess to the commission of the offence. - 21 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 39. In the cross-examination, it was disclosed for the first time that PW.1 gave the statement under Section 164(1) of the Code at the instance of the CBI officials. 40. The question is whether the said statement made in the cross-examination can be termed as a violation of the terms and conditions of the pardon. 41. The Court is of the view that the said statement in the cross-examination, that the CBI officials pressured or induced accused No.4 to make a confessional statement under Section 164(1) of the Code, even if true, cannot be termed as violation of the terms of the pardon. The reason is that if it is the truth, then the accused/approvers have narrated the truth and cannot be penalized for it. 42. If such inducement or pressure was not there while recording statement under Section 164(1) of the Code, then the statement in the cross-examination may amount to false evidence. If the approver is to be tried for giving false evidence, then the prosecution must seek the leave of the High Court as provided under the proviso to Section 308(1) of the Code. Admittedly, the petitioner has not sought such leave. - 22 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 43. This being the position, in the facts and circumstances of this case, merely because the approver did not disclose about the alleged inducement or pressure by the officials to give a statement under Section 164(1) of the Code does not amount to violation of the terms of the pardon. 44. Now the question is whether the statement in the cross-examination at paragraph No.41 extracted below amounts to false evidence and violates and the terms and conditions of the pardon “41. XXX It is true to suggest that I am not having any financial dealings with any of the customs officers.” XXX. 45. As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the accused/respondent that the statement in the cross- examination that respondent did not have any financial transaction with accused may or may not amount to a false evidence. Merely because it allegedly contradicts with what is stated in the chief-examination, it does not necessarily mean that what is stated in the cross-examination is false. It is quite - 23 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 possible that what is stated in the examination in chief is incorrect and what is stated in the cross-examination is the truth. 46. Facts revealed in the cross-examination, if not stated in the examination in chief, ipso facto may not amount to violation of the terms of the pardon. The cross-examination is not just confined to the facts which are testified in the examination-in-chief but also, extend to the facts which are relevant for adjudication. It is apparent from the provision which reads as under: Section 138 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is extracted as under: 138. Order of examinations.- Witnesses shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined. The examination and cross-examination must relate to relevant facts, but the cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief. Direction of re-examination.-The re-examination shall be directed to the explanation of matters referred to in cross-examination; and, if - 24 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 new matter is, by permission of the Court, introduced in re-examination, the adverse party may further cross-examine upon that matter.” (Emphasis supplied) 47. In view of the wide scope of cross-examination, every new statement made in the cross-examination by the approver cannot be termed as violation of the terms and conditions of the pardon. Whether, such new statements made in the cross-examination amount to violation of the terms of the pardon depends on the facts of each case. 48. As rightly urged by the learned counsel for the respondent, on the new facts which are revealed in the cross- examination, the prosecution has not sought re-examination. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Rammi Alias Rameshwar (supra), where it is held that re-examination under Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not confined to clarification of ambiguities in the cross examination. The observations in paragraphs No.16 and 17 of the said judgment are relevant and extracted hereunder: - 25 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 16. The very purpose of re-examination is to explain matters which have been brought down in cross-examination. Section 138 of the Evidence Act outlines the amplitude of re-examination. It reads thus: “138. * * * Direction of re-examination.- The re- examination shall be directed to the explanation of matters referred to in cross-examination; and if new matter is, by permission of the Court, introduced in re-examination, the adverse party may further cross-examine upon that matter.” 17. There is an erroneous impression that re-examination should be confined to clarification of ambiguities which have been brought down in cross-examination. No doubt, ambiguities can be resolved through re-examination. But that is not the only function of the re-examiner. If the party who called the witness feels that explanation is required for any matter referred to in cross- examination he has the liberty to put any question in re-examination to get the explanation. The Public Prosecutor should formulate his questions for that purpose. Explanation may be required either when ambiguity remains regarding any answer elicited during cross-examination or even otherwise. If the Public Prosecutor feels that - 26 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 certain answers require more elucidation from the witness he has the freedom and the right to put such questions as he deems necessary for that purpose, subject of course to the control of the court in accordance with the other provisions. But the court cannot direct him to confine his questions to ambiguities alone which arose in cross- examination.” (Emphasis supplied) 49. In the instant case, it is urged on behalf of the respondent that the answer in the cross-examination by the respondent that he has no financial dealings with other accused may not be with reference to what he has allegedly stated in the examination in chief. It is submitted that said statement might be pertaining to any other transaction and for this purpose there should have been a re-examination, and without such re-examination it is not possible to revoke the pardon. 50. The Court is unable to accept the said view. The reason is, at this stage, the Court need to ascertain with certainty as to whether the approver has made out a false statement or not. The Court is only required to consider the prima facie aspect of the matter. If the Court on overall consideration of the evidence/statement on record prima facie - 27 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 finds that the statement is false, or the approver has violated the terms of the pardon by concealing anything essential, then the procedure contemplated under Section 308 must follow. 51. As already noticed, the terms of the pardon were not negotiated and accepted when said statement was made before the Magistrate. Hence, the contention that alleged false statement relating to alleged pressure or inducement by the police while recording Section 164 (1) statement does violate the conditions of the pardon cannot be accepted. 52. And as already discussed, the statement relating to pressure and inducement by the CBI officials if is a false statement in the cross examination, then, to prosecute for such false evidence the prosecuting agency has to seek leave of the High Court which admittedly, is not sought. 53. If the CBI contends that the statement of the respondent that he is not having any financial dealings is not a fair or full disclosure, then if statement in the chief examination that he used to pay the money to the accused is accepted as correct, then statement that he has no financial dealings may amount to a false evidence, may amount concealment of anything essential, and may also amount to violation of the - 28 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 terms of the pardon. In such situation the prosecution is entitled to file an application for revocation of pardon. 54. The Trial judge has not noticed the said statement in paragraph No.41 of the cross-examination which prima facie appeared like concealment of essential fact concerning offence. In addition it also prima facie appears like a false evidence. It appears that it was a case where the Trial Court should have tried the approver for the offence for which the accused was tendered pardon. At that stage the Court is only required to consider whether prima facie case made out for revocation of pardon. 55. It is brought to the notice of the Court that accused No.1 to 3 were acquitted of charges and said order is not challenged. Considering the subsequent development of acquittal of main accused, facts of the case, and charges against all the accused, there is no justification to try the respondent for the main offence for which the pardon was tendered. 56. However, if the prosecution seeks to try the approver for false evidence, the CBI has to move the High Court as required under proviso to Section 308 of the Code. - 29 - CRL.RP No. 1525 of 2022 57. Hence the following: ORDER (i) The Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed. (ii) Since, the petitioner has not sought the leave of the Court to prosecute the approver for giving false evidence; the liberty is reserved to the prosecution to file such petition as advised in law. (iii) Observations made in this order relating false evidence are confined to only this Order and shall not be binding on the parties or the Court in a proceeding pursuant to an application if any filed seeking leave of the High Court to prosecute the approver for giving false evidence. Sd/- (ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE) JUDGE CHS/BRN