1 MACApp./334/2022 1 GAHC010207432018 2026:GAU-AS:8105 IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH) MACApp./334/2022 National Insurance Co. Ltd., Having Its Registered And Head Office At 3 Middleton Street, Kolkata 700071 And One Of the Regional Office At G.S. Road, Bhangagarh, Guwahati-781005. …..Appellant -Versus- 1. Smti Deep Shikha Roy Kar, W/o Jayanta Roy Kar, Representing Jayanta Roy Kar, R/o Loharpatti, Makum, P.O. And P.S. Makum, District-Tinsukia, Assam, Pin-786170. 2. Mrs. Priya Sarkar, W/o Sri Pralay Sarkar, R/o Khageswar Road, New Colony, P.O. And P.S. Tinsukia, District-Tinsukia, Assam, Pin-786125. 3. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Regional Office M.S.S. Path, Bhangagarh, Guwahati, District-Kamrup(M), 2 MACApp./334/2022 2 [1] Heard Mr. A.J. Saikia, the learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. S. Deka, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/claimant as well as Mr. K.K. Bhatta, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3/New India Assurance Company Limited. [2] This appeal under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been filed by the National Insurance Co. Ltd. impugning the judgment and award dated 29.05.2018, passed by the Motor Assam, Pin-781005. 4. Sri Prakash Shah S/o Nandu Shah, R/o Uchamati Dolongghat, P.O. And P.S. Doomdooma, District-Tinsukia, Assam, Pin-786151. ……Respondents For Appellant Mr. A.J. Saikia, Advocate For Respondent(s) 1. Mr. S. Deka, Advocate 2. Mr. K.K. Bhatta, Advocate Date of Hearing : 12.03.2026 Date of Judgment : 08.06.2026 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA JUDGMENT AND ORDER 3 MACApp./334/2022 3 Accident Claims Tribunal No. 2, Kamrup(Metro), Guwahati, in MAC Case No. 306/2012, whereby the respondent No.1/claimant was awarded a compensation amount of Rs. 29,82,959/-. [3] The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, by the impugned judgment directed the respondent No. 3 as well as the present appellant to share the liability of paying compensation to the extent of 50% each. [4] The facts relevant for consideration of the instant appeal, in brief, are that on 01.02.2012, at about 11.15 P.M., the husband of the respondent No. 1, namely, Jayanta Roy Kar was travelling by Hyundai i-10 Car, bearing Registration No. AS-23-G-0600 from Ledu Sahitya Sabha towards his residence, situated at Tinsukia. On his way, when he reached Kharjan Pol at National Highway No. 38, under the Digboi Police Station, an oil Tanker bearing Registration No. AS-23-B-9981, being driven in a rash and negligent manner, dashed the Hyundai Car, in which the husband of the present respondent No. 1 was travelling, from the front side, as a result of which the husband of the present respondent No. 1 sustained grievous injuries on his person. Thereafter, the injured, Jayanta Roy Kar represented by the present respondent No. 1, approached the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. 2, Kamrup(Metro), by filing an application under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, 1988 seeking 4 MACApp./334/2022 4 compensation on account of injuries sustained by him in the aforementioned motor vehicular accident. The said case was registered as MAC Case No. 306/2012. [5] The present appellant as well as respondent No. 3 contested the claim of the claimant/respondent No. 1 by filing written statements; wherein they denied their liability, to indemnify the owner of the vehicles involved in the accident. [6] Upon pleadings of the parties, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal framed the following issues: - i. “Whether the claimant Jayanta Roy Kar, sustained injuries in the alleged road accident dated 01-02- 2012 involving the vehicle bearing registration No.AS-23-G- 0600 (Hyundai i-10) and AS-23-B-9981 (Tanker) and whether the said accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending Tanker? ii. Whether the claimant is entitled to receive any compensation and if yes, to what extent and by whom amongst the opposite parties, the said compensation amount will be payable? [7] During the inquiry, the present respondent No. 1 (claimant) had adduced evidence of four witnesses and exhibited certain documents. Both the insurance company, i.e., the present appellant, as well as respondent No.3, did not adduce any evidence during the inquiry before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Ultimately, by the judgment and award, which has been impugned in this appeal, both the issues were decided in 5 MACApp./334/2022 5 favour of the claimant and the Tribunal came to the finding that the accident in question was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the drivers of both the vehicles involved in the accident, namely, the Tanker bearing Registration No. AS- 23-B-9981, as well as Hyundai i-10 Car, bearing Registration No.AS-23-G-0600 and directed both the insurance companies to share the liability to pay the compensation amount to the claimant to the extent of 50% each. The aforesaid judgment and award has been impugned by the present appellant, mainly on the ground that though there was no evidence on record indicating any negligence on the part of the driver of the i-10 vehicle, however, the present appellant was also directed to pay 50% of the awarded amount to the claimant. [8] Mr. A.J. Saikia, the learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had erred in holding that the driver of the i-10 vehicle was also liable and negligent; however, there was no evidence on record to that effect. He submits that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has erred in coming to the aforesaid finding, mainly on the ground that in the accident information report, there is the mention of i-10 vehicle, however, it did not consider the fact that after investigation on the basis of FIR, which was lodged after the accident, the charge-sheet was laid against the driver of the offending oil Tanker. 6 MACApp./334/2022 6 [9] He further submits that the Tribunal also failed to take into consideration the fact that the sole eye-witness, who was examined during the inquiry, i.e., the claimant himself has categorically stated that, it was the offending oil Tanker, which had driven in a rash and negligent manner and hit the i-10 vehicle/Car from the front side. [10] He submits that there is no direct evidence apart from the mentioning of the i-10 Car in the accident information report, to indicate that there was any negligence on the part of the driver of the i-10 Car/vehicle and therefore, he submits that this is not a case of an accident resulting due to composite negligence of drivers of the two vehicles. [11] He submits that in an inquiry which has been initiated upon filing of an application under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, 1988 unless there is evidence on record to indicate any fault on the part of the driver of the i-10 Car there, it does not fall within the category of a case of composite negligence. [12] He submits that as the only evidence on record was against the driver of the oil Tanker, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had erred in directing the present appellant to share the 50% of the liability to pay compensation to the claimant. [13] The learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal also erred in not 7 MACApp./334/2022 7 taking into consideration the fact that the charge-sheet which was filed after the aforesaid accident was laid in the case only against the driver of the oil Tanker under Sections 279,338, 304A, 427 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. [14] Apart from the aforesaid charge-sheet, the oral testimony of CW-2 also indicated towards the fault of the driver of the oil Tanker only and there is no reliable evidence against the driver of the i-10 vehicle. Hence, he submits that the trial court was wrong, in absence of any acceptable evidence, to attribute negligence to the driver of the i-10 vehicle. [15] He further submits that in a connected claim case filed by wife of one of the occupant of the i-10 Car, who ultimately died in the accident (MAC Case No. 304/2012), the respondent No. 3, herein, i.e., the insurance company of the offending oil Tanker has settled the matter amicably with the said claimant, accepting the entire liability to pay the compensation to the said claimant. He, therefore, submits that in absence of any evidence of negligence on the part of the driver of the i-10 vehicle, the Tribunal has wrongly directed the present appellant to pay 50 % of the awarded amount to the claimant and as such, he submits that the impugned judgment and award is liable to be set aside to the extent it has directed the present appellant to pay 50 % of the awarded amount. 8 MACApp./334/2022 8 [16] On the other hand, Mr. K. K. Bhatta, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3, has submitted that there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned judgment and award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. He submits that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has correctly arrived at the finding, on the basis of materials available on record that the accident in question was caused due to negligent driving of drivers of both vehicles, namely, oil Tanker as well as the i-10 Car. He submits that the accident information report which was produced during the inquiry before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, clearly mentions only the i-10 Car as offending vehicle and it does not mention anything about the oil Tanker. [17] He further submits that the MVI report which was exhibited at the Exhibit-9 also clearly indicates that the front sides of both the vehicles were damaged to indicate that there was a head- on collision between the vehicles and which itself indicates that there was negligence on the part of the driver of the i-10 vehicle also. He also submits that the present appellant also did not adduce any evidence during inquiry to show that the driver of the i-10 vehicle was not at fault. [18] He submits that as there was a clear indication from the materials on record that the accident was caused due to head- on collision between the oil Tanker and the i-10 Car, the Tribunal was correct in attributing the negligence which caused the accident to drivers of both the vehicles and in 9 MACApp./334/2022 9 absence of any evidence exonerating the driver of the i-10 Car, the Tribunal could not have reached a contrary finding. [19] In support of his submission, he has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “Bijoy Kumar Dugar Vs. Bidya Dhar Dutta & Ors.” reported in “(2006)3SCC242.” The learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 has, therefore, submitted that the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. [20] Mr. S. Deka, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that since two vehicles are involved in the accident and since there was a head-on collision between both the vehicles, as well as there is no independent witness examined by the insurance company which could have exonerated the driver of the i-10 Car from negligence which resulted in the aforesaid accident, the Tribunal was correct in coming to the finding that this was a case of composite negligence of the driver of the i-10 vehicle as well as the oil Tanker. He also submits that since the accident information report only indicates about i-10 Car as offending vehicle, this cannot be a case where there is no evidence, at least at the initial stage of the investigation, that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the i-10 vehicle. [21] He submits that in a case of composite negligence, jointtortfeasors are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to the claimant. He also submits that the plea that one of the claimant in an another claim case, arising out 10 MACApp./334/2022 10 of said accident had arrived at an amicable settlement with respondent No. 3 will not in itself exonerate the driver of the i- 10 Car from the negligence which caused the accident, as there was no judicial determination in that case and it was settled only on the basis of amicable settlement between the parties. [22] He also submits that if it is ultimately found by this court that the driver of the i-10 vehicle was not at fault which caused the accident, still it may direct the insurance company of the i-10 vehicle to pay the compensation to the extent of 50% as was directed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and, thereafter, they may recover the same from the respondent No. 3. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “Khenyei Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.” reported in “(2015) 9 SCC 273.” [23] I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both sides and have gone through the materials on record. I have also perused the rulings cited by the learned counsel for both sides. [24] The point to be determined in this appeal is as to whether the accident in which the claimant sustained injuries was a result of composite negligence of the driver of the oil Tanker bearing registration No. AS-23-B-9981 and the driver of Hyundai i-10 11 MACApp./334/2022 11 Car bearing registration No. AS-23-G-0600 or it was solely due to the fault on the part of the driver of the oil Tanker; and whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. 2, Kamrup(M) was right in apportioning the liability of paying compensation to the claimant equally between the present appellant and the respondent No. 3. [25] While distinguishing the concepts of “contributory negligence” and “composite negligence”, the Supreme Court of India has observed in the case of “Khenyei Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.” (supra) as follows: - “15. There is a difference between contributory and composite negligence. In the case of contributory negligence, a person who has himself contributed to the accident cannot claim compensation for the injuries sustained by him in the accident to the extent of his own negligence; whereas in the case of composite negligence, a person who has suffered has not contributed to the accident but due to the outcome of combination of negligence of two or more other persons. This Court in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan [(2008) 3 SCC 748 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 832 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 738] has held that in case of contributory negligence, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrongdoer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrongdoer separately. It is only in the case of contributory negligence that the injured himself has contributed by his negligence in the accident. Extent of his negligence is required to be determined as damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries have to be reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. The 12 MACApp./334/2022 12 relevant portion is extracted hereunder: (SCC pp. 750-51, paras 6-7) “6. „Composite negligence‟ refers to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrongdoers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrongdoers. In such a case, each wrongdoer, is jointly and severally liable to the injured for payment of the entire damages and the injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrongdoer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrongdoer separately. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence on the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stand reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. 7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of „composite negligence‟ will not apply nor can there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined 13 MACApp./334/2022 13 the extent of contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to correct the said error.” The decision in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan [(2008) 3 SCC 748 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 832 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 738] has been relied upon in A.P. SRTC v. K. Hemlatha [(2008) 6 SCC 767 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 34] .” [26] From above, it appears that when a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrong doers, it is said that the person was injured on account of composite negligence of those wrong doers. In such a case, each of the wrong doer is jointly and severally liable for payment of damages to the injured person. [27] In the instant case, the evidence on record shows that the accident occurred due to head on collision between the oil Tanker and the i-10 Car. Though, the claimant while deposing as CW-2, has deposed that the oil Tanker suddenly came from the opposite side in a very rash and negligent manner and knocked the i-10 Car. However, there is no evidence to indicate that the i-10 Car was going in its own lane and the oil Tanker came from the wrong side and dashed it. Since, the evidence on record indicate that the collision between two vehicles was from the front side, unless there is evidence to indicate that the i-10 Car was in its own lane, the driver of the i-10 Car may not be exonerated from the liability of composite negligence, along with the driver of the oil Tanker, which 14 MACApp./334/2022 14 resulted into ill fated accident. In absence of any evidence to exonerate the driver of the i-10 Car, the doctrine of “res ipsa loquitor” would be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case andthe negligence on the part of the drivers of both vehicles involved in an accident resulting from head on collision of the said vehicles may have to be presumed. Merely stating that the driver of the oil Tanker was at fault would not exonerate the driver of the i-10 Car of the negligence on his part in absence of any evidence to that effect. Under aforesaid circumstances, when there is clear evidence of head on collision between two vehicles and there is no evidence to indicate that one of the vehicle was in its own lane and the other came from the wrong lane and dashed it from the front side, the logical inference which may be drawn is that of composite negligence of both the vehicles involved in the ratio of 50:50. [28] The fact that in an analogous matter (MAC Case No. 304/2012) the respondent No. 3/insurance company has amicably settled the dispute and has agreed to pay the entire compensation to the claimant of that case may not have any impact on the case in hand as the aforesaid case was admittedly settled between the parties without any judicial determination of the question of composite negligence involved in this case. 15 MACApp./334/2022 15 [29] Similarly, merely because the charge sheet has been laid against the driver of the oil Tanker under Sections 279,338,304A,427 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which is indicative of existence of materials regarding culpable negligence on the part of the charge-sheeted person, same, in itself, is not sufficient in absence of any evidence thereto to exonerate the driver of the i-10 Car from the liability of negligence in a Motor Accident Claims Case which is basically a case of civil nature. As such, this court is of the considered opinion that though in the impugned judgment, the reasons for apportioning the liability to pay compensation, in the ratio of 50:50 between two insurance companies have not been stated in much detail, however, for the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, the said finding of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal regarding apportioning of liability may not be faulted with. [30] In view of the discussions made and reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, this court is not inclined to interfere with the findings of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in the impugned judgment and order directing the present appellant to bear 50% of the liability to pay the compensation to the claimant. [31] Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed. 16 MACApp./334/2022 16 [32] Send back the record of the MAC Case No. 306/2012 to the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, along with a copy of this judgment. [33] The appellant is directed to deposit its share of the liability to pay the awarded amount before the Registry of this court within a period of 4(four) weeks from the date of this order. On such deposit the statutory deposit made by it at the time of filing of the appeal shall be returned back after proper verification. JUDGE Comparing Assistant Munmu n Boruah Digitally signed by Munmun Boruah Date: 2026.06.09 18:09:21 +05'30'