Page 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK ARBA No.13 of 2021 And ARBA No.14 of 2021 (In the matters of Appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996) The Competent Authority & Special Land Acquisition Officer, Sambalpur … Appellant (s) -versus- Kuntala Behera (In ARBA No.13 of 2021) Sarojini Pradhan (In ARBA No.14 of 2021) … . Respondent (s) Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode: For Appellant (s) : Mr. Ajit Patnaik, Advocate. For Respondent (s) : Mr. R.N. Debata, Adv. Mr. S.K. Mishra, Adv. CORAM: DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI DATE OF HEARING:-07.03.2026 DATE OF JUDGMENT:-15.05.2026 Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J. 1. The present Appeals have been preferred seeking setting aside of judgments and orders dated 26.8.2021, passed by the Ld. District Judge, Sambalpur in ARBP No.1 of 2018 and ARBP No.2 of 2018. As both matters arise out of the same land acquisition proceedings relating to Village Naxapali, are founded upon identical notifications issued under the National Highways Act, 1956, and involve common and Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 2 overlapping questions of law, particularly concerning the applicability of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, they are being taken up together and dealt with vide this common judgment. I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE: 2. The lands involved in these connected appeals are situated at Village Naxapali under Maneswar Tahasil in the district of Sambalpur and were acquired for the purpose of widening and development of National Highway No. 42/55 under the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956. 3. The acquisition process commenced with the publication of a preliminary notification under Section 3A of the Act on 29.10.2012. After completion of the statutory formalities and consideration of objections, a declaration under Section 3D was published on 21.5.2013, upon which the acquired lands vested absolutely in the Union of India, free from all encumbrances. Thereafter, the Competent Authority-cum- Special Land Acquisition Officer, Sambalpur undertook the process of determination of compensation under Section 3G of the Act in respect of the acquired lands. 4. The estimate and determination of compensation were completed and the award was finalized on 18.10.2014. On the same date, the Competent Authority issued a formal requisition to the National Highways Authority of India seeking sanction and release of the requisite funds for disbursement of the awarded compensation. 5. The award was duly entered in the Award Register, reflecting the land value, solatium, and other statutory components. In so far as the lands Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 3 at Village Naxapali are concerned, the award was recorded in the names of the recorded tenants or vendors, which was Iswar Pandey and Krushna Pandey in the subject land in ARBA No. 13 of 2021 as the revenue records had not been mutated in favour of the respondents at the relevant point of time and the present Respondent herself in the subject land in ARBA No. 14 of 2021. 6. Pursuant to the requisition dated 18.10.2014, the National Highways Authority of India released the compensation funds, and for Village Naxapali, such funds were released on 8.12.2014. 7. Consequently, it is the Appellant’s case that the entire awarded amount stood sanctioned, released, and available with the Competent Authority for disbursement well before 31.12.2014. 8. The date 1.1.2015 is of significance, as certain provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 were extended to acquisitions under the National Highways Act with effect from that date by virtue of Section 105(3). 9. The respondent in ARBA No. 13 of 2021 claims to have purchased the acquired lands during the years 1984–1985. However, at the time of acquisition and passing of the award, the lands continued to stand recorded in the names of her vendors, no mutation had been effected in favour of the respondent, and the lands were found to be vacant and barren on field verification. No objections were filed by the respondent pursuant to the notifications under Sections 3A or 3D of the National Highways Act. Immediately after the award dated 18.10.2014, the Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 4 respondent raised oral objections before the Competent Authority, objecting to payment of compensation in favour of her vendors and claiming entitlement in her own right, whereupon she was advised to submit formal written objections with supporting documents. 10. The first written representation was submitted by the respondent in ARBA No. 13 of 2021 on 4.2.2015, after the cut-off date of 1.1.2015, seeking release of compensation in her favour. In the said representation, the respondent acknowledged knowledge of the award and furnished detailed break-ups of the compensation awarded, indicating access to award-related information soon after 18.10.2014. As all original and authenticated documents were not initially furnished, verification and apportionment could not be immediately completed. In ARBA No. 13 of 2021, an amount of Rs. 3,13,051/- was ultimately credited through NEFT on 8.9.2015 to the present Respondent as she managed to bring forward all relevant documents to showcase that she was in fact the owner of the subject land. 11. In contrast, in ARBA No. 14 of 2021, the respondent Sarojini Pradhan was already the recorded owner and the Record of Rights stood in her name. The compensation determined under the award was credited directly to her bank account on 17.4.2015 in the sum of Rs.32,34,923/-. 12. Dissatisfied with the quantum and manner of determination of compensation, the respondents in both cases invoked the remedy under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act. The Collector-cum- Arbitrator rejected their claims by arbitral awards dated 16.2.2018. These awards were set aside by the Ld. District Judge, Sambalpur by Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 5 judgments dated 26.8.2021, leading to the present appeals filed in the year 2021 and heard analogously. 13. This Court shall now endeavour to summarise the contentions of the Parties and the broad grounds that have been raised. II. APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS: 14. The Appellant submits that the Ld. District Judge committed a manifest error in setting aside the arbitral awards dated 16.2.2018 by erroneously invoking Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, despite the acquisition having been undertaken under the National Highways Act, 1956, a special statute. It is urged that the entire foundation of the impugned judgment rests on a misapplication of law, inasmuch as Section 24 of the Act of 2013 applies only to acquisitions initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and not to acquisitions under enactments listed in the Fourth Schedule, including the National Highways Act, 1956 15. It is further contended that Section 105 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 clearly excludes the application of the provisions of the said Act to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, save and except to the limited extent expressly provided under Section 105(3). By virtue of the amendments and ordinances issued thereunder, only the First, Second and Third Schedules of the Act of 2013 were made applicable to acquisitions under the National Highways Act with effect from 1.1.2015. According to the Appellant, Section 24 does not form part of these schedules and was never extended to acquisitions under the National Highways Act 1956, rendering the reasoning adopted by the Ld. District Judge legally unsustainable. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 6 16. The Appellant places strong reliance on the admitted factual position that the award determining compensation was passed on 18.10.2014 and that the requisite funds were requisitioned on the same date and released by the National Highways Authority of India on 8.12.2014, well before the cut-off date of 31.12.2014. It is submitted that the compensation amount was thus fully sanctioned and available for disbursement prior to 1.1.2015, which is the date from which the limited application of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 to National Highways acquisitions commenced. The Ld. District Judge, it is urged, failed to consider these admitted dates, despite the same being borne out from the record and the Additional Affidavit filed before this Court. 17. The Appellant further submits that the arbitral awards dated 16.2.2018 were passed strictly in accordance with Section 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956 and after considering the materials placed by the claimants. It is argued that the Ld. Arbitrator neither ignored any mandatory statutory provision nor acted in conflict with public policy. The finding of the Ld. District Judge that the arbitral awards were contrary to public policy under Section 34(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is assailed as wholly unfounded, being premised solely on an incorrect assumption regarding the applicability of the Act of 2013. 18. Lastly, the Appellant submits that the reliance placed by the Ld. District Judge on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal1 is wholly misconceived. It is 1 (2020) 8 SCC 129 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 7 argued that the said decision deals exclusively with the scope and interpretation of Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 in the context of acquisitions under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and does not address, far less extend, the applicability of Section 24 to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956. On these grounds, the Appellant seeks setting aside of the impugned judgment dated 26.8.2021 and restoration of the arbitral awards dated 16.2.2018. III. RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS 19. Per contra, the Respondents submit that the Ld. District Judge committed no error in setting aside the arbitral awards dated 16.2.2018, as the determination of compensation by the Competent Authority and the Arbitrator was contrary to the mandate of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, which embodies the current public policy governing land acquisition and compensation. It is contended that the arbitral awards failed to take into account the beneficial and welfare-oriented provisions of the Act of 2013, thereby resulting in manifest injustice to the landowners. According to the Respondents, the approach adopted by the Arbitrator was mechanical and rooted in the repealed framework of compensation, warranting judicial interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 20. The Respondents argue that Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 was rightly applied by the Ld. District Judge, as the acquisition proceedings, though initiated earlier, had not culminated in lawful payment of compensation prior to the cut-off date. It is urged that mere preparation of an award or release of funds to the acquiring authority does not Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 8 amount to “payment” of compensation to the landowner. In the present cases, the compensation was either paid after 1.1.2015 or paid in a manner disputed by the Respondents, thereby attracting the beneficial provisions of the Act of 2013. The Ld. District Judge, it is submitted, correctly appreciated this distinction. 21. It is further contended that the Respondents were not given effective notice or opportunity at the stage of determination of compensation, and that the awards were passed without proper consideration of their rights, title, possession, and the nature of the land and structures. In ARBA No. 13 of 2021, the Respondent asserts that compensation was initially awarded in favour of her vendor despite her prior purchase, while in ARBA No. 14 of 2021, though compensation was credited, the same was not calculated in accordance with the First Schedule of the Act of 2013. These deficiencies, according to the Respondents, vitiate the arbitral awards on the ground of patent illegality. 22. The Respondents also submit that the applicability of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 cannot be viewed in a narrow or technical manner. It is argued that Section 105(3) of the Act of 2013 reflects legislative intent to extend the benefit of enhanced and fair compensation to landowners affected by acquisitions under special enactments, including the National Highways Act, 1956. The Ld. District Judge, it is urged, rightly harmonised Section 105(3) with Section 24 to ensure that landowners are not deprived of just compensation merely due to the timing of administrative actions. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 9 23. Lastly, the Respondents contend that the arbitral awards were rightly held to be in conflict with public policy, as they denied the Respondents compensation in accordance with the law in force and the constitutional mandate of fairness and equality. The Ld. District Judge, it is submitted, correctly relied on the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while interpreting Section 24 of the Act of 2013 and applied them to the facts of the present cases. The Respondents therefore pray for dismissal of the appeals and affirmance of the judgment dated 26.8.2021. IV. ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION 24. Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on record, this court here has identified the following issue to be determined: A. Whether Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is applicable to land acquisitions undertaken under the National Highways Act, 1956, and, consequentially, whether the learned District Judge was justified in setting aside the arbitral awards dated 16.2.2018 passed under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act by applying the provisions of the Act of 2013? V. ISSUE A: WHETHER SECTION 24 OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013 IS APPLICABLE TO LAND ACQUISITIONS UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT, 1956, AND, CONSEQUENTIALLY, WHETHER THE LEARNED DISTRICT Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 10 JUDGE WAS JUSTIFIED IN SETTING ASIDE THE ARBITRAL AWARDS DATED 16.2.2018 PASSED UNDER SECTION 3G(5) OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT BY APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT OF 2013? 25. Before going into the merits of the contentions, it is necessary to outline the ambit and scope of Section 37(2)(b) of the 1996 Act. The said section is extracted below: “37. Appealable orders.—(1)[Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal] shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the court passing the order, namely: ∗∗∗ (2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the Arbitral Tribunal— (a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17.” 26. The Supreme Court and this Court in catena of judgments have held that the powers of appellate court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 37(2)(b) of the 1996 Act against orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is very restricted and narrow and the same should be exercised when the orders seems to be perverse, arbitrary and contrary to law. The judgment of Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.2 passed by the Apex Court, elaborates the ambit and scope of the appeals. Although the aforesaid judgment is not dealing with the arbitration proceedings but the same deals with the power of appellate court in 2 1990 Supp SCC 727 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 11 the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC). Operative paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are extracted below: “13. On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the Appellate Bench fell into error on two important propositions. The first is a misdirection in regard to the very scope and nature of the appeals before it and the limitations on the powers of the appellate court to substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a discretionary order. The second pertains to the infirmities in the ratiocination as to the quality of antox's alleged user of the trade mark on which the passing-off action is founded. We shall deal with these two separately. 14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) (P) Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph (SCC OnLine SC para 9) Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 12 ‘9. …These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Johnston “the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a Judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well-settled principles in an individual case.”’ The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.” 27. The said judgment is consistently followed in adjudicating petitions pertaining to the A&C Act by Courts across the Country in Green Infra Wind Energy Ltd. v. Regen Powertech (P) Ltd.3; Sona Corpn. India (P) Ltd. v. Ingram Micro India (P) Ltd.4; Manish Aggarwal v. RCI Industries & Technologies Ltd.5; Tahal Consulting Engineers India (P) Ltd. v. Promax Power Ltd.6 and Handicraft & Handlooms Exports Co. of India v. SMC Comtrade Ltd.7. 28. In Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. State of Goa8, the Apex Court noticing its previous decision in MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.9 has noted the limited scope of interference under Section 34 and further narrower scope of appeal under Section 37 of the Act particularly when dealing with the concurrent findings of the arbitrator and that of the Court. Relevant paragraph ‘14’ of MMTC Ltd.(supra) as noted in paragraph 3 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8273 4 2020 SCC OnLine Del 300 5 (2022) 3 HCC (Del) 289 6 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2069 7 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3981 8 (2024) 1 SCC 479 9 (2019) 4 SCC 163 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 13 ‘26’ in Reliance Infrastructure Ltd.(supra) is to be extracted hereinunder:— “14. As far as interference with an order made under Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. In other words, the court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the court under Section34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been confirmed by the court under Section 34 and by the court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings.” 29. The same view has been expressed in UHL Power Company Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh10 in paragraph ‘16’ while noticing paragraph ‘11’ in MMTC Ltd.(supra):— “16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an appellate court in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is all the more circumscribed. In MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293], the reasons for vesting such a limited jurisdiction on the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the ArbitrationAct have been explained in the following words : (SCC pp. 166-67, para 11) “11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit 10 (2022) 4 SCC 116 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 14 in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of the “fundamental policy of Indian law” would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice, and Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B. 223(CA)] reasonableness. Furthermore, “patent illegality” itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of the terms of the contract.” 30. In Haryana Tourism Ltd. v. Kandhari Beverages Ltd.11 as noted in paragraph ‘30’ in Reliance Infrastructure Ltd.(supra), it was held on the scope of interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act' 1996 as under:— “30. In Haryana Tourism [Haryana Tourism Ltd. v. Kandhari Beverages Ltd., (2022) 3 SCC 237 : (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 87], this Court yet again pointed out the limited scope of interference under Sections 34 and37 of the Act; and disapproved interference by the High Court under Section 37 of 11 2022) 3 SCC 237 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 15 the Act while entering into merits of the claim in the following words : (SCC p. 240, paras 8-9) “8. So far as the impugned judgment and order [Kandhari Beverages Ltd. v. Haryana Tourism Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 3233] passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the award and the order passed by the Additional District Judge under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act are concerned, it is required to be noted that in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the High Court has entered into the merits of the claim, which is not permissible in exercise of powers under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. 9. As per settled position of law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, an award can be set aside only if the award is against the public policy of India. The award can be set aside under Sections 34/37 of the Arbitration Act, if the award is found to be contrary to : (a) fundamental policy of Indian Law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality; or (d) if it is patently illegal. None of the aforesaid exceptions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The High Court has entered into the merits of the claim and has decided the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act as if the High Court was deciding the appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. Thus, the High Court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. The impugned judgment andorder [Kandhari Beverages Ltd. v. Haryana Tourism Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 3233] passed by the High Court is hence not sustainable.” Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 16 31. It was, thus, observed in paragraph ‘33’ of Reliance Infrastructure Ltd.(supra) as under:— “33. Keeping in view the aforementioned principles enunciated by this Court with regard to the limited scope of interference in an arbitral award by a Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section34 of the Act, which is all the more circumscribed in an appeal under Section 37, we may examine the rival submissions of the parties in relation to the matters dealt with by the High Court.” 32. It is observed in Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills12 that: “9. The object of the Act is to provide for a speedy and inexpensive alternative mode of settlement of dispute with the minimum of intervention of the courts. Section 5 of the Act is implicit in this regard and prohibits interference by the judicial authority with the arbitration proceedings except where so provided in Part-I of the Act. The judicial interference, if any, is provided inter- alia only by means of Sections 34 and 37 of the Act respectively. 10. Section 34 of the Act provides for getting an arbitral award set aside by moving an application in accordance with sub-Section (2) andsub-Section (3) of Section 34 of the Act which inter-alia provide for the grounds on which an arbitral award is liable to be set aside. One of the main grounds for interference or setting aside an award is where the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India i.e. if the award is induced or affected by fraud or corruption or is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law or it is in conflict with most basic notions of morality and justice. A plain reading of Section 34 reveals that the scope of 12 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2632 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 17 interference by the court with the arbitral award under Section 34 is very limited and the court is not supposed to travel beyond the aforesaid scope to find out if the award is good or bad. 11. Section 37 of the Act provides for a forum of appeal inter-alia against the order setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act. The scope of appeal is naturally akin to andlimited to the grounds enumerated under Section 34 of the Act. 12. It is pertinent to note that an arbitral award is not liable to be interfered with only on the ground that the award is illegal or is erroneous in law that too upon reappraisal of the evidence adduced before the arbitral trial. Even an award which may not be reasonable or is non-speaking to some extent cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the courts. It is also well settled that even if two views are possible there is no scope for the court to reappraise the evidence and to take the different view other than that has been taken by the arbitrator. The view taken by the arbitrator is normally acceptable and ought to be allowed to prevail. xxxxxx 14. It is equally settled law that the appellate power under Section 37of the Act is not akin to the normal appellate jurisdiction vested in the civil courts for the reason that the scope of interference of the courts with arbitral proceedings or award is very limited, confined to the ambit of Section 34 of the Act only and even that power cannot be exercised in a casual and a cavalier manner. xxxxxx 16. It is seen that the scope of interference in an appeal under Section37 of the Act is restricted and subject to the same grounds on which an award can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. In other words, the powers under Section 37 vested in the court of appeal are not Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 18 beyond the scope of interference provided under Section 34 of the Act.” Here, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has once again reiterated that even an award which may not be reasonable or is nonspeaking to some extent cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the courts. It is also well settled that even if two views are possible there is no scope for the court to reappraise the evidence and to take the different view other than that has been taken by the arbitrator. The view taken by the arbitrator is normally acceptable and ought to be allowed to prevail. 33. In Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge Project13 referring to MMTC Limited (supra) it has been held that: “19….The scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act is not akin to normal appellate jurisdiction. It is well-settled that courts ought not to interfere with the arbitral award in a casual and cavalier manner. The mere possibility of an alternative view on facts or interpretation of the contract does not entitle courts to reverse the findings of the arbitral tribunal…” 34. In Dyna Technology Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited14, the Apex Court observed as under: “24. There is no dispute that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act limits a challenge to an award only on the grounds provided therein or as interpreted by various courts. We need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless the court comes to a conclusion that the perversity of the award goes to the root of the 13 (2023) 9 SCC 85 14 (2019) 20 SCC 1 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 19 matter without there being a possibility of alternative interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award. Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. If the courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated. 25. Moreover, umpteen number of judgments of this Court have categorically held that the courts should not interfere with an award merely because an alternative view on facts and interpretation of contract exists. The courts need to be cautious and should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied unless such award portrays perversity unpardonable under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.” 35. Judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards is stringently limited under Indian law. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, provides the exclusive grounds upon which an arbitral award can be challenged. Courts, therefore, are not empowered to interfere merely because another interpretation or outcome may seem more reasonable. The jurisdiction under Section 34 is confined to procedural and legal infirmities such as lack of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice, or patent illegality. Consequently, appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 is even narrower in its scope. Its purpose is to evaluate whether the court adjudicating under Section 34 has remained within the permissible statutory boundaries. The appeal court cannot re-evaluate Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 20 evidence or reconsider the factual matrix afresh. The statutory framework thus reflects an overarching legislative intent to insulate arbitral decisions from excessive judicial intervention. The entire architecture of Sections 34 and 37 reinforces the finality and autonomy of arbitral proceedings. Arbitration is designed to offer an efficient, expert-led, and expedited alternative to litigation. Courts must therefore resist the temptation to intervene unless the decision by the court under Section 34 itself amounts to a significant transgression of legal boundaries. 36. Now this Court shall endeavour to answer the main question framed herein. The question of applicability of Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 must be examined first through the lens of legislative design. The National Highways Act is not a general acquisition statute but a special enactment intended to facilitate time-bound development of national infrastructure. 37. Parliament, recognising the unique requirements of highway projects, deliberately carved out a separate acquisition mechanism under Sections 3A to 3J. This framework governs notification, vesting, determination of compensation, and payment, independent of the general land acquisition law. The insertion of Section 3J in 1997 is of decisive importance, as it unequivocally declares that nothing in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall apply to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 thereby severing any statutory linkage between the two regimes. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 21 38. This legislative separation was consciously preserved even when Parliament enacted the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. Section 105 of the 2013 Act embodies a clear policy choice to exclude certain enactments from its general application. The Fourth Schedule appended to the Act lists thirteen such enactments, including the National Highways Act, 1956. Section 105(1) categorically exempts these enactments from the operation of the 2013 Act, while Section 105(3) empowers the Central Government to selectively apply beneficial provisions relating to compensation, rehabilitation, and resettlement. The structure of Section 105 thus makes it clear that inclusion in the Fourth Schedule is not accidental but reflects Parliament’s intent to preserve special acquisition regimes while permitting limited, controlled harmonisation in matters of compensation. 39. The RFCTLARR Act came into force on 1.1.2014. However, the applicability of even its limited provisions to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 was deferred and phased. Through Amendment Ordinance No. 9 of 2014 and subsequent ordinances, the Parliament provided that only specific provisions would apply with effect from 1.1.2015. This culminated in the notification dated 28.8.2015 issued under Sections 105 and 113 of the Act. That notification is of central relevance, as it precisely enumerates the provisions extended to National Highways Act acquisitions. These are confined to determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement under the Second Schedule, and Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 22 infrastructure amenities under the Third Schedule. Section 24 does not find mention in this notification. 40. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to examine the statutory text of Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 itself, as the controversy essentially turns on its scope and field of operation. Section 24(2), which provides for deemed lapse, expressly opens with the words “in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894”. The provision, set out verbatim, leaves little room for interpretive expansion beyond acquisitions traceable to Act No. 1 of 1894. Its language, structure, and placement all indicate that it is statute-specific and not intended to operate across disparate acquisition regimes. 41. The deliberate omission of Section 24 from the notification is legally significant. Section 24 deals not with the quantum of compensation but with deemed lapse of acquisition proceedings based on non-payment or non-possession under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The absence of Section 24 from the notification underscores that Parliament and the Central Government did not intend to import lapse provisions into the National Highways Act regime, which has its own timelines, vesting provisions, and consequences under Sections 3D and 3G. 42. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this understanding. In Union of India v. Tarsem Singh15, while examining the constitutional validity of Section 3J of the National Highways Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court acknowledged that the RFCTLARR Act was 15 (2019) 9 SCC 304 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 23 not made fully applicable to national highway acquisitions. Although Section 3J was read down to the extent it denied solatium and interest, the Court did not hold that the entire 2013 Act stood incorporated into the National Highways Act. On the contrary, the judgment recognises that the extension of RFCTLARR provisions is limited and controlled by statutory notifications, and that the Fourth Schedule exemption continues to operate. 43. This limited incorporation was further clarified in National Highways Authority of India v. P. Nagaraju @ Cheluvaiah16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, interpreting the 28.8.2015 notification, held that the applicability of the RFCTLARR Act to National Highways Act, 1956 acquisitions is confined strictly to the provisions specified therein. The Hon’ble Apex Court emphasised that the National Highways Act, 1956 remains in the Fourth Schedule and that the general provisions of the 2013 Act do not apply unless expressly extended. Section 24, not being among the provisions notified, was held to have no application to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956. 44. The doctrinal foundation of this position was strengthened in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Nisar Ahmed Ganai17, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court undertook a textual and purposive interpretation of Section 24 itself. The Court observed that the language of Section 24(1)(a) is “very clear and unambiguous” and refers exclusively to land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court categorically rejected the argument that Section 24 16 Civil Appeal No.4671 of 2022 (SC) 17 2022 INSC 1072 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 24 could apply to acquisitions under other statutes merely because those statutes contain pari materia provisions. It was held that the RFCTLARR Act repeals only the 1894 Act and does not override or subsume other acquisition enactments. 45. The reasoning in Bharat Petroleum (supra) is particularly instructive because it addresses the precise interpretive error often committed by courts, namely, extending Section 24 by analogy or equity. The Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear that Section 24 is not a general equitable provision but a statute-specific transitional clause. Its operation is confined to proceedings initiated under the repealed 1894 Act and cannot be expanded through judicial interpretation to cover acquisitions under special statutes like the National Highways Act, 1956. 46. A similar constitutional perspective emerges from C.S. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu18, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the continued operation of state highway acquisition laws even after the enactment of the RFCTLARR Act. The Court recognised that special enactments, particularly those protected under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, retain their independent force unless expressly overridden. The judgment reinforces the principle that lapse provisions and timelines under Section 24 are not automatically imported into special acquisition statutes, whether Central or State. 47. High Court jurisprudence has also been consistent with this settled position. The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court, while examining the 18 2023 INSC 510 Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 25 applicability of RFCTLARR provisions to National Highways Act, 1956 acquisitions, held that the extension of compensation-related provisions does not imply wholesale application of the 2013 Act. The Hon’ble Karnataka High Court has similarly emphasised that Section 24 cannot be read into the National Highways Act regime in view of Section 3J, Section 105, and the Fourth Schedule. These decisions reinforce that the statutory text, rather than perceived hardship, must govern the applicability of Section 24. 48. Another important aspect is the conceptual incompatibility between Section 24 and the National Highways Act, 1956. Under Section 3D of the National Highways Act, vesting of land is absolute and occurs upon publication of the declaration. Possession and vesting are not contingent upon payment of compensation. Compensation is determined separately under Section 3G, and disputes are resolved through arbitration. Importing Section 24, which predicates lapse on non-payment or non-possession under a different statutory scheme, would disrupt the internal coherence of the National Highways Act and undermine its purpose. 49. It is also relevant that the Central Government, while extending Sections 26 and 28 of the RFCTLARR Act for market value determination, consciously limited the extension to substantive compensation principles. Procedural provisions dealing with lapse, reopening of proceedings, or annulment of acquisitions were not extended. This distinction reflects a calibrated legislative approach: to Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 26 ensure fair compensation without destabilising infrastructure projects through retrospective lapses. 50. The consistent thread running through statutory provisions, notifications, and judicial precedents is that Section 24 is neither incidental nor ancillary to compensation determination. It is a drastic transitional provision tied exclusively to the repeal of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. To apply it to National Highways Act, 1956 acquisitions would amount to rewriting both statutes and disregarding the Fourth Schedule exemption. 51. In sum, the legal position is clear. Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 applies only to acquisitions initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The National Highways Act, 1956 constitutes a distinct acquisition code, expressly exempted from the general application of the 2013 Act. Only specified provisions relating to compensation, rehabilitation, and amenities have been extended through the notification dated 28.8.2015, and Section 24 is not among them. Any application of Section 24 to National Highway acquisitions under the 1956 Act would be contrary to the express statutory language, legislative intent, and binding authority of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 52. Ld. counsel for the Appellant has also repeatedly contended that where awards have been passed and compensation deposited prior to 1.1.2015, the authorities become functus officio and lack jurisdiction to reopen or redetermine compensation by invoking the RFCTLARR Act. Reliance has been placed on judicial precedents, including Gopa Ram Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 27 v. Union of India and Lanka Prabhakar v. Union of India19, which categorically hold that Section 24 of the 2013 Act does not apply to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, particularly where awards were passed and compensation deposited before the cut-off date. 53. The argument that administrative authorities under the National Highways Act become functus officio after passing the award is grounded in statutory design. Section 3G entrusts the competent authority with the task of determining compensation, and Section 3G(5) provides for arbitration if the amount is not acceptable. Once these statutory functions are discharged, neither the competent authority nor the arbitrator retains any residual power to reopen concluded awards in the absence of express statutory authorization. Any direction for redetermination dehors the statute would therefore be without jurisdiction. 54. The plea based on principles of equality and uniformity, though appealing at first blush, cannot override the statutory mandate. Courts have consistently held that equity cannot supplant law, particularly in matters governed by clear legislative command. As observed in judicial reasoning addressing similar contentions, the discomfort or perceived unfairness experienced by landowners cannot justify judicial extension of a statutory provision beyond its text. The rule of law requires that statutory authorities act strictly within the four corners of the statute conferring power. 19 S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.12746 of 2017 (Rajastan High Court) Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 28 55. This legal position is also reinforced by the express opinion of the Ld. Attorney General of India, rendered upon consultation by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. The Ld. Attorney General unequivocally opined that Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 applies only to acquisitions undertaken under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and that Section 105(1) of the 2013 Act excludes the application of all provisions of the Act to Fourth Schedule enactments, save to the limited extent permitted under Section 105(3). The opinion further clarifies that only the First, Second, and Third Schedules have been made applicable to the National Highways Act. 56. This interpretation has also found reflection in the comprehensive guidelines issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, dated 28.12.2017. The guidelines trace the legislative and administrative evolution of the applicability of the RFCTLARR Act to National Highways acquisitions and conclusively state that Section 24 is not applicable to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956. The guidelines specifically clarify that where the acquisition process stood completed on or before 31.12.2014—meaning the award was announced, funds deposited, and compensation paid to the majority of landowners, the process is deemed settled and cannot be reopened. 57. The circular records that although the RFCTLARR Act came into force on 1.1.2014, the applicability of its provisions to enactments listed in the Fourth Schedule, including the National Highways Act, was governed exclusively by Section 105 of the Act and subsequent amendment Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 29 ordinances and notifications. It reiterates that, with effect from 1.1.2015, only select provisions of the RFCTLARR Act were extended to acquisitions under the National Highways Act. 58. The guidelines specifically state that “it remains an unambiguous and accepted position that the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule have been made applicable to all cases of land acquisition under the NH Act, 1956… with effect from 01.01.2015.” By expressly enumerating the provisions extended, the circular makes it clear that no other provisions of the RFCTLARR Act stand incorporated into the National Highways Act acquisition regime. 59. A separate and dedicated portion of the guidelines addresses the question of applicability of Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 to acquisitions under the National Highways Act. The circular records that although an earlier Office Memorandum dated 13.1.2016 had suggested applicability of Section 24, the issue was revisited in consultation with the Ld. Attorney General. Upon such reconsideration, the Attorney General opined that “a reading of Section 24 makes it abundantly clear that the provision is applicable only to acquisitions that have been undertaken under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, inasmuch as the legislative intent can be ascertained from the specific mention of the ‘Land Acquisition Act, 1894’.” The opinion further notes that Section 105(1) of Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 30 the RFCTLARR Act expressly excludes application of the Act to Fourth Schedule enactments, and that “the only exception to Section 105(1) is Section 105(3), which makes only the First, Second and Third Schedule applicable to the Fourth Schedule Acts”. 60. Accepting this opinion, the Ministry categorically concludes in the guidelines that “as such, it is now clear that Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 is not applicable to the acquisitions under the NH Act, 1956.” This clarification represents the final and considered executive position of the Union of India on the issue and expressly withdraws any contrary administrative understanding that may have prevailed earlier. The guidelines thus align executive interpretation with the statutory text of Section 24 and Section 105 of the RFCTLARR Act. 61. The circular further clarifies the legal position regarding completed acquisitions by stating that in cases where “the process of acquisition of land stood completed (i.e. Award under Section 3G announced by CALA, amount deposited by the acquiring agency with the CALA, and compensation paid to the landowners in respect of majority of the land under acquisition) as on or before 31.12.2014, the process would be deemed to have been completed and settled. Such cases would not be re-opened.” This declaration directly negates any attempt to invoke Section 24-based lapse or redetermination in respect of acquisitions completed prior to the cut-off date. 62. Viewed as a whole, the 28.12.2017 MoRTH guidelines conclusively affirm that acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 constitute a distinct statutory regime, insulated by the Fourth Schedule Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 31 to the RFCTLARR Act. Only limited provisions of the RFCTLARR Act relating to compensation, rehabilitation, and infrastructure amenities have been consciously extended, while Section 24 stands expressly excluded. These guidelines, grounded in statutory interpretation and the Ld. Attorney General’s opinion, lend authoritative support to the conclusion that Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 has no application whatsoever to land acquisitions undertaken under the National Highways Act, 1956. 63. Viewed holistically, the statutory text of Section 24, the structure of the National Highways Act, 1956, the Fourth Schedule exemption under Section 105, the Ld. Attorney General’s opinion, executive guidelines, and consistent judicial precedent converge on a single conclusion. Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 is confined exclusively to acquisitions initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It does not apply, either directly or by implication, to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956, particularly where awards were passed and compensation deposited prior to 1.1.2015. Any contrary approach would amount to judicial legislation and would undermine the carefully calibrated statutory framework governing national highway acquisitions. 64. Applying the aforesaid statutory scheme, executive guidelines, and binding judicial precedents to the facts as found and the dates already culled out by this Court, the conclusion is inescapable that the applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 were erroneously allowed by the Ld. District Judge. The Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 32 acquisition in the present cases was admittedly undertaken under the National Highways Act, 1956. The notifications under Sections 3A and 3D were issued on 29.10.2012 and 21.5.2013 respectively, and the awards determining compensation under Section 3G were passed on 18.10.2014. These dates are not in dispute. Thus, the acquisition proceedings had not only been initiated but had culminated in the passing of awards well before the cut-off date of 1.1.2015. 65. The record further establishes that on the very date of passing of the awards, i.e. 18.10.2014, the Competent Authority requisitioned funds from the National Highways Authority of India, and the requisite compensation amounts were released on 8.12.2014. Consequently, as on or before 31.12.2014, the compensation stood fully sanctioned, released, and made available with the Competent Authority for disbursement. In terms of the comprehensive guidelines dated 28.12.2017 issued by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, such cases are expressly treated as having attained finality, it being clarified that where the award has been announced, funds deposited, and compensation paid to the majority of landowners on or before 31.12.2014, “the process would be deemed to have been completed and settled” and “such cases would not be re-opened”. 66. Even assuming, arguendo, that disbursement to certain claimants occurred after 1.1.2015 owing to disputes regarding title or apportionment, such circumstance would not alter the legal position. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal (supra) has made it clear that non-payment attributable to Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 33 reasons other than inaction of the acquiring authority does not result in lapse, and that tender or availability of compensation satisfies the statutory obligation. More importantly, Section 24 itself is confined to proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and does not apply to acquisitions under special enactments. 67. In the present cases, the Ld. District Judge proceeded on the assumption that Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 was applicable to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956, and on that basis concluded that the arbitral awards dated 16.02.2018 were in conflict with public policy. This approach overlooks the express language of Section 24, the exemption carved out by Section 105 read with the Fourth Schedule, and the notification dated 28.08.2015, which extends only the First, Second and Third Schedules of the RFCTLARR Act to National Highways Act acquisitions. Section 24 is conspicuously absent from the provisions so extended. 68. The executive position of the Union of India, as crystallised in the MoRTH guidelines dated 28.12.2017 and founded on the opinion of the Ld. Attorney General for India, further clarifies that “Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 is not applicable to the acquisitions under the NH Act, 1956”. This clarification was issued after reconsideration of earlier instructions and leaves no scope for administrative or judicial doubt. The Ld. District Judge, however, failed to notice or give effect to this authoritative clarification and instead relied upon an erroneous extension of Section 24. Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 34 69. Once it is held that Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 does not apply to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956, the very foundation of the impugned judgment collapses. The arbitral awards dated 16.2.2018 were passed strictly in exercise of powers under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, after the Competent Authority had already discharged its statutory function under Section 3G(1). The Ld. Arbitrator, upon adjudication, upheld the determination of compensation. No ground falling within the limited contours of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was made out for interference. 70. In view of the admitted dates, the completion of the acquisition process prior to 31.12.2014, the non-applicability of Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956, and the settled legal position declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and clarified by the Union of India, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the ARBP applications ought not to have been allowed. The impugned judgment proceeds on a clear error of law apparent on the face of the record and cannot be sustained. VI. CONCLUSION: 71. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court is satisfied that the Ld. District Judge proceeded on an erroneous assumption of law in applying Section 24 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 to acquisitions made under the National Highways Act, 1956. The acquisition proceedings in the present cases had culminated in the passing of awards on 18.10.2014, with funds duly released on 8.12.2014, well prior to the cut- Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 21-May-2026 17:57:39 Signature Not Verified Page 35 off date of 1.1.2015. In any event, Section 24 of the Act of 2013 has no application to acquisitions under the National Highways Act. The arbitral awards dated 16.2.2018 were thus validly passed within the statutory framework, and no ground existed for their interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The impugned judgment, being founded on an incorrect application of law and an excess of jurisdiction, cannot be sustained. 72. Accordingly, ARBA No.13 of 2021 and ARBA No.14 of 2021 are allowed. The judgment dated 26.8.2021 passed by the Ld. District Judge, Sambalpur in ARBP No.02 of 2018 and ARBP No. 01 of 2018 is hereby set aside. The arbitral awards dated 16.2.2018 passed by the Collector-cum-Arbitrator, Sambalpur are restored and shall stand affirmed. 73. There shall be no order as to costs. (Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 15th May, 2026/-