IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA (CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION) APPELLATE SIDE Present : The Hon’ble Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee WPA 11647 of 2021 Kashinath Chakraborty Vs. Central Bank of India & Ors. For the petitioner : Mr. Molay Dhar, Mr. Biswajit Sarkar, Mr. Shouvik Naskar. For the Bank : Mr. Bishwambhar Jha, Ms. Munmun Mishra. Heard on : 11.08.2026 Judgment on : 14.09.2026 Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.:- Prologue: 1. The petitioner has called in question the legality and propriety of the order dated 16th July, 2016 passed by the Appellate Authority (for short, “AA”), as well as the order of punishment dated 4th March, 2016 passed by the Disciplinary Authority (for short, “DA”), whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service. The petitioner has, in addition, prayed for a direction upon the 2 respondent no. 2 to extend to him all retiral benefits, including gratuity, pension and leave encashment, together with the arrears of salary for the period commencing from the date of his suspension until the date on which he would have attained the age of superannuation, upon setting aside the order of punishment. Petitioner’s case: 2. Shortly stated, the facts, as projected in the writ petition and the documents appended thereto are thatthe petitioner joined the service of the Central Bank of India as a Clerk on 30th April, 1971. In 1980, upon completion of the CAIIB banking diploma, he was promoted to Officer Scale-I, followed by his promotion to Scale-II in 1991 and thereafter to Scale-III in 1999. In the course of his service, he served as Branch Manager at several branches of the Bank, including Haldia, Hatudewan, Sodepur and Titagarh. He was posted as the Branch Manager of the Barrackpore Branch from June, 2002 until October, 2005. In 2005, he was transferred from the Barrackpore Branch to the Zonal Office, Kolkata, where he was posted as Chief Officer. 3. By an office memorandum dated 11th April, 2006, the respondent Bank called upon the petitioner to furnish his explanation in respect of certain irregularities alleged to have been noticed in connection with the loans and advances sanctioned by him during his tenure as Branch Manager of the Barrackpore Branch. Thereafter, by an order dated 3rd May, 2006, the petitioner was placed under suspension pending disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner, in response thereto, submitted his explanation to the said memorandum. On 4th July, 2006, the Disciplinary Authority (for short, DA) 3 issued a charge-sheet against the petitioner, containing six distinct charges, to which the petitioner submitted his written reply on 13th July, 2006. 4. Charge-sheet reflected that the Charge No. 1 pertained to nine cash credit and term loan accounts sanctioned by the petitioner in favour of M/s Taj & Sons, M.B. Engineering Consultants (India) Pvt. Ltd., Eastern Steel Casting, Kalpana Gourdar Industries, Dey Food & Fruit Products, Raaz Enterprise, Ashok Kumar Shaw, M/s Thread and Loknath Agency. It was alleged that, in relation to the said accounts, the petitioner had acted in violation of the Bank's prescribed sanctioning norms and had failed to exercise proper monitoring and follow-up. It was further alleged that eight of the said accounts had subsequently slipped to Non-Performing Assets (for short, NPA). 5. Charge No. 2 alleged that the petitioner had sanctioned and disbursed a cash credit facility in favour of M/s Kapaleswar Enterprise in an irregular manner and for his own pecuniary benefit. Charge No. 3 alleged that the petitioner had failed to adhere to the prescribed procedure while creating an equitable mortgage in respect of the cash credit account of M/s Das Electronics. Charge No. 4 alleged that the petitioner had sanctioned overdraft limits in favour of M/s Shanti Constructions and M/s Suchitra Constructions without requisite authority and in contravention of the Bank's applicable guidelines. Charge No. 5 related to the disbursement of three housing loans without ensuring the proper end-use of the loan proceeds. Charge No. 6 alleged that four housing loans had been disbursed for the purchase of flats without ensuring registration of the properties in favour of the borrowers or obtaining adequate collateral security. 4 6. Thereafter, a departmental enquiry was conducted into the aforesaid charge and upon conclusion of which the Enquiry Officer (for short, “EO”) submitted his report. Upon consideration of the evidence and materials on record, the EO held charge Nos. 1(b), 1(c) to 1(g), 2, 4, 5 and 6 to have been proved, while charge Nos. 1(a), 1(h), 1(i) and 3 were found to be only partly proved. 7. The DA, however, disagreed with the findings of the EO and, upon an independent consideration of the matter, came to the conclusion that all the charges levelled against the petitioner stood proved. Consequently, the DA imposed upon the petitioner the extreme penalty of dismissal from service by an order dated 3rd December, 2007. The statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner against the said order of dismissal was thereafter dismissed by the AA by an order dated 16th August, 2008. 8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P. No. 1631(W) of 2008, assailing the order of dismissal dated 3rd December, 2007 as well as the appellate order dated 16th August, 2008. By a judgment dated 23rd February, 2010, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and set aside the enquiry report dated 12th July, 2007, the order of dismissal and the appellate order, with a direction upon the respondent Bank to release all retiral and other consequential benefits to the petitioner within a period of two months. 9. The respondent Bank carried the matter in intra-court appeal, being A.P.O. No. 233 of 2010. The said appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench by an order dated 16th September, 2010. The respondent Bank thereafter carried 5 the matter to the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing Civil Appeal No. 4442 of 2011. By an order dated 26th February, 2014, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the respondent Bank to resume the disciplinary proceedings from the stage of the enquiry report. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further directed the DA to issue a show-cause notice to the petitioner setting out the points of disagreement with the findings recorded by the EO, consider the petitioner's response thereto and thereafter take a final decision, the entire exercise being required to be completed within a period of three months. Significantly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also clarified that the DA who had originally recorded his disagreement with the findings of the EO, and had thereby already formed an opinion in the matter, ought not to continue with the disciplinary proceedings. Accordingly, the Court directed that the matter should thereafter be proceeded with by an officer of a rank equivalent to that of the DA or, in the absence of an officer of such rank, by an officer superior in rank. 10. Pursuant to the said direction, a Deputy Regional Manager was appointed as the new DA by letter dated 17th April, 2014. The petitioner was afforded a personal hearing on 23rd April, 2014, and was called upon to submit his comments on the findings of the EO, which he did by letters dated 17th and 19th April, 2014. The DA thereafter passed a fresh order, which was affirmed by the AA by order dated 19th August, 2014. 11. The petitioner was once again approached this Court by filing W.P. No. 1035 of 2014, assailing the fresh orders passed by the DA and the AA. By a judgment dated 28th August, 2015, the learned Single Judge found that the procedure prescribed for conducting the disciplinary proceedings had not been duly followed and that the petitioner had been denied the principles of 6 natural justice. Accordingly, the impugned orders were set aside and the matter was remanded to the stage of submission of the enquiry report, with a direction that the disciplinary proceedings be taken to their logical conclusion afresh by a newly appointed DA. 12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the respondent Bank preferred an intra-court appeal, being A.P.O.T. No. 499 of 2015. By an order dated 11th January, 2016, the Division Bench disposed of the appeal with a direction that, in the event the DA proposed to take a view adverse to the petitioner by differing from the findings recorded by the EO, it would, before proceeding to take a final decision, furnish the petitioner with notice setting out its tentative reasons for such disagreement in respect of each charge and afford him an opportunity to respond thereto. 13. Pursuant thereto, by a letter dated 1st February, 2016, the DA communicated to the petitioner its tentative observations setting out the points of disagreement with the findings of the EO, which were confined to Charge No. 1(h) and Charge No. 3. The petitioner was thereafter afforded an opportunity of personal hearing on 16th February, 2016. Upon consideration of the materials on record and the petitioner’s submissions, the DA, by its final order dated 4th March, 2016, imposed upon the petitioner the punishment of dismissal from service with effect from 3rd December, 2007, being the date of the original order of punishment, in terms of Regulation 4(j) of the Central Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976. The said order was subsequently communicated to the petitioner by an administrative letter dated 5th March, 2016. 7 14. The AA, by an order dated 16th July, 2016, held that he did not find any cogent or sufficient ground warranting interference with the findings of the DA and, accordingly, affirmed the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon the petitioner. 15. Thereafter, the petitioner pursued his claim for payment of gratuity before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) by filing an application dated 21st June, 2018. By an order dated 1st August, 2019, the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act directed the respondent Bank to pay a sum of Rs.7,00,000/- towards gratuity to the petitioner. The petitioner states that he thereafter submitted further representations dated 6th May, 2020, 15th February, 2021 and 17th February, 2021, seeking release of his pension and payment of the revised amount of gratuity. According to the petitioner, notwithstanding the said representations, no decision was taken by the respondent Bank, save and except for an email dated 9th February, 2021, whereby the petitioner was informed that his request would be considered on merits. 16. Being aggrieved by the appellate order dated 16th July, 2016, whereby the order of dismissal dated 4th March, 2016 was affirmed, and further aggrieved by the non-release of his retiral benefits, including pension, leave encashment and other consequential benefits, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 17. The petitioner contends that the DA, by its order dated 4th March, 2016, acted mechanically and merely reiterated the order of punishment originally passed in 2007, without any independent application of mind and in disregard 8 of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court. It is further contended that, although the DA had expressed its disagreement with the findings of the EO only in respect of Charge No. 1(h) and Charge No. 3, it failed to record any reasons for differing from the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the remaining charges, namely, Charge Nos. 1(a) to 1(g), 1(i), 2, 4, 5 and 6. The petitioner further contends that he was neither informed of the proposed disagreement in respect of those charges nor afforded any opportunity to make a representation thereon before the DA arrived at its contrary findings, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. 18. According to the petitioner, the punishment of dismissal from service, which was founded principally upon Charge No. 2 relating to the account of M/s Kapaleswar Enterprise, is grossly disproportionate to the nature of the alleged misconduct. It is contended that neither in the course of the enquiry nor in the orders passed by the DA and the AA has any finding been recorded to establish that the petitioner had derived any pecuniary gain from the alleged irregularities. The petitioner further contends that the allegation regarding the engagement of a broker was wholly unsupported by any cogent or reliable evidence. Respondents’ case: 19. In the affidavit in opposition filed on behalf of respondent nos. 2 to 5, it is, inter alia, contended that, during his tenure as Branch Manager of the Barrackpore Branch from June, 2002 to October, 2005, the petitioner had committed acts of gross misconduct by sanctioning and disbursing loans in 9 favour of various parties without adhering to the prescribed norms, procedures and guidelines of the Bank, as a consequence of which several of the said loan accounts subsequently became non-performing assets. It is the specific case of the respondents that the office memorandum dated 11th April, 2006, the charge sheet dated 4th July, 2006 and the disciplinary proceedings initiated pursuant thereto were duly issued and conducted in accordance with the applicable rules and procedure. 20. In respect of Charge No. 2, it is averred that the allegation concerning the engagement of a broker, namely, Samarendra Sharma Sarkar, stood established in the course of the enquiry. According to the respondents, cheques obtained from the borrower were encashed through third parties with the involvement of the petitioner, thereby substantiating the allegation of the petitioner's misconduct. 21. It is further averred that all the charges levelled against the petitioner were found to have been proved and that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted upon due compliance with all prescribed formalities and after affording the petitioner adequate opportunity to place his case and considering the submissions advanced by him. Upon such consideration, the DA imposed the penalty of dismissal from service in accordance with the applicable banking norms and, accordingly, passed the order dated 3rd December, 2007. 22. It is further averred that the petitioner was not a ‘pension optee’, having opted for the Provident Fund Scheme. On such basis, the respondents contend that the petitioner has no subsisting entitlement to pension, and that the 10 Provident Fund contribution payable to him, together with the interest accrued thereon, was duly paid on 21st January, 2009. It is also stated that the amount of gratuity payable to the petitioner has since been paid. It is further submitted that the penalty of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner is commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct proved against him, particularly in respect of Charge No. 2. The respondents accordingly contend that the present writ petition, being devoid of merit and further being vitiated by delay and laches and barred by the principles of estoppel and acquiescence, is liable to be dismissed with costs. Contents of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the petitioner: 23. In the affidavit in reply, the petitioner, while elaborating upon his service career, stated that he had received several awards and accolades in recognition of his performance during his tenure with the Bank. These included the All-India Best Branch Award in 1994, the Best Profit-Making Branch Award in 1998 and the Best Zone Branch Award in 1988. The petitioner further asserted that, during his tenure as Branch Manager of the Barrackpore Branch, no loan account had been classified as a Non-Performing Asset. 24. The petitioner further contended that the memorandum dated 11th April, 2006 was issued without first determining “staff accountability” in accordance with the Bank’s prescribed procedure. He submitted that, although he had furnished his reply to the said memorandum on 16th June, 2006, the Bank did not thereafter communicate to him that his explanation was found unsatisfactory, as was required under the Bank’s Circular No. CO:PRS:96 11 97:192 dated 24th October, 1996, before initiation of formal disciplinary proceedings by issuance of a charge sheet. The petitioner further pointed out that, while 24 borrower accounts had been referred to in the memorandum dated 11th April, 2006, only 19 of those accounts found mention in the subsequent charge sheet dated 4th July, 2006. According to the petitioner, such circumstances indicate that the DA had already formed a predetermined view regarding his culpability even before the commencement of the disciplinary proceedings. 25. As regards the individual charges, the petitioner has sought to explain the position in respect of each account, contending that the loans sanctioned by him were duly secured by equitable mortgages, fixed deposits or personal guarantees and that, in most cases, the respective accounts were subsequently adjusted or closed without any loss being occasioned to the Bank. In relation to Charge No. 2, the petitioner denied having any nexus whatsoever with the alleged broker, namely, Samarendra Sharma Sarkar. He contended that the Presenting Officer had failed to adduce any evidence capable of establishing such nexus. It was further contended that, in any event, the account in question was fully secured and stood adjusted by 10th August, 2009. 26. The petitioner further contended that the penalty of dismissal from service could not have been imposed with retrospective effect from 3rd December, 2007, particularly when, in the intervening period, he had already attained the age of superannuation and retired from service on 31st October, 2009. It was urged that, as on 4th March, 2016, when the final order of dismissal was passed, no employer employee relationship subsisted between the petitioner and the respondent Bank. Referring to a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme 12 Court dated 26th February, 2014 and also a judgment of this Court dated 28th August, 2015, he contended that, in view of the directions contained therein, no penalty could thereafter have been imposed upon him, whether with prospective or retrospective effect. 27. As regards his claim for pension, the petitioner contended that, at the time when the option for pension was first extended to the employees of the respondent Bank in 1999, he was on deputation with Uttarbanga Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Coochbehar, and was, therefore, unable to exercise the said option. He further contended that, upon his repatriation to the respondent Bank, he was subsequently permitted to exercise a second option for pension pursuant to Circular No. 316 dated 1st September, 2010, and that he duly exercised such option on 8th November, 2010. According to the petitioner, he is, therefore, entitled to pension, in addition to the gratuity already paid to him, as well as the arrears of salary claimed for the period commencing from the date of his suspension until the date on which he would have ordinarily attained the age of superannuation. Submissions: 28. Mr. Dhar, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the concerned authorities had proceeded throughout with a pre-determined mind and had acted mechanically with the sole object of penalising the petitioner. He contended that, although the DA had disagreed with the findings of the EO, the DA, while passing the impugned order, had failed to record any cogent reasons for differing from the findings of the EO. It was 13 further submitted that the management had failed to establish that the petitioner had derived any pecuniary gain or that the Bank had suffered any pecuniary loss on account of the alleged misconduct of the petitioner. 29. Mr. Dhar further submitted that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was grossly disproportionate to the nature and gravity of the alleged misconduct. According to him, in most of the cases forming the subject matter of the charge, the concerned accounts had already been closed and the Bank had not suffered any pecuniary loss. He further submitted that the management had failed to establish that the petitioner had derived any illegal or undue pecuniary benefit from the transactions in question. It was contended that these circumstances ought to have been duly taken into consideration by the DA as well as the AA while determining the quantum of punishment. Instead, without giving due consideration to the aforesaid factors, an excessive and disproportionate punishment had been imposed upon the petitioner. Mr. Dhar particularly referred to Charge No. 1(h), (i) ,3, 4 and 5, in respect of which the DA had imposed the penalty of reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay for a period of three years, with a further direction that the petitioner would not earn increments of pay during the said period. He, therefore, submitted that the respondents be directed to reconsider the quantum of punishment having regard to the nature and gravity of the misconduct alleged and the attendant circumstances of the case. 30. Mr. Dhar further submitted that the DA ought to have taken into consideration the petitioner’s long and unblemished service of nearly 25 years in the Bank, during which he had discharged his duties with utmost devotion and had received several awards in recognition of his performance. According 14 to him, the petitioner had played a significant role in augmenting the business of the Bank. It was contended that the mere fact that certain loan accounts subsequently slipped into the category of Non-Performing Assets could not, by itself, justify the imposition of a severe penalty, particularly when there was no allegation that the petitioner had acted with any ulterior motive or had derived any personal or pecuniary benefit from the alleged lapses. 31. To bolster his submission, he referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2025 INSC 442 (UCO Bank &Anr. v. Vijay Kumar Handa)and an unreported decision of a learned Single Bench of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh in Naseer Ahmad Sheikg v. J & K Bank Limited through its Chairman, in WP(C) No. 2887 of 2022. Lastly, Mr. Dhar submitted that, having regard to the petitioner’s length of service and the circumstances of the case, the respondents ought to be directed to consider the petitioner’s claim for release of retirement benefits including pension, leave encashment and arrears of salary. 32. In response, Mr. Jha, learned advocate appearing for the Bank, vehemently opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. He submitted that there was no illegality or procedural irregularity in the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry. The petitioner had been afforded adequate opportunity to defend himself at every stage of the proceeding. He further submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had directed the Bank to resume the disciplinary proceeding from the stage of the enquiry, since the tentative reasons for the Disciplinary Authority’s proposed disagreement withthe findings of the Enquiry Officer, as well as the proposed punishment, had not been communicated to the petitioner. According to Mr. Jha, the said defect 15 was thereafter duly cured and all requisite formalities were complied with. He, therefore, submitted that no ground had been made out warranting interference by this Court with the disciplinary proceeding or the punishment imposed upon the petitioner. 33. He further submitted that the determination of the quantum of punishment falls primarily within the domain of the employer and that the absence of any pecuniary loss to the Bank would not, by itself, absolve an employee of misconduct or preclude the Bank from initiating disciplinary proceedings against him. According to Mr. Jha, where the misconduct alleged against a bank employee is established in a duly conducted disciplinary proceeding, the competent authority is entitled to impose an appropriate penalty,including dismissal or removal from service. He contended that, having regard to the nature of banking business, every employee of a Bank is required to maintain the highest standards of devotion to duty, diligence, integrity and honesty, as any compromise with such standards may erode the confidence of the public and, in particular, the depositors. He submitted that where a bank employee is found guilty of financial irregularities, the imposition of a major penalty, including dismissal or removal from service, cannot be said to be disproportionate merely on the ground that no actual pecuniary loss has been caused to the Bank. He further submitted that, under the applicable service rules, an employee dismissed from service is not entitled to pension, encashment of leave or other retiral benefits. In support of his submissions, Mr. Jha relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1996 SC 1561 (State of U.P. & Ors. v. Nand Kishore Shukla &Anr.) and AIR 1996 SC 484 (B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India &Anr.). 16 34. Mr. Jha further submitted that, by approaching the Labour Commissioner and seeking acceptance of the contribution towards provident fund, the petitioner had accepted the consequences flowing from the order of dismissal and could not thereafter seek to reopen the entire disciplinary proceeding or claim retiral benefits on the footing that he had retired from service in the normal course upon attaining the age of superannuation. According to him, the petitioner, having acted upon and accepted the benefits arising from his existing status, could not now turn around and contend that he should be treated as an employee who had retired on attaining the age of superannuation and be extended all consequential retiral benefits. In support of his contention, Mr. Jha relied upon an unreported decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court in Sri Pratap Ray v. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority & Ors., in W.P. No. 30108 (W) of 2017. Analysis and conclusion: 35. Heard the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties. Perused the materials on record. 36. Judicial review encompasses illegality, irrationality, including Wednesbury unreasonableness, and procedural impropriety. The doctrine of reasonableness gives way to the doctrine of proportionality.The object of judicial review is to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides in the exercise of public power. Although the jurisdiction of a writ court is ordinarily confined to examining the decision-making process and does not extend to sitting in appeal over the decision of the disciplinary authority. 17 37. These principles apply with equal force to disciplinary proceedings. Judicial review in disciplinary matters is primarily concerned with the decision-making process and not with the merits of the decision itself. It is well settled that a writ court cannot reappreciate or re-evaluate the evidence recorded during the enquiry as if it were an appellate court.The Court may, however, examine the material on record for the limited purpose of determining whether the finding of misconduct is based on no evidence, is perverse, or is such that no reasonable person could have arrived at it. 38. It is equally well settled that the power to impose punishment upon an employee ordinarily lies within the domain of the employer or the disciplinary authority, and the Court will not ordinarily interfere unless the enquiry has been conducted in breach of the applicable rules or the principles of natural justice, including denial of a reasonable opportunity to defend oneself. Interference may also be warranted where the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct proved or is otherwise such as to offend the doctrine of proportionality. 39. In the present case, as noticed previously, in the first round of litigation, the matter travelled up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4442 of 2011, and by order dated 26th February, 2014, the Hon’ble Supreme Court remitted the matter to the DA to issue a show-cause notice in respect of the difference of opinion recorded by the DA and to take a final decision in terms of the said order dated 26th February, 2014. In the second round of litigation, a coordinate Bench as well as a Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, noticing that the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court had not been complied with in its true spirit, also remitted the matter to the respondents 18 with a direction upon the DA to issue a show-cause notice to the petitioner, disclosing the tentative reasons for proposing to take a view divergent from that of the Enquiry Officer and indicating the penalty proposed to be imposed upon the petitioner. 40. It is, therefore, evident that, in the first and second rounds of litigation, the petitioner failed to establish any illegality or procedural irregularity in the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry. Thereafter, in compliance with the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as those of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in APOT No. 499 of 2015, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply thereto on 26th February, 2016 and, on the same day, was afforded an opportunity of personal hearing. Uponconsideration of the reply and after affording such opportunity of hearing, the final order of punishment was passed. Even in the present proceedings, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any illegality, procedural impropriety or infirmity in the decision-making process. Both the DA and the AA have passed reasoned orders, dealing with the charges separately and recording their findings on each charge. 41. It is well settled that the question of the nature and quantum of punishment to be imposed upon a delinquent employee, once the misconduct is proved, primarily falls within the domain of the DA and, on appeal, the AA. The said authorities are entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining discipline in the establishment and are better placed to assess the gravity of the misconduct, the nature of duties discharged by the delinquent employee, the degree of responsibility attached to such duties and the impact of the misconduct upon the institution. The Court, while exercising judicial review, 19 does not sit as an appellate authority over the quantum of punishment and cannot substitute its own opinion merely because it may, on its own assessment, consider a lesser punishment to be more appropriate. 42. In B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the DA and the AA, being the fact-finding authorities, have the discretion to impose an appropriate punishment having regard to the magnitude and gravity of the misconduct. It was further held that the High Court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on the penalty imposed. Interference would be warranted only where the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court. Even in such a case, the normal course is to remit the matter to the competent authority for reconsideration of the quantum of punishment, and substitution of the punishment by the Court itself is contemplated only in exceptional and rare cases. 43. The aforesaid principle has consistently been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is now well settled proposition of law that unless the punishment is found to be so disproportionate to the proved misconduct that it is irrational, arbitrary or in defiance of logic and thereby shocks the judicial conscience, the Court ought not to interfere with the discretion exercised by the departmental authorities. 44. The position assumes greater significance in the case of an employee of a banking institution. An employee of a bank, particularly one entrusted with responsibilities involving financial transactions and the affairs of customers, is expected to maintain a high standard of integrity, honesty, devotion and 20 diligence. The relationship between a bank and its employees is founded substantially upon trust and confidence, and any misconduct which has the effect of undermining such confidence cannot be viewed in isolation or merely from the perspective of the immediate pecuniary loss, if any, caused to the Bank. 45. It is also a well-settled proposition of law that even in the absence of any pecuniary loss, if an act of misconduct on the part of an employee of a bank is established, the disciplinary authority is competent to impose an appropriate punishment, including dismissal from service, having regard tothe nature and gravity of the misconduct. In the present case, although in some of the accounts the amounts due were fully adjusted upon closure of the accounts, in certain other cases the accounts had slipped into the category of NPAs. Charge No. 2, in particular, records that two persons, who were not known to the Bank but were known to the borrowers, had actively participated in the monetary transactions relating to the accounts. The disciplinary authority further found that the businesses purportedly carried on by the borrowers had no real existence and that the concerned accounts had consequently slipped into NPAs. The accounts were thereafter closed pursuant to settlement, resulting in pecuniary loss to the Bank. While considering the charges separately, the disciplinary authority has dealt with the individual accounts which hadslipped into NPAs and has recorded specific findings with regard thereto. In relation to Charge No. 2, the disciplinary authority has specifically noticed the involvement of two persons who were not known to the Bank but were connected with the borrowers and had actively participated in the 21 monetary transactions, as also the absence of any genuine business activity on the part of the borrowers. 46. The aforesaid findings cannot be said to be wholly irrelevant or unconnected with the charges levelled against the petitioner. Rather, they bring out the nature and seriousness of the irregularities committed by him in the discharge of his duties as a bank official. The Supreme Court, in Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh v. Krishnan Behari, reported in JT 1996 (3) SC 96, while considering a case involving financial irregularities, observed that where financial irregularity is established, there is little scope for showing sympathy, as such an approach would be contrary to public interest. This principle assumes even greater significance in the case of a bank employee, who is entrusted with the handling of public money and is, therefore, expected to maintain a high degree of integrity, honesty, financial discipline and devotion to duty. 47. Therefore, having regard to the fact that all the charges levelled against the petitioner stood proved, and that the petitioner was holding a responsible and prestigious position in a financial institution where a high degree of integrity, honesty, devotion to duty and diligence is expected of an employee, the punishment of dismissal from service cannot be said to be so disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct as to shock the conscience of the Court or to be wholly unreasonable or irrational. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, therefore, does not warrant interference in exercise of the limited power of judicial review. 22 48. I have carefully considered the decisions relied upon on behalf of the petitioner. In Noor Ahmad Sheikh (supra), the petitioner therein was an employee of the Jammu & Kashmir Bank, and the nature of the allegations levelled against him was materially different from those involved in the present case. The said decision, therefore, is distinguishable on facts and does not advance the case of the petitioner. Similarly, in UCO Bank &Anr. (supra), the Court was concerned with a different set of regulations governing the employees of the bank. The statutory and regulatory frameworkapplicable in the present case being different, the said decision is also of no assistance to the petitioner. 49. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no merit in the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed, without, however, any order as to costs. 50. In the course of hearing, reference was made to Regulation 31 of the Central Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995, which provides for the grant of compassionate allowance in appropriate cases. In view thereof, it is clarified that dismissal of the present writ petition shall not preclude the petitioner from making an appropriate application before the competent authority seeking compassionate allowance, if otherwise permissible in law. In the event such an application is made, the competent authority shallconsider and dispose of the same in accordance with the applicable Pension Regulations and in accordance with law. (Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.)