$~19 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + FAO 131/2021 & CM APPL. 13422/2021 & CM APPL. 13424/2021 CHARAN KAMAL SINGH WAHI .....Appellant Through: Mr. Vikas Sharma and Ms. Aayushi Gupta, Advocates versus KALASWARI DEVI & ORS. .....Respondent Through: Mr. Sharique Hussain, Advocate for Respondent No. 6 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI O R D E R % 22.07.2026 FAO 131/2021 & CM APPL. 13424/2021 (condonation of delay) & CM APPL. 13422/2021 (stay) 1. The present appeal has been preferred under Section 30 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter the “EC Act”) against the order dated 14.03.2018 passed by the learned Commissioner, Employee’s Compensation, in Case No. CEC/SD/D/07/2018. Vide the impugned order, the claim application filed by respondent nos. 1 to 5 came to be allowed and they were held to be entitled to receive compensation of Rs.6,30,880/- from the appellant, along with interest @ 12% per annum w.e.f. 19.12.2017 till its realisation, and a penalty of Rs.3,12,940/-. 2. Briefly stated, respondent nos. 1 to 5 filed the underlying claim on account of the death of the deceased workman, Sh. Shripati Mandal, who lost his life while carrying out construction work at the appellant’s premises. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 31/07/2026 at 13:49:55 The case of respondent nos. 1 to 5 was that the deceased was employed by the appellant and had suffered the fatal accident during the course of and arising out of his employment. By way of the impugned order, the learned Commissioner awarded compensation in favour of respondent nos. 1 to 5. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 3. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the present appeal has been preferred after a delay of 908 days beyond the prescribed period of limitation. In the captioned application seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the appellant has merely made a general reference to the previous counsel, the COVID-19 pandemic, and certain procedural difficulties. However, except for these broad assertions, no satisfactory or cogent explanation has been furnished accounting for the entire period of delay of 908 days. 4. Notice in the captioned application was issued vide order dated 04.10.2023, with the respondents being granted time to file a reply and the appellant being granted liberty to file a rejoinder thereto. Accordingly, the respondents filed a reply opposing the appellant’s prayer for condonation of delay. However, despite repeated opportunities and the matter having been listed on several occasions thereafter, the appellant neither filed any rejoinder nor sought to controvert the objections raised by the respondents. Consequently, the averments made by the respondents in the reply have remained substantially unrebutted. 5. It is well settled that though the expression “sufficient cause” occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deserves a liberal construction in appropriate cases so as to advance substantial justice, such liberal approach cannot be extended to condone negligence, inaction or This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 31/07/2026 at 13:49:55 unexplained delay. The applicant is required to establish bona fides and furnish a plausible explanation covering the entire period of delay. Mere vague assertions or general explanations do not satisfy the statutory requirement. In this regard, reference may be made to Basawaraj & Anr. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer1 and Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao Vs. Reddy Sridevi & Ors.2. 6. On the touchstone of the aforesaid, this Court finds that the appellant has failed to disclose sufficient cause warranting condonation of the substantial delay of nearly 3 years. The explanation offered neither accounts for the period between the passing of the impugned order and the alleged engagement of a fresh counsel nor explains the considerable period of inactivity after obtaining the certified record. Equally, the mere assertion that an earlier appeal had been filed but objections were not removed by the previous counsel cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient cause, particularly when no material has been placed on record to demonstrate due diligence on the part of the appellant. Significantly, despite the respondents having raised such deficiencies in their reply, the appellant chose not to file any rejoinder. Consequently, the application seeking condonation of delay is dismissed. As a necessary sequitur, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed as being barred by limitation. 7. Even otherwise, this Court finds no merit in the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. The principal challenge raised in the present appeal is that the appellant was not the employer of the deceased, inasmuch as the deceased had allegedly been engaged through an independent 1 (2013) 14 SCC 81 2 (2021) 18 SCC 384 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 31/07/2026 at 13:49:55 mason/contractor. It has further been contended that the appellant had not admitted his liability before the learned Commissioner, that the impugned order was passed without affording adequate opportunity to contest the proceedings, and that the findings recorded therein are contrary to the material placed on record. 8. In order to deal with the aforesaid contentions, it would be apposite to first reproduce the relevant portion of the impugned order passed by the learned Commissioner: “3. Notices were issued to the Respondents. On 27.02.2018, Sh. Ghanshyam, Ld. Counsel of Claimants appeared but none appeared for Respondents despite summons dated 05.02.2018. At 3:15 P.M. Sh. Charan Kamal Singh Wahi, Respondent No. 1 appeared and marked his presence. 4. On 14.03.2018, Sh. Charan Kamal Singh Wahi, Respondent No. 1, appeared in person and none appeared for Respondent No. 2. Sh. Charan Kamal Singh Wahi, Respondent No. 1, admitted the case and undertook to pay the death compensation to the Claimants. An admitted case need not be proved. In view of the said admission of Sh. Charan Kamal Singh Wahi, Respondent No. 1, Respondent No. 1 was directed to deposit the death compensation as under.” 9. The impugned order unequivocally records that the appellant appeared in person on 27.02.2018 and again on 14.03.2018, when he not only admitted the case but also expressly undertook to pay the death compensation to the respondents. The appellant now seeks to contend that he had never admitted his liability before the learned Commissioner and that the impugned order came to be passed without affording him an adequate opportunity to contest the proceedings. Fortunately, the law in this regard is This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 31/07/2026 at 13:49:55 no longer res integra. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak & Anr.3, the Supreme Court decisively held as under: “We are afraid that we cannot launch into an enquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. “Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation.”¹ We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error.² That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an appellate court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment.” 10. In the present case, nothing has been placed on record to demonstrate that the appellant had ever called the attention of the learned Commissioner to the fact that the admission recorded in the impugned order had been made in error, while the matter was still fresh in the mind of the learned Commissioner. No application seeking review or correction of the impugned order was ever preferred. As held by the Supreme Court in Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak (supra), that was the only course available to the appellant if the proceedings had not transpired in the manner recorded by the learned 3 (1982) 2 SCC 463 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 31/07/2026 at 13:49:55 Commissioner. Consequently, it is not open to the appellant to now contend that he had never admitted his liability before the learned Commissioner. Equally, the contention that he was not afforded an adequate opportunity to contest the proceedings is also belied as the impugned order expressly records his appearance before the learned Commissioner on two separate dates prior to the passing of the impugned order. 11. The only surviving contention is that the appellant was not the employer of the deceased, as he had merely engaged a mason/contractor, who in turn had employed the deceased. In any event, this contention, too, does not merit acceptance as it is well settled that a principal employer cannot evade liability under the EC Act merely on the ground that the deceased workman had been engaged through a contractor. In this regard, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Shri. Krishan Vs. Jasoda Devi & Ors.4. 12. Furthermore, the scope of interference under Section 30 of the EC Act is well settled. An appeal under the said provision is maintainable only if it involves a substantial question of law. The Commissioner is the final authority on questions of fact, and unless the findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or founded upon an erroneous application of law, no interference is warranted. In this regard, reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Golla Rajanna & Ors. Vs. Divisional Manager & Anr.5 and North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation Vs. Sujatha6. 4 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11137 5 (2017) 1 SCC 45 6 (2019) 11 SCC 514. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 31/07/2026 at 13:49:55 13. In view of the above discussion, the application seeking condonation of delay as well as the present appeal are dismissed. 14. The entire award amount deposited with the learned Commissioner in respect of the present case, along with the interest accrued thereon, be released to the respondents. 15. The present appeal, along with the pending applications, is disposed of in the above terms. MANOJ KUMAR OHRI, J JULY 22, 2026 nb This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 31/07/2026 at 13:49:55