IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH 226 CWP-23576-2021 Date of decision: 27.07.2026 Lakhwinder Singh Dhindsa .....Petitioner Versus Punjab State Power Corporation Limited & Ors. .....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR Present : Mr. A.K. Virdi, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. A.S. Chadha, Advocate for the respondents-PSPCL. **** NAMIT KUMAR, J. (ORAL) 1. The petitioner has filed the instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking quashing of the impugned order of dismissal dated 09.03.2016 (Annexure P-1). 2. The undisputed facts, which have emerged from the pleadings of the parties, are that the petitioner was initially appointed as Lower Division Clerk (LDC) on 27.11.1986 and was further promoted to the post of Upper Division Clerk (UDC) on 07.05.2002. He applied for earned leave from 24.05.2010 to 27.08.2010, which was sanctioned by the respondents-Corporation, vide order dated 24.05.2010 (Annexure P-9). Thereafter, the petitioner did not join back his duties which compelled the Corporation to issue chargesheet dated 22.09.2011 (Annexure P-14) but the petitioner did not submit any reply. The respondents appointed an Inquiry Officer, who conducted the inquiry in VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment CWP-23576-2021 -2- accordance with the procedure prescribed under the regulations of the Corporation and submitted his inquiry report proving the charge of absence against the petitioner. Thereafter, after issuance of show cause notice etc., the petitioner was dismissed from service, vide order dated 09.03.2016 (Annexure P-1). After five years of his dismissal, the petitioner served a legal notice dated 18.10.2021 (Annexure P-17) upon the respondents for reinstatement in service. In para 3(e) of the petition, it has been stated that the petitioner proceeded for Germany along with his family in the year 2010 and remained there till his return back to India on 26.07.2021. In this manner, the petitioner remained in Germany for more than 11 years. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in terms of the Regulation 3.22 of the Punjab State Electricity Board, Main Services Regulation, 1972, Vol. I Part I (now PSPCL), the petitioner could not have been dismissed from service and five years leave is admissible under the said Regulation, which reads as under:- “CONTINUOUS ABSENCE FROM DUTY 3.22 (1) Unless the Board in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case otherwise determine, no Board employee shall be granted leave of any kind for a continuous period exceeding five years. (2) Where a Board employee does not resume duty after remaining on leave for a continuous period of five years, or where a Board employee after the expiry of his leave remains absent from duty, otherwise than on foreign service or on account of suspension, for any period which, together with the period of the leave granted to him, exceeds five years, he shall, unless the authority, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case, otherwise determine, be removed from service after following the procedure laid down in Pb.S.E.B. Employees (Punishment and Appeal) Regulations. Note:- This regulation does not relate to cases where a Board employee is restrained from resuming duty by VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment CWP-23576-2021 -3- an order placing him under suspension. Sanction of the competent authority in terms of this regulation, in such a case is not, therefore, necessary. It is essential, however, in the interests of Board as well as of the concerned officer that disciplinary proceedings against an officer under suspension should be expedited and final orders passed as soon as possible.” 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that in view of the above Regulation, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents, while referring to the averments made in the written statement, submits that the petitioner only applied for 96 days' earned leave, which was sanctioned, vide order dated 24.05.2010 (Annexure P-9) and, thereafter, neither the petitioner joined his service nor he submitted any application for extension of the leave and remained continuously absent from duty with effect from 28.08.2010 onwards. During this period, the respondents-Corporation wrote various letters to the petitioner to report for duty or to get his leave sanctioned/re-approved. The relevant paras from the written statement read as under:- “4. That it is submitted that upon expiry of the leave period the petitioner did not come forward to join his duties. The answering respondent vide letter dated 09.09.2010 had written to the petitioner asking him to report for duty or to get his leave sanctioned/re-approved. Despite issuance of the aforesaid letter the petitioner did not approach the answering respondent or show off to join his duties. The answering respondents vide letter dated 03.02.2011 once again asking the petitioner to join his duty. Further, the answering respondents once again taking the lenient view vide letter dated 25.02.2011 had requested the petitioner to join back his duties considering the fact that his leave stood expired. 5. That it is submitted that upon getting no response whatsoever from the petitioner he was issued a chargesheet dated 22.09.2011. A copy of the chargesheet VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment CWP-23576-2021 -4- dated 22.09.2011 is appended herewith as ANNEXURE R-1/1. The answering respondents had sought the reply of the petitioner to the allegations levelled against him w.r.t. willful absentation from duty. 6. That upon receiving no response from the petitioner an inquiry officer was appointed in order to inquire into the allegations levelled against the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer had sought the reply of the petitioner on numerous occasions, however, the petitioner failed to show off before the inquiry officer or file any reply against the allegations levelled against him. It is submitted that the inquiry officer had given him adequate opportunities and the same are depicted herein below: Date of Letter Remarks 21.11.2012 Petitioner requested to file reply to the allegations levelled against him. 20.12.2012 Petitioner requested to file reply to the allegations levelled against him. 28.01.2013 Petitioner requested to file reply to the allegations levelled against him. 22.03.2013 Petitioner requested to file reply to the allegations levelled against him. 7. That it is submitted that considering the fact that the petitioner has failed to show up and had moreover failed to reply of any of the letters sent by the inquiry officer soliciting his presence/reply, the inquiry officer having left with no other option had closed the inquiry proceedings. The inquiry officer had held the petitioner guilty of charges leveled against him in the chargesheet. It is submitted that the answering respondents had issued a fresh notice granting another opportunity to the petitioner to appear before the answering respondents, however, he failed to do so. 8. That it is submitted that in the aforesaid background the impugned order of dismissal was issued. It is submitted that adequate and proper opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner in order to defend his case, however, he failed to show up before the respondent- authorities. It is submitted that leave of the petitioner was sanctioned for 96 days and stood expired on 27.08.2010. The impugned dismissal order has been passed in the year 2016. Prior to passing the impugned dismissal order, the VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment CWP-23576-2021 -5- petitioner has not approached the respondent-authorities on any occasion. The answering respondents as per settled rules and regulations an upon complying with the principles of natural justice had issued to the petitioner a chargesheet and thereinafter the inquiry officer has been appointed who had granted adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, however, the petitioner failed to show up before the inquiry officer or defend the allegations levelled against him.” 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. The facts are not in dispute that the petitioner, while working as UDC, applied for earned leave for 96 days from 24.05.2010 to 27.08.2010, which was duly approved by the competent authority vide order dated 24.05.2010 (Annexure P-9). After the said period, the petitioner neither applied for extension of leave nor joined his duty, despite issuance of various letters by the respondents-Corporation to the petitioner. In this manner, he remained absent from duty continuously with effect from 28.08.2010 and was issued chargesheet dated 22.09.2011 (Annexure P-14) and after following the due procedure, he was dismissed from service, vide order dated 09.03.2016 (Annexure P-1). After a period of more than five years, the petitioner served a legal notice dated 18.10.2021 (Annexure P-17) seeking reinstatement in service. It is the case of the petitioner himself in para 3(e) of the petition that he remained in Germany along with his family from 2010 onwards and came back to India on 26.07.2021, i.e., after a period of more than 11 years. 8. The principal question, therefore, is not whether this Court should re-appreciate the evidence recorded in the departmental proceedings, but whether the decision-making process suffers from any VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment CWP-23576-2021 -6- illegality or violation of principles of natural justice warranting interference. The scope of judicial review has been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, 1963 AIR Supreme Court 1723, wherein it has been held that the High Court is not a Court of appeal which examines the merits of the findings recorded in the departmental inquiry and the power of judicial review is confined to; whether the inquiry was held by a competent authority; according to the procedure prescribed and whether rules of natural justice have been followed. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. P. Gunasekaran, 2015(1) SCT 5 while considering the scope of interference under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has held he as under: - "13. Despite the well-settled settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re- appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether : a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment CWP-23576-2021 -7- f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1723, many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus : "7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent pendent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment CWP-23576-2021 -8- where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." 15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975)2 SCC 557, the principles have been further discussed at paragraph paragraph-21 to 24, which read as follows : "21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing wit with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao Rao. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment CWP-23576-2021 -9- extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. 22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh case this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the shut- down of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that at the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion. 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment CWP-23576-2021 -10- recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan. 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do." These principles have been succinctly summed summed-up by the living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491. To quote the unparalled and inimitable expressions: "4. .... in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good...." VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment CWP-23576-2021 -11- 10. To the similar effect is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Industrial Security Force and others v. Abrar Ali, 2017(1) SCT 682, wherein it has been held as under: - "8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya reported in 2011(2) S.C.T. 782 : 2011(3) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 28 : (2011) 4 SCC 584, this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, 1996(1) S.C.T. 617 : (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, 1997(4) S.C.T. 214 : (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, 1999(3) S.C.T. 669 : (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036 and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil." 11. The said view has recently been reiterated by the Hon'ble VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment CWP-23576-2021 -12- Supreme Court in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and others v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, 2021(1) SCT 285 and in the said judgment it has been held as under: - “23. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional Courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has been earlier examined by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V. Venuaopalan, 1994(6) SCC 302 and later in Government of T.N. and Another v. A. Rajapandian, 1995(1) SCC 216 and further examined by the three Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Others, 1995(6) SCC 749 wherein it has been held as under "13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued." 24. It has been consistently followed in the later decision of this Court in Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited v. Mahesh Dahiya, 2017(1) SCC 768 and recently by the three Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India and Others, 2020(9) SCC 471. 25. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the Constitutional Courts, is an evaluation of the decision- making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The Court/Tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority if based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment CWP-23576-2021 -13- would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 26. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the Court is to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. 27. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry. 28. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings. 29. The Constitutional Court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of malafides or perversity, i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained." 12. To the similar effect is the judgment in B.C. Chaturvedi v. VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment CWP-23576-2021 -14- Union of India and others : 1996(1) SCT 617 and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora : (1997) 3 SCC 72. 13. Applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the petitioner admittedly remained absent from duty with effect from 28.08.2010 without any sanctioned leave. Significantly, in the pleadings itself, the petitioner admits that he returned from Germany after more than 11 years and only thereafter sought reinstatement by serving a legal notice dated 18.10.2021. The record further reveals that the petitioner neither responded to the chargesheet nor participated in the enquiry proceedings despite due opportunity. In these circumstances, no procedural infirmity or perversity in findings of the disciplinary authority has been demonstrated so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. Keeping in view the above, finding no merit in the present petition, the same is hereby dismissed. 27.07.2026 (NAMIT KUMAR) Vinay JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No VINAY 2026.07.29 14:42 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment