1 8.sa.16.2021.odt IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR SECOND APPEAL NO.16 OF 2021 Sau. Madhavi Marotrao Pimpalkar (dead) through LRs .Vs. Tejrup Ganpat Nagrale and another Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Court's or Judge's Order Coram, appearances, Court's Orders or directions and Registrar's order Mr. A.A. Dhawas, Advocate for appellants. Mr. A.V. Lokhande, Advocate for respondents. CORAM : ROHIT W. JOSHI, J. DATE : 23/01/2026 1. Notice in the present second appeal was issued vide order dated 21.06.2021 on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the lower Appellate Court was justified in not considering that the appellant/plaintiff has been in continuous and long-standing possession of the suit property pursuant to the sale deed dated 08.11.2000?” 2. The present respondent No.1 had filed a suit for specific performance of contract against the respondent No.2, being Regular Civil Suit No.137 of 2000, on 11.10.2000, seeking specific performance of contract i.e. agreement of sale dated 01.04.2000 with respect to the suit property, which is an agricultural land. The said suit came to be decreed by the learned Civil Judge Junior Division, Rajura, vide judgment and decree dated 02.01.2003. 3. The present appellants purchased the suit property from the respondent No.2 vide sale deed dated 08.11.2000, which was registered on 30.11.2000. It is thus 2 8.sa.16.2021.odt not in dispute that the present appellants is a lis pendens transferee. The present appellants filed a suit being Regular Civil Suit No.75 of 2005 inter alia seeking declaration that the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 02.01.2003 passed in Regular Civil Suit No.137 of 2000 is not binding on him and a decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants in the said suit from disturbing his possession over the suit property. The said suit came to be dismissed by the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 21.06.2017. 4. Aggrieved by the said decree dismissing the said suit, the present appellants preferred appeal being Regular Civil Appeal No.83 of 2017, which came to be dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 20.12.2019. Both the Courts have concurrently held that the plaintiffs/appellants failed to make out a case that the judgment and decree passed in favour of respondent No.1 (plaintiff in Regular Civil Suit No.137 of 2000) is a collusive decree. 5. The learned Advocate for the appellants has filed on record paper book prepared in Regular Civil Appeal No.83 of 2017. 6. I have perused the plaint in Regular Civil Suit No.75 of 2005, out of which the present appeal is arises. Perusal of the plaint avernments will indicate that the case of the appellant/original plaintiff throughout is that the respondent No.2, who is his vendor, did not apprise him about the alleged prior agreement and the fact of filing of 3 8.sa.16.2021.odt the civil suit. The plaint avernments indicate that the plaintiff/appellant has pleaded that he is a victim of fraud, since he has purchased the property bonafide, being unaware about the alleged prior agreement or the pending civil suit. 7. Apart from this, there is a singular statement in the plaint that the decree is obtained by collusion between the respondent Nos.1 and 2 i.e. plaintiff and defendant in the earlier civil suit. The pleadings about collusion do not satisfy the requirements of Order 6 Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by any stretch of imagination. Except for the word “Collusion”, no particulars are given in the plaint. 8. I have also perused the findings recorded by both the learned Courts. Both the learned Courts have held that lack of knowledge cannot be a ground to escape the consequences of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The legal position in this regard, is not in dispute and is well settled. Indeed, lack of knowledge about pending litigation cannot be a ground for lis pendens transferee to claim that he is not bound by it. 9. In view of the aforesaid, the substantial question of law framed in the appeal deserves to be answered against the appellants/plaintiffs and in favour of respondent No.1. The appeal deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed with no order as to costs. 10. At this stage, Mr. Dhawas, learned Advocate for the appellants, contends that liberty should be granted to the appellants/plaintiffs to file a suit for recovery of money 4 8.sa.16.2021.odt against the respondent No.2, who is their vendor. Any suit for recovery of money, if filed by the present appellants, be decided in accordance with law. (ROHIT W. JOSHI, J.) C.L. Dhakate