24-CA-11997-21.odt IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11997 OF 2021 IN FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 18643 OF 2019 The Executive Engineer Minir Irrigation Division, Z.P. Osmanabad ..APPLICANT VERSUS State of Maharashtra and Others ..RESPONDENTS .... Mr. R.D. Raut, Advocate for applicant Mr. V.S. Badakh, A.G.P. for respondent - State .... CORAM : RAJNISH R. VYAS, J. DATE : 09th MARCH, 2026 PER COURT : . This is an application for condonation of delay of 1053 days occurred in filing the appeal at the instance of acquiring body, challenging the judgment and award dated 03rd May, 2016 passed in L.A.R. No. 2 of 2010 by the Civil Judge Senior Division, Omerga. 2. Learned counsel for the applicant / acquiring body contended that the delay caused is not intentional but bonafide. The delay caused in filing the appeal is duly explained, and therefore, prays for allowing the application. 1 / 4 2026:BHC-AUG:11789 24-CA-11997-21.odt 3. At this juncture it is necessary to reproduce the pleadings made in the application as follows :- “5] Being aggrieved dissatisfied by judgment and award passed by the learned reference Court, the appellant approached to this Hon’ble High Court and thereby challenge legality, validity and correctness of the said award. 6] Applicants submit that, the learned Civil Court, Senior Division, Omerga, Dist. Osmanabad has passed the judgment and decree in L.A.R. No 2/2010 on dated 03.05.2016. The authority has taken a decision to challenge the said judgment and decree before the Hon’ble High Court by way of filing First Appeal. The appellant is the acquiring body and contested party to take the decision there is a due process. Therefore, the delay in filing of First Appeal but it is not intentional the delay is caused on the count of administrative time to take decisions and collecting necessary documents information and certified copies in the present case. The delay is 1053 days.” 4. Perusal of the pleadings would reveal that no specific dates are given which could have given the foundation to the Court to arrive at proper conclusion. The only reason advanced is the applicant is the acquiring body and contested party, to take the decision there is a due process. What is the due process is conspicuously silent in the application. 5. At this juncture it is necessary to mention here that the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Shivamma (Dead) By L.Rs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board 2025 SCC OnLine 1969, has observed thus - 2 / 4 24-CA-11997-21.odt “261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude. 262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law. 263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present 3 / 4 24-CA-11997-21.odt case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.” 6. It is undisputed that in the Limitation Act, delay can be condoned if sufficient cause or plausible explanation is given. On having gone through the pleadings made, I find that no plausible explanation or reason is advanced for condoning the delay. Just because the appeal is preferred by the acquiring body, no separate treatment can be awarded. 7. In that view of the matter, following order is passed :- ORDER Civil application is rejected. Consequently, appeal on stamp number is also rejected. ( RAJNISH R. VYAS, J. ) SSD 4 / 4