(WPC No.2530/2020) CGHC010216302020 2026:CGHC:29357 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 2530 of 2020 Order reserved on: 02/07/2026 Order delivered on: 13/07/2026 Order (Full) uploaded on: 13/07/2026 Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited, Having its Registered and Corporate Office at 120, Vidyut Bhawan, Janpath, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur – 302006 ... Petitioner versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh, Through Chief Secretary, Government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2. Collector, Surguja, Office of the District Collector (Mining Department), Surguja, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh. 3. Secretary, Commercial Taxes and Registration Department, Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 4. Inspector General, Office of Inspector General of Stamp and Registration, Old Mantralay, Near DKS Bhawan, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 5. Secretary, Department of Mineral Resources, Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 6. District Registrar, Ambikapur, Sarguja, Chhattisgarh. 7. Union of India, Through Secretary, Ministry of Coal, 131, Ground Floor, World Trade Center, Babar Road, New Delhi – 110001. ... Respondents SISTA SOMAYAJULU Digitally signed by SISTA SOMAYAJULU Date: 2026.07.13 17:03:52 +0530 (WPC No.2530/2020) For Petitioner : Mr. Abhishek Sinha, Senior Advocate with Mr. Anshuman Shrivastava, Mr. Abhijeet Shrivastava (Video Conferencing), Ms. Krati Dubey, Ms. Selina Raj Mevati, Ms. Ananya Sahu, Ms. Amisha Sinha, Ms. Jasleen Kaur Gulati, Advocates. For Respondents No.1 to 6 : Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, Government Advocate. For Respondent No.7 : Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Deputy Solicitor General of India and Mr. Rishabh Dev Singh, Advocate. Single Bench: - Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal C.A.V. Order For the sake of exposition, this Order is divided in following parts:- S.No. Particulars Page Nos. 1. Challenge in the Writ Petition 3 2. Writ Petition on behalf of the Petitioner 3 3. Return on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh 10 4. Rejoinder on behalf of the Petitioner 11 5. Impugned Order passed by the Collector of Stamps 11 6. Submission on behalf of the Writ Petitioner 14 7. Submission on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh 17 8. Submission on behalf of the Union of India 20 9. Questions for Determination of the Writ Petition 21 10. Re: Question No.2 22 11. Re: Question No.3 23 12. Re: Question No.1 The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Scheme of Section 49 25 13. Discussion and Analysis 28 14. Restitution under Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act 33 15. Payment of Interest on Stamp Duty and Cess on Stamp Duty 38 16. Refund of Registration Fee 39 17. Conclusion 40 18. Relief 40 (WPC No.2530/2020) Challenge in the Writ Petition 1. Invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, who is an undertaking of the Government of Rajasthan engaged in the business of generation and sale of electricity in the State of Rajasthan, has filed this writ petition seeking quashment, amongst all, of the order dated 25-11-2019 (Annexure P-46) passed by the Collector of Stamps, Surguja, Ambikapur and consequently seeking refund of spoiled stamp duty under Section 49(d)(1) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, by which the petitioner’s application for refund of spoiled stamp duty, registration fees and cess on stamp duty, has been rejected by the competent authority finding no merit. Writ Petition on behalf of the Petitioner 2. The petitioner herein is a Company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and is an undertaking of the Government of Rajasthan engaged in the business of generation and sale of electricity in the State of Rajasthan. The petitioner on 11.08.2006, vide Annexure P-2, applied for allocation of Parsa East and Kanta Basan Coal Blocks (PEKB Coal Blocks) as per Section 3(3) (a)(i) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 under the Government Company dispensation route, on which the Union of India allocated the said PEKB Coal Blocks to the petitioner vide its letter dated 25.06.2007 (Annexure P-3) in terms of the aforesaid provision of the Act of 1973 under the Government Company (WPC No.2530/2020) dispensation route and the revised policy on Coal Mining of the State Government, pursuant to which the petitioner applied for grant of a mining lease vide application dated 31.03.2009 (Annexure P-4). Thereafter, respondent No.5 passed order dated 26-5-2012 (Annexure P-5) approving the PEKB Coal Block mining lease in favour of the petitioner for a period of 30 years and respondent No.2 Collector by its memo dated 28-5-2012 (Annexure P-6) requested the Sub-Registrar, Ambikapur to determine stamp duty and registration fee payable by the petitioner for execution of mining lease over 2,388.525 hectares, considering the annual royalty to be ₹ 62.16 crores in response to which the Sub-Registrar, Ambikapur, on the same day, assessed stamp duty amounting to ₹ 15.54 crores, cess ₹ 0.777 crores and registration fee ₹ 11.655 crores, thereby levying an aggregate amount of ₹ 27.972 crores upon the petitioner for execution of mining lease vide Annexure P-7. Thereafter, vide Annexure P-8, mining lease for a period of 30 years from 30-5-2012 to 29-5-2042 was executed between respondent No.1 i.e. Government of Chhattisgarh and the petitioner herein in respect of PEKB Coal Block admeasuring 2,388.525 hectares situate in various villages of Tehsil Udaipur, Police Station Premnagar, Sub-Division Ambikapur, District Surguja. Pursuant to execution and registration of mining lease, the petitioner paid an aggregate amount of ₹ 27.972 crores towards stamp duty, cess and registration fee to the Revenue Department, State of Chhattisgarh, as determined by the Sub- Registrar on 28-5-2012. Page 5 of 40 (WPC No.2530/2020) 3. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary and others1 (first case) (paragraphs 163 to 164) by its judgment dated 25-8-2014 considering the issue, held that "the entire allocation of coal block as per recommendations made by the Screening Committee from 14-7-1993 in 36 meetings and the allocation through the Government Dispensation Route suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and legal flaws" and, therefore, declared such allocations to be illegal. Their Lordships further held that though the object of allocation of coal blocks through Government Dispensation Route is, however, laudable, but the same is also illegal since it is impermissible as per the scheme of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973. Consequently, as per the petitioner, the allocation of PEKB Coal Blocks in favour of the petitioner stood de-allocated, the allocation letter became void ab initio and the mining lease deed dated 30-5- 2012 became void and unenforceable in law. 4. Thereafter, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary and others2 (second case) dated 24-9-2014 held that the cancellation will take effect only after six months from today, which is with effect from 31- 3-2015 (para 37). 5. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 6(1) of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 2014, the Central Government 1 (2014) 9 SCC 516 2 (2014) 9 SCC 614 (WPC No.2530/2020) vide notification dated 29-10-2014 (Annexure P-9), appointed respondent No.7 as the nominated authority for the purpose of allocation of coal mines. The said respondent No.7 – nominated authority, Government of India, vide order dated 17-2-2015 (Annexure P-10), invited applications for auction and allotment of various coal blocks including the PEKB Coal Blocks allocated to the petitioner on the earlier occasion to which the petitioner also submitted application vide Annexure P-11 and by memo dated 24-3- 2015 (Annexure P-12), respondent No.7 declared the petitioner as the successful allottee of the PEKB Coal Mines. On 26-3-2015, the petitioner entered into a Clock Block Allotment Agreement with respondent No.7 vide Annexure P-13. Pursuant to clause 4 of the Allotment Agreement dated 26-3-2015, respondent No.7 issued an Allotment Order of the said Coal Block in favour of the petitioner and pending execution of the fresh mining lease, the petitioner was authorised to continue mining operations under the provisions of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 2014, as substituted by the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015. Thereafter, in terms of clause 5.3 of the Allotment Agreement, on 30-4-2015 vide Annexure P-14, the petitioner submitted an application in the prescribed form along with the prescribed fee to the State Government for grant of fresh mining lease in respect of the PEKB Coal Blocks. The petitioner also requested for allowance of adjustment of the already paid stamp duty, cess and registration fee amounting to ₹ 27.972 crores towards the execution of mining lease (WPC No.2530/2020) dated 30-5-2012 in respect of the same PEKB Coal Blocks, which had become void pursuant to the de-allocation of the coal block consequent to the judgment in Manohar Lal Sharma (first case) (supra) and reiterated the same by memo dated 11-9-2015. 6. Ultimately, after series of correspondences, by order dated 28-10- 2015, vide Annexure P-15, respondent No.4 Inspector General of Stamp and Registration, in response to the petitioner’s letter dated 11-9-2015, rejected the petitioner’s request for allowance of adjustment/refund, stating that there is no provision for adjustment or refund after the execution and registration of an instrument. By letter dated 2-11-2015 (Annexure P-16) addressed to respondent No.2 Collector, respondent No.5 Secretary, Department of Mineral Resources, issued an order for grant of a fresh mining lease in favour of the petitioner in respect of the same PEKB Coal Blocks and the same land for which the earlier mining lease dated 30-5-2012 had been executed, stamped and registered. Respondent No.2 was directed to ensure execution of mining lease within six months from the date of the said order. Respondent No.2 vide letter dated 25-1- 2016 (Annexure P-17), requested respondent No.6 District Registrar, Ambikapur, Surguja, to determine stamp duty and registration fee payable for execution of fresh mining lease in respect of the PEKB Coal Blocks for a period of 30 years and respondent No.6 vide letter dated 9-2-2016 (Annexure P-18) intimated respondent No.2 that for execution of fresh mining lease, stamp duty of ₹ 36,75,00,000/-; cess of ₹ 1,83,75,000/-; and registration fee of ₹ 27,56,25,125/-, (WPC No.2530/2020) aggregating to ₹ 66,15,00,125/- were payable by computing the tenure of mining lease for 30 years from 30-5-2012 to 29-5-2042. 7. Number of correspondences were going on between the parties and ultimately, aggrieved by the refusal of the respondents to consider the request for adjustment of unutilised/spoiled stamp duty paid towards execution of the mining lease dated 30-5-2012 against the stamp duty payable for execution of fresh mining lease, the petitioner filed WPC No.65/2017 (Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited v. State of Chhattisgarh and others) in which interim order dated 17-2-2017 was passed by this Court that the stamp duty earlier paid by the petitioner for registration of mining lease, which had been declared void pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court, and the claim for refund thereof, shall remain subject to the final outcome of the writ petition. It was further held by this Court in the said writ petition that in the event the petitioner succeeds in the writ petition, the State may be directed to refund the said amount to the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that since the extended period of one month for execution of fresh mining lease was coming to an end, pressure tactics were exerted upon the petitioner by the respondents for execution of fresh mining lease during the pendency of the writ petition and therefore the petitioner under protest paid ₹ 44,65,12,500/- on 27-3-2017 & 24-4-2017 vide Annexures P-39 & P- 40 and accordingly, fresh mining lease was executed on 19-4-2017 vide Annexure P-41 between the petitioner and the concerned (WPC No.2530/2020) respondent over the same area and PEKB Coal Blocks as covered under under the earlier mining lease dated 30-5-2012. 8. 8. Finally, on 25-11-2019, the Collector of Stamps, Surguja vide Annexure P-46 rejected the petitioner’s claim referring to Sections 50(2) & (3) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and held that the petitioner’s claim was not acceptable because, on the date when the earlier mining lease was executed, it was valid and effective and further held that the earlier registered mining lease had undisputedly remained effective and getting the same mining lease executed again would not make it useless so as to entitle the petitioner to refund or allowance in accordance with law. It was also held by the Collector of Stamps that the stamp duty had been used for the purpose for which they were purchased and the provisions of Section 49 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 apply to spoiled stamps and not to stamps which have already been used. Now, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 25-11-2019 (Annexure P-46), the petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking quashment of that order. 9. In sum and substance, the petitioner claims stamp duty of ₹ 15,54,00,000/-, cess @ 5 % of the stamp duty of ₹ 77,70,000/- and registration fee of ₹ 11,65,50,000/-, and a further stamp duty of ₹ 6,91,74,000/-, as ₹ 6,91,74,000/- was demanded (total ₹ 34,88,94,000/-) pursuant to audit objection and was duly paid. 10. The aforesaid challenge has been made on the ground that the petitioner is entitled to spoiled stamp under Section 49(d)(1) & (6) of (WPC No.2530/2020) the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma (first case) (supra) had already declared the allotment to be illegal and void from the beginning since judicial declarations operate retrospectively. It is the case of the petitioner that spoiled stamp under Section 49(d) and the refusal to grant such allowance is based on wholly unsustainable grounds and also on the principle of restitution, the petitioner is entitled for refund of the entire amount of ₹ 34,88,94,000/-. As such, appropriate writ in the nature of mandamus be issued in favour of the petitioner and against respondents No.1 to 6 directing refund of the said amount. Return on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh 11. Return has been filed on behalf of the State Government/ respondents No.1 to 6 stating inter alia that the entire writ petition is based on surmises and conjectures without there being any substantive material to justify the claim raised by the petitioner seeking refund of the stamp duty already paid qua execution of mining lease deed on 30-5-2012. It is the further case of the respondent State that pursuant to the mining lease deed dated 30-5- 2012, the petitioner was engaged in the mining activity and carried out its operations on the strength of the mining lease deed executed in its favour. It was further stated in the return that against the order Annexure P-6 passed by the Collector of Stamps, the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy of preferring appeal under Section 56(4) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 before the Chief Revenue (WPC No.2530/2020) Controlling Authority and the instant writ petition is not maintainable for the said reason and is liable to be dismissed. It was also stated that a mining lease deed having been executed for a period of 30 years in favour of the petitioner was an instrument in terms of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short, ‘the Act of 1899’) as defined under Section 2(14) and was thus liable to be duly stamped and registered in accordance with the provisions of law. The petitioner got mining lease registered on 30-5-2012 and conducted the mining activity on the strength of the said mining lease deed for a fairly long time. The case of the petitioner is not covered under Section 49(d)(1) of the Act of 1899 and the facts of the present case do not fall under Section 49(d)(1) of the Act. The mining lease deed dated 30-5-2012 executed by the petitioner after payment of requisite stamp duty and registration fee, was duly acted upon by the parties and, therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any refund under Section 49 of the Act of 1899. As such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed with cost having no substance. Rejoinder on behalf of the Petitioner 12. Rejoinder on behalf of the petitioner has been filed denying the statement made in the return stating inter alia that Section 56(4) of the Act of 1899 (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) is not attracted. Impugned Order passed by the Collector of Stamps 13. As such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed with cost having no substance. Rejoinder on behalf of the Petitioner 12. Rejoinder on behalf of the petitioner has been filed denying the statement made in the return stating inter alia that Section 56(4) of the Act of 1899 (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) is not attracted. Impugned Order passed by the Collector of Stamps 13. The Collector of Stamps, Surguja, Ambikapur, on the application of the petitioner has passed following order dated 25-11-2019 Page 12 of 40 (WPC No.2530/2020) (Annexure P-46) which is impugned herein and which states as under: - U;k;ky; dysDVj vkWQ LVkEil~ ljxqtk vfEcdkiqj ¼N-x-½ jk0iz0dz0@35,@c&132@19&20 N-x- 'kklu………..fo:) ,0ds0 vxzoky lqizhUVsafMax bathfu;j jktLFkku fo|qr mRiknu fuxe fyfeVsM vkns’k ¼ikfjr fnukad 25-11-2019½ vkosnd ,0ds0 vxzoky lqizhUVsafMax bathfu;j jktLFkku fo|qr mRiknu fuxe fyfeVsM }kjk vkj0ds0 xkSaM+ fMIVh baftfu;j ¼ih0ih0lh0,.M ,Q½ jktLFkku fo|qr mRiknu fuxe fyfeVsM }kjk Qzsfdax ds ek/;e ls fnukad 30- 05-2012 dks dz; Qzsfdax LVkEi dh jkf’k 163170000@& :i;s ,oa ml nLrkost es a fn; s iath;u 'kqYd dh jkf’k 116550000@& :i;s dqy 279720000@& :i;s rFkk pkyku }kjk tek dh xbZ jkf’k 6]9174000@& :i;s dh okilh ds fy;s vkosnu i= ds lkFk iz’uk/khu ewy Qzsfdax LVkEi izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA laf{kIr esa izdj.k dh :ijs[kk fuEukuqlkj gS& vkj0ds0 xkSaM+ fMIVh baftfu;j ¼ih0ih0lh0,.M ,Q½ jktLFkku fo|qr mRiknu fuxe fyfeVsM }kjk Qszfdax ds ek/;e ls Qsfdax LVkEi dh jkf’k 163170000@& :i;s fnukad 30- 05-2012 dks ekbZfuax yht MhM ds iath;u gsrq dz; dj mi iath;d dk;kZy; vfEcdkiqj esa fnukad 30-05-2012 dks iath;u gsrq izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA mi iath;d vfEcdkiqj }kjk mDr ekbZfuax yht MhM dk nLrkost dzekad 1086 iath;u fnukad 30-05-2012 dk fof/kor iath;u dj iath;u 'kqYd 116550000@& :i;s tek djkdj ewy nLrkost okil fd;k x;k gSA [kfut foHkkx ds vkWfMV esa vkWfMV }kjk ekbZfuax yht MhM esa 6- 9174000@& :i;s dk deh eqnzkad 'kqYd ik;s tkus ij izdj.k bl U;k;ky; esa /kkjk 48 [k ds rgr iathc) izdj.k dzekad 1@ch&103@48 [k@2016&17 }kjk ntZ dj vkWfMV ny }kjk fu/kkZfjr deh 'kqYd dh jkf’k 69174000@& :i;s esa jktLFkku jkT; fo|qr mRiknu fy- }kjk pkyku dzekad 60 ,oa 63 fnukad 30-3-2017 }kjk tek dj ewy pkyku dk;kZy; esa izLrqr djus ij izdj.k lekIr fd;k x;k gSA muds }kjk nLrkost dzekad 1086 iath;u fnukad 30-05-2012 dks ekbZfuax yht MhM esa fn;s x;s LVkEi 'kqYd 163170000@& :i;s ,oa iath;u 'kqYd 116520000@& dqy 279720000@& :i;s ,oa pkyku dzekad 60 ,o 63 fnukad 30-03-2017 }kjk jkf’k 69174000@& :i;s dks okilh gsrq fnukad 28-5-2019 dks Hkkjrh; LVkEi vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 49 ¼?k½ ¼1½ ,oa ¼6½ ds rgr vkosnu i= bl dk;kZy; esa izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA esjs }kjk vkosnd ,0ds0 vxzoky lqizhUVsafMax bathfu;j jktLFkku fo|qr mRiknu fuxe fyfeVsM }kjk LVkEi vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 49 ds varxZr fnukad 28-5-2019 dks LVkEi okilh gsrq izLrqr vkosnu i= ,o a LVkEi dk Page 13 of 40 (WPC No.2530/2020) voyksdu ,oa ifj’khyu fd;k x;kA LVkEi dh /kkjk 50 ¼2½¼3½ ds izko/kku vuqlkj [kjkc@vuqi;qDr gq, LVkEi ds okilh dh le; lhek 6 ekg fu/kkZfjr gSA vkosnd }kjk /kkjk 49 ¼?k½ ¼1½ ds rgr izLrqr rF; fd fu"ikfnr fdlh fyf[kr ds fy, mi;ksx esa yk;k x;k LVkEi tks rRi’pkr~ izkjaHk ls gh fof/k dh n`"Vh ls iw.kZ :i ls 'kqU; ikbZ xbZ gS& dks vekU; fd;k tkrk gS D;ksafd ftl fnukad dks ekbZfuax yht MhM dk fu"iknu gqvk ml fnukad dks og ekU; Fkk rFkk izHkko esa FkkA /kkjk 49 ¼?k½ ¼6½ ds vuqlkj mlds }kjk izHkkoh fd;s tkus ds fy, vk’kf;r ,sls lO;ogkj ds ifj.kkeLo:i tks mUgha i{kdkjksa ds chp fdlh vU; fy[kr }kjk izHkkoh gqvk gS vuqi;ksxh gks tkrk gS vkSj ftl ij mlls de ewY; ds LVkEi ugha gS&dks ekU; ;ksX; ugha gS D;ksafd vkosnd }kjk iwoZ esa iath;u djk;s x;s ekbZfuax yht MhM] fu"iknu fnukad dks izHkkoh Fkk bl ckr ls budkj ugha fd;k tk ldrk gSA vkosnd }kjk dqN o"kZ O;rhr gks tkus ds ckn mlh yht MhM dks nqckjk iath;u djk;s tkus ds iwoZ iathd`r yht MhM vuqi;ksxh gS dks vekU; dj mles fn;s x;s eqnzkad ,oa iath;u 'kqYd dh jkf’k dks fjQUM fd;k tkuk fof/kuqdqy izrhr ugha gksrk gSA vkosnd }kjk fnukad 30-5-2012 dks 163170000@& :i;s ds LVkEi ij fyf[kr fy[kk;k tkdj fn"iknu i'pkr~ iath;u djk;k x;k gSA pqafd iath;u vf/kfu;e 1908 ds izko/kku vuqlkj vkosnd }kjk izLrqr nLrkost dk iath;u djk;k tk pqdk gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa vkosnd }kjk izLrqr LVkEi dk mi;ksx esa yk;k tk pqdk gS] vkosnd }kjk ftl mn~ns’; ds fy, LVkEi dk dz; fd;k x;k Fkk og ml mn~ns’; ds fy, dke esa yk;k tk pqdk gSA LVkEi vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 49 ds izko/kku vuqi;qDr gq, LVkEi 'kqYd ds okilh ds laca/k esa gS u fd mi;ksx esa yk;s tk pqds LVkEi ds laca/k esa gSA bl izdkj vkosnd }kjk izLrqr LVkEi dks mi;ksx esa yk;k tk pqdk gSA vr% LVkEi vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 49 ,oa 50 ds izko/kku ykxw ugha gksus ls LVkEi okilh fd;k tkuk laHko ugha gSA vr% vkosnd dk vkosnu i= [kkfjt dj izdj.k lekIr fd;k tkrk gSA Sd/- ¼vk’kqrks"k dqekj dksf’kd½ dysDVj vkWQ LVkEil~ ljxqtk 14. In sum and substance, the Collector of Stamps has held that on the date when the mining lease was executed between the petitioner and the State, it was valid and effective and further held that the mining lease deed has already been executed between the parties and it was put to use by the petitioner for more than 3 years and moreover, the object for which the lease deed was executed has already been carried out and as such, Section 49(d)(1) of the Act of 1899 would not be (WPC No.2530/2020) attracted, as it has been used and consequently, the application is rejected which is sought to be challenged in the writ petition. Submission on behalf of the Writ Petitioner 15. Mr. Abhishek Sinha, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, would submit as under: - 1. Undisputedly, allotment of the PEKB Coal Blocks by the Government of India in exercise of powers under Section 3(3)(a) (i) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 has been held to be arbitrary, suffering from legal flaws and illegality by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma (first case) (supra) and therefore it has become unenforceable in law and stood rendered void. The mining lease dated 30-5-2012, being a consequence of the said allotment, also became absolutely void in law from the beginning by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma (first case) (supra). 2. The prayer for saving the allocation on the ground that production had already commenced did not find favour with by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and the allocations were nevertheless cancelled, having been held to be illegal and arbitrary, and it has been made effective from 31-3-2015 by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma (second case) (supra). This would clearly establish that the rights flowing from the coal block allotment and the consequential mining lease became unenforceable in law, rendering the mining (WPC No.2530/2020) lease absolutely void in law from the beginning. Since the very substratum of the mining lease was held to be illegal, all consequential actions including the execution of the mining lease, were also rendered absolutely void. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the matter of Rakesh Kumar v. Deputy Commissioner Stamp and others3. 3. Section 49(d)(1) of the Act of 1899 is squarely attracted to the facts of the present case and the petitioner would be entitled for full refund of spoiled stamp duty, cess on the stamp duty and registration fees total amounting to ₹ 34,88,94,000/- in the following term: - Stamp Duty ₹ 15,54,00,000/- Cess @ 5% of the Stamp Duty ₹ 77,70,000/- Registration Fees ₹ 11,65,50,000/- Further Stamp Duty ₹ 6,91,74,000/- Total ₹ 34,88,94,000/- 4. Also on the ground of restitution, the petitioner is entitled for all stamp duty, cess on the stamp duty and registration fees under the principle contained in Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Reliance has further been placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of Loop Telecom and Trading Limited v. Union of India and another4 and Kuju Collieries Ltd. v. Jharkhand Mines Ltd. and others5. 3 2013 SCC OnLine All 13471 4 (2022) 6 SCC 762 5 (1974) 2 SCC 533 (WPC No.2530/2020) Judicial declarations operate retrospectively unless expressly made prospective. A judicial declaration that a contract or agreement is void operates retrospectively and relates back to the very inception of the agreement. All judicial decisions are retrospective in operation unless in a particular case the Court makes its judgment prospective and consequently the voidness which attaches to an agreement upon judicial declaration relates back to its very inception and the expression “discovered to be void” in Section 65 of the Contract Act comprehends a situation where parties entered into an agreement honestly believing it to be perfectly valid and it is only subsequently discovered to be void, in such a case the agreement is void from its inception and the discovery occurs at a later date i.e. parties are not in pari delicto. Technical plea and bar under Section 49 of the Act of 1899 cannot be invoked by the State to defeat a citizen’s rightful and just claim where the citizen is without any fault. Reliance has also been placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of Bano Saiyed Parwaz v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Inspector General of Registration and Controller of Stamps and others6 and Harshit Harish Jain and another v. State of Maharashtra and others7. 5. When doctrine of restitution is attracted, interest should follow. Reliance has finally been placed upon the decision of the Supreme 6 (2025) 2 SCC 201 7 (2025) 3 SCC 365 (WPC No.2530/2020) Court in the matter of Dr Poornima Advani and another v. Government of NCT and another8. As such, Mr. Sinha, learned Senior Counsel, would finally submit that the writ petition be allowed and the refund of ₹ 34,88,94,000/- be granted in favour of the petitioner along with interest on the above-stated amount. Submission on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh 16. Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State/respondents No.1 to 6, would submit that efficacious alternative remedy is available to the petitioner in terms of Section 56(4) of the Act of 1899, therefore, the writ petition as framed and filed is not maintainable and the petitioner be relegated to the remedy of appeal before the appellate authority and on this ground, the writ petition be dismissed. He would further submit that Section 49(d)(1) of the Act of 1899 is not attracted at all in the present case and the petitioner is not entitled to claim such refund. He would also submit that the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma (first case) (supra) has only cancelled the mining lease dated 30-5-2012 to avoid further complications. As a consequence of the order passed by the Supreme Court, the Parliament in exercise of power conferred under Entry 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution has enacted the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015 (for short, ‘the Act of 2015’), which came into force with effect from 21-10-2014. The Act of 2015 and the Rules made thereunder 8 (2025) 7 SCC 269 (WPC No.2530/2020) were framed to take immediate action to allocate coal mines to successful bidders and allottees. Under the Act of 2015, allottees like the petitioner have been defined. Clause (n) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act of 2015 defines “prior allottee”. Section 6 of the Act of 2015 provides for Central Government to act through nominated authority, Section 9 provides for priority of disbursal of proceeds and Section 16 provides for valuation of compensation for payment to prior allottee. Section 16(1) of the Act of 2015 provides that the quantum of compensation for the land in relation to Schedule I coal mines shall be as per the registered sale deeds lodged with the nominated authority in accordance with such rules as may be prescribed, together with 12% simple interest from the date of such purchase or acquisition, till the date of the execution of the vesting order or the allotment order, as the case may be. Section 16(2) states that the quantum of compensation for the mine infrastructure in relation to Schedule I coal mines shall be determined as per the written down value reflected in the statutorily audited balance sheet of the previous financial year in accordance with such rules and in such manner as may be prescribed. Therefore, the petitioner’s case will not fall under the provisions of the Act of 1899, but will fall under the provisions of the Act of 2015, where the claim for compensation had to be submitted before the nominated authority appointed under Section 6 of the Act of 2015. The Act of 2015 being a special Act enacted to cater to exigencies arising out of cancellation of coal blocks by the judgment of the Supreme Court, it (WPC No.2530/2020) will have precedence over the Act of 1899. Therefore, in terms of Rule 14 of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Rules, 2014, any compensation as a consequence of cancellation of allocation of coal block in favour of the petitioner is to be routed through the nominated authority following the procedure prescribed under the Act of 2015 and the Rules made thereunder and not under any other Act including the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Mr. Tamaskar, learned State counsel, would further contend that the Supreme Court has cancelled the allocation with effect from 31-3-2015, therefore, to interpret that the Court had intended to declare the allocation void ab initio from a future date would be preposterous. As such, Section 49(d)(1) of the Act of 1899 will have no application, as the Surpeme Court did not declare the mining leases void ab initio and inference is being drawn only to bring the case within the ambit of Section 49(d) (1) of the Act of 1899. He would also contend that Section 49(6) of the Act of 1899 has also no application to the facts of the present case, as in the instant case, stamp duty was paid for execution of mining lease dated 30-5-2012 and the allocation stood cancelled with effect from 31-3-2015. The submission of the petitioner that since mining lease was subsequently granted for the same land and for period of 30 years, and more stamp duty is paid while executing the mining lease dated 19-4-2017, the case falls under Section 49(6)of the Act of 1899, is misplaced, as the earlier lease was for period starting 30-5-2012 ending 29-5-2042, whereas the subsequent mining lease is for period starting 1-4-2015 ending 31-3-2045. Page 20 of 40 (WPC No.2530/2020) Therefore, it cannot be said that stamp became useless on account of mining lease dated 19-4-2017. The mining lease dated 30-5-2012 was duly executed and cancelled by the order passed by the Supreme Court. As such, rejection of claim of the petitioner by the impugned order is completely just and proper. Lastly, he would contend that the petitioner has raised claim for allowance of both stamp duty as well as registration fees and cess, whereas, applicability of Section 49 of the Act of 1899 is limited to allowance of impressed stamps which stood spoiled. Impressed stamp has been explained as amount mentioned in the Certificate of the Collector under Section 32 of the Act of 1899. There is no provision for allowance of registration fees under Section 49 of the Act of 1899. As such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. Submission on behalf of the Union of India 17. Mr. Ramakant Mishra, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of the Union of India/respondent No.7, would submit that the petitioner has the remedy of raising claim before the nominated authority under Section 16(1) of the Act of 2015 and the rules made thereunder and as such, the writ petition as framed and filed, deserves to be dismissed. 18. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival contentions made herein-above and also gone through the record with utmost circumspection. Page 21 of 40 (WPC No.2530/2020) Questions for Determination of the Writ Petition 19. In order to resolve the dispute arisen between the parties, the following questions arise for determination of this writ petition: - 1. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the mining lease deed dated 30-5-2012 executed between the petitioner and the State of Chhattisgarh/ Respondent No.1 herein was absolutely void in law from beginning in terms of Section 49(d)(1) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and consequently, refund of the value of stamp affixed on the instrument (mining lease deed) and cess in question can be allowed? 2. Whether relief as claimed above can be denied on the ground of availability of alternative remedy under Section 56(4) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as amended by the Indian Stamp (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1990? 3. Whether the above stated relief (1) as claimed can also be denied on the ground of remedy available under Section 16(1)(2) of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015 read with the Rules made thereunder (before the nominated authority by making claim for compensation) along with interest? 20.It would be appropriate to address questions No.2 & 3 above at the first instance, one by one, before deciding question No.1, as it goes to the root of the matter. Page 22 of 40 (WPC No.2530/2020) Re: Question No.2 21. The State has raised the plea of alternative remedy as available to the petitioner under Section 56(4) of the Act of 1899 against the order dated 25-11-2019 (Annexure P-46) passed by the Collector of Stamps. Section 56(4) was inserted by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature by way of the Indian Stamp (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1990 (Act No.24 of 1990) with effect from 27th November, 1990, which states as under: - “(4) The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority may, on its own motion or on the application by any party, at anytime for the purpose of satisfying it self as to the amount with which the instrument is chargeable with duty, call for and examine the record of any case disposed of by the Collector and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit: Provided that it shall not vary or reverse any order unless notice has been served on the party concerned and opportunity given to him for being heard: Provided further that no application for revision shall be- (i) entertained against an order appealable under this Act; (ii) entertained unless presented within ninety days from the date of order and in computing the period aforesaid, the time requisite for obtaining copy of the said order shall be excluded.” 22.A careful perusal of sub-section (4) of Section 56 of the Act of 1899 as amended by the Act of 1990 would show that sub-section (4) would be attracted when the dispute is as to the amount with which the instrument is chargeable with duty, which the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority on its own motion or on the application by any party, at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself, may call for and (WPC No.2530/2020) examine the record of any case disposed of by the Collector and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit, and shall have the jurisdiction for determining as to the amount with which the instrument is chargeable with duty. 23.In the instant case, the duty payable on mining lease dated 30-5- 2012 is not in dispute and, therefore, Section 56(4) of the Act of 1899 against the order dated 25-11-2019 is not attracted at all. Consequently, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the State is hereby rejected and question No.2 is answered accordingly. Re: Question No.3 24.The State of Chhattisgarh during the course of argument has raised the plea that in view of the provisions contained in Section 16(1) & (2) of the Act of 2015 and the Rules made thereunder, remedy of the petitioner is to file claim for compensation before the nominated authority appointed under Section 6(1) of the Act of 2015 and the writ petition as framed and filed is not maintainable. Surprisingly, this plea has not been taken expressly by the State in the return filed before this Court and for the first time, this plea has been raised before this Court at the time of argument by taking the other party to surprise. Section 16(1) & (2) of the Act of 2015 states as under: - “16. Valuation of compensation for payment to prior allottee.—(1) The quantum of compensation for the land in relation to Schedule I coal mines shall be as per the registered sale deeds lodged with the nominated authority in accordance with such rules as may be prescribed, together with twelve per cent. simple interest from the date of such purchase or (WPC No.2530/2020) acquisition, till the date of the execution of the vesting order or the allotment order, as the case may be. (2) The quantum of compensation for the mine infrastructure in relation to Schedule I coal mines shall be determined as per the written down value reflected in the statutorily audited balance sheet of the previous financial year in accordance with such rules and in such manner as may be prescribed.” 25. A careful perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act of 2015 would reveal that the quantum of compensation for the land in relation to Schedule I coal mines shall be as per the registered sale deeds lodged with the nominated authority in accordance with such rules as may be prescribed along with interest. However, in this case, the petitioner has not claimed any quantum of compensation for the land in question in relation to Schedule I coal mines. Therefore, Section 16(1) of the Act of 2015 is not attracted in the present case. 26. Similarly, sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act of 2015 provides that the quantum of compensation for the mine infrastructure in relation to Schedule I coal mines shall be determined as per the written down value reflected in the statutorily audited balance sheet of the previous financial year in accordance with such rules and in such manner as may be prescribed. The term “mine infrastructure” has been defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act of 2015, which states as under and which is not the case of the petitioner herein:- “(j) ”mine infrastructure” includes mining infrastructure such as tangible assets used for coal mining operations, being civil works, workshops, immovable coal winning equipment, foundations, embankments, pavements, electrical systems, communication systems, relief centres, site administrative (WPC No.2530/2020) offices, fixed installations, coal handling arrangements, crushing and conveying systems, railway sidings, pits, shafts, inclines, underground transport systems, hauling systems (except movable equipment unless the same is embedded in land for permanent beneficial enjoyment thereof), land demarcated for afforestation and land for rehabilitation and resettlement of persons affected by coal mining operations under the relevant law;” 27. As such, this ground of availability of remedy under Section 16(1) & (2) of the Act of 2015 is neither available on merits nor it was raised in the return. Even otherwise, for the first time, the respondent State cannot be allowed to take this new ground at the time of argument (see B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. and others9). As such, for both the reasons i.e. non-availability of the ground on merits as well as not having been raised in the return, this preliminary objection is also hereby over ruled and question No.3 is answered accordingly. Re: Question No.1 The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Scheme of Section 49 28. The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to Stamps. The Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for the State on certain classes of instruments: It is not enacted to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicality to meet the case of his opponent. (See Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Dilip Construction Company10.) 9 (2006) 11 SCC 548 10 (1969) 1 SCC 597 (WPC No.2530/2020) 29. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the matter of Ramesh Chand Bansal and others v. District Magistrate/Collector Ghaziabad and others11 has held that the object of the Indian Stamp Act is to collect proper stamp duty on an instrument or conveyance on which such duty is payable. It is a purely fiscal regulation and is intended to secure ‘revenue’ for the State (see Thiruvengadam Pillai v. Navaneethammal and another12). 30. The Bombay High Court in the matter of Gautam Landscapes Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai v. Shailesh S. Shah and another13 has discussed the scope and object of the Stamp Act, and observed as under: - “48. The Stamp Act admittedly is a fiscal enactment. The primary object of which is to ensure payment of stamp duty on the documents on which stamp duty is required to be paid. 49. In the case of J.M.A. Raju v. K. Bhatt, AIR 1976 Gujarat 72 FB, Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that the Court has to consider the provisions of the Stamp Act as a fiscal measure, the principal object of which is to secure revenue for the State. The object of the enactment is not to enable parties to raise technical objections to meet the case of their opponent. 50. In the case of Jagdish Narain v. Chief Controlling Revenue, AIR 1994 All 371, the Allahabad High Court held, in the context of Indian Stamp Act which is an enactment pari materia to the Maharashtra Stamp Act, that the sole object of the Indian Stamp Act is to increase revenue and its provisions must be construed as having in view only the protection of revenue.” 31. As such, the primary object of the Indian Stamp Act is to ensure payment of stamp duty on documents on which stamp is required to 11 (1999) 5 SCC 62 12 (2008) 4 SCC 530 13 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 563 (WPC No.2530/2020) be paid and it is purely a fiscal legislation intended to secure revenue for the State. 32. Section 49(d)(1) and (6) of the Act of 1899, which deals with allowance for spoiled stamps, states as under: - “49. Allowance for spoiled stamps.—Subject to such rules as may be made by the State Government as to the evidence to be required or, the enquiry to be made, the Collector may, on application made within the period prescribed in section 50, and if he is satisfied as to the facts, make allowance for impressed stamps spoiled in the cases hereinafter mentioned, namely:— (a) to (c) xxx xxx xxx (d) the stamp used for an instrument executed by any party thereto which— (1) has been afterwards found to be absolutely void in law from the beginning; (2) to (5) xxx xxx xxx (6) become useless in consequence of the transaction intended to be thereby effected being effected by some other instrument between the same parties and bearing a stamp of not less value; (7) & (8) xxx xxx xxx” 33. Under Section 49 of the Act of 1899, individuals who have purchased impressed stamp papers can claim an allowance if the paper is inadvertently ruined, damaged, or rendered unfit for use either before or after a transaction. To seek this relief, the claimant must file an application before the Collector within the strict timelines prescribed under Section 50 of the Act. This provision applies to impressed stamp papers that are unintentionally spoiled before execution, such as through writing errors or physical damage. It also (WPC No.2530/2020) extends to specific instances after execution where the transaction fails to materialise, including cases where the instrument is legally void from the outset (void ab initio) or is rendered unfit due to an error or mistake. 34. Section 50 of the Act of 1899 mandates strict timelines for claiming a refund on spoiled stamp papers under Section 49. Generally, applications must be made to the Collector within six months from when the stamp paper was spoiled (if unexecuted) or from its date of execution (if signed but the transaction failed). Discussion and Analysis 35. Now, question No.1 as framed would be, whether the petitioner is entitled for refund of stamp duty etc. as claimed before the Collector of Stamps, which was not found favour with by the Collector and the petitioner’s application stood rejected by order dated 25-11-2019 vide Annexure P-46. 36. Admittedly and undisputedly, mining lease was executed between the petitioner and the State Government for a period of 30 years starting from 30-5-2012 to 29-5-2042 and stamp duty amounting to ₹ 15,54,00,000/-, cess @ 5% of the stamp duty amounting to ₹ 77,70,000/- and registration fees amounting to ₹ 11,65,50,000/-, and additional stamp duty amounting to ₹ 6,91,74,000/- was paid by the petitioner to the State. However, the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma (first case) (supra), cancelled the entire allocation of coal blocks including the PEKB Coal Blocks by holding (WPC No.2530/2020) that there was no fair and transparent procedure in granting so, all resulting in unfair distribution of the national wealth and observed in paragraphs 163 to 166 as under: - “163. To sum up, the entire allocation of coal block as per recommendations made by the Screening Committee from 14- 7-1993 in 36 meetings and the allocation through the Government Dispensation Route suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and legal flaws. The Screening Committee has never been consistent; it has not been transparent; there is no proper application of mind; it has acted on no material in many cases; relevant factors have seldom been its guiding factors; there was no transparency and guidelines have seldom guided it. On many occasions, guidelines have been honoured more in their breach. There was no objective criteria, nay, no criteria for evaluation of comparative merits. The approach had been ad hoc and casual. There was no fair and transparent procedure, all resulting in unfair distribution of the national wealth. Common good and public interest have, thus, suffered heavily. Hence, the allocation of coal blocks based on the recommendations made in all the 36 meetings of the Screening Committee is illegal. 164. The allocation of coal blocks through Government Dispensation Route, however laudable the object may be, also is illegal since it is impermissible as per the scheme of the CMN Act. No State Government or public sector undertakings of the State Governments are eligible for mining coal for commercial use. Since allocation of coal is permissible only to those categories under Sections 3(3) and (4), the joint venture arrangement with ineligible firms is also impermissible. Equally, there is also no question of any consortium/leader/association in allocation. Only an undertaking satisfying the eligibility criteria referred to in Section 3(3) of the CMN Act viz. which has a unit engaged in the production of iron and steel and generation of power, washing of coal obtained from mine or production of cement, is entitled to the allocation in addition to the Central Government, a Central Government company or a Central Government corporation. 165. In this context, it is worthwhile to note that the 1957 Act has been amended introducing Section 11-A w.e.f. 13-2- 2012. As per the said amendment, the grant of (WPC No.2530/2020) reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence or mining lease in respect of an area containing coal or lignite can be made only through selection through auction by competitive bidding even among the eligible entities under Section 3(3)(a) (iii), referred to above. However, the government companies, government corporations or companies or corporations, which have been awarded power projects on the basis of competitive bids for tariff (including Ultra Mega Power Projects) have been exempted of allocation in favour of them is not meant to be through the competitive bidding process. 166. As we have already found that the allocations made, both under the Screening Committee Route and the Government Dispensation Route, are arbitrary and illegal, what should be the consequences, is the issue which remains to be tackled. We are of the view that, to this limited extent, the matter requires further hearing.” 37. Thereafter, again, in Manohar Lal Sharma (second case) (supra), in view of the submissions made, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the cancellation will come into effect from 31-3- 2015 and observed as under: - “37. In view of the submissions made, although we have quashed the allotment of 42 out of these 46 coal blocks, we make it clear that the cancellation will take effect only after six months from today, which is with effect from 31-3-2015. This period of six months is being given since the learned Attorney General submitted that the Central Government and CIL would need some time to adjust to the changed situation and move forward. This period will also give adequate time to the coal block allottees to adjust and manage their affairs. That CIL is inefficient and incapable of accepting the challenge, as submitted by the learned counsel, is not an issue at all. The Central Government is confident, as submitted by the learned Attorney General, that CIL can fill the void and take things forward.” 38. As such, it appears that mining lease was cancelled with immediate effect by judgment dated 25-8-2014, but considering the submissions of the parties, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragraph 37 (WPC No.2530/2020) of the judgment dated 24-9-2014, have held that the cancellation will take effect only after six months from the date of judgment i.e. 24-9- 2014. The period of six months was given on the request of the learned Attorney General to adjust to the changed situation and move forward and to facilitate the coal block allottees to adjust and manage their affairs. 39. In the matter of Harnathkuar v. Indar Bahadur14, it has been held by the Privy Council that the agreement would be manifestly void from its inception because its subject matter was incapable of being bound in the manner stipulated. In that case it was further held that the transfer was inoperative, as the vendor at the date of the execution of the document had no interest capable of transfer but merely an expectancy. The Privy Council also held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover under Section 65 of the Contract Act. This was followed by the Madras High Court in the matter of Chief Controlling Revenue Authority-Board of Revenue, Madras v. B.P. Eswaran (died) and others15. 40. In Rakesh Kumar (supra), the question before the Allahabad High Court was, whether in view of cancellation of the lease by the State Government any allowance or refund is permissible in view of Section 49(d) of the Act of 1899? In that case, lease was executed for a period of five years, it was cancelled by the State Government after the petitioner operated the mining lease for a period of about one 14 AIR 1922 PC 403 15 AIR 1970 Mad 349 (FB) (WPC No.2530/2020) year and few days. The Allahabad High Court allowed refund of stamp duty holding that the petitioner therein is covered by Section 49(d)(2) of the Act of 1899 and observed as under: - “16. The above provision stipulates that the Collector on an application and on being satisfied that the stamp used for an instrument executed on it being found to be void or unfit, by reason of any error or mistake may make an order for return of the stamp duty. The lease in question has been cancelled by the State Government vide order dated 2.7.1996 not on account of any mistake of the petitioner but for the reason that it was in violation of some order of the High Court. Thus, frustrating the purpose of making the lease in favour of the petitioner. The lease, as such, was found to be unfit for the reason of mistake committed by the State Government in granting the same. 17. Accordingly, as the instrument of lease after execution has been found unfit for the purpose it was executed by reason of mistake on part of the State Government in executing it, the petitioner became entitle in law for consideration of his application for allowance on spoiled stamps as per the provisions of section 49 of the Act. The case of the petitioner is covered by Clause (d) (2) of section 49 of the Act. The authorities below have not considered the application of the petitioner in the light of provisions of section 49 (d) (2) of the Act.” 41. As such, from the judgments of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma (first case and second case) (supra), it would appear that coal block/mining lease was cancelled by their Lordships by their judgment, but considering the submissions of parties, their Lordships have held that the cancellation will take effect only after six months. It is apparent that the period of six months was given on the request of the learned Attorney General to adjust to the changed situation and move forward and to facilitate the coal block allottees to adjust and mange their affairs. Therefore, it cannot be held that (WPC No.2530/2020) coal block/mining lease was not cancelled in law from the beginning, though it was given effect from 31-3-2015. The period of operation of mining lease has no relevance for refund of stamp duty and contentions raised in this behalf by the State is hereby rejected. As such, by virtue of Section 41(d) of the Act of 1899, the petitioner is entitled for refund of stamp duty along with cess on stamp duty. Restitution under Section 65 of the Contract Act 42. The petitioner has also pressed into service refund of stamp duty in alternative or in addition, on the principle of restitution as statutorily recognised in Section 65 of the Contract Act, where, after a benefit has been received, the agreement is discovered to be void, or when the contract becomes void, viz, as provided under Section 32 or 56 of the Contract Act. Section 65 of the Contract Act provides as under: - “65. Obligation of person who has received advantage under void agreement, or contract that becomes void.—When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it to the person from whom he received it.” 43. The section which is based on the law of restitution aims at preventing unjust enrichment (see Allahabad Bank v. Bengal Paper Mills Co. Ltd.16). The object is to prevent a party from avoiding an agreement and retaining the benefits received under it; section 65 is “compensatory in principle” and meant for “prevention of unjust enrichment”. The basis of the section is the doctrine of 16 (2004) 8 SCC 236 (WPC No.2530/2020) restitutio in integrum. It does not make a new contract between the parties, but only provides for restitution of the advantage taken by a party under the contract. This section is also said to embody the principles of quantum meruit. 44. The Supreme Court in Loop Telecom and Trading Limited (supra) considering Section 65 of the Contract Act has held that the application of Section 65 has to be limited to those cases where the party claiming restitution itself was not in pari delicto. Further, their Lordships also held that when the party claiming restitution is equally or more responsible for the illegality of a contract, they are considered in pari delicto. Finally, it has been observed as under: - “69. Hence, in adjudicating a claim of restitution under Section 65 of the Contract Act, the court must determine the illegality which caused the contract to become void and the role the party claiming restitution has played in it. If the party claiming restitution was equally or more responsible for the illegality (in comparison to the defendant), there shall be no cause for restitution. This has to be determined on the facts of each individual case.” 45. Similarly, in Kuju Collieries Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court considering the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the matter of Sivaramakrishnaiah v. Narahari Rao17 has held that the party is only seeking to be restored to the status quo ante, and held as under: - “9. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in its decision in Sivaramakrishnaiah v. Narahari Rao17 held that: 17 AIR 1960 AP 186 (WPC No.2530/2020) In order to invoke Section 65 the invalidity of the contract or agreement should be discovered subsequent to the making of it. This cannot be taken advantage of by parties who knew from the beginning the illegality thereof. It only applies to a case where one of the parties enters into an agreement under the belief that it was a legal agreement, i.e. without the knowledge that the agreement is forbidden by law or opposed to public policy and as such illegal. The effect of Section 65 is that, in such a situation, it enables a person not in pari delicto to claim restoration since it is not based on an illegal contract but dissociated from it. That is permissible by reason of the section because the section is not founded on dealings which are contaminated by illegality. The party is only seeking to be restored to the status quo ante. Section 65 also does not recognise the distinction between a contract being illegal by reason of its being opposed to public policy or morality or a contract void for other reasons. Even agreements, the performance of which is attended with penal consequences, are not outside the scope of Section 65. At the same time, courts will not render assistance to persons who induce innocent parties to enter into contracts of that nature by playing fraud on them to retain the benefit which they obtained by their wrong.” They also referred with approval to the earlier decision of the Hyderabad High Court in Budhulal v. Deccan Banking Co. Ltd.18.” 46. In Harshit Harish Jain (supra), a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court relying upon its earlier decision in Bano Saiyed Parwaz (supra) and also relying upon its earlier decision in the matter of Committee-GFIL v. Libra Buildtech Private Limited and others19 has held that the limitation provision in stamp law (to seek refund of stamp duty) should not be enforced so as to oust the remedy when the applicant is otherwise not blameworthy. 18 AIR 1955 Hyd 69 (FB) : ILR 1955 Hyd 101 19 (2015) 16 SCC 31 (WPC No.2530/2020) 47. In Libra Buildtech Private Limited’s case (supra), auction- purchasers had deposited the entire sale consideration along with stamp duty in connection with a court-monitored sale. The transaction subsequently failed for reasons entirely beyond the control of the parties, the very court that had monitored the auction cancelled the transaction. The State rejected the applications for refund of stamp duty on the ground of limitation. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court set aside the rejection on three cumulative grounds and held that the petitioner therein is entitled for the entire stamp duty amounting to ₹ 6.22 crores spent by the petitioner therein for purchasing stamp duty for execution of sale deeds in relation to the properties in question, but the said refund was granted without interest, and observed as under: - “24. In our considered opinion, keeping in view the undisputed facts mentioned above, the applicants are also entitled to claim the refund of entire stamp duty amount of Rs 6.22 crores from the State Exchequer, which they spent for execution of sale deeds in their favour in relation to the properties in question. This we say for the following reasons. 25. In the first place, admittedly the transaction originally intended between the parties i.e. sale of properties in question by GFIL Committee to the applicants was not accomplished and failed due to reasons beyond the control of the parties. Secondly, this Court after taking into consideration all facts and circumstances also came to the conclusion that it was not possible for the parties to conclude the transactions originally intended and while cancelling the same directed the seller (GFIL Committee) to refund the entire sale consideration to the applicants and simultaneously permitted the applicants to claim refund of stamp duty amount from the State Government by order dated 26-9-201220. Thirdly, as a result of the order of this Court, a right to claim refund of amount 20 Committee-GFIL v. Libra Buildtech (P) Ltd., 2012 SCC OnLine SC 1125 (WPC No.2530/2020) paid towards the stamp duty accrued to the applicants. Fourthly, this being a court-monitored transaction, no party was in a position to take any steps in the matter without the permission of the Court. Fifthly, the applicants throughout performed their part of the contract and ensured that transaction in question is accomplished as was originally intended but for the reasons to which they were not responsible, the transaction could not be accomplished. Lastly, the applicants in law were entitled to claim restoration of all such benefits/advantages from the State once the transaction was cancelled by this Court on 26-9-2012 in the light of the principle contained in Section 65 of the Contract Act which enable the party to a contract to seek restoration of all such advantage from other party which they took from such contract when the contract is discovered to be void or becomes void. This was a case where contract in question became void as a result of its cancellation by order of this Court dated 26-9-2012 which entitled the applicants to seek restitution of the money paid to the State for purchase of stamp papers.” 48. As such, flowing from Section 65 of the Contract Act as held in Loop Telecom and Trading Limited (supra), Kuju Collieries Ltd. (supra) and Harshit Harish Jain (supra), furthermore, the petitioner is not in pari delicto, as the lawful mining lease was entered into between the parties, but it was cancelled by the Supreme Court and the respondent State has received advantage and stamp duty refund to the extent of ₹ 23,23,44,000/- including cess, the period of operation of mining lease for few years has no relevance for payment of stamp duty by virtue of the principle contained in Section 65 of the Contract Act. Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled for spoiled stamp duty to the following extent: - Stamp Duty ₹ 15,54,00,000/- Cess @ 5% of the Stamp Duty ₹ 77,70,000/- Further Stamp Duty ₹ 6,91,74,000/- Total ₹ 23,23,44,000/- (WPC No.2530/2020) Payment of Interest on Stamp Duty and Cess on Stamp Duty 49. The petitioner in the writ petition did not pray for any relief on interest on the amount of stamp duty and cess on stamp duty sought to be refunded, however, at the time of final hearing, claimed interest on the aforesaid amount stating that since the doctrine of restitution is attracted, interest, as a consequence, would follow relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Dr Poornima Advani (supra). However, this Court is of the considered opinion that such an interest cannot be granted for the following reasons: - 1. In the writ petition filed before this Court, the petitioner did not pray for relief of interest on the stamp duty and cess on the stamp duty and as such, the relief which is not sought for in the writ petition cannot be granted. (See National Board of Examinations v. G. Anand Ramamurthy21, Rajasthan Art Emporium v. Kuwait Airways22, Ranbir Singh v. Executive Engineer23 and State of W.B. v. W.B. Registration Copywriters Assn.24.) 2. Section 49 of the Act of 1899 does not statutorily and expressly provide for grant of interest while granting refund of spoiled stamp duty. Since the Act does not provide for grant of 21 (2006) 5 SCC 515 22 (2024) 2 SCC 570 23 (2011) 15 SCC 453 24 (2009) 14 SCC 132 (WPC No.2530/2020) interest, it would be inappropriate to grant interest on the said amount of refund to the petitioner. 3. The legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit – An act of the Court shall prejudice no man, squarely applies to the facts of the present case, as the mining lease was cancelled by the Supreme Court. This maxim was founded upon justice and good sense; and afforded a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. The maxim was applied with approval by the Supreme Court in the matter of Mohd. Gazi v. State of M.P.25. 4. The Supreme Court in Libra Buildtech Private Limited’s case (supra) while granting refund of stamp duty invoking the doctrine of restitution under Section 65 of the Contract Act, did not grant any interest in favour of the petitioner therein on refund of stamp duty of ₹ 6.22 crores. As such, interest on stamp duty cannot be granted to the petitioner herein for the aforesaid reasons. Refund of Registration Fee 50. The petitioner has also claimed refund of registration fee. However, Section 49 of the Act of 1899 is confined to allowance of impressed stamps which were spoiled. There is no provision for refund of registration fee. No other provision was pointed to this Court in the Registration Act or in any other provision to seek refund of 25 (2000) 4 SCC 342 (WPC No.2530/2020) registration fee. As such, refund of registration fee after registration of the instrument cannot be granted and it is hereby refused. Conclusion 51. For the foregoing reasons, it is held that the petitioner is entitled for spoiled stamp and cess on stamp duty in the following terms, but without interest: - Stamp Duty Paid ₹ 15,54,00,000/- Cess @ 5% of the Stamp Duty ₹ 77,70,000/- Additional Stamp Duty Paid ₹ 6,91,74,000/- Total ₹ 23,23,44,000/- Relief 52. The order impugned dated 25-11-2019 (Annexure P-46) passed by the Collector of Stamps to the extent of refusing stamp duty and cess on stamp duty is hereby set aside and the petitioner is entitled for an amount of ₹ 23,23,44,000/- without interest, however, refusing registration fee is hereby upheld. Accordingly, a writ of mandamus be issued in favour of the petitioner and against respondents No.1 to 6 to make payment of the said amount within a period of four weeks from today. 53. The writ petition is allowed to extent sketched herein-above. No order as to the costs. Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge Soma