(WPS No.3498/2020) 2026:CGHC:10887 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 3498 of 2020 Dharmendra Ram, S/o Lt. Bishun Ram, aged about 28 years, R/o Village Khadiadamer, Post Balrampur, Tehsil & District Balrampur- Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh, Through the Secretary, Department of Tribal & Scheduled Caste Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2. Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Development, Balrampur, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh 3. Collector, Balrampur-Ramanujganj, Head Office Balrampur, Chhattisgarh 4. Additional Collector, Balrampur-Ramanujganj, Head Office Balrampur, Chhattisgarh 5. District Education Officer, Office of District Education Officer & District Project Officer (RMSM), District Balrampur-Ramanujganj ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Chitendra Singh, Advocate. For Respondents : Mr. Anmol Sharma, Panel Lawyer. Single Bench:- Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Order on Board 02/03/2026 SISTA SOMAYAJULU Digitally signed by SISTA SOMAYAJULU Date: 2026.03.03 15:10:28 +0530 (WPS No.3498/2020) 1. Bishun Ram, who was working as Assistant Teacher, died way back on 11-11-2002 and application for compassionate appointment was made by the petitioner on 18-4-2012 which was rejected by order dated 14-2-2013 and writ petition has been preferred on 20-8-2020. 2. Mr. Chitendra Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submits that compassionate appointment ought to have been granted which has been rejected by the impugned order, which is unsustainable and bad in law in light of circular dated 14-6-2013 (para 8). 3. Mr. Anmol Sharma, learned State counsel, submits that there is delay of seven years in filing the writ petition, as the order rejecting the application for compassionate appointment was passed on 14-2- 2013. Even otherwise, father of the petitioner i.e. the deceased Government servant died way back on 11-11-2002. As such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the material available on record with utmost circumspection. 5. As noticed herein-above, the concerned Government servant died on 11-11-2002 and the application for compassionate appointment was made on 18-4-2012 which was rejected on 14-2-2013 and the instant writ petition was filed on 20-8-2020. As such, there is delay of seven years in filing the writ petition. Page 3 of 6 (WPS No.3498/2020) 6. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of West Bengal v. Debabrata Tiwari and others1 while dealing with the issue of compassionate appointment and delay/laches in making application for the same, held as under: - “33. The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to the death of the breadearner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be in a position to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Having regard to such an object, it would be of no avail to grant compassionate appointment to the dependants of the deceased employee, after the crisis which arose on account of death of a breadwinner, has been overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need to act with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning compassionate appointment because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme of compassionate appointment would be frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date of death of the deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking compassionate appointment would cease to exist and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in determining as to whether a case for the grant of compassionate appointment has been made out for consideration. 34. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compassionate appointment is that the family of the deceased employee would be unable to make two ends meet without one of the dependants of the deceased employee being employed on compassionate grounds. The financial condition of the family of the deceased, at the time of the death of the deceased, is the primary consideration that ought to guide the authorities' decision in the matter. 35. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance, regarding whether applications for compassionate appointment could be considered after a delay 1 (2025) 5 SCC 712 (WPS No.3498/2020) of several years, we are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the government employee. In such circumstances, courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment from some other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as noted by this Court in Hakim Singh2 would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the dependants of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government employee. 36. Laches or undue delay, the blameworthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd3 as under : (LR pp. 239-40) “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, 2 Haryana SEB v. Hakim Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 85 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 31 3 (1874) LR 5 PC 221 (WPS No.3498/2020) always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher4. In the said case, it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal5, this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words : (SCC pp. 594-95, para 24) 24. … the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed 4 1967 SCC OnLine SC 117 : AIR 1967 SC 1450 5 (1986) 4 SCC 566 (WPS No.3498/2020) within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana6; NDMC v. Pan Singh7. 40. Further, simply because the respondent-writ petitioners submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently pursued the matter and had not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari8, wherein the following observations were made : (SCC p. 184, para 19) “19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time.” (emphasis supplied) 7. In that view of the matter, on the ground of delay and further considering that the deceased Government servant died on 11-11- 2002, the application for compassionate appointment was made on 18-4-2012 which was rejected on 14-2-2013 and the instant writ petition was filed on 20-8-2020 and now, after 24 years of the death of the deceased Government servant, the object of giving compassionate appointment would be frustrated, the instant writ petition is dismissed. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) JUDGE Soma 6 (1997) 6 SCC 538 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1550 7 (2007) 9 SCC 278 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 398 8 (2013) 12 SCC 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 32