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2020 DAILYLAW 2514 (PNJ)

DAYA SHANKAR v. MS BELCO PHARMA PHARMACEUTICAL MANUACTURER AND ANOTHER

CWP/22587/2026 · 2026-07-27

Kirti Singh

body2020

Judgment text

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CWP-22587 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT 111 DAYA SHANKAR M/S BELCO CORAM: HON'BLE Present: KIRTI SINGH 1. Constitution of India for setting aside the impugned award dated (Annexure P Rohtak, whereby the claim settlement of th 2. petitioner 24.03.2020. He COVID-19 lockdown, wi the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Aggrieved therefrom, the petitioner along with other co Bahadurgarh, on 12.05.2020, wherein the management appeared meetings were held, but no satisfactory reply was given. Thereafter on 22587-2026 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP Date of Decision: 27.07.2026 DAYA SHANKAR VS S BELCO PHARMA AND ANOTHER CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Mr. Kunal Bharati, Advocate for the petitioner. **** KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL) The instant petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the impugned award dated (Annexure P-1), passed by learned Industrial Tribunal Rohtak, whereby the claim settlement of th The case of the petitioner before the Labour Court was that petitioner worked with the respondent-management from .03.2020. He had been illegally terminated from service during the 19 lockdown, without compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Aggrieved therefrom, the petitioner along with other co-workers filed a complaint before the Labour Inspector, Bahadurgarh, on 12.05.2020, wherein the management appeared meetings were held, but no satisfactory reply was given. Thereafter on -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP-22587-2026 (O&M) Date of Decision: 27.07.2026 ... Petitioner PHARMA AND ANOTHER ... Respondents MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Kunal Bharati, Advocate The instant petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the impugned award dated 25.10.2023 1), passed by learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak, whereby the claim settlement of the petitioner was dismissed. The case of the petitioner before the Labour Court was that management from 01.06.2013 had been illegally terminated from service during the thout compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Aggrieved therefrom, the petitioner along workers filed a complaint before the Labour Inspector, Bahadurgarh, on 12.05.2020, wherein the management appeared and meetings were held, but no satisfactory reply was given. Thereafter on The instant petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the 0.2023 Labour Court, The case of the petitioner before the Labour Court was that the till had been illegally terminated from service during the thout compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Aggrieved therefrom, the petitioner along workers filed a complaint before the Labour Inspector, and meetings were held, but no satisfactory reply was given. Thereafter on SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-22587 18.05.2020, the petitioner filed a demand notice before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bahadurgarh, followed by a claim before the learned Industrial Tribunal evidence, the Labour Court accepted the defence of the management and declined the relief claimed by the petitioner, giving rise to the present writ petition. 3. petitioner were illegally terminated during the COVID without compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No notice, retrenchment compensation or opportunity of hearing was afforded prior is argued that the Labour Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record and has erroneously accepted the management's plea of abandonment, despite there being no material to establish a voluntary intention on the part of the petitioner to sever the relationship of employment. The findings recorded are stated to be perverse, warranting interference by this Court. 4. record, this Court finds 5. been instituted after an unexplained and substantial delay from the date of the award. The petition is conspicuously silent as regards cause for not approaching this Court within a reasonable period. Trite to say that a litigant invoking the discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is expected to act with due 22587-2026 (O&M) 18.05.2020, the petitioner filed a demand notice before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bahadurgarh, followed by a claim before the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the Labour Court accepted the defence of the management and declined the relief claimed by the petitioner, giving rise to the present writ Learned counsel for the petitioner submits the services of t petitioner were illegally terminated during the COVID without compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No notice, retrenchment compensation or opportunity of hearing was afforded prior is argued that the Labour Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record and has erroneously accepted the management's plea of abandonment, despite there being no material to establish a voluntary on on the part of the petitioner to sever the relationship of employment. The findings recorded are stated to be perverse, warranting interference by this Court. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned award. At the outset, it deserves notice that the present writ petition has been instituted after an unexplained and substantial delay from the date of the award. The petition is conspicuously silent as regards cause for not approaching this Court within a reasonable period. Trite to say that a litigant invoking the discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is expected to act with due -2- 18.05.2020, the petitioner filed a demand notice before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bahadurgarh, followed by a claim before the learned Rohtak. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the Labour Court accepted the defence of the management and declined the relief claimed by the petitioner, giving rise to the present writ Learned counsel for the petitioner submits the services of t petitioner were illegally terminated during the COVID-19 lockdown, without compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No notice, retrenchment compensation or opportunity of hearing was afforded prior to dispensing with his services. It is argued that the Labour Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record and has erroneously accepted the management's plea of abandonment, despite there being no material to establish a voluntary on on the part of the petitioner to sever the relationship of employment. The findings recorded are stated to be perverse, warranting Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the no ground to interfere with the impugned award. At the outset, it deserves notice that the present writ petition has been instituted after an unexplained and substantial delay from the date of the award. The petition is conspicuously silent as regards any sufficient cause for not approaching this Court within a reasonable period. Trite to say that a litigant invoking the discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is expected to act with due 18.05.2020, the petitioner filed a demand notice before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bahadurgarh, followed by a claim before the learned Rohtak. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the Labour Court accepted the defence of the management and declined the relief claimed by the petitioner, giving rise to the present writ Learned counsel for the petitioner submits the services of the 19 lockdown, without compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No notice, retrenchment compensation or to dispensing with his services. It is argued that the Labour Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record and has erroneously accepted the management's plea of abandonment, despite there being no material to establish a voluntary on on the part of the petitioner to sever the relationship of employment. The findings recorded are stated to be perverse, warranting Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the At the outset, it deserves notice that the present writ petition has been instituted after an unexplained and substantial delay from the date of any sufficient cause for not approaching this Court within a reasonable period. Trite to say that a litigant invoking the discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is expected to act with due SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-22587 diligence. In the petitioner cannot, as a matter of course, seek re examination of an award that has otherwise attained finality. 6. prescribed for invoki remain a relevant, and in appropriate cases a decisive, factor guiding the exercise of discretion under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 7. 1006, the Constitution Bench held that the period ordinarily prescribed for a suit claiming similar relief furnishes a reasonable yardstick for assessing delay in a writ petition, absent a satisfactory explanation. 8. (2006) 4 SCC 322, to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction where there is negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right, reiterating, with reference State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566, not ordinarily assist the tardy, the indolent, the acquiescent or the lethargic. 9. 768, it was held that inordina ground for refusing to exercise discretionary jurisdiction, the underlying object of the principle being to discourage agitation of stale claims and exhumation of matters already settled or in which the rights have accrued. 10. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, 22587-2026 (O&M) diligence. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the delay, the petitioner cannot, as a matter of course, seek re examination of an award that has otherwise attained finality. It is well settled that although no period of limitation is prescribed for invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court, delay and laches remain a relevant, and in appropriate cases a decisive, factor guiding the exercise of discretion under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR the Constitution Bench held that the period ordinarily prescribed for a suit claiming similar relief furnishes a reasonable yardstick for assessing delay in a writ petition, absent a satisfactory explanation. In Karnataka Power Corporati (2006) 4 SCC 322, the Supreme Court held that the High Court may decline to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction where there is negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right, reiterating, with reference State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566, not ordinarily assist the tardy, the indolent, the acquiescent or the lethargic. In Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 1 SCC it was held that inordinate delay in approaching the writ court is good ground for refusing to exercise discretionary jurisdiction, the underlying object of the principle being to discourage agitation of stale claims and exhumation of matters already settled or in which the rights have accrued. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, it was held that a writ court, while -3- absence of any satisfactory explanation for the delay, the petitioner cannot, as a matter of course, seek re examination of an award that It is well settled that although no period of limitation is ng the writ jurisdiction of this Court, delay and laches remain a relevant, and in appropriate cases a decisive, factor guiding the exercise of discretion under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC the Constitution Bench held that the period ordinarily prescribed for a suit claiming similar relief furnishes a reasonable yardstick for assessing delay in a writ petition, absent a satisfactory explanation. Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, the Supreme Court held that the High Court may decline to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction where there is negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right, reiterating, with reference State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566, that a writ court does not ordinarily assist the tardy, the indolent, the acquiescent or the lethargic. Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 1 SCC te delay in approaching the writ court is good ground for refusing to exercise discretionary jurisdiction, the underlying object of the principle being to discourage agitation of stale claims and exhumation of matters already settled or in which the rights of third parties Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. it was held that a writ court, while absence of any satisfactory explanation for the delay, the petitioner cannot, as a matter of course, seek re examination of an award that It is well settled that although no period of limitation is ng the writ jurisdiction of this Court, delay and laches remain a relevant, and in appropriate cases a decisive, factor guiding the 1964 SC the Constitution Bench held that the period ordinarily prescribed for a suit claiming similar relief furnishes a reasonable yardstick for assessing on Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, the Supreme Court held that the High Court may decline to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction where there is negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right, reiterating, with reference to that a writ court does not ordinarily assist the tardy, the indolent, the acquiescent or the lethargic. Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 1 SCC te delay in approaching the writ court is good ground for refusing to exercise discretionary jurisdiction, the underlying object of the principle being to discourage agitation of stale claims and of third parties Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. it was held that a writ court, while SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-22587 bound to protect the rights of citizens, is equally obliged to scrutinise whether a bel permit a litigant to sleep over his rights and rise, as it were, like a phoenix. 11. INSC 314, the writ court belatedly, having slept over his rights for a considerable period, ought not to be granted extraordinary relief, and that where delay and laches are made out, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. 12. case, the petitioner has neither pleaded nor demonstrated any sufficient cause for the delay in assailing the award, nor has any explanation been prefered that would appeal to the attained finality on account of this unexplained delay, the writ petition is liable to fail on this ground alone. 13. The Labour Court recorded a c and documentary evidence, that the respondent in the manufacture of essential goods, continued its operations during the lockdown and had repeatedly called upon the petitioner to res through WhatsApp messages and telephonic communications, a fact which could not be contradicted by the petitioner before the learned Labour Court, by way of any cogent evidence. It further noticed material inconsistencies between the petitioner' circumstances under which he allegedly failed to report for work, besides his 22587-2026 (O&M) bound to protect the rights of citizens, is equally obliged to scrutinise whether a belated lis ought to be entertained at all, since the law does not permit a litigant to sleep over his rights and rise, as it were, like a phoenix. More recently, in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, 2024 INSC 314, the Supreme Court reiterated that an ap the writ court belatedly, having slept over his rights for a considerable period, ought not to be granted extraordinary relief, and that where delay and laches are made out, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, the petitioner has neither pleaded nor demonstrated any sufficient cause for the delay in assailing the award, nor has any explanation been prefered that would appeal to the conscience of this Court. The award having attained finality on account of this unexplained delay, the writ petition is liable to fail on this ground alone. Even otherwise, no case for interference on merits is made out. The Labour Court recorded a categorical finding, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, that the respondent in the manufacture of essential goods, continued its operations during the lockdown and had repeatedly called upon the petitioner to res through WhatsApp messages and telephonic communications, a fact which could not be contradicted by the petitioner before the learned Labour Court, by way of any cogent evidence. It further noticed material inconsistencies between the petitioner's pleadings and his testimony regarding the circumstances under which he allegedly failed to report for work, besides his -4- bound to protect the rights of citizens, is equally obliged to scrutinise ated lis ought to be entertained at all, since the law does not permit a litigant to sleep over his rights and rise, as it were, like a phoenix. Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, 2024 the Supreme Court reiterated that an applicant who approaches the writ court belatedly, having slept over his rights for a considerable period, ought not to be granted extraordinary relief, and that where delay and laches are made out, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, the petitioner has neither pleaded nor demonstrated any sufficient cause for the delay in assailing the award, nor has any explanation been conscience of this Court. The award having attained finality on account of this unexplained delay, the writ petition is Even otherwise, no case for interference on merits is made out. ategorical finding, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, that the respondent-management, being engaged in the manufacture of essential goods, continued its operations during the lockdown and had repeatedly called upon the petitioner to resume duties through WhatsApp messages and telephonic communications, a fact which could not be contradicted by the petitioner before the learned Labour Court, by way of any cogent evidence. It further noticed material inconsistencies s pleadings and his testimony regarding the circumstances under which he allegedly failed to report for work, besides his bound to protect the rights of citizens, is equally obliged to scrutinise ated lis ought to be entertained at all, since the law does not permit a litigant to sleep over his rights and rise, as it were, like a phoenix. Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, 2024 plicant who approaches the writ court belatedly, having slept over his rights for a considerable period, ought not to be granted extraordinary relief, and that where delay and laches are made out, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, the petitioner has neither pleaded nor demonstrated any sufficient cause for the delay in assailing the award, nor has any explanation been conscience of this Court. The award having attained finality on account of this unexplained delay, the writ petition is Even otherwise, no case for interference on merits is made out. ategorical finding, on appreciation of the oral management, being engaged in the manufacture of essential goods, continued its operations during the ume duties through WhatsApp messages and telephonic communications, a fact which could not be contradicted by the petitioner before the learned Labour Court, by way of any cogent evidence. It further noticed material inconsistencies s pleadings and his testimony regarding the circumstances under which he allegedly failed to report for work, besides his SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-22587 inability to substantiate material assertions regarding his appointment and service. Another factor that weighed before the Court conc petitioner had not approached any authority concerned, including the labour inspector, soon after 25.03.2020, when he was allegedly stopped from resuming his responsibilities by the officials of the management. Accordingly, on a cumulati Labour Court concluded that the petitioner had voluntarily abandoned his employment, and that no case of illegal termination stood established. 14. the Labour Court are founded on evidence. No perversity, patent illegality, jurisdictional error or violation of the principles of natural justice has been demonstrated which would warrant interference in the limited supervisory jurisdiction of this 15. under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, does not sit in appeal over findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court and cannot re evidence merely because anot 16. delay and laches and being also devoid of merit, is dismissed. 17. 27.07.2026 SwarnjitS Whether speaking/reasoned Whether reportable 22587-2026 (O&M) inability to substantiate material assertions regarding his appointment and service. Another factor that weighed before the Court conc petitioner had not approached any authority concerned, including the labour inspector, soon after 25.03.2020, when he was allegedly stopped from resuming his responsibilities by the officials of the management. Accordingly, on a cumulative circumspection of the facts of the case, the Labour Court concluded that the petitioner had voluntarily abandoned his employment, and that no case of illegal termination stood established. In the considered opinion of this Court, the findings recor the Labour Court are founded on evidence. No perversity, patent illegality, jurisdictional error or violation of the principles of natural justice has been demonstrated which would warrant interference in the limited supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. Needless to reiterate that this Court, while exercising powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, does not sit in appeal over findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court and cannot re evidence merely because another view may also be possible. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition, being barred by delay and laches and being also devoid of merit, is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. 2026 Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No -5- inability to substantiate material assertions regarding his appointment and service. Another factor that weighed before the Court concerned was that the petitioner had not approached any authority concerned, including the labour inspector, soon after 25.03.2020, when he was allegedly stopped from resuming his responsibilities by the officials of the management. ve circumspection of the facts of the case, the Labour Court concluded that the petitioner had voluntarily abandoned his employment, and that no case of illegal termination stood established. In the considered opinion of this Court, the findings recorded by the Labour Court are founded on evidence. No perversity, patent illegality, jurisdictional error or violation of the principles of natural justice has been demonstrated which would warrant interference in the limited supervisory Needless to reiterate that this Court, while exercising powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, does not sit in appeal over findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court and cannot re-appreciate the her view may also be possible. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition, being barred by delay and laches and being also devoid of merit, is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE Yes/No Yes/No inability to substantiate material assertions regarding his appointment and erned was that the petitioner had not approached any authority concerned, including the labour inspector, soon after 25.03.2020, when he was allegedly stopped from resuming his responsibilities by the officials of the management. ve circumspection of the facts of the case, the Labour Court concluded that the petitioner had voluntarily abandoned his ded by the Labour Court are founded on evidence. No perversity, patent illegality, jurisdictional error or violation of the principles of natural justice has been demonstrated which would warrant interference in the limited supervisory Needless to reiterate that this Court, while exercising powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, does not sit in appeal over appreciate the For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition, being barred by SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.28 16:32 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document