CWP-12095-2019 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Sr.No.206 CWP-12095-2019 Decided on : 22.07.2026 Davinder Pal ...... Petitioner Versus State of Punjab and others ...... Respondents CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR *** Present : Mr. Rajesh Gupta, Advocate for the petitioner (through V.C.) Mr. Karunesh Kaushal, AAG, Punjab. *** NAMIT KUMAR J. (ORAL) 1. The instant petition has been filed by the petitioner under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the order dated 21.09.2018 (Annexure P-3), passed by the Commissioner of Police, Amritsar City, whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service and the order dated 04.02.2019 (Annexure P-4), passed by respondent No.2, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner joined the police department as a Constable on 09.12.1988. It is the case of the petitioner that he remained under treatment for depression from 17.04.2017 to 16.08.2017. Upon reporting for duty on 16.08.2017, he was not allowed to join his duty and was informed that he had already been placed under suspension on 06.07.2017. Thereafter, a charge-sheet dated 08.12.2017 (Annexure P-1) was served upon him, wherein allegation of unauthorized absence from duty from 17.04.2017 to 16.08.2017, i.e., 04 months and 03 hours was made. The petitioner submitted his reply to the said charge-sheet MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 2 on 01.02.2018 (Annexure P-2). The Inquiry Officer submitted his report holding the charge of unauthorized absence from duty proved. Consequently, petitioner was issued a show cause notice alongwith copy of the inquiry report, to which he submitted his representation and he was called for personal hearing. During the course of personal hearing, he produced medical documents purportedly issued by Dr. Manjit Singh of Neurology Department, Guru Nanak Dev Hospital, Amritsar. The punishing authority got the said medical documents verified from the concerned hospital through Sh. Sukninder Singh, PPS, Station House Officer, Police Station Mohkampura, Amritsar, who vide his letter dated 30.08.2018 had sent the report that the medical documents are forged, as neither did the concerned Neurology Department exist in the said hospital nor was there any doctor by the name of Manjit Singh. Upon receipt of the said report, opinion of the DA/Legal, Amritsar was obtained and on the basis of the said opinion, FIR No.51, dated 22.09.2018, under Sections 420, 465, 466, 468, 471, 120- B IPC, was registered against the petitioner at Police Station Majitha Road, Amritsar. The criminal trial arising therefrom is stated to be pending against him. Thereafter, the petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated 21.09.2018 (Annexure P-3), against which the petitioner preferred an appeal before respondent No.2 which has been considered and rejected vide order dated 04.02.2019 (Annexure P-4). 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the instant petition has been preferred by the petitioner. 4. Reply by way of an affidavit of Sartaj Singh Chahal, IPS, Addl. Deputy Commissioner of Police, Headquarters, Amritsar City has been filed on behalf of respondents No.1 to 3, wherein it has been stated as under:- MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 3 1. That petitioner Ex. Constable Davinder Pal was recruited as constable in district Tarn Taran and was allotted regimental No. 3445/TT. During his entire service he remained absent for approximately 2502 days on different occasions. He absented himself from his duty on 17.04.2017 to 16.08.2017 i.e 121 days due to which he was placed under suspension vide this office order No. 29309-11/A-1 dated 06.07.2017 (Annexure R-1) for his wilful absence and due to his habitual and wilful absence from his duty he was dismissed from service vide this office order No. 2844-50/Supdt. dated 21.09.2018. (Annexed as annexure R-2) 2. That the petitioner remained wilfully absent from his duty time and again without any leave or permission from the competent authority. Due to his habitual absence his 20 years permanent service was forfeited with permanent effect out of his total 30 year service. 3. That petitioner filed an appeal against his dismissal order dated 21.09.2018 before the Director General of Police, Punjab Chandigarh which was rejected by the appellant authority vide their office order No. 4805-06/Law & order dated 04.02.2019. (Annexed as annexure R-3). 4. That the petitioner was habitual absentee and his various absence periods are mentioned in the following table: Sr. No. Absent from Absent to D.E open/not Order No. Total Absent 1. 25.02.1993 21.04.1993 Open 11884-83/B dated 15.04.1993 55 days 2. 07.11.94 02.01.95 55 days 3. 22.07.1998 15.09.1998 After enquiry his 01 year service was forfeited 51802-6/B dated 22.11.1998 54 days 4. 05.12.92 18.12.92 13 days 5. 12.06.1998 15.06.1998 3 days 6. 04.04.1998 17.04.1998 13 days 7. 12.01.1999 02.03.1999 After enquiry his 14380-85/B dated 50 days MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 4 01 year service was forfeited 20.04.1999 8. 04.06.1998 19.06.1998 14 days 9. 18.02.1998 28.02.1998 10 days 10. 05.12.1998 18.12.1998 12 days 11. 25.05.1998 02.06.1998 21 days 12. 07.08.1999 14.08.1999 07 days 13. 19.08.1999 20.08.1999 02 days 14. 12.01.1999 02.03.1999 50 days 15. 15.06.1999 10.07.1999 26 days 16. 07.09.1999 05.04.2000 211 days 17. 26.05.2000 23.09.2000 121 days 18. 03.10.2000 12.04.2001 192 days 19. 13.04.2001 19.04.2001 06 days 20. 09.03.2004 11.03.2004 02 days 21. 21.04.2004 29.04.2004 08 days 22. 25.05.2004 06.07.2004 After enquiry his 02 year service was forfeited 41327-31/B dated 28.09.2004 42 days 23. 24.12.2004 18.03.2005 18.03.2005 04.08.2005 After enquiry his 07 year service was forfeited 84 days 139 days 24. 18.03.2005 04.08.2005 137 days 25. 18.11.2005 25.05.2008 After enquiry his 05 year service was forfeited Order No.32576- 80/B dated 20.06.2008 Approx. 919 days 26. 17.11.2008 24.11.2008 7 days 27. 08.12.2008 11.12.2008 3 days 28. 30.07.2015 14.08.2015 29. 17.04.2017 16.08.2017 Suspended and D.E open 29309- 11/A-1 dt.06.07.17 125 days Total 2502 21.09.2018 Dismissed vide order No.2844- 50/Supdt. Dated 21.09.2018. Dismissed due to the absence of 121 days. MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 5 5. That the petitioner is habitual absentee and his entire absence period was treated as non-duty non-pay vide different orders and dates. Before his dismissal his medical certificate which was produced by him was verified from the concerned authority i.e. Guru Nanak Dev Hospital, Amritsar and after verification said medical certificate was found fake. After obtaining the legal opinion a case FIR No. 51 dated 22.09.2018 u/s 420,465,466,468,471, 120-B IPC, P.S Majitha Road, Amritsar was registered against him.” 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had rendered nearly 30 years of service, therefore, instead of imposing the penalty of dismissal from service, the competent authority ought to have compulsorily retired him from service. He further submits that the punishment of dismissal awarded to him is harsh and disproportionate to the allegations made in the charge-sheet. 6. Per contra, learned State counsel while referring to the averments made in the written statement, submits that the petitioner is a habitual absentee and remained absent from duty on 29 occasions for a period of 2502 days. He further submits that even during the course of disciplinary proceedings, he has produced forged and fabricated medical certificates for which an FIR No.51, dated 22.09.2018, under Sections 420, 465, 466, 468, 471, 120-B IPC, has been registered against him, at Police Station Majitha Road, Amritsar and the criminal trial is pending. He further submits that, keeping in view the past service record of the petitioner and the fact that petitioner being a member of the disciplined force, remained absent from duty on 29 occasions, the punishment of dismissal from service awarded to the petitioner is proportionate to the misconduct committed by him. MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 6 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. The petitioner was dismissed from service on charge of unauthorized absence from duty after following the due procedure of law. He was issued charge-sheet, to which he submitted his reply. A regular departmental inquiry was conducted in accordance with Punjab Police Rules, wherein the charges levelled against petitioner have been proved. Thereafter, the petitioner was issued a show cause notice alongwith the copy of the inquiry report and during the course of personal hearing, the petitioner produced certain medical certificates in support of his defence. Upon verification, the medical certificates were found to be forged & fabricated, as no doctor by the name of Manjit Singh was found to be associated with the concerned hospital and even the said hospital was also found to be non- existent, for which an FIR has been registered against the petitioner. The scope of judicial review in matters arising out of departmental proceedings has been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, 1963 AIR Supreme Court 1723, wherein it has been held that the High Court is not a Court of appeal which examines the merits of the findings recorded in the departmental inquiry and the power of judicial review is confined to examining whether the inquiry was conducted by a competent authority; according to the procedure prescribed and whether rules of natural justice were duly complied with. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. P. Gunasekaran, 2015(1) SCT 5 while considering the scope of interference under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has held as under: - MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 7 "13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether : a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 8 (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1723, many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus : "7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent pendent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 9 the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." 15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975)2 SCC 557, the principles have been further discussed at paragraph paragraph-21 to 24, which read as follows : "21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao Rao. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 10 the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. 22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh case this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 11 disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the shut- down of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that at the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion. 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 12 to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan. 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do." These principles have been succinctly summed summed-up by the living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491. To quote the unparalled and inimitable expressions: "4. .... in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 13 strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good...." 10. To the similar effect is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Industrial Security Force and others v. Abrar Ali, 2017(1) SCT 682, wherein it has been held as under: - "8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re- appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya reported in 2011(2) S.C.T. 782 : 2011(3) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 28 : (2011) 4 SCC 584, this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 14 another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, 1996(1) S.C.T. 617 : (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, 1997(4) S.C.T. 214 : (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, 1999(3) S.C.T. 669 : (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036 and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil." 11. The said view has recently been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and others v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, 2021(1) SCT 285 and in the said judgment it has been held as under: - “23. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional Courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 15 procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has been earlier examined by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V. Venuaopalan, 1994(6) SCC 302 and later in Government of T.N. and Another v. A. Rajapandian, 1995(1) SCC 216 and further examined by the three Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Others, 1995(6) SCC 749 wherein it has been held as under:- "13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued." 24. It has been consistently followed in the later decision of this Court in Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited v. Mahesh Dahiya, 2017(1) SCC 768 and recently by the three Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India and Others, 2020(9) SCC 471. 25. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the Constitutional Courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The Court/Tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 16 prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority if based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 26. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the Court is to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. 27. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry. 28. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 17 surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings. 29. The Constitutional Court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of malafides or perversity, i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained." 12. To the similar effect are the judgments in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others : 1996(1) SCT 617 and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora : (1997) 3 SCC 72. 13. A perusal of the record leaves no manner of doubt that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted after following the prescribed procedure in its entirety and in due compliance with the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was served with a charge-sheet, participated in the enquiry proceedings, and submitted his defence, was afforded an opportunity to make representation against the enquiry report, and was granted a personal hearing before the disciplinary authority. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was denied adequate or reasonable opportunity, or that the proceedings stand vitiated on account of any procedural infirmity. 14. The challenge raised in the present writ petition, in substance, seeks re-appreciation of the factual findings returned in the departmental proceedings and reassessment of the evidentiary material on record. Such an exercise is plainly impermissible in writ jurisdiction. This Court does not sit MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh CWP-12095-2019 18 as an appellate forum over the findings recorded by the inquiry officer or the disciplinary authority and it cannot go into the adequacy or inadequacy of evidence, examine the reliability of evidence as if sitting in appeal, or substitute its own view for the view taken by the competent authorities. Unless the findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, rendered in breach of the principles of natural justice, or unless the punishment imposed is so disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the Court, no interference is warranted. In the facts of the present case, none of the aforesaid contingencies is made out. 15. Keeping in view the above, finding no merit in the present writ petition, the same is hereby dismissed. 16. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. (NAMIT KUMAR) 22.07.2026 JUDGE mamta Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No MAMTA MALHOTRA 2026.07.27 17:36 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment Chandigarh