IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM-M-1022-2019 (O&M) Reserved On: 20.04.2026 Pronounced On: 13.07.2026 NARENDER AND OTHERS ...Petitioners V/S STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER ...Respondents CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBHAS MEHLA Present: Mr. Rakesh Nehra, Senior Advocate with Ms. Harmanpreet Kaur, Advocate; Mr. Sahil Nehra, Advocate and Ms. Nitika Malik, Advocate, for the petitioners Mr. Karan Veer Singh, Senior DAG, Haryana. Mr. Aditya Sanghi, Advocate, for respondent No.2 SUBHAS MEHLA, J. 1. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) for quashing of FIR No.387 dated 08.08.2018 registered under Sections 294, 323, 506 and 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) and Section 3 of The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short ‘SC/ST Act’) at Police Station Beri, District Jhajjar and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom. 2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that on 06.08.2018, petitioner No.1–Narender, petitioner No.2–Satinder and one Rajpal allegedly misbehaved with Mahant Shri Rajinder Dass Ji. Pursuant thereto, a village Panchayat was convened on 08.08.2018 to resolve the dispute. It is alleged that when the MANISHA 2026.07.14 14:17 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-1022-2019 (O&M) 2 petitioners reached the place of Panchayat, they started abusing the complainant party, hurled caste-based remarks against respondent No.2 and Ram Chander Harijan, and thereafter assaulted them with bricks. Thereafter, the petitioners are alleged to have extended telephonic threats to the complainant party. Consequently, the present FIR was registered. During the course of the investigation, offence under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act was also added to the FIR. The gravamen of the present petition is the subsequent addition of the offence under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act to the FIR and entails a legal challenge to the manner in which the said provisions were invoked. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS 3. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners primarily assailed the invocation of the offence under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act during the course of investigation. It was contended that the said provision was incorporated two days after registration of the FIR without conducting a preliminary inquiry, which, according to learned counsel, was mandatory in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra; 2018 INSC 248. It was, thus, argued that the subsequent addition of the offence under the SC/ST Act was legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 4. In support of the aforesaid contention, learned senior counsel further submitted that the petitioners have been falsely implicated and that, in fact, it was the complainant party which had assaulted them, causing injuries for which they had received medical treatment. It was also submitted that although the petitioners had lodged a complaint regarding the said occurrence, which was MANISHA 2026.07.14 14:17 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-1022-2019 (O&M) 3 recorded vide Daily Diary Report No.39 dated 09.08.2018 (Annexure P-5), no FIR was registered thereon, compelling them to institute a private complaint before learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhajjar. Learned counsel argued that these circumstances further demonstrate that the provision under the SC/ST Act was invoked at the instance of respondent No.2 with a mala fide intention to aggravate the allegations against the petitioners. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE 5. Per contra, learned State counsel opposed the petition and submitted that the petitioners have been specifically named in the FIR and upon completion of investigation, sufficient incriminating material was found against them, culminating in the presentation of the challan before the competent Court. It was further submitted that the reliance placed by the petitioners on Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan (supra) is wholly misconceived, as the said judgment has been reviewed and overruled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. State of Maharashtra; 2019 INSC 1102. It was argued that the provision under the SC/ST Act was invoked only after due consideration of the material collected during investigation and that no preliminary inquiry or prior approval before arrest is envisaged under the prevailing legal position. Learned counsel further contended that the present petition is an attempt to thwart the prosecution despite existence of prima facie material disclosing the commission of offences under the IPC as well as the SC/ST Act. Hence, learned State counsel prayed that the present petition lacked merits, and ought to be dismissed. MANISHA 2026.07.14 14:17 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-1022-2019 (O&M) 4 CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 adopted the submissions advanced by learned State counsel and further contended that the present petition is devoid of merits. It was submitted that the allegations contained in the FIR, coupled with the material collected during investigation, prima facie disclose the commission of offence under the SC/ST Act and, therefore, the investigating agency was fully justified in invoking the said provision of Section 3 of the SC/ST Act during the course of investigation. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioners are attempting to challenge the merits of the prosecution case under the guise of assailing the subsequent addition of the provision of the SC/ST Act and that the disputed questions of fact sought to be raised cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was thus prayed that the present petition be dismissed. OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS 7. Heard. 8. The controversy in the present petition lies within a narrow compass. While the petitioners contend that the provision of the SC/ST Act was illegally invoked during investigation in the absence of a preliminary inquiry, the said contention is disputed by the respondents, who maintain that the investigating agency acted strictly in accordance with the prevailing legal position. 9. In the light of the rival submissions, the short question which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the subsequent invocation of the provision of the SC/ST Act during the course of investigation is rendered illegal MANISHA 2026.07.14 14:17 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-1022-2019 (O&M) 5 solely on the ground that no preliminary inquiry preceded the addition of the said offence. 10. The answer to the aforesaid question necessarily turns upon the legal position governing the requirement of a preliminary inquiry before invocation of the provisions of the SC/ST Act. The principal plank of the petitioners' challenge rests upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan (supra), wherein certain directions were issued with regard to the conduct of a preliminary inquiry before taking action under the provisions of the SC/ST Act. The respondents, however, contend that the said directions no longer hold the field in view of the subsequent decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is, therefore, apposite to examine the legal position as it presently stands. 11. A perusal of the subsequent legal developments reveals that the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan (supra) requiring the conduct of a preliminary inquiry before taking action under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, did not remain operative. 12. In Union of India v. State of Maharashtra (supra), while deciding the review petitions arising out of Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reconsidered the correctness of the directions requiring a preliminary inquiry before taking action under the provisions of the SC/ST Act and held as under:. The relevant observations are reproduced hereunder: “The direction has also been issued that the Dy. S.P. should conduct a preliminary inquiry to find out whether allegations make out a case under the Atrocities Act, and that the allegations MANISHA 2026.07.14 14:17 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-1022-2019 (O&M) 6 are not frivolous or motivated. In case a cognisable offence is made out, the FIR has to be outrightly registered, and no preliminary inquiry has to be made as held in Lalita Kumari (supra) by a Constitution Bench. There is no such provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for preliminary inquiry or under the SC/ST Act, as such direction is impermissible. Moreover, it is ordered to be conducted by the person of the rank of Dy. S.P. The number of Dy. S.P. as per stand of Union of India required for such an exercise of preliminary inquiry is not available. The direction would mean that even if a complaint made out a cognizable offence, an FIR would not be registered until the preliminary inquiry is held. In case a preliminary inquiry concludes that allegations are false or motivated, FIR is not to be registered in such a case how a final report has to be filed in the Court. The direction (iv) cannot survive for the other reasons as it puts the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in a disadvantageous position in the matter of procedure vis-a-vis to the complaints lodged by members of upper caste, for later no such preliminary investigation is necessary, in that view of matter it should not be necessary to hold preliminary inquiry for registering an offence under the Atrocities Act of 1989”. (emphasis supplied) A plain reading of the aforesaid observations leaves no manner of doubt that the directions issued in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan (supra) requiring the conduct of a preliminary inquiry before invocation of the MANISHA 2026.07.14 14:17 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-1022-2019 (O&M) 7 provisions of the SC/ST Act did not survive in the review judgment. On the contrary, the Hon'ble Supreme Court categorically held that neither Cr.P.C. nor the SC/ST Act contemplates such a preliminary inquiry where the allegations disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The requirement was held to be legally impermissible, as it would place members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes at a procedural disadvantage and defeat the object of the special legislation. The legal position, therefore, stands authoritatively settled that where the allegations disclose the commission of a cognizable offence under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, a preliminary inquiry is not required before registration of the FIR or invocation of the provisions of the SC/ST Act. 13. The aforesaid legal position was subsequently reaffirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India (2020 AIR SC 1036), wherein the constitutional validity of the amendments to the SC/ST Act was upheld: “Concerning the provisions contained in Section 18A, suffice it to observe that with respect to preliminary inquiry for registration of FIR, we have already recalled the general directions (iii) and (iv) issued in Dr. Subhash Kashinath's case (supra). A preliminary inquiry is permissible only in the circumstances as per the law laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1, shall hold good as explained in the order passed by this Court in the review petitions on 1.10.2019 and the amended provisions of Section 18A have to be interpreted accordingly.” MANISHA 2026.07.14 14:17 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-1022-2019 (O&M) 8 The Apex Court reiterated that the statutory scheme of the SC/ST Act does not envisage a preliminary inquiry as a condition precedent for initiating action thereunder. It was categorically observed that the directions issued in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan (supra) requiring a preliminary inquiry before registration of an FIR under the SC/ST Act had already been recalled and that a preliminary inquiry would be permissible only in the limited circumstances recognized by the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1. Thus, no independent or mandatory preliminary inquiry is contemplated merely because the provisions of the SC/ST Act are sought to be invoked. 14. The aforesaid legal position also has to be appreciated in the context of the settled principle governing the operation of judicial precedents. It is well settled that when a Court subsequently corrects or alters an earlier understanding of the law, it does not enact a new rule of law but merely declares what the law has always been. Unless expressly directed otherwise, a judicial pronouncement declaring the law operates retrospectively and governs all pending proceedings. In Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Rajkot v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd., (2008) 14 SCC 171, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the aforesaid principle in the following terms: "In our judgment, it is also well settled that a judicial decision acts retrospectively. According to Blackstonian theory, it is not the function of the court to pronounce a 'new rule' but to maintain and expound the 'old one'. In other words, Judges do not make law, they only discover or find the correct law. The law has always been the same. If a subsequent decision alters MANISHA 2026.07.14 14:17 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-1022-2019 (O&M) 9 the earlier one, it (the later decision) does not make new law. It only discovers the correct principle of law which has to be applied retrospectively. To put it differently, even where an earlier decision of the Court operated for quite some time, the decision rendered later on would have retrospective effect clarifying the legal position which was earlier not correctly understood." The said principle has recently been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanishk Sinha v. State of West Bengal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 443, wherein it was held: "Now the law of prospective and retrospective operation is absolutely clear. Whereas a law made by the legislature is always prospective in nature unless it has been specifically stated in the statute itself about its retrospective operation, the reverse is true for the law which is laid down by a Constitutional Court, or law as it is interpreted by the Court. The judgment of the Court will always be retrospective in nature unless the judgment itself specifically states that the judgment will operate prospectively." Viewed in the aforesaid light, the review judgment in Union of India v. State of Maharashtra (supra) did not lay down a new proposition of law; rather, it authoritatively declared the correct legal position governing the requirement of a preliminary inquiry under the SC/ST Act. Consequently, the law so declared would govern the present proceedings notwithstanding that the FIR came to be registered prior to the pronouncement of the review judgment. MANISHA 2026.07.14 14:17 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-1022-2019 (O&M) 10 15. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the principal challenge raised by the petitioners rests solely upon the contention that the provision under the SC/ST Act was incorporated during the course of investigation without first conducting a preliminary inquiry. In view of the legal position authoritatively settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. The State of Maharashtra (supra) the said contention cannot be accepted. Once the requirement of a preliminary inquiry stood expressly negated, the mere fact that a provision of the SC/ST Act was invoked during investigation without such an inquiry cannot, by itself, furnish a ground for quashing the FIR or the consequential proceedings. 16. Since the very premise of such challenge no longer survives in view of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. The State of Maharashtra (supra), this Court finds no illegality or infirmity in the action of the investigating agency. 17. Accordingly, the present petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. 18. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (SUBHAS MEHLA) JUDGE 13.07.2026 Manisha Whether Speaking/Reasoned: YES/NO Whether Reportable: YES/NO MANISHA 2026.07.14 14:17 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document