- 1 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF JULY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 1266 OF 2019 (INJ) BETWEEN: THE COMMISSIONER BENGALURU DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD, K.P. WEST, BENGALURU-560 020 …APPELLANT (BY SRI. JAGADEESWARA N.R, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SMT. S.M LAKSHMIDEVI W/O. LATE. P JAYARAMAREDDY, AGED 58 YEARS 2. SRI. J. SRINIVASA REDDY D/O. LATE. P JAYARAMAREDDY, AGED 33 YEARS 3. SMT. JYOTHI D/O. LATE. P JAYARAMAREDDY, AGED 28 YEARS ALL ARE R/O 76/1, 7TH CROSS, HSR LAYOUT, 27TH MAIN, I SECTOR, BDA (AGARA), BANGALORE-560 102. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. R. HEMANTH RAJ, ADVOCATE FOR R1-R3) THIS RFA IS FILED U/S.96 R/W ORDER XLI RULE 1 OF CPC AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 25.09.2014 ON THE FILE OF THE XIII ADDL.CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS Digitally signed by PANKAJA S Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 JUDGE, MAYOHALL UNIT, BANGALORE DECREEING THE SUIT FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION. THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 07.07.2026 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K CAV JUDGMENT This is defendant - Bangalore Development Authority's (for brevity, "BDA") appeal challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 25.09.2014 passed in O.S No.25713/2011 by the XIII Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Mayo Hall Unit, Bangalore (CCH-22) [for brevity, "Trail Court"], whereby the Trail Court passed the following: "ORDER The suit of the plaintiffs is hereby decreed in the following terms: Permanently restrained the defendant, its agents, men or anybody, under or through them from demolishing any portion of the schedule buildings and or in any way interfering with the plaintiffs’ lawful possession of the schedule properties. No order as to costs." - 3 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 2. The parties are referred to as per their ranking before the Trail Court for the sake of convenience. 3. The abridged facts of the case are as under: The case of the plaintiffs is that plaintiff No.1 is the wife and plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 are the children of late P. Jayaramareddy, who had acquired land measuring 1 acre 15 guntas in Sy.No.76/1 situated at Agara Village, Begur Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk (for brevity, "the suit schedule property"), pursuant to a family partition, and thereafter got the mutation and RTC records entered in his name. During his lifetime, late P. Jayaramareddy formed a layout in the schedule property, retaining Site Nos.1, 2, 3 and 4, which are more fully described as Item Nos.1 to 4 of the suit schedule property. He also constructed buildings on the said sites. Upon his demise, the plaintiffs succeeded to the suit schedule property and claim to be in peaceful and lawful possession thereof as absolute owners, asserting continuous possession from the date of the partition. It is further their case that, in the third week of February 2011, the defendant, without issuing any notice or intimating the plaintiffs about any acquisition proceedings, attempted to demolish portions of the buildings standing on the - 4 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 schedule property. Despite the plaintiffs' request to desist from such action, the defendant allegedly proceeded with its attempt. Hence, the plaintiffs were constrained to institute the suit. 4. Pursuant to the service of suit summons, the defendant–BDA entered appearance through its learned counsel and filed its written statement, inter alia, contending that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts. It was specifically contended that the suit schedule property forms part of land bearing Sy.No.76/1, which had been acquired by the defendant pursuant to the preliminary notification issued in the year 1984 and the final notification issued in the year 1986 for the formation of a layout between Hosur Road and Sarjapur Road. It was further contended that an award had been passed and possession of the acquired land had been taken. According to the defendant, upon taking possession, the acquired land stood vested in it, in terms of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. On these grounds, the defendant sought dismissal of the suit. 5. On the basis of above rival pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues: - 5 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 “ISSUES 1. Whether plaintiffs prove that they have constructed suit building item No.1 to 4 properties legally and have been in lawful possession of suit properties as on the date of the suit? 2. Whether plaintiffs prove that defendant is trying to demolish the suit properties illegally and causing interference into possession of the plaintiffs? 3. Whether plaintiffs are entitled for decree of permanent injunction as sought in the plaint? 4. What decree or order? 6. In order to substantiate the case of the plaintiffs, plaintiff No.2 examined himself as PW.1 and got marked 96 documents as Exs.P1 to P96. On the other hand, the defendant after filing written statement failed to contest the matter. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the Trial Court answered the issues as follows: Issue No.1: In the affirmative; Issue No.2: In the affirmative; - 6 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 Issue No.3: In the affirmative; Issue No.4: As per the final order. 7. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the Defendant-BDA has preferred the present appeal before this Court. 8. Heard the learned counsel Sri. Jagadeeswara N.R., for the appellant-BDA, learned counsel Sri. R. Hemanth Raj., for the respondents and also perused the materials available on record. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant - BDA contended that the impugned judgment and decree are contrary to law, facts and the evidence on record. Further, contended that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the burden lay upon the plaintiffs to establish their title and lawful possession by producing cogent documentary evidence. In the absence of the alleged partition deed and the necessary pleadings regarding the partition, the mutation entries and RTC extracts could not have been relied upon to establish title. 10. It was further contended that the pleadings of the plaintiffs are inconsistent and that the Trial Court erroneously - 7 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 relied upon documents which were neither pleaded nor produced along with the plaint. The plaintiffs also failed to establish conversion of the land, approval of the layout, sanction of the building plan, or issuance of licence and khata in respect of the suit schedule property. 11. It was further contended that, as the defendant had specifically disputed the plaintiffs' title, possession and identity of the suit schedule property, the suit for bare injunction was not maintainable. Once a cloud was cast over the title, the plaintiffs ought to have sought a declaration of title and consequential relief. 12. It was also contended that the acquisition proceedings had attained finality and had not been challenged before any competent court. The Trial Court further failed to appreciate that the burden of proving the identity of the suit property rested upon the plaintiffs and that they were required to succeed on the strength of their own case and not on the weakness of the defence. 13. Learned counsel further submits that the defendant could not effectively contest the suit on account of the failure of its panel advocate to keep it informed of the proceedings and - 8 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 examine witnesses, coupled with the transfer of the concerned officer of defendant who was in charge of the case file. Lastly, it is contended that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to examine the validity of the acquisition proceedings, which could only be challenged in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. On these grounds, the appellant seeks setting aside of the impugned judgment and decree. On these grounds, the learned counsel prays that the appeal be allowed and the impugned judgment be set aside. 14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs submits that the Trial Court, upon meticulous consideration of the evidence on record, has rendered a well-reasoned judgment and decree, which does not warrant any interference by this Court. It was further contended that, there is an inordinate delay of 1,630 days in filing the appeal and, on that ground alone, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. It is submitted that the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay does not disclose any sufficient cause. Though the impugned judgment and decree was passed on 25.09.2014 and the certified copy thereof was obtained on 18.07.2018, the appeal came to be filed only on 11.06.2019 without any satisfactory explanation - 9 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 for the delay. Further, contended that, the conduct of the defendant before the Trial Court also demonstrates lack of diligence, as it did not contest the suit after filing the written statement. On these grounds, it is prayed that the appeal be dismissed. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance on the following judgments: (i) Rajneesh Kumar and another Vs. Ved Prakash - 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380 (ii) Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited and another - (2012) 3 SCC 563 (iii) D. Gopinathan Pillai Vs. State of Kerala and another - (2007) 2 SCC 322 15. Having heard the learned counsel for both the parties and on perusal of the material on record, the sole point that would arise for my consideration in this appeal is - " Whether the Trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs ?" 16. As could be seen from the record, it is not in dispute that the defendant–BDA, though it entered appearance - 10 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 and filed its written statement, did not thereafter contest the suit. The specific defence taken by the defendant was that the suit schedule property had been acquired pursuant to the preliminary notification issued in 1984 and the final notification issued in 1986 for the formation of a layout between Hosur Road and Sarjapur Road, and that possession had been taken after payment of compensation to the husband of plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiff Nos.2 and 3. It is also not in dispute that the acquisition proceedings have attained finality. In the absence of any evidence adduced by the defendant in support of its defence, the Trial Court proceeded to decree the suit solely on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence produced by the plaintiffs, as it had no occasion to examine the defendant's plea regarding the acquisition proceedings. 17. No doubt, there is an inordinate delay in preferring the present appeal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that, in the absence of a plausible and satisfactory explanation, delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or its instrumentalities are the litigants. At the same time, it has been clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that when the "State" seeks condonation of delay, its case stands on a - 11 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 different footing from that of a private litigant. In G. Ramegowda vs. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (1988) 2 SCC 142, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paragraphs 14 to 17, explained the governing principles as under: "14. The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See: Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361 : (1962) 2 SCR 762] ; Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575 : (1969) 1 SCR 1006] ; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [(1979) 4 SCC 365 : AIR 1979 SC 1666 : (1979) 3 SCR 694] ; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953 : (1970) 2 SCR 90] ; Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107] etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression “sufficient cause” - 12 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay. In Katiji case [(1987) 2 SCC 107] this Court said: (SCC p. 108, para 3) “When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. . . . It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” 15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is - 13 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. 16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross- purposes with it. 17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the joints”. Due - 14 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley, M.R., in the In re National Bank of Wales Ltd. [LR (1899) 2 Ch 629, 673] observed, though in a different context: “Business cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them.” In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite some time for the government to realise that the law officers failed that trust." - 15 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 18. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, though there is an inordinate delay in preferring the appeal, the same appears to have been occasioned by the failure of the defendant's panel advocate to keep the authority informed of the proceedings and to effectively conduct the case, coupled with the transfer of the officer in charge of the case file. Having regard to the fact that the suit concerns a substantial extent of land acquired by the defendant-BDA and that the husband of plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 had admittedly received the award amount, in my considered view that the defendant should not be non-suited on the ground of delay alone. Since the relief granted by the Trial Court has far-reaching consequences, the defendant deserves an opportunity to contest the suit on merits. Hence, I.A.1/2019 filed seeking condonation of delay is allowed. Delay of 1069 days in filing the appeal is condoned. 19. At the same time, I cannot overlook the prejudice caused to the plaintiffs, who have been prosecuting the litigation since the year 2011. Therefore, in order to balance the equities, the delay is liable to be condoned subject to payment of appropriate costs to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the point for determination is answered in favour of the defendant, - 16 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 subject to payment of costs as indicated hereinafter. Hence, the following: ORDER i. The appeal is allowed. ii. The impugned judgment and decree dated 25.09.2014 passed by the Trial Court in O.S.No.25713/2011 is set aside. iii. The suit is remitted back to the Trial Court for reconsideration in accordance with law, which is subject to payment of cost of Rs.50,000/- payable by defendant to the plaintiffs before the Trial Court. If cost is not paid, the Trial Court shall dispose off the suit on the same terms as mentioned in the judgment impugned in this appeal. iv. The parties shall appear before the Trial Court on 17.08.2026 without expecting any notice. v. It is made clear that defendant shall pay cost and cross examine PW.1 and also lead their evidence. - 17 - RFA No. 1266 of 2019 vi. If the Trial Court considers that any fresh issue arises, it may frame issues and thereafter record the evidence of the parties. vii. The Trial Court is requested to dispose off the suit as early as possible and in accordance with the Karnataka (Case Flow management in Subordinate Courts) Rules, 2005. SD/- (RAJESH RAI K) JUDGE PKS/K