Page No.# 1/13 GAHC030005502019 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/169/2019 Lalsanglora Aizawl VERSUS State of Mizoram and 3 ors Aizawl Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr Lalremtluanga Advocate for the Respondent : Addl. AG/GA, Mizoram BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR SHARMA Date on which judgment is reserved : 08.06.2026 Date of pronouncement of judgment : 12.06.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the : N/A operative part of the judgment ? Whether the full judgment has been : Yes pronounced? Page No.# 2/13 JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV) (Sanjeev Kumar Sharma, J) Heard Mr. Lalremtluanga, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Mary L Khiangte, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State of Mizoram. 2. This writ petition has been preferred challenging Order No. L.B/PHQ/556/2015 dated 30th March, 2019 passed by respondent No. 3 to the extent that the period of suspension of the petitioner from 06.03.2002 to 03.02.2010 was treated as ‘Not on Duty’, as well as to set aside and quash the impugned order of removal vide Memo No. L.B/HQ/556/2015/278 dated 31st August, 2016 passed by respondent No. 3 to the extent that it did not decide the treatment of the suspension period suffered by the petitioner from 16.02.1999 to 06.03.2002 for any purpose, and further to direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to count the suspension periods, totaling 11 years and 14 days, for all purposes with all consequential benefits in the interest of justice. 3. It is submitted that the petitioner, who was born on 20.01.1958, joined the post of Lower Division Assistant on 16.11.1974 under the Mizoram Police Department and was subsequently promoted to the post of Upper Division Page No.# 3/13 Clerk/Sub-Inspector of Police (Ministerial), and was compulsorily retired with effect from 01.09.2016. 4. It is also submitted that the petitioner was suspended due to the alleged misappropriation of Rs. 92,04,007/- of Government money during the period from May, 1995 to July, 1998 along with two other persons, namely, S.I. Laldinliana and S.I. Anne Zosangliani, vide order dated 16.02.1999, and a memorandum of charge was issued on 14.10.1999. The petitioner was removed from service by respondent No. 4 vide order under Memo No. ASL/DEF/DE- LSR(SI(M)/99/98 dated 06.03.2002, treating the period from the effective date of suspension to the date of removal, i.e., 3 years and 18 days (or 36 months and 18 days), as ‘Not on Duty.’ 5. It is further submitted that the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 58/2006 before this Hon’ble High Court, and vide judgment and order dated 03.07.2008, the order of removal dated 06.03.2002 passed by respondent No. 4 was set aside, and the respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner to his post with all benefits as per the applicable rules from the date of removal, minus any benefits already received by him. 6. It was further directed that it would be open for the respondent authorities Page No.# 4/13 to start a de novo departmental enquiry against the petitioner in view of the alleged misappropriation of money under the “Salary Head”. 7. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner was reinstated into service by order dated 11.09.2008 passed by the Director General of Police, Mizoram, wherein it was stated that the petitioner would be deemed to remain under suspension w.e.f. 06.03.2002 until further orders. It was also stated in the said order that the Department had decided to initiate a de novo departmental enquiry against the petitioner pursuant to the judgment and order of the High Court dated 03.07.2008 Thereafter, acting on a representation of the petitioner, by order dated 02.03.2010 passed by the Director General of Police, Mizoram, the suspension of the petitioner was revoked since it exceeded ninety days without review and it was stated that the period of suspension till reinstatement would be decided on the basis of the merits and findings of the departmental enquiry instituted against him. 8. De novo departmental enquiry was completed and fresh order of removal was passed by the Director General of Police, Nizoram by order dated 25.02.2013. 9. The aforesaid order was challenged by the petitioner in WP(C) No. Page No.# 5/13 93/2015, which was disposed of by a common judgment and order dated 28.06.2016 passed by this High Court, whereby the impugned order dated 25.02.2013 was set aside on the ground that no show-cause notice had been issued to the petitioner under Rule 1037 of the Mizoram Police Manual, 2005 prior to the issuance of the impugned order. The respondents were further directed to reinstate the petitioner, with liberty to continue the departmental proceedings initiated against him, and to issue a show-cause notice under Rule 1037 of the Mizoram Police Manual, 2005 in the event that the authorities contemplated the imposition of a major penalty upon the petitioner and, thereafter, to take the departmental proceedings to their logical conclusion. 10. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner, vide order dated 27.07.2016, was reinstated in service and was immediately placed under suspension, and it was stated therein that the period of removal till reinstatement would be decided on the merits of the findings on his reply to the show-cause notice. 11. Pursuant thereto, since the authorities proposed to impose the penalty of removal from service, a show-cause notice dated 27.07.2016 was served upon the petitioner, to which the petitioner submitted a reply requesting the authority to show leniency by granting him voluntary retirement with pensionary benefits Page No.# 6/13 under the provision of FR 56 and Rule 48 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, or, in the alternative, to grant him retirement on medical grounds under Rule 38 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, or to impose compulsory retirement under Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, as he was suffering from cancer. 12. In consideration of the said reply to the show-cause notice, the disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of “compulsory retirement from service” upon the petitioner, and he was also granted Compassionate Allowance at the rate of two- thirds of his pension and gratuity by order dated 31.08.2016. 13. In the said order dated 31.08.2016, it was also stated that the removal period w.e.f. 25.02.2013 to 26.07.2016 was treated as ‘Not on Duty’, and the suspension period w.e.f. 27.07.2016 till 31.08.2016 was treated as ‘On Duty’; however, no order was passed as to how the earlier period of suspension w.e.f. 02.05.2010 to 26.07.2016 was to be treated. 14. Thereafter, on 12.10.2016, the petitioner submitted a representation claiming arrears of subsistence allowance for the period between 16.02.1999 and 06.03.2002, along with annual increments, which prayer was, however, rejected on the ground that nothing in this regard was mentioned in the judgment and order dated 03.07.2008. Page No.# 7/13 15. The petitioner once again approached the High Court by way of WP(C) No. 24/2018, which was disposed of by judgment dated 23.04.2018, granting liberty to the petitioner to file a representation with regard to the manner in which the respondents were to treat the aforesaid period of suspension, i.e., from 02.03.2010 to 31.08.2016, which the petitioner had claimed should be treated as ‘On Duty’ in the writ petition. 16. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 15.05.2018, which was disposed of by an order holding that there was no scope for treating the absence period as ‘On Duty.’ It was held by the authorities that, as per the provisions of sub-rule (5) of Chapter 6 (Reinstatement – Rules and Decisions) under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, and sub-clause (1) of clause (3) of FR 54 of the Government of India’s Decision contained in Swamy’s Compilation of FRSR Part-I, General Rules, the period of suspension w.e.f. 02.03.2010 till 31.08.2016 claimed by the petitioner, Ex-SI Lalsanglora, could not be considered as spent on duty, and the period of deemed suspension w.e.f. 02.03.2010 to 26.07.2016 was treated as ‘Not on Duty’ in terms of the aforementioned rules. The petitioner was held not entitled to any financial benefits other than the Subsistence Allowance which he had already drawn, but he was allowed to continue receiving the earlier sanctioned Compassionate Allowance not Page No.# 8/13 exceeding two-thirds of his pension and gratuity, as admissible under the rules, vide Order No. LB/PHQ/556/2015/132 dated 23.07.2018. 17. The petitioner submitted a representation dated 04.10.2018 for reconsideration of the treatment of his two periods of suspension, i.e., w.e.f. 06.03.2002 to 30.09.2008 and 01.10.2008 to 03.02.2010, on the basis of the judgment dated 03.07.2008 passed by the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court, Aizawl Bench, in WP(C) No. 58/2006. 18. The said representation was disposed of by the authorities by holding that, as per the provisions of sub-rule (5) of Chapter 6 (Reinstatement – Rules and Decisions) under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, and clause (5) of FR 54 of Swamy’s Compilation of FRSR Part-I, General Rules, it was clearly stated that the period of absence from duty, including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal, or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, shall not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the Competent Authority specifically directs that it shall be treated as such for any specific purpose. 19. Since there was no specific purpose or direction from the Competent Authority regarding the treatment of the period of absence in the instant case, and having regard to clause (5) of FR 54 of Swamy’s Compilation of FRSR Part-I, Page No.# 9/13 General Rules, the period of absence was treated as ‘Not on Duty.’ 20. Accordingly, the period w.e.f. 06.03.2002 to 30.09.2008 and from 01.10.2008 to 03.02.2010 was directed to be treated as ‘Not on Duty’ by order dated 20.03.2019 passed by the Inspector General of Police, Mizoram, which is impugned in the present writ petition along with the order dated 31.08.2016, wherein it was not decided as to how the suspension period suffered by the petitioner from 16.02.1999 to 06.03.2002 would be treated for any purpose. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to FR 54(5), which reads as follows: “(5) In a case falling under sub-rule (4), the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, shall not be treated as a period spent on duty, unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be treated so for any specified purpose: Provided that, if the Government servant so desires, such authority may direct that the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the Government servant. Page No.# 10/13 Note.—The order of competent authority under the preceding proviso shall be absolute and no higher sanction shall be necessary for the grant of— (a) extraordinary leave in excess of three months in the case of temporary Government servant; and (b) leave of any kind in excess of five years in the case of permanent or quasi-permanent Government servant.” 22. The only submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the benefit of the proviso to the aforesaid sub-rule (5) of FR 54 ought to have been extended to the petitioner. On a query from the Court as to whether any application or prayer had been made by the petitioner seeking the aforesaid benefit in terms of the said proviso, learned counsel answered in the negative. Hence, there is no scope for this Court to extend the said benefit to the petitioner. 23. As far as the challenge to the order dated 31.08.2016, insofar as it did not decide as to how the period of suspension from 16.02.1999 to 06.03.2002 is to be treated is concerned, it is to be noticed that way back by order of removal dated 06.03.2002, the said period was treated as ‘Not on Duty’. The said order of removal was set aside by order dated 03.07.2008 in WP(C) No. 58/2006 but Page No.# 11/13 subsequent de novo enquiries again resulted in fresh order of removal and lastly, compulsory retirement, as narrated hereinabove. Therefore, in terms of FR 54(5) quoted above, the said period has necessarily to be treated as ‘Not on Duty’. Moreover, since the petitioner has been granted Compensatory Allowance to the extent of two-third of his pension and gratuity, which is not under challenge, no prejudice has apparently been caused to the petitioner, or at least none has been shown. Had the period of suspension been treated as ‘On Duty’, the same would only have counted as qualifying period of service for the purpose of pension, which evidently he has not been granted in view of the penalty imposed, and as he has been granted Compassionate Allowance equal to two-third of pension and gratuity. Further, the petitioner would not have been entitled to arrears of salary for that period, since the proceedings against the petitioner culminated in punishment. 24. Another contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, since the period of suspension of the petitioner was not reviewed before the expiry of ninety days as required under Rule 10(7) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, the said period of suspension ought to have been treated as ‘On Duty.’ 25. Learned Addl. Advocate General has referred to paragraph No. 10 of the Page No.# 12/13 affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the State respondents, wherein it was stated that since the petitioner, along with two others, had been suspended for more than ninety days without review by the Suspension Review Committee, the petitioner submitted a representation seeking reinstatement in service as per the provisions of sub-rule (6) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. On consideration of his representation and on the recommendation of the Police Establishment Board at its meeting held on 25.02.2010 for the review of the suspension order, the Disciplinary Authority reinstated the petitioner and the other two employees into service on 02.03.2010 vide Memo No. CB/PHQ/C- 839/06/208 dated 02.03.2010 on account of the suspension period having exceeded ninety days without review by the Suspension Review Committee. It was further stated therein that the suspension period till reinstatement would be decided on the merits of the findings of the departmental enquiry instituted against them as and when the Inquiry Officer submitted his findings. 26. From the above, it is seen that, based on the representation submitted by the petitioner, the suspension of the petitioner was revoked, which has already been mentioned hereinbefore. In any case, merely because of a violation of Rule 10(7) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, which requires review of the suspension within ninety days of the order of suspension, the petitioner would not be Page No.# 13/13 entitled to have the period of suspension till his reinstatement treated as ‘On Duty.’ That would obviously be determined by the outcome of the Departmental Enquiry, which has already been adverted to hereinbefore. All that the petitioner would be entitled to under the aforesaid Rule would be reinstatement on account of the violation of the said Rule, which has been done by the authorities. 26. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in the writ petition, which accordingly stands dismissed. JUDGE Comparing Assistant