RSA 139/2019 IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (The High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh) PRINCIPAL SEAT AT GUWAHATI RSA No. 139/2019 On the death of Shyam Sundar Bhattar, his legal heirs- 1. Smt. Manju Devi (wife). 2. Shri Anurag Bhattar (son). 3. Shri Abhishek Bhattar (son). Karta of M/s Ramballav Omprakash, No.1 Kathiakhunda Gaon, Sapekhati Main Road, PO & PS-Sapekhati, Sub-Division-Charaideo, Dist.-Charaideo, Assam. ……Appellants. -Versus- Shri Jyotirmoy Dey, S/o Late Jamini Mohan Dey, Resident of No.1 Kathiakhunda Gaon, Sapekhati Main Road, PO & PS-Sapekhati, Dist.-Charaideo, Assam. ……Respondent. For the Appellants : Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, Sr. Adv., Ms. S. Todi. ……Advocates. For the Respondent : Mr. S. Ali, Mr. A. Ikbal, Mr. R. Barua. ……Advocates. GAHC010131632019 2026:GAU-AS:7461 RSA 139/2019 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN Date(s) of Hearing :- 02.04.2026 Date on which judgment is reserved :- 02.04.2026 Date of pronouncement of judgment :- 29.05.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment? :- N/A Whether the full judgment has been pronounced? :- Yes JUDGMENT AND ORDER Heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Ms. S. Todi, learned counsel for the appellants and also heard Mr. S. Ali, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This second appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 22.04.2019, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Sivasagar RSA 139/2019 (hereinafter Appellate Court), in Title Appeal No.4/2018. Notably, vide impugned judgment and decree, dated 22.04.2019, the learned Civil Judge, Sivasagar, has affirmed the judgment and decree, dated 13.03.2018, passed by the learned Munsiff, Charaideo, Sonari, in Title Suit No.15/2010. 3. For the sake of convenience and also to avoid confusion, the status of the parties, will be referred to by their original status in the suit, before the learned Trial Court. Background Facts:- 4. The background facts leading to filing of the present appeal are briefly stated as under:- “The respondent/plaintiff had filed one title suit, being Title Suit No.15/2010, before the learned Munsiff, Charaideo, Sonari, against the defendant, alleging inter alia amongst others that the father of the plaintiff and the proforma defendant was the original owner of the plot of land measuring 3 katha 15 lecha covered by Dag No.1158 of periodic patta No.26 of Sapekhati Mouza, No.1 Kathiakhunda village, under Sivasagar district together with one Assam type pucca house standing thereon. After the death of their father, the plaintiff and the proforma defendant, became the absolute owners of the aforesaid plot of land and the house thereon. But, after the family settlement in the year 1994, only the plaintiff became the RSA 139/2019 owner of the tenanted premises, described in the schedule of the plaint, which is the part of the house of the Assam type house, standing behind the shop house. The defendant No.1 started to pay rent to the plaintiff through the defendant No.2 irregularly. Thereafter, in the year 2001 the plaintiff was compelled to serve legal notice for the payment of rent and the defendants started to breach the conditions of the tenancy. The defendants again stopped the payment of monthly rent from January, 2009 and the defendants became defaulter. The defendants also raised false claim before the Inspecting Authority of Land Acquisition Department, showing the entire tenanted premises to be his own, and tried to grab the plaintiff’s right over the tenanted premises and then the plaintiff had instituted the suit seeking following relief(s):- (a) Decree be awarded by declaring that the Defendants are Tenants under the Plaintiff in respect of the Tenanted premises (Suit Premises) and they have already became the Defaulter, and unauthorized occupier, and liable to be evicted for no payment of rents, and for ante Tenancy activities etc. (b) Decree be awarded by declaring that the Tenants/Defendants are not entitle to retain the possession of the Tenanted shop house if it remains RSA 139/2019 un used and without being demolishing the existing houses after due acquisition. (c) Decree be awarded by evicting, and by removing all such fixtures, tools and equipments, goods and utensils etc. of the Defendants from the Suit premises and deliver the khas and vacant possession to the Plaintiff. (d) Decree be awarded for recovery of Rs.13,200/- (Rupees Thirteen thousands and Two Hundred Only) against arrear of rents with simple interest accrued thereon, and with compensatory cost. (e) Decree be awarded for recovery of current Rents @ Rs.600/- per month commencing from the December 2010 and until recovery with future compensation from the date of filing this Suit till recovery of khas and vacate possession of the Suit premises @ Rs.50/- per diem. (f) Decree be awarded by issuing Permanent Injunction against the Defendants restraining the Defendants, their men, and agents etc. for their any attempts to violate the conditions of the Tenancy, and or any attempts to re construct the Tenanted house in near future and during continuance of this Suit. (g) Decree be awarded by issuing any precept to the Land Acquisition Officer, or to the Highway Authority RSA 139/2019 to demolish the respective house (Shop & Residential House) which will be acquisitioned by them for the proposed road, and left no existence and make it free so that the Plaintiff may rebuild its new House facing road side, if found necessary. (h) Cost of the Suit. (i) For any other relief and relives to which the Plaintiff is entitled either in law or in equity, The defendant had contested the suit by filing written statement, wherein he has taken the stand that the suit is not maintainable and there is no cause of action for the suit and the plaintiff and the proforma defendant are not the absolute owner of the land measuring 3 katha 15 lecha of Dag No.1158 of P.P. No.26 of Sapekhati Mouza, No.1 Kathiakhunda Gaon, together with the Assam type pucca house standing thereon. It is also stated that the house, standing on the said plot of land, was built by the father of the defendant. The plaintiff and the proforma defendant had never spent a single paisa for constructing the Assam type house, latrine, kitchen and bathroom. There is also no question of irregular payment of rent. The plaintiff had taken goods and cash amount from the defendant, as per his requirement and promised to adjust the amount and the cost of goods from the yearly rent of the land and the defendant sent a demand draft of Rs.9,988/- of UBI Bank, Sapekhati Branch for the payment of the rent with a RSA 139/2019 letter, dated 01.06.2002, wherein it was clearly stated that the Assam type house has been constructed at the expenses of the defendant and the rent is paid for the use of the land only. The defendant also denied that he had agreed with the plaintiff to pay the enhanced rate of Rs.50/- in every 3 years and also denied that the rent was Rs.550/- per month from January, 2007 to December, 2009 and also denied that the rent was Rs.600/- per month, from the month of January, 2010. The land is proposed to be acquired by the Collector for the purpose of Arunachal Highway No.52B and the plaintiff wanted to deprive the defendant from getting the compensation of the house and he also denied that he stopped the payment of monthly rent from January, 2009 and the plaintiff had sent a legal notice to the defendant, asking him to vacate the tenanted premises by 30th April, 2010 and the plaintiff had knowledge that the rent for the year 31st March, 2011 had been paid in advance by the defendant and the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant as landlord and tenant was in respect of the plot of land and not in respect of the Assam type house and that he is not a defaulter and under such circumstances, it is contended to dismiss the suit. Upon the aforementioned pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court has framed the following issues:- i) Whether there is any cause of action for the suit? RSA 139/2019 ii) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises? iii) Whether there is any default of payment of rent by the defendants to the plaintiff? iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the recovery of arrear of rents and current rents from the defendants? v) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the decree as prayed for or any other relief(s)? Thereafter, the learned Trial Court has examined 3 witnesses of the plaintiff. The defendants, however, did not adduce any evidence and thereafter, hearing arguments of both the parties, the learned Trial Court has decreed the suit. Being aggrieved, the defendant had preferred an appeal, being Title Appeal No.4/2018, before the Court of learned Civil Judge, Sivasagar and thereafter, the learned First Appellate Court, after hearing learned counsel for both the parties, affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, by holding that the learned Trial Court has rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiff and there is no ground for interference and thereby affirmed the same.” 5. Being aggrieved, the defendant preferred the present second appeal, which was admitted by this Court for hearing on the following substantial question of law:- RSA 139/2019 (i) Whether the decree passed by the learned Appellate Court below affirming the decree passed by the learned Trial Court, without any observation regarding the trial of the suit as per the provisions of Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 is illegal and as such the impugned judgments and decrees are liable to be set aside and quashed? Submissions of learned counsel for the appellants:- 6. Mr. Sahewalla, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, submits that the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 is not at all applicable in the present case as the land is situated in a village falls under Sapekhati Gaon Panchayat and the said aspect eschewed consideration of both the Courts below, and that the land is situated in a village and as such, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, and as affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court, are perverse and the appellant herein is not liable to pay any rent to the respondent herein under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act. 6.1. Mr. Sahewalla also submits that the relief, if any, could have been sought under Section 114 of the Transfer of property Act. Under such circumstances, Mr. Sahewalla has contended to allow this appeal. Submissions of learned counsel for the respondent:- 7. Per contra, Mr. Ali, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the issue of the non application of Assam Urban Area Rent RSA 139/2019 Control Act and also about application of Section 114 of the Transfer of property Act was never raised before the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court and the same is being raised for the first time in this second appeal and he cannot take a new ground in second appeal. In support of his submission, Mr. Ali has referred to a decision of this Court in Kishanlal Singol and another vs. Hari Kisson Lohia, reported in AIR 1956 Guw 113. Mr. Ali also submits that there is a concurrent finding of fact by both the learned Courts below that the appellant herein is a defaulter and that in view of concurrent finding of fact by both the Courts below, this Court is not entitled to appreciate the facts in second appeal. In support of his submission, he has referred to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRs., reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179. Mr. Ali submits that the decree so passed by the learned Trial Court, stands merged with the decree so passed by the learned First Appellate Court in view of the Doctrine of Merger. 7.1. Mr. Ali has also referred the following decisions in support of his submission:- (i) Sudhir Ranjan Chanda vs. Uma Dutta, reported in 2013 (4) GLT 177; (ii) Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi v. Pearl Drinks Limited, reported in (2010) 11 SCC 153; RSA 139/2019 (iii) Gojer Bros. (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Shri Ratan Lal Singh, reported in (1974) 2 SCC 453; and (iv) Manti Devi and another v. Kishun Sah Alias Kishun Deo Sao and others, reported in (2018) 12 SCC 500. 7.2. Under the given facts and legal position, Mr. Ali has contended to dismiss this appeal being devoid of merit. Consideration and Analysis:- 8. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, this Court has carefully gone through the memo of appeal and the grounds mentioned therein and also gone through the decisions referred by Mr. Ali, learned counsel for the respondent. 9. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court that in second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the court has to confine its discussion only in respect of substantial question of law formulated at the time of admission of appeal and also at the time of hearing of appeal if found necessary, after notifying both the parties. In the case in hand the question is whether the decree passed by the learned Appellate Court below affirming the decree passed by the learned Trial Court, without any observation regarding the trial of the suit as per the provisions of Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 is illegal? RSA 139/2019 10. In the case in hand, the learned trial court had held that the defendant had admitted that he is a tenant under the plaintiff and regularly paid the rent. Then referring to a decision of this court in Chittaranjan Ghosh vs. Abedur Rahman reported in (1996) 2 GLR 262, held that the burden to prove that he is not defaulter and paid rent regularly, lies upon the defendant. Thereafter, the learned trial court had held that in this present suit in hand, the defendant failed to comply with the mandate of law as provided u/s 5(4) of Assam Urban Area's Rent Control Act 1972 and in absence of evidence from the defendant he failed to discharge the burden that defendant had not defaulted in payment of rent in order to get protection under the aforesaid provision. Even the defendant had not adduced any evidence in his support to establish the fact that rent has been paid regularly to the plaintiff. Thereafter it had decided the Issue No.3, i.e. whether there is any default in payment of rent by the defendant to the plaintiff, in affirmative. 11. The learned First Appellate Court, also after hearing the learned counsel for the both parties and appreciating the evidence on record affirmed the finding, so recorded by the learned trial court. But, the learned First Appellate Court had arrived at such a finding without any observation regarding the trial of the suit as per the provisions of Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. 12. Thus, it appears that there is concurrent finding of facts by both the courts below, in respect of the fact that the defendants are RSA 139/2019 tenant under the plaintiff and that the defendants are defaulter in respect of payment of rent. It is well settled in catena of decisions that the High Court, in second appeal is not entitled to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact by re-appreciating the evidence, and substitutes its own view with that of the courts below. Reference in this context can be made to the following decisions:- (i) In Thiagarajan v. Venugopalaswamy B. Koil reported in [(2004) 5 SCC 762] Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC was not justified in interfering with the findings of fact. The Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. In the same case, Hon’ble Supreme Court has also observed that in a case where special leave petition was filed against a judgment of the High Court interfering with findings of fact of the lower appellate court. This Court observed that to say the RSA 139/2019 least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court further observed that the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. (ii) Hon’ble Supreme Court has again reminded the High Court in Commr., Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments vs. P. Shanmugama reported in [(2005) 9 SCC 232] that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the finding of facts. (iii) Again, Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi reported in [(2005) 10 SCC 139] has reiterated the same principle that the High Court is not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (iv) Again, in the case of Madhavan Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai reported in [(2005) 10 SCC 553] this Court observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that it is well settled that even RSA 139/2019 if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 12.1. It is the categorical contention of Mr. Ali, learned counsel for the respondent that though no such finding was recorded by the learned First Appellate Court in the impugned judgment, yet, it would not render the finding so arrived at, illegal in view of the Doctrine of Merger. The submission of Mr. Ali received due consideration of this court. And this court finds substance in the same. And the decisions referred by him also fortified his submission. 12.2. In the case of Sudhir Ranjan Chanda (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in cases where the decree of the Trial Court is carried in appeal and the Appellate Court disposes of the appeal after a contested hearing, the decree to be executed is the decree of the Appellate Court and not the Trial Court. 12.3. In the case of Pearl Drinks Limited (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Doctrine of Merger will depend largely on the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the superior Court and the context of the subject matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid before it. Again in the case of Gojer Bros. (Pvt.) Ltd. (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein it has been RSA 139/2019 held that the decree of Trial Court merged into the decree of High Court. 12.4. What can be crystallized from the aforesaid discussion is that the decree of Trial Court merged into the decree of the Appellate Court. And the decree to be executed is the decree of the Appellate Court and not the Trial Court. And applying aforesaid proposition, to the fact herein this case it can be safely concluded that in view of the Doctrine of Merger, the decree executable is the decree of appellate court since the decree of the learned trial court stands merged with the decree of the learned First Appellate Court. 12.5. And in that view of the matter, absence of any observation regarding the trial of the suit as per the provisions of Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 in the impugned judgment and decree cannot be said to be illegal. 13. This court has also considered the submission of Mr. Sahewalla, learned counsel for the appellant, regarding non application of Assam Urban Area Rent Control Act and also about application of Section 114 of the Transfer of property Act in the case in hand. Admittedly, this issue of jurisdiction of both the Courts below in granting relief under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, is raised for the first time in this appeal. No such ground was raised before the learned Trial Court and as well as before the learned First Appellate Court. Mr. Ali, learned counsel for the respondent has rightly pointed this out at the time of hearing that neither before the learned Trial Court, nor before the learned First RSA 139/2019 Appellate Court, the issue has been raised. Now the question is whether the appellant can raise a new issue for the first time in this second appeal. 13.1. This issue has been dealt with by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Panchugopal Barua and others v. Umesh Chandra Goswami and others, reported in (1997) 4 SCC 713. In the said case, it has been held that second appellate jurisdiction is confined to the substantial question of law formulated at the time of admission, and an entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case within the meaning of Section 100 CPC, unless it goes to the root of the matter. 13.2. The same proposition is echoed by a co-ordinate bench of this court, almost 4 decade back in the case of Kishanlal Singol and another(supra). 13.3. In that view of the matter, this Court is afraid that the contention, so raised by Mr. Sahewalla, learned Sr. Counsel for the appellant, cannot be accepted. Moreover, from the conduct of the appellant, such as entering appearance before the learned Trial Court by filing written statement and preferring appeal before the learned First Appellate court, it appears that he has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Courts below under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act. And in that view of the matter, he cannot and should not raise the issue of jurisdiction when the finding of both the Courts below gone against him. RSA 139/2019 14. It is well settled in the case of Manti Devi (supra), that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied in appeal on account of any misjoinder or non-joinder of parties or cause of action or any error, defect or irregularity in proceeding, not affecting the merit of the case of jurisdiction. Mr. Ali, learned counsel for the respondent has rightly pointed this out at the time of hearing and this court finds substance in the same and accordingly record concurrence to the same. 15. In respect of the submission of Mr. Sahewalla, regarding applicability of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, this court finds that the Section deals with relief against forfeiture for non- payment of rent. It provides that where a lease of immoveable property has determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent, and the lessor sues to eject the lessee, if, at the hearing of the suit, the lessee pays or tenders to the lessor the rent in arrear, together with interest thereon and his full costs of the suit, or gives such security as the Court thinks sufficient for making such payment within fifteen days, the Court may, in lieu of making a decree for ejectment, pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture; and thereupon the lessee shall hold the property leased as if the forfeiture had not occurred. 15.1. Thus, a bare perusal of the provision indicates that it provides relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent. It states RSA 139/2019 that where a lease of immovable property has been determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent, and the lessor sues to eject the lessee, the court may relieve the lessee against forfeiture if, at the hearing of the suit, the lessee pays/tenders the rent in arrears with interest and with full costs. The lessee then holds the property as if forfeiture had not occurred. This relief is equitable and limited. It applies only in cases of forfeiture, not ordinary termination of tenancy. 15.2. But, this court afraid the submission of Mr. Sahewalla cannot be accepted as for the first time it has been raised in this second appeal and besides, it is nobody’s case that there was any agreement of lease between the plaintiff and the defendants not to speak of a forfeiture clause therein. In that view of the matter, Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 generally cannot be applied in the absence of a lease agreement (particularly one containing an express forfeiture clause) for recovery of rent and suit for possession. Moreover, Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue in Pradesh Kumar Bajpai v. Binod Behari Sarkar, reported in (1980) 3 SCC 348 held as under:- “12. Although the question of termination of the lease by forfeiture does not arise on the facts of the case as the learned Counsel strenuously contended that even then the tenant is entitled to the benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act and that plea was accepted by the trial court, we would briefly deal with the point raised. During the trial RSA 139/2019 when the arguments of the case were going on and the case was due to be closed, the learned Counsel for the tenant prayed that the court be pleased to confer benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act on the defendant. He tendered the full amount of rent along with full costs of the suit and interest as ordered by the court. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the defendant should not be allowed the benefit of Section 114. Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for relief against forfeiture on non- payment of rent on the following terms: “Where a lease of immovable property has determined by forfeiture for non- payment of rent, and the lessor sues to eject the lessee, if, at the hearing of the suit, the lessee pays or tenders to the lessor the rent in arrears, together with interest thereon and his full costs of the suit, or gives such security as the court thinks sufficient for making such payment within fifteen days, the court may, in lieu of making a decree for ejectment, pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture; and thereupon the lessee shall hold the property leased as if the forfeiture had not occurred.” If the relief provided for under the section is available, as the lessee had tendered the rent in arrears along with the interest thereon and his full costs in the suit, it was open to the court to pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture. The plea of the learned RSA 139/2019 Counsel for the tenant is that this provision should also be read into the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. In a decision of seven-Judges, Bench of this Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yasodai Ammal [(1979) 4 SCC 214 the question as to whether in order to get a decree for eviction, the landlord under the Rent Control Act should give notice as required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was considered. This Court held that determination of the lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and that if a case is made out for eviction under the Rent Act, it is itself sufficient and it is not obligatory to determine the lease by issue of notice as required in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Counsel for the tenant submitted that the decision is confined only to the question as to whether notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary and did not decide as to whether the provisions of the other sections of the Transfer of Property Act are applicable. It is to be noted, however, that the question of determination of a lease by forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act, was specifically dealt with by the court and it was held that the claim of the tenant that he is entitled to a double protection (1) under the Rent Act and (2) under the Transfer of Property Act, is without any substance. While ruling thus the court noted the passage occurring in Manujendra case [Manujendra Dutt v. Purendu Prosad, AIR 1967 SC 1419 : (1967) 1 SCR 475 : (1967) 1 SCJ RSA 139/2019 503] and quoted with approval in Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander reported in (1976) 2 SCC 103, 109 : “We are inclined to hold that the landlord in the present case cannot secure an order for eviction without first establishing that he has validly determined the lease under the Transfer of Property Act.” (SCC p. 109, para 8) Disapproving this view, the court framed a question “why this dual requirement?” and answered it as follows: “Even if the lease is determined by a forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act, the tenant continues to be a tenant, that is to say, there is no forfeiture in the eyes of law. The tenant becomes liable to be evicted and forfeiture comes into play only if he has incurred the liability to be evicted under the State Rent Act, not otherwise . . . one has to look to the provisions of law contained in the four corners of any State Rent Act to find out whether a tenant can be evicted or not. The theory of double protection or additional protection, it seems to us, has been stretched too far and without a proper and due consideration of all its ramifications.” In the case before us, it is not in dispute that after the Rent Act came into force, the RSA 139/2019 landlord cannot avail himself of clause 12 which provides for forfeiture, even if the tenant neglected to pay the rent for over two months. The landlord cannot enter into possession forthwith without notice. The only remedy for him is to seek eviction under the provisions of the Rent Act. In such circumstances the tenant cannot rely on Section 114 of Transfer of Property Act and claim that he should be given an opportunity to pay the arrears of rent, even though the requirements of Section 3(1) had been fulfilled.” 15.3. In that view of the matter, this Court find that the substantial question of law, as formulated at the time of admission of the appeal, appears to be not at all involved here in this appeal. And accordingly, the substantial question of law stands answered in aforesaid terms. 16. In the result, this Court finds no merit in this appeal and accordingly, the same stands dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost. Comparing Assistant Sd/- Robin Phukan JUDGE