Page No.# 1/19 GAHC010256282019 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/7934/2019 SUKURON NESA D/O- HABEZUDDIN MOLLAH, W/O- AFZAL HAQUE, VILL- 36 SALMARA PART-VII, P.S. FAKIRGANJ, DIST- DHUBRI, ASSAM VERSUS THE UNION OF INDIA AND 5 ORS. REP. BY ITS SECY. OF THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, UNION OF INDIA, NEW DELHI 2:THE STATE OF ASSAM REP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME DEPTT. DISPUR GHY-6 3:THE ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA REP. BY THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER OF INDIA NIRVACHAN SADAN ASHOKA ROAD NEW DELHI 4:THE STATE COORDINATOR OF NATIONAL REGISTER OF CITIZENS ASSAM 1ST FLOOR ACHYUT PLAZA GHY SHILLONG ROAD BHANGAGARH GHY ASSAM PIN- 781005 Page No.# 2/19 5:THE DY. COMMISSIONER OF DHUBRI AT DHUBRI P.O. P.S. AND DIST- DHUBRI ASSAM PIN- 6:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (B) DHUBRI AT DHUBRI P.O. P.S. AND DIST- DHUBRI ASSAM PIN Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. J AHMED, MR. A S CHOUDHURY,MR A MOTALIB,MS A HUSSAIN Advocate for the Respondent : ASSTT.S.G.I., SC, ELECTION COMMISSION.,SC, NRC,SC, F.T,SC, ELECTION COMMISSION.,SC, NRC,SC, F.T B E F O R E Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE Pranjal Das Advocate for the petitioner : Shri J. Ahmed Advocates for the respondents : Ms. A. Verma, SC- Home Deptt. & NRC, Shri P. Sarma, GA, Assam; Shri N. Kalita, for ECI. Ms. B. Sarma, CGC. Date on which judgment is reserved : 20.05.2026 Date of pronouncement of judgment : 29.05.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment? : NA Whether the full judgment has been pronounced? : Yes Page No.# 3/19 Judgment & Order (S.K. Medhi , J.) The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 09.08.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No.2nd, Dhubri in F.T. Case No. FT 1123/F/16 (Police Ref. Case No. 609/98). By the impugned judgment, the petitioner, who was the proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post 25.03.1971. 2. The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows: (i) A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Dhubri District, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T. Case No. FT 1123/F/16. (ii) As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written statement on 27.12.2018 along with certain documents and adduced evidence through 3 DWs. (iii) The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as opposite party, had failed to discharge the burden cast upon her and accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be a foreign national post 25.03.1971. 3. We have heard Shri J. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have Page No.# 4/19 also heard Ms. A. Verma, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department & NRC; Shri P. Sarma, learned GA, Assam, Shri A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel, Election Commission of India and Shri AK Dutta, learned CGC. We have also carefully examined the records which were requisitioned vide an order dated 04.03.2020. 4. Shri Ahmed, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner could prove her case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this regard, he has referred to the evidence adduced by 3 nos. of DWs and also the following documentary evidence: (i) Ext-1 – Marriage registered Kabinnama dated 03.10.93; (ii) Ext-2 – Certified copy of the draft Chitha copy dated 19.11.18; (iii) Ext-3 – Certified copy of Final Khatian dated 01.11.18; (iv) Ext-4 – Certified extract copy of E/Roll of 1966; (v) Ext-5 – Certified extract copy of E/Roll of 1970; (vi) Ext-6 – Certified extract copy of E/Roll of 1977; (vii) Ext-7 - – Certified extract copy of E/Roll of 1985; (viii) Ext-8 – Certified extract copy of E/Roll of 1997; (ix) Ext-9 – Electronic Certified extract copy of E/Roll of 2018. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted at the outset that the LVO had furnished the report without proper verification and therefore, the proceeding stood vitiated. He has submitted that in the written statement, all material disclosures including the aspect of the faulty LVO report were made. It is submitted that the aspect of shifting from Village Salmara Part-VI to Salmara Page No.# 5/19 Part-VII was pleaded. He has submitted that the Kabinnama dated 13.09.1993 would prove the linkage. He has submitted that in the Voters List of 1997, “D” was prefixed before the name of the petitioner. Reliance has been placed upon a Voters List of 1966 containing the names of her grandfather – Jaynuddin Mollah and father – Habez Uddin Sk. He has also referred to a land document (Ext.2) in the name of the petitioner as being daughter of Habez Uddin Mollah. He has referred to the evidence adduced by the petitioner as DW1 and two other witnesses, namely, her father as DW2 and the Mondal as DW3. He has submitted that DW3 had deposed that the daughters had got their names mutated over the plot of land. 6. On the aspect of the nature of the investigation, the learned counsel for the petitioner had relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rahim Ali Vs. UoI reported in AIR 2024 SC 3551. 7. By submitting that the father’s evidence as DW2 has to be given due weightage under Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following case laws: i) AIR 1959 SC 914, Dolgobinda Paricha Vs. Nimai Charan Misra & Ors.; ii) 2008 (4) SCC 75, Bant Singh & Anr. Vs. Niranjan Singh (D) by Lrs. & Ors.; iii) 2020 (1) GLT 330, Motior Rahman Vs. UoI; iv) 2021 (4) GLT 664, Sujab Ali (Md.) Vs. Union of India & Ors. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner accordingly submits that in view of the availability of the aforesaid materials, the impugned opinion could not have Page No.# 6/19 been rendered against the petitioner and therefore, the same requires interference. 9. Per contra, Ms. Verma, the learned Standing Counsel, Home Department has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. She submits that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act of 1946. However, in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden. It is also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would be given only if necessary. She further submits that the evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in. 10. The learning Standing Counsel has further submitted that the written statement is the basic document which is supposed to lay down the foundation of the case of the proceedee and the written statement in the instant case lacks details and is vague. There is no date or year of the birth of the petitioner. In this connection, she has relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal Vs. Union of India reported in(2005) 5 SCC 665: “17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. Page No.# 7/19 In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Some times the place of birth of his grand parents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1) (d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 11. She has submitted that in the instant case there is not a single documentary evidence which can be regarded as a proof of citizenship. The Kabinnanma was not proved by the Kazi and in any case, would not serve as a link document of the petitioner with her father / parents. The Voters List of 1997 is an uncertified document and therefore, cannot be taken into consideration. The Voters List of 1966 containing the name of the grandfather and father will not serve as a link document qua the petitioner. The only document which requires consideration is the land document (Ext.2). However, the petitioner has been shown to be the daughter of Habez Uddin Mollah whereas the projected father has been stated to be Md. Habez Uddi son of Zonu Mollah. It may be mentioned that in the Voters List of 1966 relied upon by the Page No.# 8/19 petitioner herself, the name of her grandfather is Jaynuddin Mollah and the name of her father Habez Uddin Sk. There is also no explanation as to why the names of the other children, more particularly the sons were not mentioned in the Draft Chitha. 12. In support of her submission that a document has to be proved from contemporaneous records, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Romila Khatun Vs. Union of India reported in 2018 (4) GLT 373 and the following observations have been pressed into service: “20. It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the basis of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate and prove the contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing and proof of contents is another. Not only the document would have to be proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be established from the record. A document or the contents of the document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge. …” 13. She has also drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Nur Begum Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347 wherein certain observations regarding exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction have been made which read as follows: “9. On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and Page No.# 9/19 opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.” 14. She has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rupajan Begum Vs. Union of India reported in (2018) 1 SCC 579, wherein it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two aspects, firstly, the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of the contents. 15. The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated. 16. The learned counsel for the rest of the respondents have supported the submissions advanced on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court, in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. It is Page No.# 10/19 submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. They have further submitted that the procedure adopted for adjudication of a reference by a Foreigners Tribunal is summary in nature and there is also a time frame for completion. It is also submitted that there is a question of national security by the unabated influx of foreign nationals and before any action is taken, the proceedee is given an opportunity whereby he or she is required to prove the citizenship through cogent, credible and acceptable evidence. 17. Shri Ali, the learned Standing Counsel, ECI has specifically contended that Ext.2 – Draft Chitha would not have any probative value in the instant case. He has submitted that from the said document, it appears that the father had inherited the land from Jolu Sheikh on 01.06.1966 and on 13.07.2015, the names of the petitioner and her sisters were inserted leaving behind the brothers. Ext.3 – the final Khatian is however in the name of Jolu Mollah, son of Jabbar. He has highlighted that the descriptions of the land in Ext. 2 and Ext. 3 are different. He submits that under those facts and circumstances, there would be absolutely no documentary evidence to support the petitioner. In this regard, he has relied upon a decision of this Court dated 29.05.2018 in WP(C)/2641/2017 [State of Assam Vs. Ohab Ali]. 18. The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court including the records of the Tribunal have been carefully perused. 19. With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts. Page No.# 11/19 In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is extracted hereinbelow- “9. Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person.” 20. In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [AIR 1963 SC 1035] which followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [AIR 1961 SC 1526] in the context of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which are extracted hereinbelow- “22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order Page No.# 12/19 made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent.” 21. Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 22. Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023] has laid down as follows: “49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law Page No.# 13/19 governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after Page No.# 14/19 setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.” 23. In the instant case, the written statement is absolutely vague and apparently, has not met the requirements, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). There is a requirement to disclose the following: (i) the date of birth; (ii) place of birth; (iii) name of the parents; (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the grandparents. It has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. 24. With regard to the submissions advanced on the LVO report, the issue is no longer res integra. In fact, the entire facet has been discussed and answered in details by this Court in the case of Sayam Uddin Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2019 (4) GLT 456 which has also been upheld by the Hon’ble Division Bench in WA/170/2019 vide judgment and order dated 29.07.2019. It has been held that lack of details in the LVO Repot or an incompletely filled up LVO Report would not come to the advantage of a proceedee. Further, the proceedee is not at all prejudiced inasmuch as, he / she will not be precluded from raising all valid defence in the Reference to prove that he / she is an Page No.# 15/19 Indian citizen. The aforesaid views have been endorsed and reiterated by a Coordinate Bench in the subsequent case of Shukurjan Nessa @ Sukurjan Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2025 (2) GLT 1058. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid decision and accordingly hold that the contention of the petitioner is not sustainable. 25. We have seen that the Kabinnama dated 13.10.1993 has not been proved by the Kazi or any authorized person. The Voters List of 1997 is an uncertified copy in which the petitioner’s name is prefixed with “D” and that document would not be relevant. The Voters List of 1966 contains the name of the projected grandfather and father which would not serve as a link document. In any case, as observed above, there are palpable discrepancies in the name and address of the projected father. The only document worth consideration is the Draft Chitha (Ext.2). However, the said document is not at all reliable inasmuch as, it is not clear as to how the petitioner’s name got inserted along with her projected sisters and the projected brothers are left out. It also appears that at the time of the preparation of the same, the projected father was still alive and therefore, the question would arise as to how the land was mutated. There are also inconsistencies in the name of the father along with the grandfather. We also find force in the contention advanced by the learned Standing Counsel, ECI that the description of the land in Ext.2 and the Final Khatian (Ext.3) are different. In the case of Ohab Ali (supra), the following observations were made by a Coordinate Bench which we respectfully endorse: “13. Though petitioner exhibited a number of documents from Exhibits-A to M, we find that none of these documents were proved in accordance with law. There were simply filed and marked as exhibits. It is trite that Page No.# 16/19 mere filing of document or marking of document as exhibit is not enough. Not only the document has to be proved, the contents of the document would also have to be proved; that apart truthfulness of the contents would have to be proved too. 14. The two crucial documents which say that Ahed Ali @ Oheb Ali was the son of Late Shangser Ali are Exhibits-H and Exhibit-I. Exhibit-H is a certificate dated 02.06.2014, issued by one Akmat Ali, Gaonburah, certifying that Ohed Ali was the son of Late Shangser Ali, but Akmat Ali did not appear before the Tribunal alongwith the contemporaneous record to prove Exhibit-H as well as the contents thereof. Therefore, this exhibit was not proved. That apart, we find that the Gaonburah had embossed the State Emblem of India in Exhibit-H certificate. Under the State Emblem of India (Prohibition of Improper Use) Act, 2005, and the State Emblem of India (Regulation of Use) Rules, 2007, Gaonburah is not authorized to use the State Emblem of India in any manner. Such unauthorized use of the State Emblem of India had rendered Exhibit-H inadmissible in evidence. Similar is the position in respect of Exhibit-I, issued by another Gaonburah, Jahidul Islam Bhuyan on 23.12.2014. For the reasons mentioned above, this exhibit is also inadmissible in evidence. Therefore, these two exhibits besides not being proved were inadmissible in evidence. If these documents are excluded from consideration, there is nothing on record to establish linkage between Ahed Ali @ Oheb Ali or Ohed Ali on the one hand and Shangser Ali on the other hand.” 26. The case of Md. Rahim Ali @ Md. Abdul Rahim (supra) has been cited on behalf of the petitioner with regard to the aspect of the initial investigation. Page No.# 17/19 It, however, clearly appears that certain binding observations of a Larger Bench in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra) were not brought to the notice of the Court and therefore, reliance upon the case of Md. Rahim Ali @ Md. Abdul Rahim (supra) would be of no avail. 27. The cases of Bant Singh (supra) and Dolgobinda Paricha (supra) are on the aspect of Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act relating to evidence adduced by family members. However, the present subject matter is governed by Section 9 of the Foreigners’ Act which, as discussed above, excludes the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act with a specific non obstante clause. 28. The case of Motior Rahman (supra) is on the aspect that minor discrepancies may be ignored / overlooked and the said case is based on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sirajul Hoque Vs. State of Assam & Ors. reported in 2019 (5) SCC 534. In the said case, while the Hon’ble Supreme Court had laid down that minor discrepancy in the voters list may be ignored, the same is with a rider that all other things are to remain consistent. In that case, except a minor change in the name of the grandfather of the proceedee from Kematullah to Kefatullah, all other things were consistent. For ready reference, the relevant observations are extracted hereinbelow: “3. There is no doubt that the great grandfather`s name Amtullah appears as Amtullah throughout the document. Equally, there is no doubt about the father's name which appears as Hakim Ali throughout. The only discrepancy found is that in some of the documents Kefatullah later becomes Kematullah. However, what is important to note is that his Page No.# 18/19 father's name Amtullah continues as Amtullah and the other family members associated continued as such. Also produced are NRC Registration details of the year 1971 of the grandfather who is noted to be Kefatullah in this document. Other voters lists are then produced where the letter F becomes the letter M with other family names remaining the same. In fact, the appellant has himself produced a document of 1981 from the Income Tax Department giving his Permanent Account Number. Apart from these documents, certain other later documents have also been produced including photo identity cards issued by the Election Commission of India and identity cards issued to his brother including voters lists in which the appellant's name appears.” 29. However, the facts of the present case would show that the discrepancies are not minor or trivial and therefore, the case of Motior Rahman (supra) cannot be applied mechanically. 30. The reliance upon the case of Md. Sujab Ali (supra) is misplaced. In the instant case, there is no documentary evidence to connect the DW-2 with the proceedee. 31. In the case of Bijoy Das Vs. UoI reported in2018 (3) GLT 118, this Court has laid down that in proceedings of this nature, oral evidence alone would not be enough and such evidence is required to be supported and corroborated by documentary evidence and contemporaneous records. However, in this case, the same has not been able to be done by the petitioner.We are of the view that the petitioner, as proceedee had failed to discharge her burden to prove her citizenship. 32. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion Page No.# 19/19 that the impugned order dated 09.08.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No.2nd, Dhubri in F.T. Case No. FT 1123/F/16 (Police Ref. Case No. 609/98) does not call for any interference. 33. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by the learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law. 34. The records be returned to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal forthwith, along with a copy of this order. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant