(WPS No.4898/2019) 2026:CGHC:8591 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 4898 of 2019 Karlus Tirkey (Died) Through Legal Heirs 1(A) Ilijabeth Tirkey, W/o Late Karlus Tirkey, aged about 58 years, R/o Village Junai Kala, Bhagatoli, Police Station Kansabel, District Jashpur, Chhattisgarh. 1(B) Anshumala Kindo, W/o Santosh Kindo, D/o Late Karlus Tirkey, aged about 37 years, R/o House No.44, Kamrai, Sanajori, Supkalo, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 1(C) Anjulata Tirkey, D/o Late Karlus Tirkey, aged about 32 years, R/o Village Junai Kala, Bhagatoli, Police Station Kansabel, District Jashpur, Chhattisgarh. 1(D) Aman Tirkey, S/o Late Karlus Tirkey, aged about 30 years, All are R/o Village Junai Kala, Bhagatoli, Police Station Kansabel, District Jashpur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioners versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh, through Secretary, Home Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Capital Complex, Naya Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2. Director General, Chhattisgarh Armed Force, Police Head Quarters, Sector 19, Atal Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3. Commandant 6th Battalion, Chhattisgarh Arms Force, Raigarh, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents For Petitioners : Mrs. Savita Tiwari, Advocate. For Respondents : Mr. Sharad Mishra, Panel Lawyer. SISTA SOMAYAJULU Digitally signed by SISTA SOMAYAJULU Date: 2026.02.18 16:22:03 +0530 (WPS No.4898/2019) Single Bench:- Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Order on Board 17/02/2026 1. The original petitioner namely, late Karlus Tirkey was convicted for offence under Sections 302, 201 & 120B of the IPC and ultimately, his conviction was set aside by this Court vide judgment dated 4-3- 2014 passed in Cr.A.No.2242/1998 and upon direction by this Court, he was reinstated in service by order dated 16-11-2018, however, he has not been granted pay and allowances on the principle of ‘no work no pay’ which he seeks to challenge by way of this writ petition. 2. Mrs. Savita Tiwari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners herein who are legal heirs of late Karlus Tirkey, would submit that the order impugned Annexure P-1 be quashed and the original petitioner be granted all the consequential benefits for the period during which he was not in job because of pendency of criminal case. 3. Mr. Sharad Mishra, learned State counsel, would oppose the writ petition and support the impugned order Annexure P-1. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the record with utmost circumspection. 5. The issue involved herein is no longer res integra and it stands conclusively determined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court by their judgment first of all in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. (WPS No.4898/2019) Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar1 in which their Lordships have considered a case where an employee was dismissed from service on account of his conviction by a criminal court for his involvement in an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and subsequently, he was acquitted and as a consequence, reinstated. Their Lordships while considering the issue whether back-wages should be paid to the employee for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement, held as under: - "The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages." 6. Similarly, in the matter of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh2, the principle of law laid down in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) has been followed with approval. 7. In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India, New 1 (1996) 11 SCC 603 2 (2004) 1 SCC 121 (WPS No.4898/2019) Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal3, the Supreme Court has considered a provision in the service regulation which provided that an employee, who is absent from duty without any authority, shall not be entitled to any pay and allowance during the period of such absence (similar to F.R. 17) and held as under: - “15. … It is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty during the period of suspension that such employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the said period. In other words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. During this period, the employee renders no work. He is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances for the period. That will be against the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and positively inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. …” 8. In the matter of State Bank of India and another v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim4, the Supreme Court considering the earlier decisions in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh’s case (supra) and Baldev Singh v. Union of India5, held that subsequent acquittal of Government servant though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act, and observed as under: - “11. … During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant Bank from employing him. If the respondent could not have remained employed with the appellant Bank during the said period on account of the 3 AIR 1994 SC 552 4 (2013) 11 SCC 67 5 (2005) 8 SCC 747 (WPS No.4898/2019) provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same has been granted by the appellant Bank.” 9. Finally, in the matter of Raj Narain v. Union of India and others6, their Lordships have relied upon the decision rendered in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) and have held that the appellant therein shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal till the date of his reinstatement. 10. Coming to the facts of the case, it is quite apparent that the original petitioner herein was convicted by the jurisdictional criminal court by judgment dated 14-9-1998 and consequently, he was terminated on 17-11-1998, however, on appeal being preferred by him before this Court, he was acquitted on 4-3-2014 and was reinstated in service on 16-11-2018, but his claim for back-wages from the date of his termination to the date of reinstatement has been denied as the said period has been treated as ‘no work no pay’. In light of the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh’s case (supra), Baldev Singh (supra), Mohammed Abdul Rahim’s case (supra) and Raj Narain (supra), subsequent acquittal of the original petitioner though obliterates his conviction, but it does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction, 6 (2019) 5 SCC 809 (WPS No.4898/2019) however, he will be entitled for back-wages only from the date of his acquittal i.e. 4-3-2014 till the date of his reinstatement i.e. 16-11- 2018 in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Narain (supra), which will be paid to the original petitioner’s legal representatives within 45 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 11. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. There will be no order as to cost(s). Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) JUDGE Soma