1 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE PRESENT: THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE CRR 2796 of 2019 Sujay Bhatta & Ors. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Anr. For the Petitioners : Mr. Debarshi Brahma Mr. Subarna Bank Mr. Jakir Sardar Ms. Suchandra Kundu For the State : Mr. Ranajoy Chatterjee Mr. Arka Naha Heard on : 20.08.2026 Judgment on : 15.09.2026 Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J. 1. Petitioners have filed the present Revisional application before this court praying for quashment of the FIR and Charge sheet in connection with the Berhampore P.S. Case No. 1396 of 2018 corresponding to GR Case No. 4518 of 2018, presently pending before the Learned Additional District & Sessions Judge 3rd Court, Berhampore. 2 2. The defacto complainant Anita Saha lodged a written complain alleging interalia that about eight years back her daughter (victim) was married with petitioner no.1, Sujay Bhattacharya and since after her marriage, she was subjected to torture both physically and mentally by her husband and in laws over the issue of her husband’s illicit relationship with another lady and it is further alleged that on 09.11.2018 at 23.10 Hrs., the accused persons assaulted her physically and thereafter had set fire on her wearing apparel. As a result her daughter got severe burn injury on her person and was admitted in hospital and thereafter she succumbed to her injuries. After completion of investigation, the investigating authorities have submitted charge sheet against the present petitioners under section 498A/307/34 of the IPC. 3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid proceeding learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners have been falsely implicated with the criminal proceeding by the in laws of the petitioner no.1, solely due to personal grudge and rivalry. The petitioners are no way connected with the alleged offence. Learned Counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued that the victim being the wife of petitioner no. 1, while admitted in the hospital for treatment of her burn injuries, she had placed her statement before the authorities which was voluntary and from the said dying declaration made by the deceased, it is clear that she has not levelled any imputation against the petitioners. In fact she had voluntarily stated that no person is held responsible for such incident. She further stated that in fact, due to her negligent act, her wearing apparel caught fire. The petitioner no. 1 by pressing pillow against the deceased/victim extinguished the fire. 3 4. Therefore, said dying declaration proves that the petitioners have not committed any crime upon the deceased victim and on the contrary they have made their best efforts for the survival of the victim but unfortunately she died. Moreover, immediate after unfortunate incident, the parents did not choose to lodge the FIR, but after a delay of almost seven days, they lodged the FIR. Therefore the unexplained delay in lodging FIR, along with the dying declaration clearly demonstrate that the petitioners are no way responsible with the alleged offence and entire incident occurred solely due to mishappening but the petitioners have been implicated out of personnel grudge and rivalry. One of the neighbours namely Tanmoy Sartheke while made statement under section 161of Cr.P.C before police, has stated that the petitioner no.1 himself carried the deceased victim from the residence and had taken her to hospital by an Ambulance and the petitioner was all along present in the Hospital. Furthermore the statement of another witness Surojit Mondal also discloses, that while the said person rushed to the residence of the petitioners, he found that the petitioner no. 1 was crying by wrapping up the deceased victim. 5. He further argued that section 498A of the Indian Penal Code also does not have any application in the present context. Relying upon the judgment of Dara LaxmiNarayan and Others. Vs. Telengana and another reported in (2025) 3 SCC 735, he contended that further continuance of the impugned proceeding against the petitioners shall be mere abuse of the process of the court. Therefore he prayed for quashment of the proceeding, as the allegations levelled against the petitioners do not constitute offence either under section 498A or 306 of the IPC. 4 6. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State relying upon the statements recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C opposed petitioner’s contention and contended that the prayer made by the petitioners for quashment of the proceeding is liable to be dismissed. 7. Private opposite party no.2/de facto complainant was not represented. 8. The allegation levelled in the FIR in gist is that marriage of the victim along with petitioner no.1 took place eight years back and since after marriage she was subjected to torture both physically and mentally by her husband and in-laws over the issue of her protest against illicit relationship of her husband with another lady and on 09.11.2018 at 23.10, hrs the accused persons assaulted her and petitioner no.1 herein with the aid and assistance of other accused persons had set fire on her wearing apparel. As a result victim suffered serious burn injury on her person and ultimately succumbed to the injuries. Therefore, according to FIR as the victim came to know about the illicit relationship after her marriage and as she raised protest she was subjected to cruelty by the accused persons. There is no allegation of dowry demand by the petitioners. The witnesses who were examined during investigation have not stated anything in support of FIR story that the victim came to know about the illicit relationship between the petitioner no.1 and another women after the marriage and as a result of which she was subjected to physical violence at the hands of the petitioner no. l but she was subjected to torture by petitioner No.1 under the influence of all other accused persons over matrimonial and family disputes. Two witness have stated that on 09.11.2018 the petitioner no.1 at the instigation 5 of the other accused persons had set fire at the wearing apparel of the deceased victim. 9. In contradiction, Post-mortem report of the victim collected during investigation reveals as follows:- “death was due to the effect of burn injuries as noted above Ante Mortem in nature. The distribution of burn injury rules out the possibility of homicide, whether it is suicidal or accidental to be proved by circumstantial evidence.” 10. Therefore the P.M. report clearly belied the statement made in the complaint as well as said statements which were recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. that the petitioner No.1 at the instigation of other accused had set fire on victim’s body. Now the P.M. report raised the question as to whether the death was suicidal or accidental. It appears from victims written dying declaration that before her death, she stated in presence of medical officer on 10.11.2018 at 3.45 P.M. that while she was cooking in front of a gas oven, due to inadvertence her night dress caught fire and thereafter her husband pressed pillow to extinguish the fire, and he later brought her to the hospital. She categorically stated that she has no allegation against any person. Prosecution has not collected any evidence nor recorded any other contrary statement of victim to disbelieve the aforesaid Post Mortem report and the dying declaration made by the victim. 11. In the above backdrop now let me consider whether prosecution has succeeded in establishing even prima facie the allegations under section 306 and/or under section 498A of the IPC. Needless to say that section 306 of IPC has two basic ingredients one is the act of suicide by the victim and the second is the abetment to the said act by the accused persons. In other words it has to be prima facie shown that the accused persons had 6 contributed to the suicide by the deceased by some direct or indirect act. Therefore, to show prima facie such abetment or involvement, one of the three conditions outlined in section 107 of the IPC has to be satisfied. To attract section 306 read with section 107 of IPC, the result of investigation must prima facie show the proof of direct or indirect act or instigation or incitement to commit suicide by the accused, and such instigation must be in close proximity to the commission of the suicide by the deceased and not only that such instigation or incitement should also reveal a clear guilty mind to abet the commission of suicide, putting the victim in such a position that she would have no other option but to commit suicide. 12. 12. Such proposition of law has been clearly propounded while defining the term ‘instigation’ in Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chattisgarh reported in (2001) 9 SCC 618 “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.” 13. Law in this context has further been fortified in subsequent judgments passed by the Apex Court, which includes Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2017) 7 SCC 780 wherein it was held:- “43 [Ed.: Para 43 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./23/2017 dated 28-6-2017.] . Keeping in view the aforesaid legal position, we are required to address whether there has been abetment in committing suicide. Be it clearly stated that mere allegation of harassment without any positive action in proximity to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused that led a person to commit suicide, a conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. A casual remark that is likely to cause harassment in ordinary course 7 of things will not come within the purview of instigation. A mere reprimand or a word in a fit of anger will not earn the status of abetment. There has to be positive action that creates a situation for the victim to put an end to life. 14. From the materials on record as well as in the Case diary, I find that while the FIR story and some of the prosecution witnesses have stated that the petitioner no.1 with the help of the other petitioners/accused persons had set fire in the wearing apparel of the victim over the issue of quarrel relating to alleged illicit relationship of her husband with another lady, which continued for eight years, since the time of her marriage, the Post Mortem Report has completely ruled out the case of homicidal death in the present context. The victim while made the dying declaration had made it clear that the cause of her death was purely accidental. 15. It also appears that though it is alleged in the FIR as well as in the statements made by the witnesses that the victim was subjected to cruelty for eight years since after her marriage but before the instant complaint, no other complaint was lodged by anybody alleging any case of cruelty against the petitioners. The witnesses have in their testimonies stated that the deceased was subjected to torture physically and mentally by the accused persons for the first time, when this FIR was lodged. Even if all the evidence on record including the charge sheet and witness statements are taken to be correct, there is no credible evidence against the petitioners under section 306 of the IPC. There is also no allegation against the petitioners of a nature that the deceased was left with no alternative but to commit the unfortunate act of committing suicide, even if it is taken for granted that she committed suicide. The deceased in her dying declaration has clearly expressed her disapproval towards the cause of her death as homicidal or suicidal and 8 therefore it does not attribute direct or indirect involvement of the petitioners in causing her death. Even no witness during investigation has stated that it is a case of suicidal death. 16. At the cost of repetition I must say that there needs to be at least an allegation of a positive act that creates an environment where the deceased is pushed to an edge in order to sustain the charge of section 306 IPC. In view of entire evaluation of the facts and the legal position as stated above ,I find that allegations set out in the FIR has not been substantiated during investigation and therefore it does not constitute the offence under section 306 of the IPC against the petitioners and therefore they should not be compelled to undergo the ordeal of trial under the said provision. 17. Let me now consider the other issue i.e. whether charge under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code attracts against the petitioners in the present case or not. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law that section 306 and 498A of the IPC are independent of each other and acquittal of one does not lead to acquittal of the other. There are catena of judgments in affirmation thereto. It is also recognised under the law that if extra marital relationship as a wilful conduct destroys the congeniality of the married life, to such an extent, that amounts to drive a women to commit suicide, also amounts to cruelty under the definition given under explanation (a) to section 498A. 18. However, in the present case, I find from record two inconsistent versions. While in the FIR and the statements of some witnesses recorded during investigation discloses that the petitioner no.1 with the help of other accused persons had set fire on the body of the victim, the Post Mortem 9 Report and the dying declaration speaks contrary to the same and does not support the prosecution case and as such no credence can be put on such statements made in the complaint. Even if there was any matrimonial discord over the issue of husband’s alleged illicit relationship with another lady and on protest she was not treated well, that by itself cannot suggest that it is of such a nature as was likely to drive the deceased to commit suicide. 19. Before going further let me reproduce section 498A of the IPC which runs as follows:- 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a)any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b)harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 20. Therefore, it is clear from the aforesaid definition of “cruelty” that in order to constitute cruelty it is not enough that the conduct of accused is wilful or is offensively unjust to the women but it is further necessary that the decree of intensity of such conduct on the part of the accused is such as is likely to drive the women to commit suicide. Unless it is established that the physical assault and/or harassment was with a view to force her to commit suicide or to fulfil illegal demands of the husband and in-laws, the provisions of section 498A would not be attracted to make out a case of cruelty. Therefore in the aforesaid background when it has not even 10 established during investigation that the victim at all committed suicide and when the dying declaration of the victim actually has ruled out both the cases of prosecution that the cause of death of the victim was neither suicidal nor homicidal, I find it difficult to come to a conclusion that the petitioners have done anything wilfully which conduct is of such a nature, as is likely to drive the victim to commit suicide. Therefore, the allegation of cruelty under section 498A of the IPC has also not been established nor corroborated from the materials collected during investigation against the petitioners. 21. Under explanation (a) of section 498A “cruelty” must comprise of “any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the women to commit suicide”. In the present case there is no specific allegation in the FIR to the effect that the victim was subjected to such wilful conduct, which ultimately had driven her to commit suicide. On the other hand FIR only discloses that since marriage, there was a discord between the parties on account of alleged immoral lifestyle of the victim’s husband, though the witnesses during investigation has not stated anything about husband’s alleged immoral relationship. In the face of the record, there is nothing to show that such matrimonial discord had resorted to drive the victim to commit suicide. Such matrimonial discord, even if admitted (for the sake of argument and if it is presumed that she committed suicide, going against the dying declaration), that by itself are not sufficient conduct as is likely to drive the victim to commit suicide, which is one of the requirements of explanation (a) to section 498 A of IPC. Defacto complainant has also not been represented before this court during hearing. Therefore, the veiled 11 object behind the lame prosecution was to harass the petitioners and the prosecution case is wholly unfounded. 22. In the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal, 1992 Supp (1) 335, the Apex Court has laid down the guideline where jurisdiction under section 528 of BNSS can be invoked in para 102 of the judgment and I am of the view that sub-paragraph (5) & (7) of para 102, clearly attracts in the present case which runs as follows:- (5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 23. Therefore, I am of the view that the continuance of the criminal proceeding against the petitioners would amount to the abuse of the process of the court and in view of total contradictions of the prosecution case, there is hardly any chance to conviction of the petitioners at the end of trial and as such I find that the quashing of the impugned proceeding is warranted in this case to secure the ends of justice. 24. In view of above CRR 2796 of 2019 is allowed. 25. The impugned proceeding being Berhampore P.S. Case no. 1396 of 2018 under section 498/306/34 IPC Corresponding to GR no. 4518 of 2018 presently pending before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Berhampore is hereby quashed. Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this Judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities. (DR. AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J.)