1 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE Present:- The Hon’ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya S.A. 100 of 2019 Meena Ghosh Vs. Pankaj Kumar Dasgupta (since deceased) Bina Dasgupta and Ors. For the Appellant : Mr. Snehatosh Majumder Mr. Ujjwal Dutta Mr. Amar Nath Ghosh Mr. Sattwik Majumder For the Respondents : Mr. Tarak Nath Halder Delivered On : 03.07.2026 Supratim Bhattacharya, J.: 1. The present appeal has been preferred by the landlady being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court dated 4th September, 2017 in Ejectment Appeal No. 11 of 2016 whereby and wherein the learned judge of the First Appellate Court has allowed the said appeal thereby setting aside the judgment of eviction passed by the learned Trial Court dated 29th February, 2016 in Ejectment Suit No. 52 of 2006. 2. Factual Matrix The fact of the instant lis is that the property was Debottar property being in the name of Sree Sree Nikunja Behari Thakur. It is a two 2 storied building situated at 13C, Rajendralal Street, KMC ward No. 28, P.S. Narkeldanga, Kolkata -700006. The sebaits of the said Debottar property were Sabitri Dey, the mother and her three sons namely Shyamal Kumar Dey, Amal Kumar Dey and Bimal Kumar Dey. The property was being possessed through tenant namely Ranibala Dasgupta, wife of late Ananta Dasgupta (since deceased). The tenants are in possession of the suit property consisting of two storied brick built building with stair case having four bedrooms, two kitchen at a monthly rental of Rs. 100/- payable according to English calendar month. The erstwhile sebaits being unable to maintain the premises in habitable condition decided to sell the same and in pursuance to the said decision entered into an agreement to sell the premises to the appellant /plaintiff. The said agreement was a registered conveyance and the same was to take place after obtaining lawful permission from the learned District Judge, Alipore. The sebaits /owners applied before the learned District Judge, Alipore seeking permission to sell the property on the ground that they did not have the capacity to maintain the premises. The said proceeding was Miscellaneous Case No. 179 of 1999 before the learned District Judge at Alipore. The said miscellaneous case had been finally disposed of by the learned District Judge, Alipore vide order No. 6 dated 10.09.1999 thereby allowing and permitting the joint trustees of the said trust to sell the property being premises No. 3 13C, Rajendralal Street Kolkata 700006 to Smt. Meena Ghosh on the condition that the sale proceeds shall be invested in any Nationalised Bank, with the liberty given to the sebaits or the managing sebaits thereof to collect the interest accrued therefrom for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the seba puja of the deity and for meeting other essential expenses required for the said Debottar estate. Thereafter on 02.08.2000 Smt. Sabitri Dey expired leaving behind his three sons as the only sebaits of the said trust. The surviving sebaits after being permitted by the learned District Judge sold the premises by executing a registered deed of sale dated 14.03.2005. On the death of Ranibala Dasgupta her four sons and one married daughter have inherited the tenancy being tenants-in- common. In spite of receiving the letter of attornment, the tenants have not paid rent to the transferee landlord since the month of March, 2005. Through the plaint it has also been stated that out of the four brothers two of them have constructed their own house and are residing therein with their family but have kept the occupied rooms under lock and key since January, 2002. The landlady in spite of purchasing the suit property is residing along with her family in a tenanted house at Garpar Road, PS Narkeldanga, Kolkata 700009, wherein she is under constant threat of eviction by the owner of the said property. 4 Thereafter, on 25.11.2005 a notice of eviction under Section 6(4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (for short the 1997 Act) has been issued by the learned Advocate calling upon the tenants to quit and deliver vacant, peaceful possession of the tenanted suit property on the expiry of the last day of December, 2005. In spite of service of notice for eviction dated 25.11.2005, the tenants have neither quit nor vacated the said suit property, as a consequence of which the landlady has been compelled to institute a suit seeking eviction of the tenants from the suit property on the grounds of default, nuisance, reasonable requirement and keeping the tenanted portion under occupation while residing at their own dwelling houses elsewhere. As such the landlady has sought for relief/reliefs under the 1997 Act. Written statement has been filed on behalf of the tenants being Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 denying and disputing the allegations made by the landlady against them. It has been stated through the written statement that Sri Sri Nikunja Behari jew thakur the inducting landlord of the predecessor of the defendants, who is the owner of the property is a necessary party. It has also been stated that the plaintiff is bound to prove her derivative title by production of her deed of conveyance and also the permission of the Ld. District Judge. It has also been stated that the plaintiff has intentionally suppressed the number of the deed and the place of registration 5 which infers that the registration was not complete till the date of presentation of the plaint. The tenants have not admitted the plaintiff as the landlady on the ground of derivative title and has stated that the plaintiff has acquired the property by virtue of so called erroneous deed of conveyance. It has also been stated by the tenants that two of their brothers have left the premises for paucity of accommodation but none of them has acquired his own house. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Trial Judge framed the following issues: “1) Is the suit maintainable in its present form and prayer? 2) Is there any cause of action to file the suit? 3) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property? 4) Whether the notice to quit is legal, valid sufficient and duly served on the defendants? 5) Whether the defendants are defaulters in payment of rents? 6) Whether the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit property? 7) Whether the plaintiff has other reasonable and suitable accommodation? 8) Is the plaintiff entitled to the decree as prayed for? 9) To what other relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?” 6 On behalf of the landlady, one Mr. Abani Kumar Ghosh adduced evidence being PW1. He has proved the following documents which have been marked as Exhibit Nos. 1 to 13 which are as follows: 1. Exhibit -1- Deed of Conveyance dated 13.03.2005. 2. Exhibit-2 - Ration card of the family is marked as Exhibit-2 series. 3. Exhibit-3- Voter ID card of PW1. 4. Exhibit -4- Madhyamik Admit Card of Snehashis Ghosh . 5. Exhibit- 5-Admit card issued by University of Calcutta in the name of Sanjukta Ghosh. 6. Exhibit- 6- Trade Licence for 2010-2011 in the name of PW1 by KMC. 7. Exhibit- 7- The original letter of tenancy dated 15.07.1981 8. Exhibit- 8- 09 rent receipts. 9. Exhibit- 9 - Rent receipt. 10. Exhibit-10- Original certificate dated 04.06.12 11. Exhibit- 11- Certified copy of deed No. 5846 dated 20.06.1999 12. Exhibit-12.- True copy of assessment register. 13. Exhibit-13- The notice to quit PR Slip and AD card. On behalf of the defendant tenants two persons adduced evidence, they are Amit Kumar Dasgupta (DW1) and Pradip Kumar Dasgupta (DW2). 7 Apart from one evidence a certified copy of an assessment register has been proved and exhibited. After adjudication the learned Trial Court has decreed the suit by passing the following: “ Hence, it is ORDERED That the instant suit be and the same is decreed on contest. The plaintiff to do get decree of her recovery of possession by evicting the defendants from the suit property. The defendants is further directed to quit and vacate and deliver khas possession of the suit property to the plaintiff within 60 days from the date of order in default the plaintiff would be entitled to execute the decree as per law. Interim order if any, stands vacated.” Before the First Appellate Court Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment passed by the learned Trial Judge the tenants preferred the first appeal before the learned District Judge, South 24 Parganas, Alipore being Ejectment Appeal No. 11 of 2016. The said first appeal was heard by the learned Civil Judge Senior Division Sealdah, South -24- Parganas. After hearing the learned counsels representing the tenants/appellants and the landlady /respondent the learned First 8 Appellate Court allowed the said appeal setting aside the decree of eviction passed by the learned Trial Court by passing the following: “ Hence, it is ORDERED that the instant appeal be and the same is allowed on contest against the respondent and exparte against the proforma respondent but without any order as to costs. The impugned judgment and decree dated 29.02.2016, passed by the Court of Ld. Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1st Court, Sealdah in Ejectment Suit No. 52 of 2006 is hereby set aside and it is hereby ordered that the said suit be and the same is dismissed on contest.” The aforementioned judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Court is the bone of contention in the present appeal. 3. At the time of admission one substantial question of law was framed being: Whether a notice of suit issued under Section 6(4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act can be regarded as invalid and bad in law having issued within one year from the date of the acquisition of title by the landlady appellant in view of the embargo created under Section 6(2) of the said Act ? At the time of hearing, another substantial question of law has been framed which is as follows: 9 Whether the learned Trial Court has correctly taken into consideration the decision arrived at the time of disposal of the application under Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 as that the appellant is the owner of the property and whether the First Appellate Court has been correct in coming to the finding that the appellant is not the owner of the said property without the certified copy of the ‘permission of the learned District Judge not being exhibited’? 4. So from the substantial questions of law framed it transpires that there are two points to be considered as to whether the issuance of the notice under Section 6(4) of the 1997 Act as has been issued within one year from the date of purchase of the suit property is valid and as to whether without the permission of the learned District Judge being exhibited can it be considered that the appellants are the owners of the suit property. 5. The learned Counsel representing the appellant during his exhaustive argument has submitted the following I. That the appellant/ plaintiff /landlady has filed the present lis seeking decree of eviction against the tenants on four grounds being under Section 6(1) (b), 6 (1)(d), 6 (1)(i) and 6 (1)(l) upon due service of notice of quit dated 25.11.2005 under Section 6(4) of the 1997 Act. II. He has further submitted that the landlady is a transferee landlord and has purchased the suit property which had been 10 a Debottar property on the strength of registered deed of purchase dated 14.03.2005. III. He has further submitted that on the expiry of clear one year the landlady has instituted the suit on 06.04.2006 which is in compliance with the requirement under Section 6(2) of the 1997 Act. IV. He has also submitted that prior to execution of the deed of sale the sebaits of the deity obtained permission from the learned District Judge Alipore. V. He has further submitted that one Ranibala Dasgupta since deceased was the last tenant and on her death the defendants respondents have become tenants in common by operation of law. VI. He has further submitted that the landlady is residing at a rented premises situated at 52, Garpar Road PS Narkeldanga in spite of being owner of the suit property. VII. He has further submitted that the learned First Appellate Court allowed the said appeal only on one ground that is notice to quit dated 25.11.2005 holding it to be bad as it has been issued prior to the expiry of one year as contemplated under Section 6(2) of the said Act. VIII. He has further submitted that apart from the above issue the learned First Appellate Court as regards to the ownership has come to the same finding as that the Trial Court. Both the 11 courts have come to a concurrent finding that the appellant plaintiff is the owner of the suit property. IX. He has further submitted that as regards to the issue of reasonable requirement of the suit property by the appellant plaintiff the First Appellate Court has not framed any issue and in accordance with Order VIII Rules 3 to 5 has admitted the fact of requirement on the ground that the defendants have admitted the said requirement. He has stressed upon the point that as regards to reasonable requirement also there has been concurrent finding by both the courts. X. He has relied upon a judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case between Bindeswar Prasad Gupta Vs. Murari Mohan Bhandari and Dalimbala Ghosh and others Vs. Murari Mohan Bhandari published in 1992 1 CLT 48 corresponding to 1991 SCC Online Calcutta 105 and has submitted that through the said judgment it has been held that there is bar in filing a suit for eviction imposed by Section 13 (3A) of the Premises Tenancy Act 1956 but there is no bar in issuing a notice of eviction under Section 16 (6) of the said Act before the expiry of three years from the date of acquisition of title by the transferee landlord. XI. He has further submitted that Section 6 (2) of the 1997 Act is pari materia with the contents of Section 13 (3A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. 12 XII. He has further submitted that as regards to the second substantial question of law, non-production and non-exhibiting the permission of the learned District Judge, allowing the erstwhile sebaits to sell out the Debottar property to the appellant landlord, is fatal. In this context he has further submitted that mere mentioning of the proceedings and the date of the order of permission in the deed of conveyance which is registered is enough to establish the appellant landlord’s title to the suit property. XIII. In this aspect the learned counsel has relied upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in the case between Howrah Municipal Corporation and others vs. Smt. Shakuntala Devi Dalmia and another. Relying upon the aforementioned submission the learned counsel has prayed for allowing the present appeal. 6. The learned counsel representing the respondents during his exhaustive argument has submitted as follows: I. That the plaintiff has to prove his own case and would not depend upon the weakness of the defence witness. In this context he has referred to a judgment passed in the case between Satyabrata Bose Vs. Amiya Bala Bose and ors. reported in AIR 1984 CAL 392. II. He has further submitted that in the present case the Debottar property has been sold for the benefit of the sebaits and not 13 for the benefit of the idol or for the purpose of preservation of the Debottar property. III. He has further submitted that Debottar property if sold in its entirety the very purpose of sale of the Debottar property for preservation of the same to keep it in habitable condition is futile. IV. He has further submitted that no deed of trust has been produced in support of their claim that they had inherited the sebaitship of the Debottar property and no permission of the learned District Judge has been produced to substantiate that prior permission of the District Judge which is a pre-condition of transfer of a Debottar property as such no title has passed to the appellant /plaintiff. V. He has further submitted that from the judgment of the learned Trial Court it transpires that the issue of ownership has been decided in favour of the appellant plaintiff solely on the basis of the decision arrived at the time of disposal of the application under Section 7 (2) of the 1997 Act and upon the recitals of the deed. VI. The Ld. Counsel has further submitted that it is settled law that any finding arrived at the time of disposing of the application under Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 will not be binding upon the Trial Court at the time of trial. In this context the Ld. Counsel has relied upon a judgment reported in (2006) (3) CHN 689 and another 14 judgment reported in 1987 (1) CHN 362 and another judgment reported in 1991 (1) CHN 443. VII. The Ld. Counsel has further submitted that in order to get a decree of eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement it is required to be ascertained by holding local inspection. VIII. The Ld. Counsel has further submitted that in a suit for eviction valid notice to quit is a condition precedent for institution of a suit and if there is any defect in the said notice suit cannot be stand and is liable to be dismissed in this context the Ld. Counsel has relied upon a judgment reported in 2008 (3) CHN 962. IX. The Ld. Counsel has further submitted that if the notice to quit is bad and inoperative the suit is liable to be dismissed. In this context he has relied upon the judgments reported in 1987 (2) CHN 436 and 1974 CHN. Relying upon the aforementioned submission the Ld. Counsel has prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 7. From the contentions of the Ld. Counsels it transpires that the present appeal revolves upon two issues. Firstly, as to whether the landlady is the owner of the suit property on the basis of the deed of purchase or not and secondly as to whether the landlady is entitled to eviction of the tenants on the basis of the notice of eviction having been issued within one year from the date of purchase of the suit property. 15 8. As regards to the validity of the deed of purchase by the appellant/landlady, without the production of the order of permission of the Ld. District Judge as regards to the sale of debottar property, the Courts have relied upon the deposition of Amal Kumar Dasgupta son of late Ananta Kumar Dasgupta, who is one of the co-tenants being the respondent No.2 herein. During his cross-examination on 24.08.2009 at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 7 (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 this witness has deposed the following: “ ... It is a fact that the plaintiff became the owner of the suit premises after purchasing the same from the then shebaits of the ‘debottar’ property, after receiving permission from Ld. District Judge. ...” Having deposed the same which is mentioned hereinabove in a proceeding in the self same lis, the respondents/tenants cannot challenge the ownership of the landlady, on the ground that the original permission of the concerned Ld. District Judge has not been produced. One cannot approbate and reprobate in a self same lis although the same has been deposed in an inter locutory proceeding. In addition to the above on perusal of the deed of sale, through which the said landlady has purchased the suit premises, it transpires that in the recital of the said deed the following has been specifically mentioned: 16 “AND WHEREAS since the execution of the instant sale and that of the formal Deed of Conveyance pursuant to the said Agreement for Sale dated 30.5.1999 required a formal order of the Concerned District Judge, the property under Sale being a Trust Property, the then Joint Trustee and Shebaits, as named above, had made an application before the Learned District Judge at Alipore in accordance with their said purpose and praying for therein a formal Order of the said Learned Court for enabling the applicants therein, being the Joint Trustees of the said Trust Estate, to execute sale of the property as aforesaid and the said proceeding had been numbered as Miscellaneous Case No. 179 of 1999 before the Learned District Judge at Alipore. AND WHEREAS the said Miscellaneous Case No.179 of 1999 had finally been disposed of by the said Learned District Judge at Alipore by his order No. 6 dated 10.9.1999 allowing and/or permitting the parties thereof, being the Joint Trustees of the said Trust Estate as aforementioned to cause sale of the property as described in the Schedule of the said petition, being the Premises No. 13C, Rajendralal Street, Kolkata - 700 006 to the said Smt. Meena Ghosh, being the Purchaser hereof on condition that the sale proceeds out of the said proposed sale be invested in any Nationalised Bank with liberty given to the Shebaits or the managing Shabaits thereof to collect the interest accrued therefrom for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the Seva Puja of the Deity of the said Trust Estate and for meeting other essential expenses required for the said Debutter Estate. ....” Thus, on perusal of the said deed it transpires that in the said deed it has been mentioned in details as regards to seeking of permission to execute a sale deed by the shebaits and the granting of the said 17 permission by the Ld. District Judge Alipore. Therein it has also been mentioned that a Miscellaneous case being Miscellaneous Case No. 179 of 1999 was filed and the Ld. District Judge had permitted the same subject to the provisions. So it transpires that permission had been granted by the concerned Ld. District Judge and accordingly deed was executed. So the contention of the respondents/tenants cannot be taken into consideration and is not sustainable and the ownership of the appellant/landlady is not questionable. As such this issue is decided in favour of the landlady/appellant. 9. The next issue is as to whether the issuance of notice of eviction dated 25.11.2005 is valid or not in the perspective of Section 6(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. Section 6(2) of the 1997 Act lays as follows: “ where a landlord has acquired his interest in the premises by transfer, no [suit] for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground of requirement for building or rebuilding or addition or alteration or requirement for own occupation shall be instituted by the landlord before the expiration of a period of one year from the date of acquisition of such interest ” Substituted by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 2006 (W.B. Act 12 of 2006) for “proceeding” (with effect from 01.06.2006). 18 So Section 6(2) of the said Act till 31.05.2006 was stated to be that no proceeding could have been instituted by a landlord who had acquired his interest in the premises by transfer for the recovery of possession of premises on the ground of requirement for own occupation before expiration of the period of one year from the date of acquisition of such interest and since 01.06.2006 the word “proceeding” being substituted by the word “suit” so a landlord who had acquired his interest in the premises by transfer, no suit for the recovery of the possession of the premises on the ground of requirement for own occupation could have been instituted by the landlord before the expiration of a period of one year from the date of acquisition of such interest. Earlier the word proceeding was there as because during those days eviction or ejectment of tenant were being dealt by the rent controller and thereafter once again eviction suit or ejectment suit is being dealt by the Court. So from the said aforementioned section it is crystal clear that there is bar in institution of a suit but there is no bar in the issuance of a notice for eviction within the period of one year from the date of purchase of the suit premises. In the present lis the suit premises was purchased on 14.03.2005 and the notice for eviction was issued on 25.11.2005 and ultimately the suit for ejectment has been instituted on 06.04.2006. So the institution of the suit has taken place beyond the period of one year of purchase of the suit premises. 19 As there being no bar in issuance of notice for eviction of a tenant by a landlord on the ground of his requirement for own occupation so the notice dated 25.11.2005 is valid and is tenable in law. So this issue is also decided in favour of the landlady/appellant. 10. As regards to reasonable requirement of the suit property by the landlady which has been specifically and elaborately laid down in the plaint the tenants /respondents have not specifically controverted the same. In their written statement there has not been any specific denial on the issue of reasonable requirement of the suit property by the landlady. In this context this Court relies upon Order VIII Rules 3, 4 and 5 which are placed hereinbelow. Order VIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that Denial to be specific. It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages. Order VIII Rule 4 states as follows : Evasive Denial Where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the plaint, he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. Thus, if it is alleged that he received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received. And if an allegation 20 is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances. Order VIII Rule 5 states as follows : Specific Denial (1) [Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability : Provided that the Court may in it discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. ... Thus, in the present lis there being no specific denial by the tenants through their written statement as regards to reasonable requirement of the suit property by the landlady and her family, so the issue of reasonable requirement goes in favour of the respondent/landlady on the ground of non-traverse by the appellants/tenants . 11. The judgment cited on behalf of the respondents/tenants been reported in AIR 1984 CAL 392 is not applicable in the present case as because herein the landlady has proved her right over the suit property being the landlady and it is not the case that the landlady has not proved her case. She has produced her deed of purchase wherein it has been specifically laid down mentioning the order of permission to sale of the concerned Ld. District Judge. The Ld. Counsel has relied upon a judgment published in 2008 SCC Online CAL 90. In the said judgment the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court has dealt with the issue of non-maintainability of a suit for eviction in the absence of valid notice to quit. In the present case, the 21 said principle does not come into play as because Section 6(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 has clearly and explicitly laid down the law that a suit cannot be instituted within one year from the date of purchase and in the present case the suit for eviction has been instituted after one year of purchase of the suit property so the case cited on behalf of the respondent in not applicable herein. The Ld. Counsel has also relied upon a judgment published in 1987 (2) CHN 436 . The said case referred is also not relevant though therein the issue of ejectment has been dealt but the issue involved was post notice default which is not the case in the present lis. The Ld. Counsel has also relied upon a judgment passed by a coordinate bench of this court in a case between Gangadhar Adak Vs. Gour Chandra Bag. In the said case two issues have been dealt those are whether conditions for eviction must exist where notice is issued and whether the plaintiff can avail of a situation which existed at the time of the institution of the suit but not at the time of issue of the notice to quit. In the said judgment the Hon’ble Single Judge has laid down “ .... that the grounds must be in existence when the notice is issued. ....”. The issue dealt in the referred case is not at all applicable in the present situation after the statute that is West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 having laid down the law under Section 6(2) of the said act in unequivocal, clear, precise and unambiguous terms stating that ... no suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground of requirement for building or rebuilding or addition or alteration or requirement for own occupation shall be instituted by the 22 landlord before the expiration of a period of one year from the date of acquisition of such interest. So the said judgment is not applicable in the present situation. In this context this Court relies upon Paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the judgment passed by an Hon’ble Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in the case between Bindeswar Prasad Gupta Versus Murari Mohan Bhandari and Dalimbala Ghosh & Ors Versus Murari Mohan Bhandari reported in 1991 SCC Online Cal 105 which is laid down as follows: “ .... 10. It is clear from the above provision that sub-section (3A) puts a bar upon the landlord acquiring his interest in the premises by transfer not to file a suit for recovery of possession of the premises on any grounds mentioned in Clause (f) or Clause (ff) of sub-Section (1) before the expiration of period of three years from the date of acquisition of such interest. The plain language of sub-section (3A) is that “no suit………shall be instituted by the landlord”. If we have to go by the plain language of the statute it cannot be read in sub-section (3A) the further embargo that the notice of ejectment u/S. 13.(6) cannot also be issued upon the tenant before the expiry of the period of three years, when the statute on its plain reading does not put such an embargo to a transferee-landlord. 11. Mr. Shakti Nath Mukherjee appearing for the respondent has drawn my attention to Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. pages 23 64–65 where it has been clearly observed that if the words of statute are themselves precis and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense and the words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver. The similar observation is found in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, Page 143. In this particular case also the clear and unambiguous expression of the Legislature contained in sub- section (3A) is to prohibit only filing a suit for eviction on the ground of Clause (f) or Clause (ff) of section 13(1) of the Act prior to the expiry of three years. However, the embargo is not an absolute one. The proviso gives the right to such transferee- landlord to approach the Rent Controller praying for permission to institute such suit on the ground of building and re-building and the Rent Controller after giving the tenant an opportunity of being heard can give such permission. 12. In view of the above, there can be no bar for a transferee- owner to issue the notice of ejectment even prior to the expiry of three years which is admittedly a sine qua non to the filing of an ejectment suit under the Act and thereafter immediately after expiry of three years to file a suit for ejectment. If the transferee- landlord has to issue the notice of ejectment only on expiry of three years from the date of the purchase then he cannot exercise his right to file a suit for ejectment immediately on 24 expiry of three years and he has to wait some time more to file a suit for ejectment because a tenant has to give a notice for a period of at least one month with the expiry of the month of tenancy before an ejectment suit under the Act can be filed against the tenant. 13. In view of the above, we are unable to accept the contention of the appellants that both the suits filed by the respondent are hit by sub-section (3A) of section 13. When in this case both the suits have been filed after the expiry of three years from the date of purchase by the plaintiff-respondent, the suits on the ground of reasonable requirement against the appellants are quite maintainable.” .... The aforementioned judgment referred by this Court has been passed in respect of an eviction suit under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The principle remains the same in respect of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, only the period has been changed from three years to one year . As per the 1997 Act there is bar in institution of the suit within one year from the date of acquiring the ownership. 12. Thus all the issues, that is the issue of ownership in respect of the suit property by the landlady, issuance of notice of eviction and there being non-specific denial as regards to reasonable requirement by the landlady and her family, are decided in favour of the landlady/appellant. 25 13. This being the position this Court is of the opinion that the judgment passed by the Ld. First Appellate Court in the Title Appeal requires interference and as such the said impugned judgment is set aside and the present appeal being No. SA 100 of 2019 stands allowed. 14. The respondents/tenants are directed to vacate the suit property and hand over khas possession of the same to the landlady within three months from this date. 15. Parties shall be entitled to act on the basis of the server copy of the judgment and order placed on the official website of the Court. 16. Urgent Xerox certified photo copies of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities. (Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)