1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 247 of 2018 Judgment Reserved on: 8.12.2025 Judgment Delivered on: 31.1.2026 1 - Meghnath Dewangan S/o Late Sadaram Dewangan Aged About 63 Years R/o Bhiragaon, Tehsil And District Narayanpur, Chhattisgarh. ..................Non Applicant No. 2, District : Narayanpur, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Smt. Vimla Komarra W/o Brahmanand Aged About 29 Years R/o Bore Thana Saria, Tahsil- Sarangarh, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Minor Gaurav S/o Brahmanand Aged About 5 Years R/o Bore Thana Saria, Tahsil- Sarangarh, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Minor Aarohi D/o Brahmanand Aged About 2 Years R/o Bore Thana Saria, Tahsil- Sarangarh, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 4 - Hirondi Bai W/o Late Mahaveer Aged About 57 Years R/o Bore Thana Saria, Tahsil- Sarangarh, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. 5 - Sukdas Manikpuri S/o Late Shankardas Manikpuri Aged About 35 Years R/o Bade Donger, District Kondagaon, Chhattisgarh.................. Driver Of Vehicle., District : Kondagaon, Chhattisgarh. 6 - Kartik Das S/o Lokman Aged About 32 Years R/o Village Chimdi , Tehsil And District Kondagaon, Chhattisgarh...............Owners, District : Kondagaon, Chhattisgarh. 7 - Babudas S/o Mandas R/o Village Chimadi, Tehsil And District Kondagaon, Chhattisgarh., District : Kondagaon, Chhattisgarh. 8 - Shivam Tractors Through Branch Manager/ Proprietor, Address Bathena Chowk, Raipur Road, Dhamtari, Tehsil And District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh. Appeal Valued At Rs. 15,45,560/- And Fixed Court Fee Of Rs. 15/- Is Affixed, District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Raza Ali, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : None. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad C A V Judgment 1. The present appeal has been preferred by non-applicant No. 2 assailing the award dated 29.09.2017 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kondagaon, in Claim Case No. 23/2017, whereby, upon due appreciation of the pleadings and evidence on record, the learned Claims Tribunal has fastened the liability upon non-applicant No. 2 to pay the awarded amount of 3 compensation to the claimants, which determination as to liability is the subject matter of challenge in the present proceedings. 2. Brief facts of the case, is that, on 14.08.2016 at around 6:40 PM, when the deceased Brahmanand along with respondent No. 1 was proceeding on a motorcycle near Village Devgann main road, the offending vehicle, namely Mahendra Max bearing registration No. CG-08-5160, driven by Sukdas Manikpuri (respondent No. 5 herein), dashed the motorcycle of the deceased, as a result of which the deceased sustained grievous injuries and succumbed to the same while being taken to the hospital, whereas respondent No. 1/claimant No. 1 suffered minor injuries; accordingly, the claimants, being the legal heirs of the deceased, filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, averring that at the time of the accident the deceased was aged about 30 years, was working as a Nagar Sainik, and was earning Rs.10,000/- per month, and further pleaded that the offending vehicle was not insured on the date of accident, therefore respondent No. 5 (driver) and respondents No. 6 to 8 as well as the appellant herein were impleaded as parties; in response, the appellant/non-applicant No. 2 filed a written statement denying the allegations and specifically contended that about three months prior to the accident, i.e., on 01.06.2016, he had exchanged the offending vehicle at the showroom of respondent No. 8 and had handed over possession of the vehicle, RC book, and duly signed transfer forms (Forms 29 and 30) to respondent No. 6, pursuant to 4 which respondent No. 6, through respondent No. 7, had purchased the vehicle, and thus on the date of accident respondent No. 6 was the owner in exclusive possession and control of the offending vehicle, absolving the appellant of any liability; it was further stated that after the accident all relevant documents were seized from the custody of respondent No. 6, who also submitted an affidavit affirming his ownership and control of the vehicle; respondents No. 5 to 7 jointly filed their written statement alleging that the deceased was bodily infirm, had no proved income, and that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the deceased himself, while also contending that the appellant was the registered owner and therefore liable; respondent No. 8 showroom also denied ownership or possession of the vehicle on the date of accident; upon pleadings, issues were framed and evidence led, and the Trial Court noted that an FIR was registered against respondent No. 5, the offending vehicle and its RC were seized from respondent No. 6, and statements of respondents No. 5 to 7 (Ex. D-1, D-2, and D-3) admitted that respondent No. 6 was the owner and in possession of the vehicle at the relevant time, yet the Trial Court, on the ground of absence of other documentary proof and merely because the appellant’s name continued in the official records, held the appellant liable to pay compensation, which, according to the appellant, is a result of improper appreciation of evidence and erroneous application of law, particularly when respondent No. 6 5 had also filed an affidavit before the Tehsildar asserting his ownership and possession of the offending vehicle and stating that respondent No. 5 was his driver at the time of the incident. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the offending vehicle had been sold by the appellant nearly three months prior to the date of the accident and, therefore, the appellant had neither control nor possession of the said vehicle at the relevant time. He further submits that from the evidence of respondent Nos. 5 to 7, it stands clearly established that the vehicle was in fact owned, possessed, and being operated by respondent No. 6, Sukdhas, on the date of the incident. Despite such categorical evidence on record, the learned Claims Tribunal has committed a manifest error of law in fastening liability upon the appellant solely on the basis that the registration certificate continued to reflect the appellant’s name. The settled position of law, however, is that upon sale of a vehicle, the liability to pay compensation lies upon the person who had actual control and possession of the vehicle at the time of the accident, a crucial legal aspect which has been completely overlooked by the Tribunal while passing the impugned award. He has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Purnya Kala Devi vs. State of Assam & Others reported in (2014) 14 SCC 142. 4. None for respondents though notice has been served. 6 5. I have heard learned counsel of the appellant and perused the material available on record. 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Purnya Kala Devi vs. State of Assam & Another reported in (2014) 14 SCC 142, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “11. The 1939 Act was consolidated and amended by the 1988 Act. Section 2(30) of the 1988 Act defines "owner" to mean as under: “2. (30) owner' means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the sutiject of a hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement;" 12. It is not in dispute that on 14-2-1993, the SDO, Udalguri requisitioned a bus belonging to Md. Abdul Salam under the Assam Act. While under requisition, on 16-2-1993, the bus involved in an accident and killed the husband of the appellant at 10.15 a.m. At that time, the vehicle was not insured. 13. The appellant claimant claimed compensation of Rs 2,00,000 against the owner of the vehicle ie. Md. Abdul Salam as well as the State of Assam, Respondent 1 herein. The registered owner filed the reply contending 7 that Respondent I was liable to pay compensation. The SDO, Udalguri, Respondent 2 herein, filed a written statement before the Tribunal alleging that the vehicle was released on the date of accident at 10.30 am. In this regard, it is useful to refer the stand taken by the Sub- Divisional Officer (SDO) (C), Udalguri on behalf of the State of Assam in the following terms: "The fact of the case is that the vehicle was requisitioned by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) Udalguri on public demand. The vehicle was handed to O/C of Police Udalguri for their duties. As per police report in the absence of driver the handyman of the mini bus drove the bus without any permission from the police and occurred the accident. The vehicle was released on same date at 10.30 a.m. and the accident occurred at 10.30 a.m. 16. Though the above point was pressed into service, the High Court, without adverting to Section 5 of the Assam Act, merely on the basis of the definition of "owner" as contained in Section 2(30) of the 1988 Act, mulcted the award payable by the owner of the vehicle. The High Court failed to appreciate that at the relevant time the offending vehicle was under the requisition of 8 Respondent 1 State of Assam under the provisions of the Assam Act. Therefore, Respondent 1 was squarely covered under the definition of "owner" as contained in Section 2(30) of the 1988 Act. The High Court failed to appreciate the underlying legislative intention in including in the definition of "owner" a person in possession of a vehicle either under an agreement of lease or agreement of hypothecation or under a hire-purchase agreement to the effect that a person in control and possession of the vehicle should be construed as the "owner" and not alone the registered owner. The High Court further failed to appreciate the legislative intention that the registered owner of the vehicle should not be held liable if the vehicle was not in his possession and control. The High Court also failed to appreciate that Section 146 of the 1988 Act requires that no person shall use or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place without an insurance policy meeting the requirements of Chapter XI of the 1988 Act and the State Government has violated the statutory provisions of the 1988 Act. The Tribunal also 9 erred in accepting the allegation of Respondent 2 that the vehicle was released on the date of the accident at 10.30 a.m. and the accident occurred at 10.30 a.m. without any evidence even though in the claim petition, it was stated that the accident had occurred at 10.15 a.m.” 7. Likewise, in the matter of Vaibhav Jain vs. Hindustan Motors Pvt Ltd 1 the said view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding the issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 12. Having noticed the rival submissions, in our view, following issues fall for our consideration: - (i) Whether, as a mere dealer of M/s Hindustan Motors, the appellant could be considered owner of the vehicle and as such liable, jointly and severally with M/s Hindustan Motors, to pay the compensation as directed by the Tribunal/ High Court? (ii) Whether clauses 3 (b) and 4 of the Dealership Agreement absolved M/s Hindustan Motors of its liability to pay compensation as an owner? (iii) Whether M/s Hindustan Motors, even without preferring an appeal against the award of the Tribunal, 1 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2337 10 could question its liability under the award by relying on the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 of the CPC? Issue No.(i) 13. Before we delve into the afore-stated issues, we must have a look at the concept of 'ownership' of a vehicle as obtaining under the M.V. Act for fixing liability in respect of compensation. Section 166 of the M.V. Act enumerates the persons who may file an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal whereas Section 168(1) of the M.V. Act speaks about the award of the Tribunal. Interestingly. Section 166, though specifies the persons who may file an application for compensation, omits to specify person(s) against whom the application is to be filed. However, sub-section (1) of Section 168 by providing that the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident, gives sufficient indication on whom the liability for compensation would fall. 14. In v. Godavari Finance Satyanarayanamma & Ors." a question arose whether a Company Degala financier would be an owner of a motor vehicle within the meaning of Section 2(30) of the M. V. Act, 1988. In that case, the accident took place on 29.5.1995 and. admittedly, the 11 vehicle was not in control of the financier though its name was entered in the registration book of the vehicle. The extract of the registration book, however, revealed that the vehicle was registered in the name of fourth respondent therein (1.e.. not the financier) and that the hire-purchase agreement with the financier had also been cancelled on 10.11.1995. In that context, while holding that financier was not liable, interpreting the definition of 'owner', as provided in Section 2(30), this Court observed: "12. Section 2 of the Act provides for interpretation of various terms enumerated therein. It starts with the phrase unless the context otherwise requires. The definition of owner is a comprehensive one. The interpretation clause itself states that the vehicle which is the subject matter of a hire purchase agreement. the person in possession of vehicle under that agreement shall be the owner. Thus, the name of financier in the registration certificate would not be decisive for determination as to who was the owner of the vehicle. We are not unmindful of the fact that ordinarily the person in whose name the registration certificate stands should be presumed to be the owner, but such a presumption. can be drawn only in the absence of any other material brought on record or unless the context otherwise requires. 13. In case of a motor vehicle which is subjected to a hire purchase agreement, the financier cannot ordinarily be treated to be the owner. The person who is in possession 12 of the vehicle, and not the financier being the owner would be liable to pay damages for the motor accident. 15. An application for payment of compensation is filed before the Tribunal constituted under Section 165 of the Act for adjudicating upon the claim for compensation in respect of accident involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. Use of the motor vehicle is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compensation. Ordinarily if driver of the vehicle would use the same, he remains in possession or control thereof. Owner of the vehicle, although may not have anything to do with the use of vehicle at the time of the accident, actually he may be held to be constructively liable as the employer of the driver. What is, therefore, essential for passing an award is to find out the liabilities of the persons who are involved in the use of the vehicle or the persons who are vicariously liable. The insurance company becomes a necessary party to such claims as in the event the owner of the vehicle is found to be liable, it would have to reimburse the owner in as much as a vehicle is compulsorily insurable so far as the third party is concerned, as contemplated under section 147 thereof. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the possession or control of a vehicle plays a vital role. 15. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (In short RSRTC) (supra), the vehicle along with services of the driver were hired by RSRTC from its registered owner. The issue which arose for consideration by this Court was whether RSRTC, which had htred the vehicle along with services of the driver from the registered 13 owner of the vehicle, could be held vicariously liable for the accident caused by use of that vehicle. Answering the question in the affirmative, this Court, on the principle of vicarious liability of RSRTC for the tort committed by a person under its control and command, held: 17. The general proposition of law and the presumption arising therefrom that an employer, that is the person who has the right to hire and Bre the employee, is generally responsible vicariously for the tort committed by the employee concerned during the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority. is a rebuttable presumption. If the original employer is able to establish that when the servant was lent, the effective control over him was also transferred to the hirer, the original owner can avoid his liability and the temporary employer or the hirer, as the case may be. must be held vicariously liable for the tort committed by the employee concerned in the course of his employment while under the command and control of the hirer notwithstanding the fact that the driver would continue to be on the payroll of the original owner............" 16. In that backdrop, this Court while construing the definition of "owner", as provided in Section 2(19) of the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", held that (a) the definition of "owner" under section 2 (19) of the Act is not exhaustive; (b) it has to be construed in a wider sense based on the acts and circumstances of a given case; and (c) it must include, in a given case, the person who has the actual possession and control of the vehicle and 14 under whose direction and command the driver is obliged to operate the same. It was also observed that to confine the meaning of owner to the registered owner only would not be proper where the vehicle is in the actual possession and control of the hirer at the time of the accident. 17. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepa Devi & Ors, the question was as to who would be liable to pay compensation if the offending vehicle at the time of accident is under requisition for election. claimant's side, by relying on the decision of this Court in From the Guru Govekar v. Filomena F. Lobo, it was argued that regardless of the vehicle being in possession of some other person, the owner would be liable. Negativing this argument, this Court held that when a vehicle is requisitioned for State duty, the owner of the vehicle has no other alternative but to hand over the possession to the statutory authority and, therefore, the case would be distinguishable from the one where the owner gives the vehicle to someone else on his own free will. Holding so, it was observed: "10. While the vehicle remains under requisition, the owner does not exercise any control there over. The driver may still be the employee of the owner of the vehicle but he has to drive it as per the direction of the 15 officer of the State, who is put in charge thereof. Save and except for legal ownership, for all intent and purport, the registered owner of the vehicle loses entire control thereover. He has no say as to whether the vehicle should be driven at a given point of time or not. He cannot ask the driver not to drive a vehicle on a bad road. He or the driver could not possibly say that the vehicle would not be driven in the night. The purpose of requisition is to use the vehicle. For the period the vehicle remains under the control of the State and/or its officers, the owner is only entitled to payment of compensation therefor in terms of the Act. but he cannot exercise any control thereupon. In a situation of this nature, this court must proceed on the presumption that Parliament while enacting the 1988 Act did not envisage such a situation. If in a given situation. the statutory definitions contained in the 1988 Act cannot be given effect to in letter and spirit, the same should be understood from the common sense point of view." 18. While observing as above, this Court noticed that the clause defining "owner" is prefaced with the expression "unless the context otherwise requires and, therefore, in the light of an earlier decision of this Court in Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand Singhvi & Ors.". It was held that where the context makes the definition given in the Interpretation clause inapplicable. the same meaning cannot be assigned. 19. What is clear from the decisions noticed above, is that 'owner' of a vehicle is not limited to the categories 16 specified in Section 2(30) of the M.V. Act. If the context so requires. even a person at whose command or control the vehicle is could be treated as its owner for the purposes of fixing tortious liability for payment of compensation. In this light. we shall now examine whether at the time of accident the vehicle in question was under the command and control of the appellant (1.e., the dealer). 8. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Claims Tribunal has committed a manifest error in fastening the liability upon non- applicant No. 2 merely on the basis that his name continued to appear in the registration certificate, despite there being clear and cogent evidence on record to establish that the offending vehicle had already been sold to respondent No. 6, Kartik Das, much prior to the date of the accident and that the possession and control of the vehicle had also been transferred to him, therefore, the non- mutation of the registration certificate, by itself, cannot be treated as determinative of ownership or liability. 9. Consequently, the appeal filed by non-applicant No. 2 deserves to be and is hereby allowed, and the impugned award, to the extent it fastens liability upon non-applicant No. 2, is set aside. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge 17 The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website Operative Full 8.12.2025 31.1.2026 - 31.1.2026 Raghu Jat