CWP No. 19870 of 2018 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH (231) CWP No. 19870 of 2018 Date of Decision: 03.09.2026 Gurcharan Singh ......Petitioner Versus PEPSU Road Transport Corporation, Depot Sangrur and others .....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Present: Ms. Gurleen Kaur, Advocate for Mr. Simranjeet Singh, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Anil Sharma, Advocate and Ms. Devyani Sharma, Advocate for the respondent Nos.1 to 3. **** KIRTI SINGH , J. (ORAL) 1. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the impugned award dated 29.11.2017 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Patiala, whereby the application filed by the petitioner-workman under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), claiming a sum of Rs 2,76,200/- towards alleged difference of wages, along with interest, came to be dismissed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had initially worked with the respondent-Corporation in the Carpenter trade and his services were subsequently terminated. The dispute regarding his termination culminated in an award dated 01.09.1997 passed by the learned Labour Court, Patiala, whereby the termination was held to be wrongful and the petitioner was directed to be reinstated with continuity of service, though without back wages. It is submitted that, despite the said award, the ITHLESH KUMAR 2026.09.10 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this order/judgment CWP No. 19870 of 2018 -2- petitioner continued to be treated as a daily-wage labourer even though he was performing duties in the Carpenter trade. Reliance is also placed upon the fact that the learned Labour Court, while dealing with the termination dispute, had accepted the petitioner’s case that he had been working as a Carpenter. Learned counsel further submits that, pursuant to the subsequent proceedings concerning regularisation, the petitioner was granted only the minimum pay scale applicable to daily-wage/Class-IV employees, whereas, according to him, he was entitled to the minimum pay scale applicable to a Carpenter. On this basis, the petitioner claimed the difference in wages for the period in question under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It is further submitted that the petitioner had acquired sufficient experience in the Carpenter trade and, therefore, the absence of the prescribed qualification could not, according to him, defeat his claim. Reliance has been placed upon Bhagwati Prashad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation, 1990(1) SCC 361. 3. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 3 submits that the impugned award calls for no interference. It is submitted that the award dated 01.09.1997 did not grant the petitioner any right to regularisation or to the pay scale of a Carpenter; rather, the relief granted therein was confined to reinstatement with continuity of service and specifically without back wages. It is further submitted that, in the subsequent proceedings for regularisation, the petitioner’s case was considered by the Corporation and, vide order dated 19.10.2005, it was specifically found that he did not possess the qualification prescribed for regular appointment to the post of Carpenter. His case was consequently to be considered for a Class-IV post in accordance with the applicable seniority and regularisation policy. ITHLESH KUMAR 2026.09.10 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this order/judgment CWP No. 19870 of 2018 -3- 4. Learned counsel further submits that, pursuant to the directions issued in the proceedings concerning regularisation, the petitioner had already been granted the minimum pay scale applicable to the concerned category, with the benefit of dearness allowance. Since the petitioner’s claim for the Carpenter pay scale was specifically disputed and had never been adjudicated or recognised in his favour, the same could not be converted into an existing monetary entitlement and enforced through proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant material on record. 6. The controversy in the present petition is narrow. The petitioner seeks computation of the alleged difference between the wages/pay scale actually paid to him and the pay scale claimed to be applicable to a Carpenter, for the period mentioned in his application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The question, therefore, is whether, on the date of invocation of Section 33-C(2), the petitioner had an existing, adjudicated or otherwise recognised right to receive the minimum pay scale of a Carpenter, leaving only the computation of the monetary benefit arising therefrom. 7. A perusal of the material on record reveals that the petitioner had earlier raised an industrial dispute challenging the termination of his services. Vide award dated 01.09.1997, the learned Labour Court, Patiala, accepted, on consideration of the evidence, that the petitioner had been working in the Carpenter trade. The Labour Court found the termination to be illegal and directed his reinstatement with continuity of service. However, the petitioner’s representatives did not press the claim for back wages and, accordingly, no back wages were awarded. The said award, therefore, has to ITHLESH KUMAR 2026.09.10 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this order/judgment CWP No. 19870 of 2018 -4- be understood in the context of the relief which was actually granted. It neither directed regularisation of the petitioner against the post of Carpenter nor determined his entitlement to any particular pay scale. The finding that the petitioner had been working in the Carpenter trade, rendered in the context of the dispute concerning termination of his services, cannot by itself be construed as an adjudication of his entitlement to the minimum or regular pay scale prescribed for the post of Carpenter. 8. The subsequent proceedings assume significance in this regard. Vide order dated 19.10.2005, the Corporation considered the petitioner’s case in the context of regularisation. The said order records that, although the petitioner was performing duties in the Carpenter trade, he did not possess the qualification prescribed for the post of Carpenter under the PRTC Conditions of Appointment and Service Regulations, 1981, namely, Matric with ITI in Carpenter Trade. His case was accordingly considered for appointment to a Class-IV post, in accordance with his position in the seniority list and the applicable regularisation policy. The same order also records the decision of the Board of Directors to grant the minimum pay scale applicable to Class-IV employees to similarly situated workers. Thus, the record does disclose recognition of the petitioner’s entitlement to the Class-IV minimum pay scale; however, no order or award placed on record recognises his entitlement to the minimum pay scale of a Carpenter. 9. The distinction between an existing monetary entitlement and a claim which itself requires adjudication is fundamental to the present controversy. Section 33-C(2) of the Act contemplates computation of money or of a benefit capable of being computed in terms of money, where the underlying entitlement already exists. The provision does not confer jurisdiction upon the Labour Court to adjudicate, in the first instance, a ITHLESH KUMAR 2026.09.10 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this order/judgment CWP No. 19870 of 2018 -5- disputed entitlement or to determine the basis on which a workman claims a particular wage or pay scale. The jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) is essentially in the nature of execution of an existing or previously recognised right. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and another, (1995) 1 SCC 235, has held that where the entitlement itself is disputed, proceedings under Section 33-C(2) cannot be invoked for adjudication of such entitlement. The same principle was reiterated in M/s Bombay Chemical Industries v. Deputy Labour Commissioner and another, Civil Appeal No. 813 of 2022, decided on 04.02.2022, wherein it was held that the Labour Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2), cannot adjudicate upon the entitlement or the basis of the workman’s claim where the same has not already been adjudicated or recognised. 10. Tested on the aforesaid principle, the petitioner’s claim for the Carpenter pay scale cannot be regarded as an existing right capable of mere computation. The award dated 01.09.1997 did not grant him the said pay scale. Its operative relief was confined to reinstatement with continuity of service, without back wages. The subsequent order dated 19.10.2005 also did not recognise any entitlement to the Carpenter pay scale. On the contrary, while noticing that the petitioner was performing duties in the Carpenter trade, the Corporation specifically considered his eligibility for regular appointment and recorded that he did not possess the prescribed qualification for the post of Carpenter. His case was instead considered for appointment to a Class-IV post, and the minimum pay scale applicable to Class-IV employees was extended to him. 11. The fact that the petitioner may have continued to perform duties in the Carpenter trade does not, by itself, alter the above position. The ITHLESH KUMAR 2026.09.10 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this order/judgment CWP No. 19870 of 2018 -6- issue whether such performance, experience or otherwise entitles him to the pay scale prescribed for a Carpenter is a substantive question of entitlement. It cannot be converted into a question of mere computation so as to bring it within the limited scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The petitioner’s reliance upon his experience and the judgments dealing with the effect of experience upon prescribed qualifications may have relevance in appropriate proceedings where his substantive entitlement is open to adjudication; however, such considerations cannot enlarge the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 12. In the present case, therefore, the petitioner was required to establish a pre-existing or previously adjudicated/recognised entitlement to the Carpenter pay scale before seeking computation of the alleged difference in wages. No such entitlement is discernible from the award dated 01.09.1997, the order dated 19.10.2005, or any other material placed on record. The respondents had, in fact, specifically disputed such entitlement and had relied upon the aforesaid orders as well as the pay scale actually extended to the petitioner. 13. The learned Industrial Tribunal, therefore, rightly declined to entertain the petitioner’s claim under Section 33-C(2) on the ground that the entitlement to the Carpenter pay scale itself was not a pre-existing or adjudicated right. The finding of the learned Tribunal is borne out from the record and is consistent with the settled legal position governing the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. This Court finds no error in the approach adopted by the learned Tribunal. 14. It is also well settled that, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, this Court does not sit as an appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence or substitute its own view merely ITHLESH KUMAR 2026.09.10 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this order/judgment CWP No. 19870 of 2018 -7- because another view may be possible. Interference is warranted where the finding under challenge is shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, contrary to the record, or suffers from a patent error of law. No such infirmity has been demonstrated in the present case. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also not been able to point out any provision of the award dated 01.09.1997 or any subsequent order whereby an entitlement to the minimum pay scale of a Carpenter was granted or recognised in favour of the petitioner. In the absence of such pre- existing or recognised entitlement, the claim raised by the petitioner necessarily involved determination of a substantive right and, therefore, could not have been adjudicated in proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 16. Consequently, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned award dated 29.11.2017 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Patiala. 17. The present writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. 18. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE September 03, 2026 Ithlesh Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No ITHLESH KUMAR 2026.09.10 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this order/judgment