[1] THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH i) FAO-1165-2018 (O&M) Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. ...Appellant Versus Geeta Devi and others ...Respondents ii) FAO-1174-2018 (O&M) Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. ...Appellant Versus Neelam Kumari and others ...Respondents iii) FAO-82-2019 (O&M) Neelam Kumari and others ...Appellants Versus Shami and others ...Respondents iv) FAO-158-2019 (O&M) Geeta Devi and others ...Appellants Versus Shami and others ...Respondents Reserved on: 17.07.2026 Pronounced on: 23.07.2026 Pronounced fully/opera4ve part: Fully CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued by: Mr. Vinod Chaudhari, Advocate for the appellant (Through VC) in FAO-1165-2018 and FAO-1174-2018. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2] Mr. Arnav Sood, Advocate and Mr. Manpreet Singh, Advocate for the appellants in FAO-82-2019 and FAO-158-2019. Mr. Manpreet Kanda, Advocate and Ms. Pridhi Sandhu, Advocate for the respondents (Through VC) in FAO-1165-2018 and FAO-1174-2018. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. Since all the aforesaid four appeals arise out of two claim pe99ons ins9tuted on account of the same motor vehicular accident involving the same oﬀending vehicle and common ques9ons of fact and law arise for determina9on, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Before adver9ng to the rival submissions, it deserves to be no9ced that although both claim pe99ons arose from one and the same accident, the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Hoshiarpur, instead of deciding them by a common award, chose to pronounce two separate awards on the same day. Such a course was wholly unnecessary. Where claim pe99ons arise out of the same accident and involve iden9cal ques9ons regarding negligence, liability and evidence, judicial discipline requires that they ordinarily be decided together by a common award. Such prac9ce avoids conﬂic9ng ﬁndings, ensures consistency and facilitates eﬀec9ve appellate scru9ny. Nevertheless, since the ﬁndings recorded in both awards are substan9ally iden9cal, both the maBers are being considered together. 3. Two appeals, namely FAO Nos.1174 and 1165 of 2018, have been preferred by the insurer ques9oning the awards dated 09.10.2017 principally on two grounds. Firstly, it seeks reduc9on of the compensa9on awarded by the Tribunal. Secondly, it seeks complete exonera9on from liability on the allega9on that the driver of the oﬀending vehicle was not holding a valid and eﬀec9ve driving licence on the date of accident. The remaining two appeals, namely FAO YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [3] Nos.82 and 158 of 2019, have been ﬁled by the claimants seeking enhancement of the compensa9on awarded by the Tribunal. 4. Both the appeals preferred by the claimants are accompanied by separate applica9ons under Sec9on 5 of the Limita9on Act praying for condona9on of delay of 319 days in ﬁling the appeals. Applicaons for Condonaon of Delay 5. Since the insurer itself has challenged the quantum of compensa9on awarded by the Tribunal and the claimants have sought enhancement thereof, this Court considered it appropriate to hear all the appeal together. Consequently, the applica9ons seeking condona9on of delay are taken up ﬁrst. 6. The explana9on furnished in the applica9ons is undoubtedly sketchy. The applicants have merely pleaded that aFer receiving cer9ﬁed copies of the awards, they entrusted the case papers to a rela9ve, who assured them that appeals would be ﬁled, but subsequently they came to know that no appeals had in fact been ins9tuted. 7. The applica9ons do not disclose the iden9ty of the said rela9ve, the date on which the papers were allegedly handed over or the circumstances in which the applicants ul9mately discovered that the appeals had not been ﬁled. Strictly speaking, the explana9on cannot be said to be wholly sa9sfactory. 8. However, while considering applica9ons under Sec9on 5 of the Limita9on Act in maBers arising out of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Court cannot remain oblivious of the beneﬁcial nature of the legisla9on. Compensa9on awarded under the Act is intended to provide succour to the dependants of deceased vic9ms and not to punish them for procedural lapses. Equally signiﬁcant is the fact that the insurance company itself has ques9oned the correctness of the awards by ﬁling appeals within limita9on, thereby opening YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [4] the en9re issue rela9ng to quantum before this Court. 9. In these peculiar circumstances, refusal to condone the delay would result in an anomalous situa9on, whereby this Court would examine the correctness of the award only at the instance of the insurer, while depriving the claimants of an opportunity to seek just compensa9on. 10. Having regard to the object of the Motor Vehicles Act and in order to enable this Court to determine the just compensa9on payable to the claimants, the delay of 319 days in ﬁling both the appeals by claimants deserve to be condoned. The applica9ons are accordingly allowed. 11. Facts : The facts giving rise to the present li9ga9on are largely undisputed. On the intervening night of 11.01.2015, Rajinder Kumar, Nashatar Singh, Kutubdin, Surat Ali and Altmas Hassan were travelling in bus No. UP-34H- 1000, which was proceeding from Jammu towards Delhi. Rajinder Kumar was stated to be a helper on the bus, whereas Nashatar Singh was pleaded to be an alternate driver. The bus was admiBedly being driven by respondent No.1— Shami. It is the consistent case of the claimants that at about 1.30 a.m., when the bus reached near Harry Garry Palace, Mahilpur, respondent No.1 was driving the vehicle at an excessive speed and in a rash and negligent manner. Despite repeated requests by the occupants to drive cau9ously, he failed to slow down and ul9mately rammed the bus into a trailer bearing registra9on No. PB-07-AC-3386. The impact was so severe that the cabin of the bus was completely crushed. Rajinder Kumar, Nashatar Singh and another occupant became trapped inside the mangled cabin and were extricated only with the assistance of a JCB machine. Nashatar Singh succumbed to the injuries at the spot, whereas Rajinder Kumar, aFer being shiFed to PGIMER, Chandigarh, succumbed to his injuries on 13.01.2015. 12. Separate claim pe99ons under Sec9on 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act were ins9tuted. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [5] 12.1 The ﬁrst pe99on was ﬁled by the widow, three minor children and father of deceased Rajinder Kumar claiming that the deceased was about 34 years of age and earning approximately ₹25,000/- per month as helper on the bus. 12.2 The second pe99on was ins9tuted by the widow, two minor children and mother of deceased Nashatar Singh alleging that he was 40 years of age and was earning about ₹25,000/- per month. 12.3 Compensa9on was claimed jointly and severally from the driver, owner and insurer of the oﬀending bus. 13.1 Despite service, the driver and owner failed to contest the proceedings and were proceeded against ex parte. 13.2 The insurance company alone contested the claim pe99ons. Besides dispu9ng the income and occupa9on of the deceased persons, the insurer pleaded that the driver was not holding a valid and eﬀec9ve driving licence and, therefore, it was either en9tled to complete exonera9on or, in the alterna9ve, recovery rights against the insured. 14. Upon apprecia9on of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned Tribunal returned a categorical ﬁnding that the accident had occurred solely due to the rash and negligent driving of respondent No.1 while driving the oﬀending bus. 15. The ﬁnding regarding negligence has aBained ﬁnality and has rightly not been seriously disputed before this Court. 16. By separate awards dated 09.10.2017, compensa9on of ₹11,08,000/- was awarded in the claim pe99on rela9ng to Rajinder Kumar; whereas compensa9on of ₹10,45,000/- was awarded in the claim pe99on arising out of the death of Nashatar Singh. Although the Tribunal directed the YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [6] insurer to sa9sfy both awards, it granted recovery rights against the owner and driver on the sole premise that they had failed to produce the driving licence. 17. In view of the rival submissions made before this court, the following ques9ons arise for considera9on: (i) Whether the compensa9on awarded by the Tribunal represents "just compensa9on" within the meaning of Sec9on 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act? (ii) Whether the claimants are en9tled to enhancement? (iii) Whether the insurer has succeeded in making out any ground for reduc9on of compensa9on? (iv) Whether the Tribunal was jus9ﬁed in gran9ng recovery rights merely because the driver and owner had chosen not to contest the proceedings? (v) Whether this Court can interfere with the ﬁnding regarding recovery rights in exercise of powers under Order XLI Rule 33 CPC even though neither the owner nor the driver has preferred any appeal? A) Re: Quantum of Compensa4on Death of Nashatar Singh (Subject maer of FAO-82-2019 and FAO-1174-2018) 18. The ﬁrst ques9on relates to the adequacy of compensa9on awarded on account of the death of Nashatar Singh. The learned Tribunal assessed the monthly income of the deceased at ₹7,000/- and consequently his annual income at ₹84,000/-. The deceased was found to be about 40 years of age. The Tribunal, however, omiBed to award any amount towards future prospects. Likewise, compensa9on under the conven9onal heads was not awarded in conformity with the principles subsequently seBled by the Cons9tu9on Bench of the Supreme Court in Naonal Insurance Company Limited versus Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC 680. 19. Learned counsel appearing for the claimants argued that the YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [7] deceased was working as an alternate driver and, therefore, at least the minimum wages payable to a semi-skilled or skilled worker ought to have been adopted while determining his income. 20. The submission does not merit acceptance. Although the pleadings contain an asser9on that the deceased was working as an alternate driver, no documentary evidence whatsoever was produced to establish either his employment or his earnings. No appointment leBer, salary cer9ﬁcate, driving licence or employer's tes9mony was produced before the Tribunal. Even otherwise, there is no material to establish that he was being employed as a regular driver carrying the wages claimed in the pe99on. 21. In the absence of sa9sfactory evidence regarding voca9on or actual income, the Tribunal cannot be faulted for assessing the monthly income no9onally at ₹7,000/-. The said ﬁnding is accordingly aﬃrmed. 22. However, the Tribunal commiBed an error in omiSng to grant future prospects. The Cons9tu9on Bench in Pranay Sethi (supra) has authorita9vely held that where the deceased was below forty years of age and was either self-employed or earning on ﬁxed wages, an addi9on towards future prospects is equally permissible. Since Nashatar Singh was forty years old, an addi9on of 40% to the established income necessarily follows. The annual income of ₹84,000/- thus becomes ₹1,17,600/-. 23. The deceased leF behind his widow, two minor children and his mother, making four dependents in all. Consequently, in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma and others versus Delhi Transport Corporaon and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121, one-fourth of the income is liable to be deducted towards personal and living expenses of the deceased. AFer making this deduc9on, the annual contribu9on to the family works out to ₹88,200/-. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [8] 24. Since the deceased was aged forty years, the mul9plier of 15 has rightly been applied by the Tribunal in accordance with Sarla Verma (supra). The loss of dependency, therefore, comes to ₹88,200 × 15 = ₹13,23,000/-. 25. The Tribunal awarded ₹75,000/- jointly under the head of loss of love and aﬀec9on besides ₹25,000/- towards funeral expenses. The aforesaid approach is contrary to the law declared by the Supreme Court. AFer the judgment in Pranay Sethi (supra) and the subsequent clariﬁca9on in United India Insurance Company Limited versus Sander Kaur, (2021) 11 SCC 780, no independent compensa9on is permissible under the head of "loss of love and aﬀec9on". The conven9onal heads stand exhaus9vely determined by the Cons9tu9on Bench and are no longer open to varia9on except to the extent subsequently revised. 26. Similarly, consor9um is no longer conﬁned merely to the spouse. In Magma General Insurance Company Limited versus Nanu Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130, the Supreme Court recognised spousal consor9um, parental consor9um and ﬁlial consor9um as separate and independent heads of compensa9on. 27. Accordingly, widow is en9tled to spousal consor9um; two minor children are en9tled to parental consor9um; and mother is en9tled to ﬁlial consor9um. Each claimant is thus en9tled to ₹40,000/-. The total amount payable towards consor9um comes to ₹1,60,000/-. 28. Besides this, ₹15,000/- each is payable under the heads of funeral expenses and loss of estate. 29. The compensa9on payable consequently stands reassessed as follows: Par4culars Amount Monthly income ₹7,000/- YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [9] Annual income ₹84,000/- 40% future prospects ₹33,600/- Annual income aFer addi9on ₹1,17,600/- Less 1/4 personal expenses ₹29,400/- Annual dependency ₹88,200/- Total loss - Mul9plier (15) ₹13,23,000/- Consor9um (4 × ₹40,000) ₹1,60,000/- Loss of Estate ₹15,000/- Funeral Expenses ₹15,000/- Total Compensa4on ₹15,13,000/- 30. Since the Tribunal has awarded ₹10,45,000/-, the claimants become en9tled to an enhancement of ₹4,68,000/- together with interest. B) Death of Rajinder Kumar (Subject maer of FAO-158-2019 and FAO-1165- 2018) 31. The next ques9on pertains to the compensa9on awarded on account of the death of Rajinder Kumar. 32. The learned Tribunal assessed the monthly income of the deceased at ₹7,000/-. Signiﬁcantly, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the claimants has fairly not ques9oned the assessment of income before this Court. Likewise, the insurer has also failed to point out any material warran9ng reduc9on of the income so assessed. The said ﬁnding is accordingly aﬃrmed. 33. Rajinder Kumar was found to be 34 years of age. The Tribunal omiBed to grant future prospects despite the law now standing conclusively seBled by the Cons9tu9on Bench in Pranay Sethi (supra). Since the deceased was below forty years of age, 40% deserves to be added towards future prospects. Consequently, the annual income of ₹84,000/- becomes ₹1,17,600/-. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [10] 34. Rajinder Kumar leF behind his widow, three minor children and his aged father. Thus there were ﬁve dependents. Accordingly, deduc9on towards personal expenses is required to be one-fourth in accordance with Sarla Verma (supra). The annual dependency thus comes to be ₹88,200/-. 35. Considering the age of thirty-four years, the appropriate mul9plier is 16. The loss of dependency accordingly works out to be ₹88,200 × 16 = ₹14,11,200/-. 36. Under the conven9onal heads also, the Tribunal has not awarded compensa9on in accordance with the seBled legal principles. The widow is en9tled to spousal consor9um. The three minor children are en9tled to parental consor9um. The aged father is en9tled to ﬁlial consor9um. Accordingly, compensa9on of ₹40,000/- each is payable to all ﬁve claimants aggrega9ng to ₹2,00,000/-. 37. Besides this, ₹15,000/- each is payable under the heads of funeral expenses and loss of estate. 38. The compensa9on is consequently recalculated as under: Par4culars Amount Monthly income ₹7,000/- Annual income ₹84,000/- 40% future prospects ₹33,600/- Annual income aFer addi9on ₹1,17,600/- Less 1/4 personal expenses ₹29,400/- Annual dependency ₹88,200/- Total Loss - Mul9plier (16) ₹14,11,200/- Consor9um (5 × ₹40,000) ₹2,00,000/- Loss of Estate ₹15,000/- YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [11] Funeral Expenses ₹15,000/- Total Compensa4on ₹16,41,200/- The Tribunal has awarded ₹11,08,000/-. The claimants are, therefore, en9tled to an enhancement of ₹5,33,200/- together with interest as awarded by the Tribunal. Re: Appeals Preferred by the Insurance Company 39. The insurer has not been able to point out any legal inﬁrmity in the reassessment made hereinabove. Rather, the recalcula9on undertaken by this Court merely aligns the compensa9on with the binding principles laid down by the Supreme Court. The only correc9on required in the Tribunal's award was the dele9on of the amount awarded under the impermissible head of "loss of love and aﬀec9on" and the subs9tu9on of compensa9on under the legally permissible heads of consor9um, loss of estate and funeral expenses. Consequently, no ground is made out for reduc9on of compensa9on. The insurer's challenge to the quantum of compensa9on is, therefore, liable to be rejected. Re: Recovery Rights Granted to the Insurance Company 40. The ﬁnal issue concerns the challenge laid by the insurer to its liability under the award. The insurance company has contended that it deserves to be completely exonerated from liability as the driver of the oﬀending bus was allegedly not holding a valid and eﬀec9ve driving licence on the date of the accident. In the alterna9ve, it has sought aﬃrma9on of the recovery rights granted by the Tribunal. 41. The submission, in the opinion of this Court, is devoid of any merit. 42. Before examining the evidence, it is necessary to no9ce the seBled legal posi9on governing the defence available to an insurer under Sec9on 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [12] 43. The statutory liability of the insurer to sa9sfy an award passed in favour of third-party vic9ms is founded upon the social welfare object of the legisla9on. The defences available to an insurer are, therefore, limited and must be strictly established. Where the insurer seeks either complete exonera9on or recovery rights on the plea that the oﬀending vehicle was being driven by a person not holding a valid and eﬀec9ve driving licence, the burden squarely lies upon the insurer to prove not only the alleged breach but also that such breach was aBributable to the insured. 44. The law in this regard is no longer res integra. In Naonal Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the defence available under Sec9on 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act is a statutory defence, the burden whereof lies en9rely upon the insurer. The Court further held that mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualiﬁca9on of the driver does not, by itself, absolve the insurer of its liability towards third-party claimants. The insurer must establish not only the breach of the policy condi9on but also that such breach was commiBed by the insured consciously and willfully. Unless the insurer discharges this burden by leading cogent evidence, neither complete exonera9on nor recovery rights can be granted. 45. The same principle has consistently been reiterated in subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. 46. Examining the present case in the light of the aforesaid principles, this Court ﬁnds that the insurance company has miserably failed to discharge the burden cast upon it. A perusal of the record reveals that the insurer neither examined any oﬃcial from the Licensing Authority nor produced any veriﬁca9on report to establish that respondent No.1 was not holding a valid driving licence on the date of the accident. 47. Equally signiﬁcant is the fact that no applica9on was ever moved YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [13] before the Tribunal reques9ng the Court to direct the owner or the driver to produce the original driving licence. The record is also completely silent as regards any no9ce or communica9on having been issued by the insurer calling upon either of them to produce the licence. 48. In the absence of any such evidence, there existed no material before the Tribunal from which it could legi9mately infer that respondent No.1 was not duly licensed. 49. The Tribunal, however, proceeded to grant recovery rights solely on the reasoning that the driver and owner had failed to contest the proceedings and had not produced the driving licence. This reasoning, in the considered opinion of this Court, cannot be legally sustained. 50. The mere fact that the owner and driver chose to remain ex parte does not relieve the insurer of the burden which the statute places upon it. A party cannot succeed merely because the opposite party has abstained from contes9ng the proceedings. Even in ex parte proceedings, the party upon whom the burden of proof lies is required to establish the facts cons9tu9ng its defence by admissible evidence. 51. Failure of the owner or driver to enter appearance cannot, by itself, jus9fy an adverse inference regarding the existence or validity of the driving licence, par9cularly when no direc9on requiring its produc9on had ever been issued by the Tribunal. 52. Acceptance of such a proposi9on would virtually reverse the statutory burden of proof and compel the insured to establish the absence of breach, contrary to the mandate of Sec9on 149(2) of the Act and the law declared by the Supreme Court in Swaran Singh (supra). 53. In the present case, therefore, the ﬁnding recorded by the Tribunal rests en9rely upon presump9on and not upon legal evidence. A judicial ﬁnding YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [14] aﬀec9ng valuable civil rights cannot be founded on conjectures. Recovery rights impose a substan9al ﬁnancial liability upon the owner and driver. Such liability can arise only when the insurer discharges the burden placed upon it by law through clear, cogent and reliable evidence. Since no such evidence exists on the record, the grant of recovery rights is wholly unsustainable. 54. However, ques9on arises that whether this Court can interfere in absence of an appeal by the owner and driver. 55. Learned counsel appearing for the insurance company has contended that even if the Tribunal commiBed an error in gran9ng recovery rights, the said ﬁnding has aBained ﬁnality as neither the owner nor the driver has preferred any appeal or ﬁled cross-objec9ons challenging that part of the award. It is thus argued that this Court ought not to interfere with the said ﬁnding. 56. The submission cannot be accepted. Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers wide and plenary powers upon the appellate Court to pass any decree or make any order which ought to have been passed by the Court below and to mould the relief in such manner as the jus9ce of the case may require. The Rule is an excep9on to the ordinary principle that relief can be granted only to an appellant or a party who has ﬁled cross-objec9ons. The provision is intended to ensure that technicali9es of procedure do not stand in the way of rendering complete jus9ce. 57. The scope of the power under Order XLI Rule 33 CPC was explained by the Cons9tu9on Bench of the Supreme Court in Panna Lal v. State of Bombay and others, AIR 1963 SC 1516, wherein it was held that the Rule was enacted to empower the appellate Court to do complete jus9ce between the par9es and that the absence of an appeal by one of the par9es does not denude the Court of its jurisdic9on to grant appropriate relief where the jus9ce of the case so demands. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [15] 58. Similarly, in Nirmala Bala Ghose v. Balai Chand Ghose, AIR 1965 SC 1874, the Supreme Court observed that the Rule confers a discre9onary jurisdic9on upon the appellate Court to pass such decree as ought to have been passed by the trial Court and that the power is not conﬁned to gran9ng relief only to the appellant. 59. The legal posi9on was further clariﬁed in Banarsi and others v. Ram Phal, (2003) 9 SCC 606, wherein the Supreme Court, while explaining the scope of Order XLI Rule 33 CPC, held that although the power is undoubtedly wide, it is to be exercised with judicial restraint where interference is necessary to avoid inconsistent, inequitable or illegal results and to render complete jus9ce between the par9es. 60. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this Court ﬁnds that the issue regarding liability of the insurer is itself directly before this Court at the instance of the insurance company, which has sought complete exonera9on from the awards. Once the correctness of the Tribunal's ﬁndings regarding liability has been opened for examina9on by the insurer itself, this Court cannot ignore another part of the same ﬁnding merely because it incidentally operates against the owner and driver, who have chosen not to challenge it. 61. The appellate Court cannot be compelled to perpetuate an illegality once it becomes apparent from the record that the ﬁnding of the Tribunal is contrary to the statutory scheme and the binding precedents of the Supreme Court. 62. It also deserves no9ce that the insurance company has suﬀered no prejudice on account of the proposed exercise of jurisdic9on under Order XLI Rule 33 CPC. On the contrary, the insurer itself has invited adjudica9on on the very issue of liability by seeking complete exonera9on from the award. It has been aﬀorded full opportunity to establish the alleged breach of policy YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [16] condi9ons and to jus9fy the recovery rights granted by the Tribunal. 63. Conversely, permiSng the direc9on regarding recovery rights to survive despite the admiBed absence of evidence would amount to aﬃrming an order founded upon legal presump9on rather than proof. Such a course would be wholly inconsistent with the law laid down in Naonal Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297, which unequivocally places the burden of proving breach of policy condi9ons upon the insurer. 64. This Court is, therefore, sa9sﬁed that the present case is a ﬁt one for exercising the extraordinary but salutary jurisdic9on vested in the appellate Court under Order XLI Rule 33 CPC. The Tribunal commiBed a patent error in gran9ng recovery rights merely because the owner and driver remained ex parte and did not produce the driving licence, without there being any evidence whatsoever establishing breach of the insurance policy. Allowing such a ﬁnding to stand would result in manifest injus9ce and would defeat the very object of the appellate jurisdic9on. 65. Accordingly, in exercise of powers under Order XLI Rule 33 CPC, the ﬁnding of the Tribunal gran9ng recovery rights in favour of the insurance company is set aside. The insurance company shall remain jointly and severally liable, along with the driver and owner, to sa9sfy both the awards and shall have no right to recover the compensa9on amount from them. 66. In view of the foregoing discussion, FAO Nos.1174 of 2018, and 1165 of 2018, ﬁled by the insurance company, are dismissed. 67. FAO No.82 of 2019, arising out of the death of Nashatar Singh, is partly allowed. The compensa9on payable to the claimants is enhanced from ₹10,45,000/- to ₹15,13,000/-, resul9ng in an enhancement of ₹4,68,000/-. The enhanced amount shall carry an interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of ﬁling of the pe99on, 9ll its realiza9on. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [17] 68. FAO No.158 of 2019, arising out of the death of Rajinder Kumar, is also partly allowed. The compensa9on is enhanced from ₹11,08,000/- to ₹16,41,200/-, resul9ng in an enhancement of ₹5,33,200/-. The enhanced amount shall carry an interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of ﬁling of the pe99on, 9ll its realiza9on. 69. The enhanced compensa9on shall be appor9oned amongst the claimants in the same propor9on and shall be released in accordance with the terms and condi9ons contained in the respec9ve awards of the Tribunal, unless any modiﬁca9on is found necessary by the Execu9ng Court having regard to the welfare of the minor claimants. 70. The direc9on issued by the Tribunal gran9ng recovery rights in favour of the insurance company is set aside. The insurance company shall sa9sfy the en9re award and shall not be en9tled to recover the amount from the owner or the driver of the oﬀending vehicle. Pending miscellaneous applica9ons, if any, also stand disposed of. A photocopy of this order be placed on the ﬁle of connected cases. 23.07.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether reportable:- Yes/No Uploaded on: 23.07.2026 YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.23 15:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. GEETA DEVI AND ORS

Judgment text