FAO-6506-2018 (O&M) [1] IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH FAO-6506-2018 (O&M) Date of decision: 06.07.2026 Jagbir Singh (deceased) through His LRs ...Appellants Versus Kitabo and others ...Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Present: Mr. Gaurav Singla, Advocate for the appellant. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) The present appeal is directed against the award dated 22.04.2016 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sonipat, whereby compensa9on of ₹2,45,000/- along with interest was awarded in favour of respondent No.1-claimant Smt. Kitabo, on account of the injuries suffered by her in a motor vehicular accident. The liability to sa9sfy the award was fastened jointly and severally upon the driver and owner of the offending vehicle. 2. During the proceedings before the Tribunal, Jagbir Singh, the owner of the offending vehicle, expired and was subs9tuted by his legal representa9ves, who are the present appellants. Since the Tribunal found that the offending vehicle was not covered by any valid insurance policy on the date of the accident, the liability to pay compensa9on was fastened upon the driver and the owner jointly and severally. 3. Aggrieved thereof, the present appeal has been preferred by the legal representa9ves of the deceased owner. The appeal is accompanied by CM-22729-CII-2018 under Sec9on 5 of the Limita9on Act, 1963 seeking condona9on of delay of 646 days in filing the appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the delay was neither inten9onal nor deliberate. It is pleaded that the appellants were not YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.07 14:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document FAO-6506-2018 (O&M) [2] conversant with the legal procedure and that their previous counsel failed to inform them about the award dated 22.04.2016. According to the appellants, they acquired knowledge of the award only in July, 2017, whereaFer they immediately engaged another counsel and ini9ated steps for filing the present appeal. 5. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants. 6. Sec9on 5 of the Limita9on Act undoubtedly confers a discre9onary power upon the Court to condone delay where sufficient cause is shown. At the same 9me, the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be construed so liberally as to render the law of limita9on o9ose. The party seeking condona9on must furnish a bona fide, cogent and sa9sfactory explana9on covering the en9re period of delay. Mere asser9ons unsupported by convincing material do not cons9tute sufficient cause within the meaning of Sec9on 5 of the Act. 7. The explana9on furnished by the appellants does not inspire confidence. The record reveals that aFer the death of Jagbir Singh, all his legal representa9ves were duly impleaded before the Tribunal and were throughout represented by learned counsel. Once a party has entered appearance through counsel, a bald plea that the counsel failed to in9mate the passing of the award cannot, by itself, cons9tute sufficient cause, par9cularly when no material has been placed on record to substan9ate such allega9on. Significantly, even the concerned advocate has neither filed any affidavit admiIng such omission nor has any explana9on been offered as to why the appellants remained completely inac9ve during the pendency of the proceedings. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquision Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, has held that the law of YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.07 14:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document FAO-6506-2018 (O&M) [3] limita9on is founded upon public policy and that delay cannot be condoned merely on sympathe9c grounds. It was observed that where no sufficient cause is shown, the Court has no discre9on to condone the delay. Similarly, in Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) through LRs v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 4 SCC 363, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while a liberal approach may be adopted where sufficient cause is established, such liberality cannot extend to condoning negligence, inac9on or lack of bona fides. The Court further observed that the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. Likewise, in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, it has been categorically held that the law of limita9on has to be applied with all its rigour and the Courts cannot condone delay on equitable considera9ons in the absence of a sa9sfactory explana9on. 9. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the explana9on tendered by the appellants is vague, unsupported by any reliable material and wholly insufficient to explain the inordinate delay of 646 days. The applica9on conspicuously lacks due diligence on the part of the appellants and does not disclose any circumstance beyond their control which prevented them from approaching this Court within the prescribed period of limita9on. 10. Consequently, no sufficient cause is made out for condona9on of delay under Sec9on 5 of the Limita9on Act. The applica9on seeking condona9on of delay is, accordingly, dismissed. 11. As a necessary consequence, the appeal, being barred by limita9on, also stands dismissed. 06.07.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether reportable:- Yes/No YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.07 14:18 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document