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2018 DAILYLAW 3109 (BOM)

THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER MSEDC TD. , KEDGAON DIV. AND ANR v. M/S SHREE SAI SAMARTH DUDH SHITKARAN KENDRA , DAUND

WP/14306/2018 · 2026-06-22

Shri Amit Borkar

body2018

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

24-WP-14306-18-F.doc Sayali IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.14306 OF 2018 The Executive Engineer MSEDC Ltd Kedgaon Division and Others … Petitioners V/s. M/s. Shree Sai Samarth Dudh Shitkaran Kendra … Respondents Mrs. Anjali Baxi, for Petitioners. CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J. DATED : JUNE 22, 2026 P.C.: 1. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 06th February, 2018 passed by the Superintending Engineer, Pune, Regional Electrical Inspection Circle, Pune in Appeal No. 03/2017-2018 and have prayed that the said order be quashed and set aside. The facts which have given rise to the present proceedings are as follows. It appears that on 27th May, 2010, the petitioners had provided an industrial electricity connection to the respondent at its Shitkaran Kendra situated at Betwadi. The electricity supply was sanctioned on the basis that the respondent would use the same for carrying out milk processing activities at the said premises. 1 24-WP-14306-18-F.doc 2. The record shows that on 07th January, 2017, the Flying Squad at Satara carried out an inspection of the respondent’s premises. During the inspection, it was noticed that the electricity connection was being used only for operating a milk collection centre and that no milk processing activity was being undertaken at the site. According to the petitioners, a milk collection centre falls under the LT-II category and is liable to be charged at the commercial tariff as prescribed under the orders issued by MERC. On that basis, a bill dated 11th January, 2018 for an amount of Rs.3,94,410/- was issued to the respondent towards the differential charges for the period from June, 2015 to the year 2017. Being aggrieved by the said demand, the respondent preferred an appeal under Section 127 of the Electricity Act, 2003 before the Appellate Authority on 06th February, 2018. The petitioners thereafter filed their reply on 20th February, 2018 and disputed the allegations as well as the contentions raised by the respondent. After considering the matter, the Appellate Authority passed its order on 18th April, 2018. It is this order which is the subject matter of challenge in the present petition. 3. Mrs. Anjali Baxi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, invited attention to the findings recorded by the Executive Engineer in the order dated 20th February, 2018. She pointed out that the consumer himself had furnished an email address on 16th September, 2017 and the contents of the material produced by him clearly indicated that no milk processing activity was being carried out at the premises. Learned 2 24-WP-14306-18-F.doc counsel further relied upon Commercial Circular No.243 dated 03rd July, 2015. According to her, the said circular provides that the HT-II category applies to all non-residential, non-industrial and commercial establishments. She particularly referred to clause (m) of the circular, which specifically includes milk collection centres within the HT-II commercial category. On the strength of these documents, she submitted that once there was an admission from the consumer himself that no milk processing work was being conducted at the site, the Appellate Authority could not have ignored that material and ought to have treated the electricity supply under the HT-II commercial category. She therefore contended that the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority are contrary to the material available on record. 4. Though the respondent was duly served with notice of the present proceedings, none appeared on his behalf when the matter was taken up for hearing. In these circumstances, the Court proceeds to decide the petition finally on the basis of the material available on record. 5. Hence, upon careful perusal of the material placed on record, this Court finds that the contention raised by the petitioner deserves acceptance. The documents which were produced before the authorities and which are placed before this Court throw light on the nature of the activity carried out at the premises. The order passed by the Executive Engineer and the reply submitted before the Appellate Authority on 20th February, 3 24-WP-14306-18-F.doc 2018 show that the authorities had examined the nature of use of electricity at the relevant time and had taken into consideration the information supplied by the consumer. 6. It is important to note that the email dated 16th September, 2017 was sent on behalf of the consumer. Therefore, the contents of the said communication carry evidentiary value. A reading of the said email shows that the consumer had stated that the activities undertaken at the site were collection of milk from various sources, storage of such milk and thereafter transportation of the same to another place. The description furnished in the email show that any process was being undertaken whereby the milk was being converted or subjected to any industrial operation. The activities mentioned are confined only to receiving the milk, keeping it in storage and sending it further. Such activities may be necessary for the business of milk handling, but it cannot be assumed that milk processing activity is also being carried out. 7. The distinction between collection and processing is required to be kept in mind. Processing involves use of machinery and equipment for carrying out industrial operation upon the product. Mere receipt and storage of milk do not establish that an industrial process is taking place. Therefore, when the consumer has described the activity in a manner which indicates only collection, storage and transport, the authorities were justified in examining whether the electricity connection was being utilized 4 24-WP-14306-18-F.doc for the purpose for which the industrial tariff category had been granted. 8. The respondent had relied upon a video clip to indicate that machinery was available at the premises. The video may show that certain machinery had been installed at the location. However, the mere existence of machinery cannot establish that processing activity was in fact being undertaken during the relevant period. Machinery may remain installed and yet remain unused. What is material is not merely the presence of equipment but the actual nature of operations being carried out. In the present matter, apart from showing installation of machinery, no convincing material has been brought on record to demonstrate that milk processing activity was being conducted during the period for which the differential billing was raised. Therefore, the existence of machinery cannot outweigh the description of activities furnished by the consumer. 9. Viewed from any angle, the material available on record indicates that the predominant activity at the premises was collection of milk, storage and transportation. The record does not establish that milk processing operations were being carried on so as to justify continuation of the industrial category. The findings recorded by the Executive Engineer are therefore supported by the material available on record and cannot be said to be without basis. 5 24-WP-14306-18-F.doc 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner deserves acceptance. The material on record indicates that the premises were being used as a milk collection centre. Therefore, the petitioner was justified in contending that the respondent would fall within the HT-II commercial tariff category and not within the industrial category. 11. As a result, the conclusion reached by the Appellate Authority cannot be sustained. Since the finding regarding industrial use is not supported by the material available on record, the impugned order warrants interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the order treating the supply category as industrial is liable to be set aside. 12. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause ‘b’. 13. The petition accordingly stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. (AMIT BORKAR, J.) 6