JUDGMENT Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. Introduction: 1. A person gets the permissions from the civic authorities to establish an industry. While he is proceeding with his work, the public protest. The civil body turns hostile, and litigation ensues. Despite the pending judicial proceedings, the permits and licences still survive. Yet the public protests seem to continue unabated. Should the pending litigation and the public protests act as an automatic deterrent, preventing the permit holder from proceeding further? The Controversy: 2. The petitioners, the two Someni brothers, obtained a building permit and a development permit to establish an industrial unit--Moonlight Premium Sands (M-Sand manufacturing)--at Navayikulam village. They obtained all the statutory permits and licences: Ext. 2 building permit; Ext. P3 development permit to construct internal roads; Ext. P4 no objection certificate (NOC) from the Fire and Rescue Services; Ext. P5 NOC from the District Medical Officer (Health); Ext. P6 permit from the Factories and Boilers Dept., Kollam; and Ext. P7 'consent to establish' issued by the State Pollution Control Board. 3. While the Somenis, as the Directors of Moonlight Premium Sands Pvt., Ltd., were building their unit, the respondents 3 to 9 with their men trespassed upon the construction site, disrupted the construction, and declared that they would not allow the Somenis to establish any industry there. On the site, they also erected various flags showing affiliation to different political parties. The respondents also said to have threatened the Somenis with violence even at the slightest resistance from them. In this process, the respondents have said to have destroyed the temporary office built on site by the Somenis. 4. Alarmed at the turn of events, the Somenis approached the 2nd respondent-Sub Inspector of Police but received no protection. This is despite the brothers' submitting the Ext. P11 complaint to the police. So the Somenis have approached this Court seeking a mandamus to the SI of Police to take effective steps to restore law and order and to provide "adequate police protection" to them from the respondents 3 to 9 and their men. Submissions: The Petitioners': 5. In the above factual background, Sri T. Krishnanunni, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that the Somenis have all the requisite permissions from the statutory authorities, including the 10th respondent-Grama Panchayat. Illustratively, he stresses on the Ext. P16--the Grama Panchayat Resolution that permits the Somenis to establish their M Sand unit. Submissions: The Petitioners': 5. In the above factual background, Sri T. Krishnanunni, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that the Somenis have all the requisite permissions from the statutory authorities, including the 10th respondent-Grama Panchayat. Illustratively, he stresses on the Ext. P16--the Grama Panchayat Resolution that permits the Somenis to establish their M Sand unit. After taking us through all the permits and licences available on file, the learned Senior Counsel has strenuously contended that the respondents 3 to 9 have no manner of right to take the law into their hands and resort to violent, destructive, and disruptive criminal activities. He has also drawn our attention to Section 4 of the Kerala Police Act, 2011, to stress that the police are duty bound to protect the life, liberty, and property of all persons. 6. As to the further developments after the Somenis obtained the building permission from the Grama Panchayat, the learned Senior Counsel submits that even Ext. R10(s) stop-memo issued by the Grama Panchayat has already been stayed by the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions ("The Tribunal"). According to him, absent any statutory interdiction, the Somenis are free to proceed with their establishing the industrial unit, and the police are bound to protect their legitimate activities in the face of criminal acts--vandalism-- committed by the respondents 3 to 9. The Grama Panchayat's: 7. Sri Biju Balakrishnan, the learned counsel for the Grama Panchayat, has submitted, first, that the Somenis have not obtained a licence under Section 232 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. Second, there have been mass complaints--Ext. R10(k) and Ext. R10(1)--from the public and the representatives of different political parties against the Somenis' establishing their industrial unit. He has also submitted that in terms of clause 7 of Ext. R10(a), the permit issued by the Chief Town Planner, the Panchayat Secretary is duty bound to ensure that the industrial unit functions without disturbing the peace of the nearby residents. 8. Sri Balakrishnan has also drawn our attention to Ext. R10 (m), a resolution passed by the Panchayat Committee proposing to request the statutory authorities concerned to re-consider the NOCs granted by them. He has taken us through Exts. R10(n), (o), (p) and (q) letters the Panchayat said to have been addressed to those statutory authorities. He has also submitted that through Ext. R10 (m), a resolution passed by the Panchayat Committee proposing to request the statutory authorities concerned to re-consider the NOCs granted by them. He has taken us through Exts. R10(n), (o), (p) and (q) letters the Panchayat said to have been addressed to those statutory authorities. He has also submitted that through Ext. R10(r), the Grama Sabha of Ward No. 2, in which the Somenis are establishing their industrial unit, requested the Panchayat to withdraw the permit it had granted earlier. 9. Though Sri Balakrishnan has conceded that the Tribunal has already stayed the Panchayat's stop-memo, he has submitted that certain other persons have already initiated independent legal proceedings before the same Tribunal against the Somenis' establishing the industrial unit. 10. In short, Sri Balakrishnan contends that the entire issue about the Somenis' industrial unit is sub judice before a competent Tribunal, and that at this juncture this Court's granting any protection to the Somenis leads to further legal complications. The Respondents 3 to 9's: 11. Sri M. Sreekumar, the learned counsel for respondents 3 to 6, has contended that the Somenis' establishing the industrial unit in what is said to be a thickly populated area affects the public interest. He has further submitted that, earlier, this Court, through its order dated 03.04.2017, appointed an Advocate-Commissioner, who submitted his Annexure-I report along with photographs. 12. Drawing our attention to the Annexure I report, Sri Sreekumar has contended that even the disinterested Commissioner has concluded in his report that if the Somenis establish the industry, it may lead to seepage of waste water. 13. Sri Sreekumar showed us the photographs attached to the Annexure-1 report to hammer home his contention that the industry will eventually block various waterbodies in the area. In the end, he has also contended that the area in question already faces water scarcity, and the proposed industrial unit, in fact, needs a lot of water--about 1 lakh litres--for its daily consumption. Adopting the Grama Panchayat's submissions, he has also contended that the Somenis have not obtained the permit under Section 233 of the Panchayat Raj Act. Sri C.R. Sivakumar, the learned counsel for the respondents 7 to 9 adopted the above submissions. Reply: 14. In reply, Sri T. Krishnanunni, the learned Senior Counsel, has submitted that the Panchayat's stop-memo has already been stayed by the Tribunal. Sri C.R. Sivakumar, the learned counsel for the respondents 7 to 9 adopted the above submissions. Reply: 14. In reply, Sri T. Krishnanunni, the learned Senior Counsel, has submitted that the Panchayat's stop-memo has already been stayed by the Tribunal. On the proceedings said to have been initiated by a third party before the Tribunal, he has submitted that the Tribunal, so far, has issued no interim direction restraining the Somenis' construction activities, nor has it found fault with the numerous permits and licences they obtained. 15. In short, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that if the statutory permits and licences subsist, the Somenis are entitled to carry on their legitimate activities, and the police are bound to protect their interest if respondents 3 to 9 act illegally. He has put forward the proposition that this Court in a petition for police protection will not go into the disputed questions of fact--especially about the validity or the legality of the licences obtained by the Somenis. To support that contention, he has relied on Karoor Panchayat v. State, 1995 2 KLJ 742 and A.A. Sakeer v. Shinu, an unreported judgment in W.P.(C) No. 27703/2012. 16. Heard Sri T. Krishnanunni, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, Sri P.P. Thajudeen, the learned Senior Government Pleader, Sri Biju Balakrishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the Grama Panchayatt, Sri M. Sreekumar, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 3 to 6 and Sri C.S. Sivakumar, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 7 to 9, besides perusing the record. ISSUES: 17. The petitioners, after obtaining the permits and the licences, begin to establish an industry. Many people around complain to the Grama Panchayat, which then issues a stop-memo to the petitioners. But the petitioners get the stop-memo suspended by the Tribunal. A third party, too, challenges the permits and the licences, but obtains no stay. The residents of the area, nevertheless, obstruct the petitioners' activities. The petitioners want police protection. Now, the issues are these: I. In a petition for police protection, can this Court examine the validity of the licences and the permits the petitioners obtained? II. Can the petitioners' claim police protection despite public protests and pending legal proceedings? Discussion: Issue No. I 18. The Somenis, the directors of Moonlight Premium Sands Pvt. Ltd., obtained the statutory permits and licences to establish an M-Sand unit. The Panchayat permitted them. II. Can the petitioners' claim police protection despite public protests and pending legal proceedings? Discussion: Issue No. I 18. The Somenis, the directors of Moonlight Premium Sands Pvt. Ltd., obtained the statutory permits and licences to establish an M-Sand unit. The Panchayat permitted them. When they proceeded with the work, public protested, and petitioned the Panchayat. Other technicalities apart, the Panchayat was alarmed by the protests: its committees met and they resolved to withdraw the permits the Panchayat had granted. The Panchayat has even requested the other statutory authorities to revoke the NOCs they have granted--all this without notice to the Somenis. True, the Panchayat put the Somenis on notice, eventually. But it was to prevent them from proceeding with the construction--a stop-memo was served. 19. Not in dispute is the fact that the Somenis approached the Tribunal and had the stop-memo stayed. The proceedings are pending. On the other hand, a third-party seems to have questioned the permits and the licences the Somenis got--including those given by the Panchayat. But the Tribunal so far has not interdicted, even as an interim measure, any of those permits or licences. 20. Panchayat took two contentions: (a) that the Somenis have not obtained the Panchayat's permission under Section 232 of the Act; (b) that public have been protesting. 21. True, the Somenis had to get two types of permissions-- one from the Panchayat to develop the factory site and the other from the Secretary to build. Though the Panchayat in its counter affidavit contended that the permission must be obtained under Section 232, (Purpose for which places may not be used without a license. The village Panchayat may notify that no place in the Panchayat area shall be used for any of the purposes specified in the Rules made in this behalf being purposes, which in the opinion of the Government, are likely to be offensive or dangerous to human life or health or property, without a licence issued by the (Secretary) and except in accordance with the conditions specified in such licence.) of the Act, as we see, it ought to be Section 233. In fact, both the learned counsel for the respondents have argued about the mandatory nature of Section 233, and the learned Senior Counsel for the Somenis, too, tried to repel those contentions. 22. In fact, both the learned counsel for the respondents have argued about the mandatory nature of Section 233, and the learned Senior Counsel for the Somenis, too, tried to repel those contentions. 22. Section 233 of the Act deals with the "permission for the construction of factories and the installation of machinery." Without the permission of the village panchayat and except under the conditions specified in that permission, no person can (a) construct or establish any factory, workshop or workplace in which it is proposed to employ steam power, water power or other mechanical power, or electrical power; or (b) install in any premises any machinery or manufacturing plant. The provision provides for an elaborate mechanism and invests the Panchayat--not the Secretary--with the decision-making. In fact, Rule 12 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Issue of Licence to Dangerous and Offensive Trades and Factories) Rules, 1996 ("the D & O Rules) elaborate on the procedural nitty-gritty of Section 233 of the Act. 23. Section 235-F, on the other hand, deals with construction and reconstruction of buildings--building permit to be granted by the Panchayat Secretary. Rule 61 of the Kerala Panchayat Building Rules, 2011, deals with "hazardous occupancy." Under this Rule, too, the Secretary needs to, as does the Panchayat under Rule 12 of the D & O Rules, consult various statutory authorities. 24. To sum up, we may observe that Section 233 of the Act read with Rule 12 of the D & O Rules compels an applicant to get a permit to construct a factory. And Section 235F of the Act read with Rule 61 of the Building Rules deals with the construction or building. The former is purpose-specific, and the latter structure-specific. 25. The Grama Panchayat and the contesting respondents contend that the Somenis do not have the permission under Section 233 of the Act; what they have is a building permit under Section 235F. On the contrary, the Somenis' contend that Ext. P16 is the permission granted by the Panchayat under Section 233, though, as put by the learned Senior Counsel, not happily worded. The arguments and the counter-arguments are galore on this aspect. But we restrain from ruling on this question for the Tribunal has already been seized of the issue. If we adjudicated on it, it would amount to forestalling the decision from a competent judicial forum. 26. The arguments and the counter-arguments are galore on this aspect. But we restrain from ruling on this question for the Tribunal has already been seized of the issue. If we adjudicated on it, it would amount to forestalling the decision from a competent judicial forum. 26. In the alternative, let us visualize a situation in which the issue has not been seized of by any other judicial forum but is raised as a defense against police protection. This Court, even under its summary, extraordinary jurisdiction, can visit the issue. First, the public-law remedy under Article 226 is not only discretionary but also equitable. The Court can serve the ends of justice only if it ensures that no person guilty of breaching a statutory mandate gets the benefit, despite the breach. The Constitutional Court will not open and shut a case only on the issues raised by the suitor. Indeed, the very concept of dominus litis is alien to the public law remedy. 27. So, we answer the issue No. I--Can this Court examine the validity of the licences and the permits the petitioners obtained?--in the affirmative. But on facts, this Court refrains from examining the issue, guided by the principle of equitable abstention, (Equitable abstention: A federal court's refraining from interfering with a state administrative agency's decision on a local matter when the aggrieved party has adequate relief in the state courts (Black's Law Dictionary). Issue No. II: Can the petitioners' claim police protection despite public protests and pending legal proceedings? 28. The protest is free speech in motion. It is like a stream by the road, but not on the road. The road is the rule of law, and the stream the societal reservation embanking that road. The stream serves its purpose--draining out the road of the excessive legislative zeal--so long as it does not erode the very road. Indian Constitution provides a place of primacy and pride to a citizen's right to express himself freely (Art. 19(1)(a)) and to assemble peaceably (Art. 19(1)(b)), both of which combine in public protest. But nothing comes without a price tag, not even our fundamental freedoms. That price tag is prominent in Article 19(2) to (6) of the Constitution. 29. True, free speech and peaceful protest on matters of public concern are core constitutional virtues unless they descend into vituperation and violence. But nothing comes without a price tag, not even our fundamental freedoms. That price tag is prominent in Article 19(2) to (6) of the Constitution. 29. True, free speech and peaceful protest on matters of public concern are core constitutional virtues unless they descend into vituperation and violence. We may add that "speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government".(Garrison v. Lousiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)) The Constitutional Courts have repeatedly stressed the primacy of the fundamental freedoms. They have underlined the need for "free and robust debate of public issues," too. 30. This writ petition involving a Grama Panchayat presents us with a feeling of déjà vu: that this Court has repeatedly faced the same legal issues and repeatedly ruled on them: the rule of law is paramount and public protests--their efficacy as a democratic measure apart--do not deter the officials from being loyal to the legislative mandate. In Southern Granite Industries v. Pallichal Grama Panchayat, 2016 (1) KHC 207, one of us (Dama Seshadri Naidu, J) considered almost an identical issue: the officials negating the statutory, and even judicial, mandate in the name of public protests. 31. Southern Granite has prefaced its discussion on public protests with an observation that this Court has noticed in numerous writ petitions a common theme running through: the Local Self Governments are unable to discharge their statutory functions, despite the applicants' eligibility to obtain, as in that case, licences, solely on the ground that there have been public protests about the issues. Then, it acknowledges that peaceful protest is a constitutionally consecrated right under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. At any rate, it is a measure to bring to the notice of the executive the shortcomings in their administration or concerning any policy prerogatives that may have been affecting the public at large. As public protests are the order of the day-- exerting, sometimes justifiably and some other times not so justifiably--enormous pressure on the public functionaries, especially at the local government level, it is apposite to dwell on the issue with some detail. 32. The protest is a symbol of strident and vibrant democracy. It is thinking out loud in a democratic discourse--a discourse nevertheless. 32. The protest is a symbol of strident and vibrant democracy. It is thinking out loud in a democratic discourse--a discourse nevertheless. Public protest is a quasi-legal mechanism at the hands of the general populace for a policy change or even its nullification, but not statutory annihilation; whereas electoral exercising franchise is the very legal mechanism for the same purpose. Thus, the general elections being a constitutional and statutory protest against or affirmation of the executive and legislative policies, public protests, on the other hand, are the intermittent instances of 'thinking-aloud' between. The core constitutional principle of a Republic is that a democratic government, paradoxical as it sounds, is a government of laws, not of men of the majority. In Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803), Chief Justice Marshall has, in unmistakable terms, echoed the words of John Adams that the Government of United States is a government of laws and not of men. It rings true of any other democratic republic, not only the U.S. 33. Erick J. Haynie in 'Populism, Free Speech, and the Rule of Law: The Fully Informed Jury Movement and its Implications', 88 J. Crim. L & Criminology 343 (Fall 1997) has said that under the rule of law, citizen behavior is regulated not according to the passions and prejudices of human beings, but according to objective, published laws formally sanctioned by elected representatives through a pre-ordained process. But this Court is of the view that there is no denying that populism vis-à-vis. democracy is a highly contested concept, for democracy has the popular mandate as its base and the rule of law as its crown--a seeming contradiction, though. We may note that a popular protest is, perhaps, a symptom of policy discontent, but not at all a remedy in itself. 34. Dissent is the keystone of the democratic edifice, but it must be in conformity with the very fabric of the edifice--the rule of law. Dissent thus being the legitimate stuff of democracy, its course altering potential is undeniable. Democracy is a cauldron of conflicting political ideologies and policy preferences; the churning must go on, but only in an orderly manner--an oxymoron. And it may be to sub-serve the common good. 35. Indeed, the venerable principle that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty is the constant refrain of any democratic polity. Democracy is a cauldron of conflicting political ideologies and policy preferences; the churning must go on, but only in an orderly manner--an oxymoron. And it may be to sub-serve the common good. 35. Indeed, the venerable principle that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty is the constant refrain of any democratic polity. There is, however, a cause for caution and concern that with dissent sans conformity, a democratic society descends into anarchy; but when regulated, it leads to progress. It is, in essence, a vice rather than a virtue to substitute public opinion for law, which in itself is the sanctified popular will. The line is thin. We may recollect the most felicitous words of Abraham Lincoln about the constant conflict between the law and public protests, (The Oxford Dictionary of American Legal Quotations, 1993 Edn, Pg. 320) : "Let me not be understood as saying there are no bad laws, nor that grievances may not arise, for the redress of which, no legal provisions have been made. I mean to say no such thing. But I do mean to say, that, although, bad laws, if they exist, should be repealed as soon as possible, still while they continue in force, for the sake of example, they should be religiously observed." 36. Exercising one's franchise in a general election is a wholesale political action, whereas intermittent protests are the preludes to the eventual wholesale action. Thus the protests on a smaller scale involving people of particular areas, a la voting with feet, are usually confined to parochial pockets concerning the commonplace issues. They are essentially aimed at achieving immediate objectives of transitory nature, mostly. Essential as they are, they can never transcend the law, though. The danger is this: unregulated, the dissent takes different forms; it may transform itself into vigilantism. Vigilantism finds justification in forms as varied as launching peaceful protests to lynching people. For historic reasons the American Constitution has recognised vigilantism (right to bear arms, for example), but Indian Constitution has not. 37. The danger is this: unregulated, the dissent takes different forms; it may transform itself into vigilantism. Vigilantism finds justification in forms as varied as launching peaceful protests to lynching people. For historic reasons the American Constitution has recognised vigilantism (right to bear arms, for example), but Indian Constitution has not. 37. In Beenu Rawat v. Union of India, (2013) 16 SCC 430 , the Supreme Court has sounded a word of caution: that nobody can be permitted to paralyse the functioning of police or other State institutions in the name of public protest cannot be rejected off hand because it is only a corollary to the right to protest peacefully; proverbially, the other side of the coin which corroborates the well-accepted principle is that rights without duties tend to degenerate into licence for misuse of rights. 38. In Ramlila Maidan Incident (2012) 5 SCC 1 , para 44, In re, the Supreme Court has observed that the distinction between "public order" and "law and order" is fine but clear. A restriction imposed by "law and order" in mind would be least intruding upon the guaranteed freedom, while "public order" may qualify for more restriction since the public order is a matter of even greater social concern. 39. Indeed, exalted is the right to protest, as has been consecrated under Article 19(1)(a) & (b) of the Constitution, albeit subject to the restrictions under Article 19(2). But the State is equally under an obligation to preserve the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives, and the property of its people. So long as the democracy does not descend into mobocracy, the protest is paramount as a method of democratic discourse and also as a mode of dissemination of information. It is, to repeat, at best a method to exert pressure on the legislature or the executive to change or fine-tune its legislative or administrative policies, as the case may be. 40. But it must be clarified that however justified an instance of protest is, it cannot hold the rule of law for ransom and negate the statutory mandate. Thus, the officials can hardly be heard saying that they could not discharge their statutory duties on a mere premise that there have been protests; nor can they justify their action at odds with the rule of law in the name of public protest or unrest. 41. Thus, the officials can hardly be heard saying that they could not discharge their statutory duties on a mere premise that there have been protests; nor can they justify their action at odds with the rule of law in the name of public protest or unrest. 41. In short, we may hold that the officials cannot abdicate their administrative responsibility on the premise there have been public protests. Nor can they alter their course of action with that singular excuse. Sometimes the administrative exigencies make the officials hurry through the procedural rigmarole; in that process, they may make mistakes--at times costly ones, affecting the environment, public safety, to name two hazards. They are not remediless, however. The officials can, with hindsight, realise the mistakes and rectify them, too. But the prerequisite for taking the corrective measures is the due process of law. 42. In the alternative, let us assume that the officials have inadvertently made a mistake in granting the permits or licences. They may have realised it in the wake of public protests. Still, knee-jerk reactions and cosmetic cover-ups are no answer. They can always put the aggrieved party on notice and remedy the situation, of course, well-within the statutory parameters. In this process, a person may knock the doors of courts, which may, then, dictate the course of action--in the interest of justice. CONCLUSION: 43. Veering back to the facts, we may observe that the role of the Secretary or the Grama Panchayat itself comes into play in terms of clause 7 of Ext. R10(a), the permit issued by the Chief Town Planner, only when the industry starts functioning. For the condition is that the Panchayat Secretary should ensure that the industrial unit functions without disturbing the peace of the nearby residents. 44. The advocate-commissioner, true, has concluded in his report that if the Somenis establish the industry, it may lead to seepage of waste water. He has also offered a solution: the seepage of the waste water can be effectively prevented if the industrial unit re-uses "the water in the unit itself by appropriate mechanism or device". The identified problem is pertinent, but the suggested solution is gratuitous. It is for the experts, say Pollution Control Board, to examine this issue. The contesting respondents can always approach--as they already said to have done--any authority complaining of any hazards posed by the industry. 45. The identified problem is pertinent, but the suggested solution is gratuitous. It is for the experts, say Pollution Control Board, to examine this issue. The contesting respondents can always approach--as they already said to have done--any authority complaining of any hazards posed by the industry. 45. To conclude, we observe that the stop-memo issued by the Panchayat stands stayed by the Tribunal, and the proceedings initiated against the Somenis by a third party have so far not borne any fruit. The upshot is that the permits and the licences are still in force. If a person desires to act on subsisting statutory permits, it is undesirable to prevent him merely because somebody else objects to it. The objection must be legally vindicated. Nor can we persuade ourselves that the pending judicial proceedings should automatically nullify the duly passed orders. If the Somenis proceed lis pendens, they do so at their own risk, for all their acts will be subject to the outcome of the judicial proceedings. 46. The police, we must observe, may not have much of a role to play in a dispute of this nature: somebody trying to establish an industry, and somebody else trying to scuttle it. But, all is said and done, the police's primary concern is law and order. And if it is threatened, they act--complaint or no complaint. 47. So we hold that if the petitioners are anybody else complain to the police of breach of peace or potential for violence, they will act promptly, in accordance with law. Thus, we dispose of this writ petition. No order on costs.