Page No.1 of 11 IN CRA-114-2017 CGHC010023562017 2026:CGHC:28666-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 114 of 2017 [Airing out of judgment dated 18.01.2017, passed in Sessions Trial No.18/2016, passed by the Sessions Judge, Surguja, Ambikapur (CG)] Chandan Singh, S/o Sundar Sai Gond, aged about 33 years Occupation Agriculture, R/o Village Ghatbarra, Police Station Udaypur, District Surguja (Chhattisgarh) ... Appellant (On Bail) Versus State of Chhattisgarh, through Station House Officer, Police of Police Station Udaypur, District Surguja Ambikapur (Chhattisgarh) ... Respondent [Cause-title taken from Case Information System (CIS)] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellant : Mr. Amarnath Pandey, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Amit Buxy, Deputy Government Adv. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Division Bench Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal, and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal Judgment on Board (09.07.2026) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J (1) Invoking criminal appellate jurisdiction of this Court, the sole appellant herein has preferred this criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C., calling in question the legality, validity and SAIFAN KHAN Digitally signed by SAIFAN KHAN Page No.2 of 11 IN CRA-114-2017 correctness of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.01.2017, passed in Sessions Trial No.18/2016, passed by the Sessions Judge, Surguja, Ambikapur (CG), whereby he has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.2,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 06 months. (2) The case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 22.09.2015, at Village Ghatbarra, which comes within the ambit of Police Station Udaypur, District Surguja (CG), the accused-appellant committed murder of Balinder Singh (hereinafter referred to as the “deceased”) by causing him injuries by means of axe and, thereby, said to have committed the aforesaid offence. (3) It is further case of the prosecution that when the matter was reported to the police by son of the deceased, namely, Ratiram (PW- 03), merg intimation (Ex.P/04) and FIR (Ex.P/05) were registered and wheels of investigation started running, in which, summons under Section 175 of CrPC were sent vide Ex.P/06 and inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P/07. Nazari Naksha was also prepared vide Ex.P/01. The dead-body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted by Dr. GL Miri (PW- 02) and, as per PM report (Ex.P/02), cause of death of the deceased is shock due to excessive internal and external hemorrhage and nature Page No.3 of 11 IN CRA-114-2017 of death is homicidal. The appellant-accused was arrested vide Ex.P/13 and his memorandum statement was recorded vide Ex.P/11. Pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant, axe was seized vide Ex.P/12. Thereafter, the seized articles were sent for chemical examination and as per FSL report (Ex.P/24) it has been opined that stains of blood were found on the said axe. After statements of witnesses were recorded and due investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against the appellant in the competent criminal court having jurisdiction and, thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which the appellant/accused abjured his guilt and entered into defence by stating that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. (4) The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 12 witnesses and exhibited 26 documents, whereas the appellant- accused in support of his defence though not examined any witness but exhibited 04 document. (5) The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, proceeded to convict the appellant for offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced him as mentioned herein-above, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. Page No.4 of 11 IN CRA-114-2017 (6) Mr. Amarnath Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court is unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 of IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The sole eye-witness in the present case, namely, Jagarnath (PW-07) has not suported the case of the prosecution and turned hostile. As such, there is no direct evidence available against the appellant and case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence. The circumstances relied upon by the learned trial Court in Para-17 of the impugned judgment are based on surmises and conjunctures and there is no material available on record to connect the appellant herein with the aforesaid offences. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed and the appellant is liable to be acquitted of the said charges on the basis of benefit of doubt. (7) Per-contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. In view of the statements of prosecution witnesses coupled with other material available on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence under Sections Section 302 of IPC. Thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. (8) We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their Page No.5 of 11 IN CRA-114-2017 rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. (9) The first and foremost question is as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative by taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/02), wherein it has been opined that cause of death of the deceased is shock due to excessive internal and external hemorrhage and nature of death is homicidal, which is duly proved by the statement of Dr. GL Miri (PW-02). Accordingly, taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/02) and the statement of Dr. GL Miri (PW-02), who has conducted the postmortem of the dead-body of the deceased, we are of the considered opinion that the death of the deceased is homicidal in nature, as the same is correct finding of fact based on evidence and same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. We hereby affirm the said finding. (10) Now, the next question for consideration would be whether the appellant herein is the author of the crime or not, which the learned trial Court has answered in affirmative by relying upon following incriminating circumstances as culled out in Para-17 of the impugned judgment and same reads as under: “ए- घटना के एके दि ना पहले मृतके बलिलेन् र के पत मृनामृहना लिह द्वार शाकेय Page No.6 of 11 IN CRA-114-2017 भूदिमृ मृ उनाके द्वार पर्व!  बनाय गय खेत के जु%तई केरना पर आरप( उ, उ खेत मृ जुना पर बके मृरना के धमृके दि य था तथा हत्य के एके दि ना पहले आरप( ना खेत के जु%तई के दिर्वर्व पर  बलिलेन् र लिह के भू( जुना  मृरना के धमृके दि य था । ब(- घटना दि नाके-22/09/2015 के %बह लेगभूग 09.00 बजु बलिलेन् र लिह जुब अपना खेत गय था तब इके के% छ र ब आरप( के भू( अपना( मृटरयकेले मृ उधर जुत खे गय था। (- बलिलेन् र लिह के हत्य के ब घटनास्थाले के प आरप( के मृटरयकेले दिमृले( था( लेदिकेना आरप( र्वह नाह1 था । डी(- घटना के दि ना आरप( रदि3 लेगभूग 08.00 बजु ग्रामृ हरिरहरप%र मृ रहना र्वले( अपना( बड़ी( मृ श्री(मृत( फु% लेबलिय के घर गय था दिके त% उके ब9ठना र्व खेना के लिलेय केहना पर भू( ना त र्वह ब9ठ और ना ह( खेना खेय और केह जु रह ह केहकेर पछना पर भू( र्वह दिबना के% छ बतय र्वह  चले गय। ई- आरप( के दिनाशाना ह( पर उके बड़ी( मृ फु% लेबलिय के घर के प(छ बड़ी(  टग( जुब्त के गई तथा उमृ रक्त हना पय गय ह9।” (11) Before proceedings further, since the present case is based on circumstantial evidence, it is profitable here to note following five golden principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra 1 which constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence and same read as under: “153. …. (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a 1 (1984) 4 SCC 116 Page No.7 of 11 IN CRA-114-2017 legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made: "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” (12) We shall now consider the incriminating circumstances mentioned herein-above in light of the above-quoted principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as also in light of the evidence available on record, in order to ascertain whether the appellant herein has rightly be held guilty for offence in question by the learned trial Court or not. Incriminating Circumstance-(A): Page No.8 of 11 IN CRA-114-2017 (13) So far as incriminating circumstances-A is concerned, it is the case of the prosecution that the appellant threatened the grandson of the deceased, namely, Manmohan Singh (PW-08) and other family members with regard to plowing the fields. However, with regard to threatening, Manmohan Singh (PW-08) did not lodge any FIR till the date of incident and, therefore, the aforesaid version of Manmohan Singh (PW-08) cannot be accepted to hold the appellant guilty of the offence in question. We hereby hold accordingly. Incriminating Circumstance-(B): (14) So far as this incriminating circumstance is concerned, it is the case of the prosecution that on the date of incident at about 09:00 AM, the deceased visited his fields and, after some time, the appellant was also seen going there. However, in this regard, eye- witness, namely, Jagarnath (PW-07) has not supported the case of the prosecution and completely turned hostile and, even, the learned trial Court did not accept this witness as eye-witness to the incident rather accepted it as a fabricated witness. As such, this incriminating circumstance is also not at all found established. We hereby hold accordingly. Incriminating Circumstance-(C): (15) The next incriminating circumstance that has been relied upon by the learned trial Court is that the motor-cycle of the appellant Page No.9 of 11 IN CRA-114-2017 was also found at the place of occurrence, but the appellant was not present there. However, in the opinion of this Court, this incriminating circumstance is also not found proved for the reason that as per document (Ex.P/09) it is clear that the motor-cycle, which was found on the place of incident, having Chechis No.MBZHA10BLEGGM00952 & Engine No.MF2597CMCBC, whereas as per documents (Ex.P/18 & Article-A & B) the motor-cycle, which is owned by the appellant, is having Chechis No.MBLHA10BLEGM00952 & Engine No.HA10ETE4M13321 i.e. the motor-cycle which is found from the place of incident is different from the motor-cycle owned by the appellant herein. As such, the recovery aforesaid is of no help to the prosecution. We hereby hold accordingly. Incriminating Circumstance-(D): (16) In this incriminating circumstance it has been stated that on the date of incident, in the night, the appellant visited the house of his aunt, namely, Smt. Phoolbasia (PW-06) at Village Hariharpur, however, upon being asked to sit and have food, he refused and left the house without informing as to where he is going. However, by no stretch of imagination, this incriminating circumstance in anyway connect the appellant with the offence in question. Neither Smt. Phoolbasia (PW-06) has stated anything with regard to the incident in question nor she informed that the appellant has given any extra- Page No.10 of 11 IN CRA-114-2017 judicial confession to her with regard to the offence. Therefore, this incriminating circumstance is of no help to the prosecution. We hereby hold accordingly. Incriminating Circumstance-(E): (17) Now, the next piece of evidence that has been relied upon by the learned trial Court is that pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant recorded vide Ex.P/11, axe has been seized vide Ex.P/12, in which, as per FSL report (Ex.P/24), stains of blood were found. However, the Supreme Court in the matter of Raja Nayka v. State of Chhattisgarh 2 by relying upon its earlier decision rendered in the matter of Mustkeen @ Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan 3 has held that sole circumstance of recovery of blood- stained article cannot form the basis of conviction unless the same is corroborated with other piece of incriminating circumstances. Consequently, the recovery of aforesaid article is also of no help to the prosecution. We hereby hold accordingly. (18) In view of foregoing analysis, we are unable to hold that the prosecution has been able to prove the five golden principles to constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), in absence of which, the learned 2 2024 SCC Online SC 67 3 (2011) 11 SCC 724 Page No.11 of 11 IN CRA-114-2017 trial Court is unjustified in convicting the appellant for offences under Sections 302 of IPC being the author of the crime in question in light of the incriminating circumstances culled out in the impugned judgment and same are liable to be set aside. (19) Accordingly, we hereby set aside the conviction so recorded and the sentence so awarded by the trial Court to the appellant vide the impugned judgment dated 18.01.2017. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the IPC on the basis of benefit of doubt. The appellant is reported to be on bail, therefore, he need not to surrender. However, his bail bond shall remain in force for a further period of six months in view of the provision contained in Section 437-A of the CrPC. (20) This criminal appeal is allowed. (21) Let a certified copy of this judgment alongwith the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and action, if any. Sd/- sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge Judge s@if