Page No.1 of 10 IN CRA-1344-2017 2026:CGHC:23651-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Criminal Appeal No. 1344 of 2017 [Arising out of judgment dated 28.09.20216, passed in Session Trial No.107/2014 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Shyam Sunder Baghel) by the 2nd Addl. Sessions Judge, South Bastar, Dantewada (CG)] Shyam Sunder Baghel @ Kirka S/o Mata Baghel, Aged About 47 Years R/o Village Kuakonda, Garpadarpara, Police Station Kuakonda, District Dantewada, (Chhattisgarh) ... Appellant Versus State of Chhattisgarh, through Station House Office, Police Station Kuakonda, District South Bastar Dantewada, (Chhattisgarh) ... Respondent [Cause-title taken from Case Information System (CIS)] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellant : Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, Advocate/Amicus Curiae For Respondent : Mr. Amit Buxy, Dy. Govt. Advocate ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Division Bench Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and Hon'ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board (15.06.2026) Per: Ramesh Sinha, CJ (1) Invoking criminal appellate jurisdiction of this Court, the sole appellant herein has preferred this criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C., calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated SAIFAN KHAN Digitally signed by SAIFAN KHAN Page No.2 of 10 IN CRA-1344-2017 28.09.20216, passed in Session Trial No.107/2014 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Shyam Sunder Baghel) by the 2nd Addl. Sessions Judge, South Bastar, Dantewada (CG), whereby he has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.100/-. (2) The case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 17.05.2014, in the night at about 11:30, at Village Kuakonda, Garpadarpara, which comes within the ambit of Police Station Kuakonda, District Dantewada, the accused-appellant herein with the intent to kill Mehtar Baghel (hereinafter referred to as the “deceased”) assaulted him by means of knife, due to which, he suffered grievous injuries and died and, thereby, said to have committed the aforesaid offence. (3) It is further case of the prosecution that when father of the deceased, namely, Lakhmu (PW-01) reported the matter to the police, FIR (Ex.D/01) was registered and wheels of investigation started running, in which, summons under Section 175 of CrPC were sent vide Ex.P/05 and inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P/06. Panchnamas’ were also prepared vide Ex.P/11 & Ex.P/12. The dead- body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted by Dr. Vijay Karma (PW-05) and, as per PM report (Ex.P/02), cause of death of the deceased is hemorrhagic shock due to excessive bleeding from the light lung and nature of death is homicidal. The appellant-accused was arrested and his memorandum statement was recorded vide Ex.P/07. Pursuant to the memorandum statement of the Page No.3 of 10 IN CRA-1344-2017 appellant, weapon of the offence i.e. knife and his clothes (lungi) have been seized vide Ex.P/08. The seized articles were sent for chemical examination and, in FSL report (Ex.P/01), it has been opined that no stains of blood were found either on the knife axe or on the clothes (lungi) seized pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant. After statements of witnesses were recorded and due investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against the appellant in the competent criminal court having jurisdiction and, thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which the appellant/accused abjured his guilt and entered into defence by stating that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. (4) The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 08 witnesses and exhibited 12 documents, whereas the appellant- accused in support of his defence, though not examined any witness, but exhibited 02 documents. (5) The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, proceeded to convict the appellant for offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced him as mentioned herein-above, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. (6) Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court is unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 of IPC, as the prosecution Page No.4 of 10 IN CRA-1344-2017 has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. There is no direct evidence available against the appellant and case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence. The circumstances relied upon by the learned trial Court in the impugned judgment are based on surmises and conjunctures and there is no material available on record to connect the appellant herein with the aforesaid offences. He vehemently argued that the circumstances, as projected by the prosecution and relied upon by the learned trial Court to base the conviction of the appellant herein, are weak pieces of evidence. Firstly, the learned trial Court has relied upon the evidence in the nature of recovery of knife pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant, but the FSL report is negative to that extent and, therefore, the same cannot be relied upon. Secondly, the learned trial Court has relied upon the motive of the offence, as the appellant and the deceased were having previous enmity with regard to a land dispute, which is also a weak piece of evidence in absence of any corroboration. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed and the appellant is liable to be acquitted of the said charges on the basis of benefit of doubt. (7) Per-contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. In view of the statements of prosecution witnesses coupled with other material available on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence Page No.5 of 10 IN CRA-1344-2017 under Sections Section 302 of IPC. Thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. (8) We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. (9) The first and foremost question is as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative by taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/02), wherein it has been opined that cause of death of deceased is hemorrhagic shock due to excessive bleeding from the light lung and nature of death is homicidal, which is duly proved by the statement of Dr. Vijay Karma (PW-05). Accordingly, taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/02) and the statement of Dr. Vijay Karma (PW-05), who has conducted the postmortem of the dead- body of the deceased, we are of the considered opinion that the death of the deceased is homicidal in nature, as the same is correct finding of fact based on evidence and same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. We hereby affirm the said finding. (10) Now, the next question for consideration would be whether the appellant herein is the author of the crime or not ? (11) Before proceedings further, since the present case is based on circumstantial evidence, it is profitable here to note following five golden principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Page No.6 of 10 IN CRA-1344-2017 matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra 1 which constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence and same read as under: “153. …. (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made: "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” (12) We shall now consider the incriminating circumstances mentioned hereinabove in light of the above-quoted principles of law laid down by 1 (1984) 4 SCC 116 Page No.7 of 10 IN CRA-1344-2017 their Lordships of the Supreme Court as also in light of the evidence available on record, in order to ascertain whether the appellant herein has rightly be held guilty for offence in question by the learned trial Court or not. Recovery from the appellant: (13) The first incriminating that has been relied upon by the learned trial Court is that pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant recorded vide Ex.P/07, knife and his clothes (lungi) have been seized vide Ex.P/08. However, admittedly, in the FSL report (Ex.P/01) it has been clearly stated that no blood stains were found on the said seized articles. (14) The Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh vs. State of Chhattisgarh and another 2 held that if the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation was not found to be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood found on the articles is of human origin though, even though the blood group is not proved because of disintegration of blood and held in Para-24 as under: “24. In the instant case, then, we could have placed some reliance on the recovery, had the prosecution at least proved that the blood was of human origin. As observed supra, while discussing the evidence of PWs 9 and 16, the prosecution has tried to concoct the case from stage to stage. Hence, in the absence of positive material indicating that the stained blood was of human origin and of the same blood group as that of the accused, it would be difficult for the Court to rely 2 (2019) 7 SCC 781 Page No.8 of 10 IN CRA-1344-2017 upon the aspect of recovery of the weapons and tabbal, and such recovery does not help the case of the prosecution.” (15) In that view of the matter, since as per FSL report no blood was found in the articles seized from the appellant, the recovery of aforesaid articles at the instance of the appellant is of no help to the prosecution more particularly when the said articles were seized pursuant to the confessional statement of the appellant. We hereby hold accordingly. Motive of the offence: (16) The next circumstance that has been found proved by the learned trial Court is that the appellant has motive to commit murder of the deceased because the appellant and the deceased both were having previous enmity with regard to a land dispute. However, It is well settled law that previous enmity is a doubled edged sword, it can be used for false implication as well as for correct implication. There is no evidence available on record to show that on account of previous enmity the appellant has committed murder of the deceased. Though, father of the deceased, namely, Lakhmu (PW-01) has stated while lodging FIR that a day before the date of offence (i.e. on 17.05.2015) the appellant and the deceased had dispute on account of previous enmity (land dispute) and, in which, the appellant has threatened the deceased with dire consequences, but during his cross-examination, he has clearly stated that he has not seen the appellant assaulting the deceased on the date and time of the offence. As such, the evidence to that extent pales into insignificance. Even otherwise, it is well settled law that motive may be an important circumstance in a case based on circumstantial evidence, Page No.9 of 10 IN CRA-1344-2017 but it cannot take place of conclusive proof. (See: Sampath Kumar vs. Inspector of Police, Krishnagiri 3 ). Thereafter, in a decision rendered in the matter of Mahendra Singh vs. State of M.P. 4 their Lordships of Supreme Court reiterated the law on the point stating that merely because motive is established, solely on that basis accused cannot be convicted under Section 302 of IPC. We hereby hold accordingly. (17) In view of foregoing analysis, we are unable to hold that the prosecution has been able to prove the five golden principles to constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), in absence of which, the learned trial Court is unjustified in convicting both the appellants for offences under Sections 302 of IPC being the author of the crime in question in light of the incriminating circumstances culled out in the impugned judgment and same are liable to be set aside. (18) Accordingly, we hereby set aside the conviction so recorded and the sentence so awarded by the trial Court to the appellant vide the impugned judgment dated 28.09.2016. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the IPC on the basis of benefit of doubt. The appellant is reported to be on bail, therefore, he need not to surrender. However, his bail bond shall remain in force for a further period of six months in view of the provision contained in Section 437-A of the CrPC. 3 (2012) 4 SCC 124 4 (2022) 7 SCC 157 Page No.10 of 10 IN CRA-1344-2017 (19) This criminal appeal is allowed. (20) Let a certified copy of this judgment alongwith the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and action, if any. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice s@if