$~54 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI # CNR No. DLHC011882042017 + CRL.M.C. 1477/2017 SUDHA .....Petitioner Through: Mr Anil Kumar Pruthi and Mr Dinesh Advocates versus STATE NCT OF DELHI .....Respondent Through: Ms. Shubhi Gupta, APP for State. ASI Pawan Kumar, P.S.- Paschim Vihar, East. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV O R D E R % 17.08.2026 1. This petition seeks to challenge the order dated 10.07.2014 passed by the Trial Court, whereby, the respondent nos. 2 to 6 herein have been discharged from offences under Sections 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 2. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that two accused persons namely Bihari Lal and Rekha who are brother in law and sister-in-law, respectively have been charged, whereas, the remaining accused persons have been discharged. According to him, the allegations are almost similar. 3. Against the order of discharge, the petitioner had filed the revision This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 24/08/2026 at 10:38:56 petition which has also been dismissed vide order dated 04.01.2026. 4. A perusal of the order of framing of the charges would indicate that the allegations against the present respondents are vague and would not specifically indicate as to how they have caused abetment on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry, whereas, the allegations against Bihari Lal and Rekha, are of beating the complainant on various occasions and of demand of dowry. Therefore, the Court finds that the present respondents have rightly been discharged by the Trial Court and revision against the said order has also been rightly dismissed by the Revisional Court. 5. For the sake of clarity, findings rendered by the Trial Court in order dated are extracted as under: “Accused Rekha is stated to have demanded heavier and better quality ear-rings. Both accused Rekha and Bihari Lai have been accused of having beaten the complainant on various occasions and of demanding money from her time and again. She was also threatened to be thrown out of the house now and then to coerce her into fulfilling their demands. She has also categorically stated that her jewelry was taken by them and kept in the locker in collusion. In view of the allegations, the accused are charged for the offence under section 498A/406 IPC. The accused Mukesh (PO) is the husband of the complainant and is alleged to have demanded Rs. 8 Lakh to Rs.- 12 Lakh from her and on non fulfillment of is demands also committed physical violence upon her. She has stated that the husband used to pressurize her to withdraw sums of money and in collusion with accused Bihari Lai and Rekha took her jewelry and kept it in a locker. In view thereof. the accused Bihari Lai and Rekha be charged with offence under section 498A/ 406 IPC. As the allegations are general in nature and there is insufficient evidence to proceed against the rest of the accused, they are discharged for the offences they were charge sheeted.” 6. The Revisional Court in paragraph nos 7 to 9 has held as under: “7. The counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on judgments AIR 1987 Supreme Court 773 titled as "State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Krishan Lal Pardhan &Ors." and IX (2012) SLT 26 titled as "Sheoraj Singh. Ahlawat &Ors Vs. State of U.P. &Anr." but these judgments are not helpful to the present case. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 24/08/2026 at 10:38:56 8. Ld. Counsel for the respondents no. 2 to 6 has placed reliance on judgment titled as "Raj Kumar Khanna v. State (NCT of Delhi), 95 (2002) Delhi Law Time 147 (DB) wherein it was observed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court that "In order to attract the provisions of Section 498-A it is not every harassment or every type of cruelty that would attract the provision of Section 498-A. In this regard reliance can also placed on the decisions of Bombay High Court titled Smt. Sarla Prabhakar Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra, (supra) and Rajanimal and Ors. v. State, (supra), wherein it was observed that cruelty by itself without demand would not be sufficient to bring home the guilt under Explanation (b) of Section 498-A, IPG. Harassment by itself is not a cruelty unlass there is a demand of dowry and the cruelty is a consequence of that demand. Ld. Counsel for the respondents no. 2 to 6 has placed reliance, on judgment titled as "Onkar Nath Mishra &Ors. v. State (NCT of.Delhi) ,& Anr., I (2008) DMC 265 (SC) wherein it has been observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court that "Section 498A, I.P.C was introduced with the avowed object to combat the menace of dowry deaths and harassment to a woman at the hands of her husband or his relatives. Nevertheless, the provisions should not be used as a device to achieve oblique motives." Ld. Counsel for the respondents no. 2 to 6 has also placed reliance on judgment titled as "Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala & Anr., 2009 (3) JCC 2233 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that "In the light of the aforesaid language used in the Section, the provision would be applicable only to such a case where the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman subjects the said woman to cruelty. In order to understand the meaning of the expression 'cruelty' as envisaged under Section 498-A, there must be such a conduct on the part of the husband or relatives of the husband of woman which is of such a nature as to cause the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or physical of the woman." Ld. Counsel for the respondents no. 2 to 6 has also placed reliance on judgment titled as "Chander Kanta Lamba v. State &Ors., 2010 (1) JCC 610, where it is held that "it is highly improbable to assume that the married sisters of the husband of the complainant who got married much prior to the marriage of the complainant and were living in their own matrimonial homes would come down simultaneously to the matrimonial home of the complainant and subject her to demand of dowry and the consequent cruelty. Therefore, on this ground itself, I feel that the charge against the present petitioners IS not prima facie made out nor is any 'grave suspicion' to have summoned such an offence available on record to put them to trial." Ld. Counsel for the respondents no. 2 to 6 has also placed reliance on judgment titled as "Hans Raj Sharma & Ors. v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2012 (2) JCC: 972, where it is held that "The expression “harassment” has not been defined in Section 498-A of IPG, but its This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 24/08/2026 at 10:38:56 dictionary meaning is to subject someone to continuous vexatious attacks, questions, demands or other unpleasantness, etc. But it is not harassment of every nature which is punishable under Section 498-A IPC. In order to attract criminal liability, there should be torture physical or mental, positive acts. Such acts should be aimed at persuading or compelling the woman or her relatives to meet an unlawful demand of any property or valuable security or it should be actuated by the failure of the woman or her relative to meet such a demand." 9. In view of the above discussions, I am of the view that there is no infirmity, illegality, impropriety or inaccuracy in the impugned order dated 10.07.2014 passed by the Ld. MM. The revision petition filed by the petitioner is without any merits and same is hereby dismissed.” 7. In Mathura Das & Ors. v. State,1 the this Court held that at the time of framing of charge the court is not required to examine and assess the material placed on record by the prosecution in great detail. In Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. The State of West Bengal2 has held as under: “15. This Court has recently in Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of UP (2024) 10 SCC 651, cited with approval earlier decisions of this Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715; P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398; and Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 as under: - *** 22. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], after extracting Section 227CrPC, this Court in paras 10 and 11 held thus: (SCC pp. 401-402) 10. … If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the 1 2003 SCC OnLine DEL 269. 2 2025 INSC 1373. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 24/08/2026 at 10:38:56 prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. *** (Emphasis supplied) 8. Further, the Supreme Court in State of Orissa Vs Pratima Behera3, has held as under: “14. …We have no hesitation to hold that such meticulous consideration for presence or absence of clinching material is beyond the scope of power of the Court while considering the question of discharge under Section 239, Cr. P.C. as also while considering the question of quashing of charge framed by the Trial Court, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. It is to be noted that at that stage the materials collected by the prosecution would not mature into evidence and therefore, beyond the question of existence or otherwise prima facie case based on materials, the question whether they are clinching or not could not be gone into.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. In view of the aforesaid, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J AUGUST 17, 2026 aks/ksr 3 2024 INSC 1010. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 24/08/2026 at 10:38:56