PUNJAB STATE POWER CORPORATION LTD v. M/S GANZ ENERGETIC LTD & ORS
FAO/4011/2017 · 2026-08-07
Lapita Banerji
body2017
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2017 DAILYLAW 3612 (PNJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2017 DAILYLAW 3612 (PNJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
FAO-4011-2017 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT Punjab State Power M/s Ganz Energetic Ltd. and others
CORAM : HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI
Present : Mr. Jagdeep S. Rana, Advocate and
Mr. Lokendra Singh, Advocate,
for the appellant.
LAPITA BANERJI
Under challenge in the present appeal is an award dated November 4, 2013 and a judgment dated October 13, 2016 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Patiala whereby the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation 1996 Act’) has been dismissed.
2.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner draws the attention of this Court Contract Agreement runners supplied by respondents No.1 and 2 were defective, they were under an obligation Clause No.8 erroneously found that such replacement.
3.
He further submits that without appreciating t objection in the a ADJ rejected the same.
2017 (O&M) Sr. No.205
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH FAO Date of Decision:
Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd.
Versus M/s Ganz Energetic Ltd. and others
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI Mr. Jagdeep S. Rana, Advocate and Mr. Lokendra Singh, Advocate, for the appellant.
*** LAPITA BANERJI, J. (Oral)
Under challenge in the present appeal is an award dated November 4, 2013 and a judgment dated October 13, 2016 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Patiala whereby the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation 1996 Act’) has been dismissed.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner draws the attention of this Court to the warranty contained in Agreement-cum-Purchase Order. rs supplied by respondents No.1 and 2 were defective, they were under an obligation to replace the same. However, after appreciation of No.8 and analysis of the evidence found that respondents No.1 and 2 could not such replacement. He further submits that without appreciating t objection in the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the learned ADJ rejected the same.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
FAO-4011-2017 (O&M) Date of Decision: 07.08.2026
…Appellant
…Respondents HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI Mr. Jagdeep S. Rana, Advocate and Under challenge in the present appeal is an award dated November 4, 2013 and a judgment dated October 13, 2016 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Patiala whereby the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner draws the the warranty contained in Clause 8 of the Purchase Order. He submits that since the rs supplied by respondents No.1 and 2 were defective, they were to replace the same. However, after appreciation of and analysis of the evidence, the learned Arbitrator respondents No.1 and 2 could not be held liable for He further submits that without appreciating the grounds of pplication under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the learned
VANDANA 2026.08.19 09:19 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
FAO-4011-2017 (O&M)
4. This Court has heard learned counsel for the appella perused the material on record. 5. After perusing t learned Arbitrator has dis the Purchase Order He found that the runners were liable to be replaced by the respondents only in case where be defective. 6. The respond prolonged use of the runners for 26 capacity was taken into consideration to arrive at the finding that the respondents were not liable to replace the same because some defects could have arisen due to normal wear and tear. 7. Furthermore, the learned Arbit identifying the defects and respondents, the claimant majeure clause runners to a different agency which course of action was unjustifiably harsh. Therefore, the learned Arbitrator rejected the claim of the claimants. 8. While adjudicating the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the learned ADJ was of the opini Arbitrator failed to appreciate the statutory provisions of law or acted patent illegality, the Court concerned could not sitting as a Court of appeal and re
9. This C a well-reasoned 2017 (O&M) This Court has heard learned counsel for the appella perused the material on record. After perusing the award, it finds that in paragraph 6.3, the learned Arbitrator has discussed in detail the effect of Purchase Order-cum-Contract Agreement and the evidence before He found that the runners were liable to be replaced by the respondents where design, engineering, material or workmanship
The respondents’ contention with regard to frequent use of the runners for 26 years in a was taken into consideration to arrive at the finding that the respondents were not liable to replace the same because some defects could have arisen due to normal wear and tear.
Furthermore, the learned Arbitrator identifying the defects and recommending the claimant-appellant terminated the contract jeure clause and allotted the contract/work of repair of the damage runners to a different agency which course of action was unjustifiably Therefore, the learned Arbitrator rejected the claim of the claimants. While adjudicating the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the learned ADJ was of the opini Arbitrator failed to appreciate the statutory provisions of law or acted patent illegality, the Court concerned could not as a Court of appeal and re-appreciating This Court is of the view that the learned Arbitrator has passed reasoned/speaking award upon appreciation of evidence. The This Court has heard learned counsel for the appellant and finds that in paragraph 6.3, the cussed in detail the effect of warranty Clause of Agreement and the evidence before him. He found that the runners were liable to be replaced by the respondents material or workmanship proved to contention with regard to frequent and years in an old machine of 50MW was taken into consideration to arrive at the finding that the respondents were not liable to replace the same because some defects could have arisen due to normal wear and tear. rator observed that instead of corrective measures to the appellant terminated the contract under the force and allotted the contract/work of repair of the damaged runners to a different agency which course of action was unjustifiably Therefore, the learned Arbitrator rejected the claim of the claimants. While adjudicating the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the learned ADJ was of the opinion that unless the learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate the statutory provisions of law or acted with patent illegality, the Court concerned could not interfere with the award by appreciating the evidence. ourt is of the view that the learned Arbitrator has passed speaking award upon appreciation of evidence. The VANDANA 2026.08.19 09:19 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
FAO-4011-2017 (O&M)
learned Arbitrator is the master of appreciation of quality and evidence before him even though there is no unreasonableness in the learned Arbitrator but for the sake of arguments different view was possible still the Court Section 37 of the 1996 Act learned Arbitrator.
In this context, a beneficial reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi Development Autho same is being reproduced hereinafter:
2017 (O&M) learned Arbitrator is the master of appreciation of quality and evidence before him while passing the award. even though there is no unreasonableness in the learned Arbitrator but for the sake of arguments different view was possible still the Court Section 37 of the 1996 Act should not interfere with the view taken by the learned Arbitrator. In this context, a beneficial reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority’, (2015)3 SCC 49. same is being reproduced hereinafter:-
“12. xxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying the “public policy” test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral. Thus an award base on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score arbitrators approach is not arbitrary or capri he is the last word on facts. xxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx An arbitral tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable it will not mean that the award can be set ground. Construction of the terms of a primarily for an arbitrator to decide unless arbitrator construes the contract in such a way that could be said to be something that no fair minded or reasonable person could do.
It wa that when it comes to setting aside of an award under the public policy ground, it would mean that the award should shock the conscience of the court and would not include what the court thinks is unjust seeking substitute its view for that of the arbitrator to do what considers to be “justice”. xxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx” learned Arbitrator is the master of appreciation of quality and quantity of passing the award. On the facts of the case, even though there is no unreasonableness in the possible view taken by the learned Arbitrator but for the sake of arguments even if it is assumed that a different view was possible still the Court in hearing an appeal under interfere with the view taken by the learned Arbitrator. In this context, a beneficial reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Associate Builders Vs. , (2015)3 SCC 49. Relevant extract of the
12. xxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying the “public policy” test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a court of appeal and fact cannot be corrected. A view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon delivers his arbitral. Thus an award base on evidence or on evidence which does not measure to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score. Once it is found that the arbitrators approach is not arbitrary or capricious, then he is the last word on facts.
xxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx An arbitral tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, award can be set aside on this ground. Construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide unless the arbitrator construes the contract in such a way that it could be said to be something that no fair minded or person could do. It was opined by this court that when it comes to setting aside of an award under the public policy ground, it would mean that the award should shock the conscience of the court and would not include what the court thinks is unjust seeking to substitute its view for that of the arbitrator to do what it xxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx” VANDANA 2026.08.19 09:19 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
FAO-4011-2017 (O&M)
10. A beneficial reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Project Undertaking, hereinafter:-
“14. of the Court under Section 37 of the Act, as Court in akin to the jurisdiction of the Scope of of the Act, in examining an order, setting aside or set aside an award, is restricted and sub grounds as the challenge under Section 34
15. and Section 37 of the Act is not akin to normal jurisdiction. with the arbitral award in a mere possibility of an interpretation of the the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal. xxx
11. Accordingly, the present appeal is would be no order as to costs. 12. Connected application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. August 07, 202 vandana
Whether speaking/reasoned : Whether reportable 2017 (O&M) A beneficial reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Konkan Railway Corporation Limited vs. Chenab Bridge roject Undertaking, (2023) 9 SCC 85.
The relevant extract is reproduced
14. Analysis: At the outset, we may state that the of the Court under Section 37 of the Act, as Court in MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., akin to the jurisdiction of the court under Section 34 of the Act. Scope of interference by a court in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, in examining an order, setting aside or set aside an award, is restricted and sub grounds as the challenge under Section 34
15. Therefore, the scope of jurisdiction under Section and Section 37 of the Act is not akin to normal jurisdiction. It is well-settled that courts with the arbitral award in a casual and cavalier manner. The mere possibility of an alternative view on facts or interpretation of the contract does not entitle courts to reverse the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal. xxx
xxx
xxx” Accordingly, the present appeal is would be no order as to costs. Connected application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (LAPITA BANERJI)
JUDGE
, 2026 ther speaking/reasoned :
Yes/No Whether reportable :
Yes/No A beneficial reference may be made to the decision of the Konkan Railway Corporation Limited vs. Chenab Bridge The relevant extract is reproduced
Analysis: At the outset, we may state that the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 37 of the Act, as clarified by this MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163, is court under Section 34 of the Act. interference by a court in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is restricted and subject to the same grounds as the challenge under Section 34 of the Act. Therefore, the scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act is not akin to normal appellate settled that courts ought not to interfere casual and cavalier manner. The alternative view on facts or contract does not entitle courts to reverse the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed. However, there Connected application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(LAPITA BANERJI) JUDGE
VANDANA 2026.08.19 09:19 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document