IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH **** 123 FAO-2904-2017 (O&M) Date of decision: 23.07.2026 Javed . . . . Appellant Vs. Bala Devi and others . . . . Respondents **** CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA **** Present: - Mr. Kunal Phogat, Advocate, for Mr. Ashish Gupta, Advocate, for the applicant-appellant. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. The present appeal has been preferred against the award dated 07.12.2007 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Gurgaon. Along with the appeal, CM-9766-CII-2017 has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 3266 days in filing the appeal. 2. Briefly stated, one Zakir lost his life in a motor vehicular accident which occurred on 12.12.2005 on account of the use of truck No. HR-55-F- 0545. His widow, four minor children and parents instituted a claim petition under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 seeking compensation from the owner and insurer of the offending vehicle. 3. The learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Gurgaon, vide award dated 07.12.2007, allowed the claim petition and awarded compensation of ₹3,70,000/- together with interest, holding respondents No.1 and 2 jointly and severally liable to satisfy the award. 4. The present appeal has been filed by Javed, one of the sons of the deceased. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act accompanies the appeal praying for condonation of delay of 3266 days. It is pleaded that at the time of passing of the award, the appellant was a minor and was under the VIVEK PAHWA 2026.07.24 13:30 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document FAO-2904-2017 2026:PHHC: 102053 impression that his mother had already preferred an appeal against the award. It is further averred that after attaining majority, he contacted the counsel who had represented the claimants before the Tribunal and only then came to know that no appeal had been filed. On this premise, it is contended that the delay is neither intentional nor deliberate and deserves to be condoned. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the applicant-appellant and have carefully considered the averments made in the application. In my considered opinion, the application is wholly devoid of merit. 6. The delay sought to be condoned is of 3266 days, i.e. almost ten years. Such an extraordinary delay cannot be condoned as a matter of course. Though the expression "sufficient cause" occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is required to receive a liberal construction in appropriate cases, the law is equally well settled that such liberality cannot be stretched to the extent of rendering the law of limitation otiose. The discretion vested in the Court under Section 5 is judicial and can be exercised only where the applicant establishes a bona fide and sufficient explanation covering the entire period of delay. 7. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigour and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Similarly, in Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, it was held that "sufficient cause" implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons and that negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot constitute a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 8. Again, in Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that though a liberal approach may be adopted in deserving cases, the concept of liberal construction cannot be employed to condone gross and unexplained delay. The Court specifically held that in the absence of acceptable and cogent reasons, delay cannot be condoned merely because substantial justice is pleaded. VIVEK PAHWA 2026.07.24 13:30 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document FAO-2904-2017 2026:PHHC: 102053 9. The legal position was reiterated in Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that limitation is founded upon public policy and that the Court cannot ignore statutory limitation on equitable considerations. It was further held that unless sufficient cause is shown, delay cannot be condoned and the Court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of law. 10. Examined in the light of the aforesaid principles, the explanation furnished by the appellant falls far short of constituting "sufficient cause". Admittedly, there were seven claimants before the Tribunal, namely the widow, four minor children and the parents of the deceased. The present appellant, along with his other minor siblings, prosecuted the claim petition through their mother and natural guardian, claimant No.1 - Sakkan. The award dated 07.12.2007 was thus passed in proceedings, in which the appellant was duly represented by his legally competent guardian. 11. It is a settled principle of civil jurisprudence embodied in Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure that where a minor is represented through a duly appointed natural guardian or next friend, every step taken in the proceedings and every decree or adjudication rendered therein binds the minor to the same extent as any other litigant. The rationale is that the guardian acts in a representative capacity on behalf of the minor and the proceedings attain finality unless the representation itself is shown to be vitiated by fraud, collusion, conflict of interest or gross negligence resulting in prejudice to the minor. 12. In the present case, the appellant has not pleaded, much less established, that his mother and natural guardian had acted fraudulently, collusively or in a manner adverse to his interest while prosecuting the claim petition. There is not even a whisper in the application that there existed any conflict of interest between the mother and the minor children or that the award had been accepted by the guardian for any collateral purpose detrimental to the appellant. In the absence of any such foundational pleading, the representation afforded to the appellant during his minority has to be treated as valid and binding. VIVEK PAHWA 2026.07.24 13:30 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document FAO-2904-2017 2026:PHHC: 102053 13. In Amrik Singh v. Karnail Singh, (1974) 2 SCC 312, it has been held that decree against a minor properly represented by guardian is binding unless fraud or gross negligence is proved. Similarly, in Ram Chandra Arya v. Man Singh, AIR 1968 SC 954, it was held that proceedings against a minor are binding when duly represented. 14. The submission that the appellant has acquired a fresh or independent right to challenge the award merely because he has now attained majority is legally misconceived. The disability of minority cannot be invoked to reopen proceedings, which had already attained finality through a competent guardian. The Limitation Act protects a person suffering from legal disability, only where such disability prevented him from instituting proceedings in his own right. It does not create a fresh cause of action or revive a remedy, where the minor had already been effectively represented before the competent Court by a legally recognized guardian. Acceptance of the appellant's contention would lead to an anomalous situation, where every adjudication involving a minor would remain open to challenge for years after the minor attained majority, notwithstanding that the proceedings had been lawfully conducted through a guardian. Such a consequence would defeat the very object underlying Order XXXII CPC as well as the law of limitation, namely certainty and finality in judicial proceedings. 15. It is also important to note that neither the widow of the deceased, who represented all the minor claimants before the Tribunal, nor the parents of the deceased ever questioned the correctness of the award. The application is completely silent regarding the date on which the appellant allegedly came to know that no appeal had been preferred. The bald assertion that he remained under an impression that his mother had filed an appeal is vague and bereft of particulars. The application neither discloses the date on which he attained majority nor explains the period thereafter before approaching this Court. Thus, the delay of 3266 days remains wholly unexplained. 16. As noted earlier that although the expression "sufficient cause" deserves a liberal construction, such liberality cannot be extended to condone VIVEK PAHWA 2026.07.24 13:30 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document FAO-2904-2017 2026:PHHC: 102053 gross and unexplained delays or to defeat the statutory mandate of limitation. Since the appellant has failed to furnish any satisfactory explanation for the extraordinary delay of nearly ten years and has also failed to establish any legal infirmity in his representation during minority, no ground is made out for exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 17. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances leaves no manner of doubt that the delay is gross, unexplained and devoid of any bona fide justification. The application fails to disclose any circumstance warranting exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 18. Consequently, finding no sufficient cause to condone the delay of 3266 days in filing the appeal, CM-9766-CII-2017 is dismissed. 19. As a necessary corollary, the appeal also stands dismissed as barred by limitation (DEEPAK GUPTA) 23.07.2026 JUDGE Vivek Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes Whether reportable No VIVEK PAHWA 2026.07.24 13:30 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document