IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CR-3659-2017 (O&M) Leelawan& (deceased) thr her LRs and anr. . . . . Pe&&oners Vs. Om Parkash (deceased) thr his LRs and ors. . . . . Respondents Reserved on: 04.02.2026 Pronounced on: 06.02.2026 Pronounced fully/opera&ve part: Fully **** CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued by:- Mr. Raghav Sharma, Advocate for the pe##oners. Mr. Vivek Singla, Advocate for respondent Nos.9 to 11, 12(i, iii, viii, a and b). **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. The pe##oners herein are the plain#ffs in Civil Suit No. 3964 of 2013, #tled “Leelawan and another v. Om Parkash and others”, pending before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kurukshetra. They have invoked the re- visional jurisdic#on of this Court to assail the order dated 05.05.2017 (Annexure P-3), whereby their applica#on under Sec#on 151 CPC seeking permission to ad- duce addi#onal evidence was dismissed. 2. A perusal of the record reveals that the pe##oners, who are daughters of Smt. Bholi, ins#tuted the suit in April 2013, seeking declara#on and possession to the effect that various sale deeds, exchange deeds, mortgages, muta#ons and compromises executed between the years 1964 to 1972, detailed in the plaint, are null, void, illegal and not binding upon their rights. Consequen- #al relief of permanent injunc#on restraining the defendants from aliena#ng or crea#ng encumbrance over the suit property was also sought. 3. The defendants contested the suit. Issues were framed, and both par#es led their respec#ve evidence. A=er the closure of evidence, the case was listed for rebu>al/arguments. NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.02.06 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR-3659-2017 (O&M) 4. At that advanced stage, the pe##oners moved an applica#on un- der Sec#on 151 CPC, pleading that while preparing for arguments, certain docu- ments were shown to their counsel, namely: (i) a cer#fied copy of a sale deed dated 5.6.1970 pertaining to land measuring 21 Kanal 7 Marla allegedly sold to Ram Kishan, brother of defendant No.1; and (ii) a cer#fied copy of a lease deed dated 27.02.1964 rela#ng to land measuring 164 Kanal 11 Marla. 5. It was pleaded that these documents were material to establish that the land in ques#on had been mortgaged/leased and that the impugned sale deeds were fraudulent. It was further asserted that these documents were 30 years old, cer#fied copies, admissible in evidence, and that their produc#on would not prejudice the defendants. 6. The said applica#on was opposed by the defendants. The learned Trial Court, vide a detailed order dated 05.05.2017, dismissed the applica#on, holding that the same was belated, lacked due diligence and was intended to fill up lacunae. 7. Assailing the impugned order, learned counsel for the pe##oners contends that the documents sought to be produced are cer#fied copies of old documents, which go to the root of the controversy, and that the Court pos- sesses ample inherent powers under Sec#on 151 CPC to permit addi#onal evi- dence in the interest of jus#ce. Reliance is placed upon K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, AIR 2011 SC 1000, and Rukaiyabibi Ahmed Ali Ismail and ors. v. Musa Ismail Mahmed Khusal and ors., (2015) 3 SCC 677. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the pe##oners had already closed their evidence in affirma#ve on 30.01.2017. It is further pointed out that a=er closure of evidence of both sides, the pe##oners had earlier moved an applica#on to produce the same documents during re- bu>al evidence, which was dismissed by the Trial Court vide order dated 29.03.2017. This material fact, it is argued, has been deliberately concealed by the pe##oners in the present proceedings. It is contended that the present ap- NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.02.06 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR-3659-2017 (O&M) plica#on is nothing but an a>empt to re-open the en#re case and fill up lacu- nae, which is impermissible. 9. This Court has heard learned counsel for the par#es and has care- fully examined the record. 10. At the outset, it is significant to note that the pe##oners had ear- lier moved an applica#on seeking permission to produce the same documents during rebu>al evidence, which stood dismissed by the Trial Court on 29.03.2017. This fact has not been disclosed either in the applica#on under Sec- #on 151 CPC, or in the present revision pe##on, or during the course of argu- ments on behalf of the pe##oners. It is only upon a specific reference by learned counsel for the respondents that the said order was brought to the no- #ce of this Court. 11. The concealment of such a material fact disen#tles the pe##oners to any discre#onary relief. A li#gant approaching the Court is expected to come with clean hands, and suppression of material facts by itself is a valid ground to decline relief. 12. Even otherwise, the applica#on under Sec#on 151 CPC does not sa#sfy the fundamental requirement of due diligence. The law is well se>led that addi#onal evidence can be permi>ed only when the party seeking to ad- duce such evidence establishes that despite exercise of due diligence, the evi- dence was not within its knowledge or could not be produced earlier. 13. In the present case, the pe##oners have not pleaded that the doc- uments were not within their knowledge. On the contrary, the applica#on itself suggests that the documents were already in their possession and were merely shown to the counsel at the stage of prepara#on of arguments. The applica#on is conspicuously silent as to when and how the pe##oners came into possession of these documents. 14. The dis#nc#on between rebu>al evidence and addi#onal evidence is well recognized. Rebu>al evidence relates to issues already pleaded and for which the right to rebut has been reserved. Addi#onal evidence, on the other NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.02.06 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CR-3659-2017 (O&M) hand, is permissible only upon strict sa#sfac#on of the test of due diligence. In the present case, the pe##oners fail on both counts. 15. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the pe##oners on K.K. Velusamy (supra) is misplaced. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly held that though the Court has inherent power to permit addi#onal evi- dence, such power must be exercised sparingly and not to cover up negligence or fill lacunae. The Court further held that if an applica#on is found to be mis- chievous or intended only to delay proceedings, it ought to be rejected. 16. Similarly, in Rukaiyabibi Ahmed Ali Ismail (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated that addi#onal evidence cannot be permi>ed as a ma>er of course and that the discre#on must be exercised judiciously. The facts of the present case do not bring it within the permissible parameters laid down in the aforesaid judgments. 17. The learned Trial Court has rightly observed that permiHng the pe##oners to adduce the documents at this belated stage would virtually amount to re-opening the en#re trial, causing serious prejudice to the defen- dants and defea#ng the mandate of expedi#ous disposal of civil li#ga#on. 18. The impugned order does not suffer from any illegality, perversity or jurisdic#onal error. It is a well-reasoned discre#onary order, passed upon cor- rect apprecia#on of facts and se>led legal principles. Interference in revisional jurisdic#on is, therefore, unwarranted. 19. Consequently, finding no merit, the present revision pe##on is dis- missed. Pending applica#on(s), if any, also stand disposed of. (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE 06.02.2026 Neeka Tuteja Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes/No Whether reportable? Yes/No Uploaded on.: 06.02.2026 NEETIKA TUTEJA 2026.02.06 16:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document