- 1 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. NATARAJ WRIT PETITION NO. 22413 OF 2017 (GM-DRT) BETWEEN: SHRI. MAHESH BISANI AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS MARWADIPURA, VILLAGE HINGNI, POST SELOO, DIST WARDHA, MAHARASHTRA-440102 …PETITIONER (BY SRI. K.V.DHANANJAY, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. RECOVERY OFFICER - I SH. RAMCHANDRA RAO, DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNAL-I, RESIDENCY ROAD, BANGALORE-560001 2. UCO BANK ASSET MANAGEMENT BRANCH, NO.13/11, 3RD FLOOR, KG ROAD, BANGALORE-560001. REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER 3. MRS. DEEPIKA MAHESHWARI W/O MAHESH BISANI, R/O NO.83, 2ND FLOOR, 11TH CROSS, VALMIKI RASTE, HANUMANTH NAGAR, GAVIPURAM EXT, BANGALORE-560019 4. SHRI SUSHIL KUMAR AGARWAL S/O SRI BHIM SAIN AGARWAL, NO.45, NEW GANGANMACHARI STREET, MOTINAGAR, BANGALORE-560002 …RESPONDENTS Digitally signed by HEMALATHA J Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 (BY SRI. G.S.KANNUR, SENIOR ADVOCATE ALONG WITH SRI. DHIRENDRA N. KATTI, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.2; VIDE ORDER DATED 14.10.2019, NOTICE TO RESPONDENT NOS.3 AND 4 IS DISPENSED WITH; NOTICE SERVED ON RESPONDENT NO.1 AND UNREPRESENTED) THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DECLARE THAT THE PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE SARFAESI AND RDB ACT ARE CONTROLLED BY ARTICLE 137 OF THE LIMITATION ACT, THE ONLY ARTICLE IN THE ENTIRE LIMITATION ACT APPLICABLE TO SPECIAL ACTS BOTH AT THE STAGE OF ADJUDICATION AND EXECUTION IN BOTH THE ACTS AND ETC. THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDER ON 18.12.2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. NATARAJ CAV ORDER The petitioner has sought for a writ in the nature of mandamus or an appropriate writ to declare that the proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (henceforth referred to as 'SARFAESI Act, 2002') and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (henceforth referred to as 'RDB Act, 1993') are controlled by Article 137 of the Limitation Act both at the stage of adjudication and execution. He has also sought for a writ in the - 3 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 nature of mandamus or an appropriate writ declaring that the first proviso to Section 19(1) of the RDB Act, 1993 is a temporary arrangement which expired on 11.11.2004 and the bank cannot invoke action under RDB Act for initiating proceedings under SARFAESI unless they are governed under Section 13(10) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. He has also sought for a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash all proceedings initiated by respondents No.1 and 2 in DCP No.7859 in O.A No.690/2011 and all consequential proceedings as without jurisdiction, barred by limitation and opposed to public policy. 2. The petitioner contends that respondent No.2 had initiated proceedings under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 demanding Rs.64,57,125/- followed by a notice under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 dated 21.04.2010. The petitioner claims that the respondent - bank tried to auction the properties under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The petitioner challenged the same before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (henceforth referred to as 'Tribunal') in S.A. No.477/2010 and before this Court in W.P No.41731/2010. The respondent No.2 without following the mandatory procedure in SARFAESI Act, 2002 invoked Section 13(10) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 by filing an application for recovery of the entire - 4 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 principal along with interest on 15.06.2011, in violation of Section 13(10) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 which mandates to file an original application only for the remaining dues. During the proceedings, the bank tried to auction the properties under SARFAESI Act, 2002 on 15.02.2012 and sent a letter dated 13.02.2012 admitting that it had invoked SARFAESI proceedings. The bank obtained a final order dated 30.09.2013 in the original application, which is now sought to be executed by the Recovery Officer in DCP No.7859 in O.A.No.690/2011. The petitioner is therefore before this Court seeking aforementioned reliefs. 3. (i) The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though several contentions are raised by the petitioner, the only contention that he intends to press into service is that respondents No.1 and 2 have not executed the final order within the prescribed period of limitation of three years as mentioned in Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961. He contended that Section 29 of the RDB Act, 1993 mandates that provisions of Second and Third Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962 as in force from time to time shall, as far as possible, apply with necessary - 5 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 modifications as if the said provisions and the rules referred to the "amount of debt due" under the DRT Act instead of to "the Income Tax". (ii) He contends that Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 provides for the procedure for recovery of the sum adjudicated under the Income Tax Act as a due from an assessee in default or deemed to be in default under Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961. The time limit for sale of attached immovable property is fixed as three years from the end of the financial year, in which the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum for the recovery of the immovable property has become conclusive under the provisions of Section 245-I or, as the case may be, final in terms of the provisions of Chapter XX. He therefore, contends that since the amount due was finally adjudicated on 30.09.2013, the steps to bring the property for sale must have been initiated within three years i.e., on or before 29.09.2016. He contends that since no steps were taken within three years to bring the said property for sale, the auction initiated by respondent No.2 to recover the sum due under the certificate of recovery is not maintainable. - 6 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 (iii) He then contended that Section 29 of the RDB Act, 1993 is very significant as it saved the entire RDB Act, 1993 being declared unconstitutional. He contends that the RDB Act, 1993 was challenged before the Delhi High Court in Delhi High Court Bar Association vs Union of India [AIR 1995 Del 323], where the RDB Act, 1993 was struck down as draconian and arbitrary. Thereafter, the Parliament passed the Amendment Act of 2000, which cured defect by providing for the defendant's right to make a counter claim or set off. The Union of India defended the RDB Act, 1993 before the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India and another Vs. Delhi High Court Bar Association and others [(2002) 4 SCC 275]. He contends that the Union of India countered the remaining aspects of arbitrariness pointed by the Delhi High Court by referring to Section 29 of the RDB Act, 1993. He contends that the Hon'ble Apex Court accepted this contention and held in its judgment at para 30 as follows:- "30. By virtue of Section 29 of the Act, the provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962, have become applicable for the realisation of the dues by the Recovery Officer. Detailed procedure for recovery is contained in these schedules to the Income Tax Act, including provisions - 7 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 relating to arrest and detention of the defaulter. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Recovery Officer would act in an arbitrary manner. Furthermore, Section 30, after amendment by the Amendment Act, 2000, gives a right to any person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer, to prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. Thus now an appellate forum has been provided against any orders of the Recovery Officer which may not be in accordance with law. There is, therefore, sufficient safeguard which has been provided in the event of the Recovery Officer acting in an arbitrary or an unreasonable manner. The provisions of Sections 25 and 28 are, therefore, not bad in law." (iv) He therefore, contends that this establishes that Section 29 is the constitutional justification for an otherwise drastic recovery regime. Thus, he submits that the time limit for sale of a secured asset prescribed in Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 is a sufficient safeguard against arbitrary acts by the bank and hence, has to be strictly implemented. (v) He then referred to the words "as far as possible" in Section 29 of the RDB Act, 1993 and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C.N. Paramasivam and another vs. Sunrise Plaza and others [(2013) 9 SCC 460], where the aforesaid words were interpreted and it was held as follows: - 8 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 "26. It is, therefore, reasonable to hold that the phrase “as far as possible” used in Section 29 of the RDDB Act can at best mean that the Income Tax Rules may not apply where it is not at all possible to apply them having regard to the scheme and the context of the legislation." (vi) He submits that applying a three years time limit is not impossible or impracticable but is eminently possible and practicable. He also referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court where the above principle was applied in the case of K. Kutaguptan Vs. Canara Bank and others [W.A.No.60/2010], where it was held that Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961, is applicable to proceedings under the RDB Act, 1993. He also referred to the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Ratheesh M.N. Vs. Debt Recovery Tribunal and others [2019 SCC OnLine Ker 643], where it was held that any time barred sale would violate the right of property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and declared a time barred sale as a nullity. (vii) He submits that the final order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal in O.A.No.690/2011 was passed on 30.09.2013 and as per the limitation prescribed in Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961, the period - 9 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 of three years is to be calculated from the date of the order becoming final. He submits that the assessment year is the bedrock of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the words "as far as possible " in Section 29 of the RDB Act, 1993 would necessarily mean that a date for reckoning the proceedings under the RDB Act, 1993 would give the date of the order itself, which is 30.09.2013. The three years period expired on 29.09.2016 and hence, the impugned notice for possession as precursor for sale was issued by the recovery officer on 23.03.2017 long after his power to do so was statutorily extinguished. He submits that the petitioner is not attempting to avoid or evade a liability but is trying to protect himself from manifest illegality. 4. (i) The writ petition was opposed by the respondents No.1 and 2 who filed an elaborate statement of objections contending that respondent No.2 had sanctioned a Cash Credit facility of Rs.50,00,000/- to the petitioner on certain terms and conditions and respondent Nos.3 and 4 stood as guarantors. The respondent No.2 also sanctioned a term loan of Rs.12,00,000/- to the petitioner as an applicant and respondent No.3 as co-applicant. The respondent No.4 stood as guarantor for the repayment of the loan availed by the petitioner and respondent No.3. - 10 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 (ii) It is submitted that due to the default committed by the petitioner and respondent No.3, the respondent No.2-bank initiated recovery proceedings in O.A No.690/2011 on 15.06.2011 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal issued notices which were served on the petitioner as well as respondent Nos.3 and 4. The petitioner did not file his written statement to the original application. The respondent Nos.3 and 4 also did not choose to appear before the Tribunal and they have placed ex-parte. Thereafter, the Tribunal in terms of an order dated 30.09.2013 allowed the original application and directed the petitioner and respondent Nos.3 and 4 jointly and severally to pay a sum of Rs.80,10,456/- to the respondent No.2 along with future rate of interest as mentioned therein till realisation. (iii) The petitioner and respondent Nos.3 and 4 have not challenged the said order dated 30.09.2013 and hence, it became final. Thereafter, Recovery Certificate was issued by the Tribunal and the Recovery Officer-1 initiated the execution proceedings in DCP No.7859 and issued Form Nos.16 and 17 for sale of mortgage property. In the meanwhile, the respondent No.2-bank received an order of attachment issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Bengaluru intimating that the schedule property was attached on - 11 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 28.07.2011 by the Department for Recovery of Tax Dues. The respondent No.3 who is the wife of the petitioner filed miscellaneous application before the Tribunal, Bengaluru along with an interlocutory application for condonation of delay which was registered as I.A No.5834/2016 in SR No.1913/2013 for restoration of O.A No.690/2011. The said miscellaneous application was dismissed vide order dated 17.04.2017. (iv) The respondent No.2 contends that in the aforesaid execution proceedings, respondent No.1 took steps for taking physical possession of the mortgage property and accordingly the Recovery Officer-1 passed an order under Section 25(aa) of the RDB Act, 1993 for taking possession of the property for which security interest was created. It is therefore contended that the petitioner who was bound to challenge the said order has not availed the remedy of an appeal but has approached this Court. Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. It is also contended that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable only to an application filed before the Tribunal and the same is evident from Section 24 of the Act, 1993. Therefore, it is contended that the provisions of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an execution proceedings and that the execution proceedings is barred by limitation is not tenable. - 12 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 (v) Learned Senior counsel for respondent No.2 contended that under Section 19 of the RDB Act, 1993, it is the duty of the Presiding Officer to issue a certificate of recovery along with the final order under Section 19(20) of the RDB Act, 1993. The Recovery Certificate issued by the Presiding Officer under Section 19(22A) of the RDB Act, 1993 shall be deemed to be decree or order of the Court for the purposes of initiation of winding up proceedings against a Company registered under the Companies Act, 2013 or Limited Liability Partnership registered under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 or Insolvency proceedings against any individual or partnership firm under any law for the time being in force, as the case may be. (vi) He contends that the period of limitation prescribed for filing an original application before the Tribunal is three years. Upon filing of an original application seeking the recovery of a debt legally due and payable by a borrower, the necessary consequence is the adjudication of such claim by the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal and the passing of a final order determining the amount due. Upon such adjudication, the Presiding Officer issues a Recovery Certificate under Section 19(22) of the Act, 1993 to the Recovery Officer for execution - 13 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 and recovery of the determined amount in accordance with law. Under Section 24 of the RDB Act, 1993 the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall as far as may be, apply to applications made to the Tribunal. Further, Section 2(b) of the RDB Act, 1993 defines an 'application' made to the Tribunal under Section 19 of the RDB Act, 1993. Accordingly, the application filed by the bank before the Tribunal for recovery of the outstanding debt falls within the ambit of Section 24 of the RDB Act, 1993, thereby attracting the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. (vii) He contends that under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, period of twelve years is required for execution of a decree or order of the Civil Court. Therefore, by necessary implication, the order passed by the Tribunal is executable in the same manner as a decree of the Civil Court. Therefore, the limitation prescribed in Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable. He contends that the Tribunal in O.A No.690/2011 passed its final order on 30.09.2013 determining the amount due and payable. Thereafter, the Presiding Officer issued the Recovery Certificate on 16.09.2014. Subsequently, a sale proclamation was issued on 16.11.2016. Thus, it is contended that the sale proclamation dated 16.11.2016 was issued well - 14 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 within the period of limitation if it is reckoned from the date of issuance of the recovery certificate. Hence, it is claimed that the impugned sale proclamation is valid in the eyes of law and not barred by limitation. (viii) In support of his contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case Tottempudi Salalith Vs. State Bank of India & others (2024) 1 SCC 24, where it was held that a Recovery Certificate issued under the RDB Act, 1993 is clothed with the character of a deemed decree. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the High Court of Kerala in the case of Geevarghese P John and others Vs. Federal Bank Ltd., (2024) SCC Online Ker 7318), where it was held that the period of limitation for recovery of the dues of the Banks/Financial Institutions, Section 19 of the RDB Act, 1993 will be the period of limitation prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (ix) It is contended that Rule 68(B) of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 the restriction is on sale and is referable to the conclusiveness of the demand and the finality of the case. Such conclusiveness is made on the basis of - 15 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 Section 245-I and Chapter XX of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, Rule 68(B) of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 which applies to proceedings covered by Section 245-I or Chapter XX of the Income Tax Act, 1961 does not apply to proceedings under the RDB Act, 1993. In this regard, the reliance is placed on the judgment of the Geevarghese P John referred supra, where it was held that the provisions of Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 is not applicable to proceedings for recovery of amounts determined as payable to a Bank/Financial institution under the Provisions of the RDB Act, 1993. (x) As regards the connotation of the words "as far as possible" the reference is made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C.N.Paramasivan Vs. Sunrise Plaza, (2013) 9 SCC 460), where it was held that the expression is indicative of a certain inbuilt flexibility and the scope of that flexibility extends only to what is "not at all practicable". It was also contended that in the said judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the phrase "as far as possible" used in Section 29 of the RDB Act, 1993 would mean that the Income Tax Rules may not apply where it is not at all possible to apply them having regard to the scheme and context of the - 16 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 legislation. Therefore, it is contended that Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 does not apply to the instant case. Further more, it is contended that issuance of a Recovery Certificate pursuant to an order of DRT is a sine qua non to initiate recovery proceedings. (xi) It is further contended that Chapter V of the RDB Act, 1993, governs the procedure for recovery of debts by the Tribunal. The 2016 Amendment to Section 19(22) of the RDB Act, 1993 clarifies that the Presiding Officer is required to issue a Recovery Certificate along with a final order to the Recovery Officer for execution and recovery of the determined amount. However, prior to the said amendment, no such contemporaneous issuance was mandated and the Recovery Certificate was issued pursuant to the Tribunal's final order. (xii) It is further contended that the dispute in the present case relates to a Recovery Certificate issued on a date distinct from that of the Tribunal's final order. In as much as, 2016 Amendment is prospective in operation, it cannot be contended that the Recovery Certificate ought to have been issued along with the final order of the Tribunal. It is then contended that the delay in the Tribunal issuing the Recovery - 17 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 Certificate, cannot result in any consequences of the bank and the bank cannot be denied relief on the ground of limitation when there is a delay on the part of the Presiding Officer in issuing the Recovery Certificate. (xiii) It is contended that the role of the bank is restricted after the promulgation of RDB Act, 1993. Earlier the banks were required to approach the Civil Court for recovery of amount due and file a separate suit for execution of a decree. However, pursuant to the RDB Act, 1993, the task of realising the debt is vested with the Recovery Officer. The Recovery Officer can proceed to attach, sell or take other measures against the borrowers' assets to recover the certified amount. After issuance of a Recovery Certificate by the DRT in favour of a Bank or Financial institution, the execution and enforcement thereof are to be carried out exclusively by the Recovery Officer. Consequently, the bank has no role in the enforcement process of the Recovery Certificate. Therefore, no period of limitation can be imposed upon the enforcement of the Recovery Certificate, as the beneficiary Bank or Financial institution is not responsible for initiating or effecting such enforcement against the secured assets. It is claimed that the Bank or Financial institution cannot be made to bear any - 18 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 adverse consequences arising out from any delay or omission on the part of the Recovery Officer in enforcing the Recovery Certificate. (xiv) The learned Senior Counsel then adverted to the maintainability of the writ petition and contended that in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tandon and Others (2010) 8 SCC 110, the petitioner was bound to avail the alternate remedy before approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He contended that this Court should not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the final order passed by the Tribunal is not challenged by the petitioner. (xv) He then invited the attention of the Court to Section 19(22A) of the RDB Act, 1993, where it states that any Recovery Certificate issued by the Presiding officer under Section 19(22) of the RDB Act, 1993 shall be deemed to be decree or order of the Court for the purposes of initiation of winding up proceedings against the company registered under the Companies Act, 2013 or Limited Liability partnership registered under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 or - 19 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 Insolvency proceedings against any individual or partnership firm under any law for the time being in force, as the case may be. He therefore, contends that the said provision can be read to imply that the Recovery Certificate has the status of a deemed decree only for the limited purposes of winding up proceedings and not to the recovery proceedings initiated under the RDB Act, 1993. 5. (i) In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that an executable decree is legally effective not from the date of its administrative preparation but from the date of the judicial pronouncement that gave it life. He referred to Order 20 Rule 7 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 which mandates that the decree shall bear date, the day on which the judgment was pronounced. He thus, contends that the framework of RDB Act, 1993 mirrors this structure making the principle directly applicable by analogy. He submits that final order passed under Section 19(20) of the RDB Act, 1993 is the adjudication while the issuance of recovery certificate under Section 19(22) of the RDB Act, 1993 is a formal instrument of execution. He contends that a recovery certificate is a ministerial act that records conclusion of the final order for the benefit of the recovery officer. He contends that this - 20 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 interpretation is not accepted, then that would create an anomalous situation where a bank's right to execute could be indefinitely extended owing to the tribunals delay in preparing the recovery certificate. He also contends that the bank did not take steps to remind the tribunal for preparation of the recovery certificate. He also contends that the 2016 Amendment to the RDB Act, 1993, by which Section 19(22) of the RDB Act, 1993 was amended making it mandatory to issue a recovery certificate along with the final order was not merely remedial but declaratory and clarificatory and simply stated explicitly what the law always was or was intended to be. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dr. Chiranji Lal (Dead) by Lrs Vs. Haridas (Dead) by Lrs. (2005) 10 SCC 746 where it was held that the limitation prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 commences from the date of final adjudication and not from the date of endorsing the decree on the stamp paper. (ii) He further contends that Rule 68B of the Income Tax Act, 1961 with its three years limit is a central aspect of time bound execution and ensures that the speed and urgency at which the adjudication taken place are not lost at the stage of execution. - 21 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 (iii) He further contends that the reliance placed by learned counsel for respondent No.2 on the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Binu Vincent Vs. Federal Bank - W.P.(C) No.19544/2025 and Geevarghese P.John referred supra are per incuriam, as they were decided ignoring the binding precedent of the Division Bench of the same Court in the cases of Kutaguptan and Ratheesh M.N referred supra. He therefore submits that the contentions urged by the respondent No.2 do not merit acceptance. 6. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Senior counsel for respondent No.2. 7. The only question that arises for consideration is: "Whether prior to Act 44 of 2016, by which Section 19(22) of the RDB Act, 1993 was substituted, the recovery of the debt due had to be initiated within three years from the date of crystallization of the debt or from the date of Recovery Certificate?" 8. Section 19(22) of the RDB Act, 1993 before its substitution by Act 44 of 2016 was as follows: - 22 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 "(22) The Presiding Officer shall issue a certificate under his signature on the basis of the order of the tribunal to the recover officer for recovery of the amount of debt specified in the certificate. 9. A perusal of the RDB Act, 1993, shows that it is only upon a Recovery Certificate issued by the Tribunal that the amounts due becomes recoverable. Chapter V of the RDB Act, 1993, which deals with recovery of debt determined by the Tribunal, copiously refers to the Recovery Certificate in Sections 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the RDB Act, 1993. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that a debt adjudicated upon by the Tribunal becomes payable only upon issuance of a Recovery Certificate. However, the moot question is when does the limitation start to initiate steps to recover the amount due, when the order of adjudication and the recovery certificate are on two different dates. 10. In the instant case, the Tribunal determined the debt due in terms of its order dated 30.09.2013 under sub-section 20 of Section 19 of the RDB Act, 1993. Under sub-section 21 of Section 19 of the RDB Act, 1993 it is incumbent upon the tribunal to forward a copy of every order passed by it to the bank as well as the borrower. It is there upon that a certificate - 23 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 is issued by the Presiding Officer to the Recovery Officer to recover the amount due specified in the certificate. A Recovery Certificate not only contains details of the principal amount due but also the interest calculated upto the date of the issuance of the Recovery Certificate plus costs and other charges. Ideally, the Presiding Officer must have issued the Recovery Certificate immediately after adjudication of the application filed by the bank to determine the due. Since the due determined becomes recoverable only after Recovery Certificate is issued, the bank cannot be put in a quandary if the Presiding Officer does not issue the Recovery Certificate within time. It is now well settled that a mistake committed by the Court cannot prejudice any party to the proceedings. No doubt, under Section 29 of the RDB Act, 1993, the provisions of the Second and Third Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the Income Tax (Certificate Proceeding) Rules, 1962 shall as far as possible apply with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and the rules referred to the amount of debt due under the RDB Act, 1993 instead of to the Income Tax. 11. A perusal of Rule 68B of Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 provides as follows: - 24 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 "Time limit for sale of attached immovable property. 68B. (1) No sale of immovable property shall be made under this Part after the expiry of three years from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum, for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached, has become conclusive under the provisions of section 245-I or, as the case may be, final in terms of the provisions of Chapter XX: Provided that where the immovable property is required to be re-sold due to the amount of highest bid being less than the reserve price or under the circumstances mentioned in rule 57 or rule 58 or where the sale is set aside under rule 61, the aforesaid period of limitation for the sale of the immovable property shall stand extended by one year. (2) In computing the period of limitation under sub-rule (1), the period— (i) during which the levy of the aforesaid tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum is stayed by an order or injunction of any court; or - 25 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 (ii) during which the proceedings of attachment or sale of the immovable property are stayed by an order or injunction of any court: or (iii) commencing from the date of the presentation of any appeal against the order passed by the Tax Recovery Officer under this Schedule and ending on the day the appeal is decided, shall be excluded: Provided that where immediately after the exclusion of the aforesaid period, the period of limitation for the sale of the immovable property is less than 180 days, such remaining period shall be extended to 180 days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to be extended accordingly. (3) Where any immovable property has been attached under this Part before the 1st day of June, 1992, and the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum, for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached, has also become conclusive or final before the said date, that date shall be deemed to be the date on which the said order has become conclusive or, as the case may be, final. - 26 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 (4) Where the sale of immovable property is not made in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (1), the attachment order in relation to the said property shall be deemed to have been vacated on the expiry of the time of limitation specified under this rule." 12. Rule 68B of Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 prescribes limitation of three years from the end of the financial year in which, the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum for the recovery of which immovable property has been attached has become conclusive under the provisions of Section 245-I or, as the case may be final in terms of the provisions of Chapter XX. (Underlining by Court) 13. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the bank cannot be given a long leash in taking steps to recover the amount due. The Honb'le Apex Court in the case of C.N.Paramasivam and Another Vs. Sunrise Plaza and Others (2013) 9 SCC 460) had held that the provisions contained in Section 29 of the RDB Act, 1993 and Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961, acts as a safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power by the bank. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that proceedings for recovery of debt - 27 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 due under the Recovery Certificate issued by the Tribunal, should strictly comply with the Second and Third Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the Income Tax (Certificate Proceeding) Rules, 1962. Under Rule 68B, the time commences from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand of any tax becomes conclusive. If the scheme of the RDB Act, 1993 and the significance attached to a Recovery Certificate are taken into consideration, the expression "order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty ……. has become conclusive" in Rule 68B should be construed that the right to recover the amount due arises only after issuance of a recovery certificate. Since there was no stipulation in 19(22) of RDB Act, 1993 before its substitution that the recovery certificate had to be issued along with the final order under Section 19(20) of the RDB Act, 1993, the limitation to take steps to recover the debt due has to be reckoned from the date of the recovery certificate. Therefore, the contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that steps to recover the debt had to be initiated within three years from the order of adjudication does not merit acceptance. The Parliament has remedied this anomaly by amending Section 19(22) of the RDB Act, 1993 to incorporate the words “the - 28 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 Presiding Officer shall issue a certificate of recovery along with the final order, for payment of debt with interest”. 14. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the in the facts and circumstances of this case, the respondent No.2 was justified in initiating proceedings to recover the debt due within three years from the date of issuance of recovery certificate. 15. The contention of the learned Senior counsel for the respondent No.2-bank that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable as provided under Section 24 of the RDB Act, 1993, and therefore, the limitation as prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable, is liable to be rejected, as Section 24 of the RDB Act, 1993 only deals with applications to the Tribunal under Section 19 of the RDB Act, 1993. The further contention that the State Government had already attached the property for recovery of tax arrears and that the State Government had priority over the dues to the bank and hence, could not initiate steps to recover the amount within time and that the debt due to the bank was given priority by virtue of Section 31B of RDB Act, 1993 with effect from 01.09.2016, is inconsequential as the bank was bound to - 29 - WP No. 22413 of 2017 take steps to recover the amount irrespective of the question, whether the property attached was seized by some other agency or not? 16. In view of the above, this writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed. 17. In view of dismissal of main petition, pending interlocutory applications, if any do not survive for consideration and the same stand disposed of. Sd/- (R. NATARAJ) JUDGE UN/HJ