1 MACApp./523/2017 Page 1 GAHC010047062017 2026:GAU-AS:8758 IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH) MACApp./523/2017 1. Kulendra Pathak, S/o Sri Tileswar Pathak, R/o- Village- Charaidoloni, P.O. Madhabpur, P.S. Narayanpur, Dist. Lakhimpur, Assam. 2. Jitendra Pathak, S/o Sri Tileswar Pathak, R/o- Village- Charaidoloni, P.O. Madhabpur, P.S. Narayanpur, Dist. Lakhimpur, Assam. …..Appellants -Versus- 1. Atul Pathak, S/o Late Joyram Pathak, R/o- Village- Charaidoloni, P.S. Narayanpur,Dist. Lakhimpur, Assam. Present Address Village-Mirzapur, P.S. Azara, Guwahati-17, Kamrup, Assam. 2. Lilawati Borah, W/o Atul Pathak, Village- Charaidoloni, P.S. Narayanpur, Dist. Lakhimpur, Assam, Present Address Village-Mirzapur, P.S. Azara, Guwahati-17, Kamrup, Assam. 2 MACApp./523/2017 Page 2 3. Moushumi Pathak, W/o Atul Pathak, Village- Charaidoloni, P.S. Narayanpur, Dist. Lakhimpur, Assam. Present Address Village-Mirzapur, P.S. Azara, Guwahati-17, Kamrup, Assam. ……Respondents For Appellants : Mr. I.H. Saikia,Advocate For Respondents : Mr. A. Acharya, Advocate Date of Hearing : 26.03.2026 Date of Judgment : 17.06.2026 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA JUDGMENT AND ORDER [1] Heard Mr. I.H. Saikia, the learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. A. Acharya, the learned counsel for the respondents. [2] This appeal, under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, has been preferred by the appellants, namely, Kulendra Pathak and Jitendra Pathak, impugning the judgment and award dated 30.06.2017, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. 1, Kamrup, Guwahati in MAC Case No. 791/2015, whereby, the appellants were directed to pay a compensation 3 MACApp./523/2017 Page 3 amount of Rs. 29,82,000/- along with an interest @ 7% per annum to the respondents/claimants. [3] The facts relevant for consideration of the instant appeal, in brief, are that on 31.01.2015, one Bishnu Jyoti Pathak was travelling in a vehicle bearing Registration No. MH-14-BX-1288 from Pathali Pahar to Charaidoloni. When the said vehicle reached near Jorabari, it met with an accident, when it dashed against the roadside tree, as a result of which the said Bishnu Jyoti Pathak sustained injuries and later on, succumbed to his injuries. It is further relevant to note that at the time of the accident, apart from the deceased three other persons were travelling in the “ill-fated,” vehicle, the deceased was sitting on the front seat beside the driver seat, whereas, the present appellant No. 2 was driving the vehicle. [4] Later on, the present respondents/claimants being dependence and legal representatives of the deceased filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. 1, Kamrup, Guwahati seeking compensation for death of Late Bishnu Jyoti Pathak in the aforementioned vehicular accident. The aforesaid application was registered as MAC Case No. 791/2015. The opposite parties, including the present appellants contested the case by filing the written statement, wherein, the owner of the vehicle took the plea that he has already sold and transferred the “ill-fated,” vehicle to the 4 MACApp./523/2017 Page 4 appellant No. 2, however, the registration certificate of the offending vehicle still bear his name. [5] It was contended in the written statement that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the deceased himself as he was sitting in the front side of the vehicle and when he saw a heavy vehicle coming from the opposite direction, he became nervous and pull the hand break of the car in which they were travelling and also jumped outside the vehicle, as a result of which he sustained injuries. [6] On the basis of the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal: - i. Whether the victim, Bishnujyoti Pathak, died in the alleged road accident dated 31.01.11 involving vehicle no. MH- 14/BX-1288 and whether the said accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle? ii. Whether the claimants are entitled to get any compensation and if yes, to what extent and by whom amongst the opposite parties, the said compensation amount will be payable? [7] During the enquiry the claimants examined 3(three) witnesses, in support of their claim, whereas, the contesting 5 MACApp./523/2017 Page 5 opposite parties examined 4(four) witnesses in defence of their case. However, by the judgment which has been impugned in this appeal, both the issues were decided in favour of the claimants and they were awarded the compensation in the manner as already described in the foregoing paragraphs. [8] Mr. I.H. Saikia, the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. 1, Kamrup, Guwahati is bad in law on the ground that, in the instant case, the said Tribunal has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in as much as the accident in question occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Lakhimpur district as well as the claimant and the opposite parties were all resident of Lakhimpur district. [9] He submits that the contention of the claimants in the claim petition that they temporarily resides at Mirzapur within the jurisdiction of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. 1, Kamrup could not be substantiated by adducing any documentary evidence. He further submits that rather in her testimony before the Tribunal during the enquiry, the mother of the deceased, i.e. PW-1 has stated that she is the resident of village Charaidoloni, Police Station Narayanpur, under Lakhimpur district. He submits that the Tribunal failed to take into consideration the fact that it lacks jurisdiction to conduct the enquiry and he, therefore, submits that the claims petition 6 MACApp./523/2017 Page 6 filed by the claimant before the Tribunal is hit by embargo of Section 166 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. [10] The learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the Tribunal also erred in not appreciating the evidence on record in its proper perspective. He submits that the Tribunal relied on the testimony of PW-2, i.e. Papu Munda, who was one of the occupant of the vehicle when the accident occurred, however, it did not consider the testimony of other independent witnesses on record, namely, the DW-3 and the DW-4, who had categorically deposed before the Tribunal that it was the deceased, who had pulled the hand break as a result of which the vehicles skipped and its back side got damaged after hitting a roadside tree. [11] He submits that the Tribunal has mentioned no reason for discarding the testimony of the DW-3 and the DW-4. He further submits that in the connected criminal case filed against the appellant No. 2, i.e., which was registered as G.R. Case No. 313/2015; the appellant No. 2 has been acquitted of the charges under Sections 279/338/304A/427 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. [12] The learned counsel for the appellants has produced a photo copy of judgment dated 18.11.2022, passed in G.R. Case No. 313/2015 in support of his submissions. He further submits that in the said case, i.e., G.R. Case No. 313/2015, the PW-2, 7 MACApp./523/2017 Page 7 Papu Munda was also examined as a witness in death case as PW-7. He submits that before the criminal court the PW-7 has deposed that as he was sitting on the back side of the vehicle as such, he could not see as to what happened and what cause the accident. He only saw a truck was coming from the opposite direction. [13] The learned counsel for the appellants further submits that in Paragraph No. 18 of the judgment, passed in G.R. Case No. 313/2015, the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, while acquitting the appellant No. 2 from the charges levelled against him has also observed in paragraph No. 18 that there is no evidence on record to come to the conclusion that the accused (present appellant No. 2) was at fault due to which the accident occurred, rather it was observed that the evidence adduced in that case establishes that it was the victim (deceased), who pulled the hand break while he was sitting in the front seat beside the driver. [14] The learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that in a Motor Accident Claims Case which is registered on the basis of an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it is incumbent on the claimant to prove the negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle, however, in this case, the claimants have miserably failed to discharge that burden. He has cited following rulings in support of his submissions: - 8 MACApp./523/2017 Page 8 i. “Surender Kumar Arora And Another Vs. Manoj Bisla And Others” reported in “(2012) 4 SCC 552;” ii. “Navnirman Development Consultants (India) Private Limited Vs. Divisional Commissioner And President District Sports Complex Executive Committee, Pune” reported in“(2017)8SCC 603;” iii. “Mohd. Hanif and Another VS. H.P. Road Transport Corpn, and Others” reported in “2005 Legal Eagle (SC)1019.” [15] On the other hand, Mr. A. Acharya, the learned counsel for the respondents/claimants has submitted that the Tribunal has correctly awarded the compensation amount of Rs. 29,82,000/- after considering the evidence on record and same does not warrant any interference by this court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. [16] He further submits that as regards the objection regarding the jurisdiction of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. 1, Kamrup to entertain the claim petition filed by the present respondents is concerned, he submits that no such objection as to jurisdiction of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was taken by the appellants in their written statement or at any stage before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. He submits that it is a well settled proposition of law that any objection regarding the question of jurisdiction has to be taken in a proceeding at the earliest possible time. However, he submits that in this case, it is only at the appellate stage the plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under 9 MACApp./523/2017 Page 9 Section 166 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been taken by the appellants. Hence, he submits that the objection regarding lack of jurisdiction is not sustainable at this stage and may not be considered. [17] He further submits that as regards the judgment passed in the G.R.Case No. 313/2015 is concerned, same was never produced before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal when the enquiry was pending before it. He submits that even at this appellate stage also, no application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by the appellants to bring on record the additional evidence. Hence, he submits that the said judgment which is sought to be relied upon by the appellants may not be taken into consideration while considering this appeal. [18] He further submits that otherwise also, there is evidence on record that the vehicle bearing Registration No. MH-14-BX- 1288 was driven at a high speed and that is enough to come to a conclusion that the driver of the said vehicle was at fault which caused the accident. He further submits that finding in a criminal case, may not have a bearing in a claims case which is basically civil in nature and standard of proof in such cases is mainly on the basis of preponderance of probability. Whereas, in a criminal case, the standard of prove is beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, he submits that the outcome of a criminal case arising out of same incident may not have any 10 MACApp./523/2017 Page 10 impact in an enquiry initiated on the basis of an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 because of different standards of prove in both the cases. He submits that the Tribunal can arrive at its finding of fault on the part of the offending driver on the basis of prima facie material such as First Information Report, charge sheet, and other evidence on record. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the respondents has cited a ruling of a co-ordinate bench of this court in the case of “Godavari Devi Sharma And Ors. Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. And Ors” reported in “2012(4) GLT 516.” [19] He submits that the evidence of the DW-3 and the DW-4 was correctly discarded by the Tribunal as they were interested witnesses and in the connected criminal case those witnesses have categorically deposed that they have deposed before the court as friend of the accused persons. Hence, he submits that the Tribunal was right in discarding their testimony. [20] The learned counsel for the respondents has further submitted that the testimony of the DW-3 and the DW-4 was also discarded by the Tribunal because during their cross- examination they have stated that they did not state anything to police whereas, from the charge sheet laid against the appellant No. 2 in G.R. Case No. 313/2015, it appears that police submitted the charge sheet after examining all the listed witnesses in the charge sheet. He submits that this 11 MACApp./523/2017 Page 11 shows that the story of the deceased jumping out of the vehicle is a concocted story made only to escape the liability of paying compensation to the claimants. He, therefore, submits that this appeal is liable to be dismissed. He further submits that the report of the MVI also shows that the vehicle was badly damaged on the front side also. The dashboard, the steering and all the doors and the front side seat were badly damaged, which itself indicates that there was rash and negligent driving by the driver of the offending vehicle. [21] I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both sides and have also gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for both sides in support of their respective submissions. [22] The point to be determined in this appeal is as to whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was correct in directing the appellants to pay the compensation amount of Rs.29,82,000/- to the claimants for death of their son/brother Bishnu Jyoti Pathakin the motor vehicular accident involving vehicle bearing Registration No.MH-14-BX-1288. [23] One of the main contentions of the appellants in this appeal is that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. 1, Kamrup, Guwahati lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 166 of M.V. Act, 1988 in this case as the accident occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of 12 MACApp./523/2017 Page 12 Lakhimpur District, and the claimants were also resident of Lakhimpur District. However, on perusal of the claim petition filed by the claimants before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, it appears that in Column No. 19 of the said petition, where the addresses of the claimants are to be mentioned, the present address of the claimants are mentioned at Village Mirzapur Police Station, Azara, Kamrup, Guwahati 17, which is an area which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. 1, Kamrup, Guwahati. [24] It also appears that no objection as regards the lack of territorial jurisdiction was raised by the claimants before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, and it is only at the appellate stage the objection as to territorial jurisdiction has been raised. [25] This Court is of considered opinion that it is settled legal proposition that any objection as regards territorial jurisdiction of the Court has to be raised at the earliest available opportunity and after the claim has been adjudicated and wherein no whisper has been made regarding territorial jurisdiction, same cannot be raised belatedly. More so, when the present addresses of the claimants are shown in the claim petition to be in an area which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which adjudicated the claim of the claimants. Hence, the objection 13 MACApp./523/2017 Page 13 as regards the territorial jurisdiction of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No.1, Kamrup, Guwahati is not sustainable. [26] The second contention of the appellants that in the G.R. Case No. 313/2015, the appellant No.2 has been exonerated from the charges under Sections 279/338/304/427 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is concerned, it appears that the settled proposition of law in this regard is also that the standard of proof required in a claims case as well as in a criminal case are quite different. Whereas, in the former, the standard is on the basis of preponderance of probability. However, in the later, it is proof beyond reasonable doubt, and as such, merely because a person has been acquitted in a criminal case, same may not be a reason for exonerating him of the liability in a claims case which is of civil nature, where the standard of preponderance of probability is applicable. Furthermore, in the instant case, the judgment of the criminal court was not produced before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and hence, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was not having the benefit of going through the same, while considering the claims petition. The judgment of the G.R. Case No. 313/2015 could have been brought on record under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, at the appellate stage, however, same has also not been done. As such, this court does not find the judgment of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at fault on that count. 14 MACApp./523/2017 Page 14 [27] Moreover, the contention that the PW-2 had deposed differently in the G.R. Case wherein, he had stated that he only saw a truck coming from the opposite direction and that he could not see as to what caused the accident is also not of any help to the appellants’ side as same was not brought to the notice of PW-2 when he deposed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal during his cross-examination. He could have very well been contradicted by bringing his testimony which he deposed before the Criminal Court to his notice when his evidence was recorded in the Motor Accident Claims Case. However, by not doing so, the appellant’s sides are now precluded from taking that plea of contradiction in the testimony of PW-2. When the judgment delivered in the G.R. Case No. 313/2015 as well as evidence adduced therein were not brought on record before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, the said Tribunal cannot be faulted within not relying on the same. The appellants also faulted in not bringing the same on record in this appeal by filing an application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. As such, same cannot be relied upon at this appellate stage also. [28] Moreover, as regards the fact of the Tribunal not relying on the deposition of the DW-2 and the DW-3 is concerned, it is apparent from record that the testimony of Papu Munda (PW- 2) and those of the DW-3 and the DW-4 are contradictory to each other. Both set of witnesses have given different versions of the accident. Whereas, the DW-3 and the DW-4 has 15 MACApp./523/2017 Page 15 deposed that it was the deceased who pulled the handbrake and jumped outside the vehicle which has been denied by the PW-2 Papu Munda. It is also pertinent to mention here that all the three were the occupants of the ill-fated vehicle. Now, as both the versions cannot be true, the Tribunal has relied upon the version which is in preponderance of probabilities is more likely to be true. [29] PW-2 Papu Munda has categorically denied the story narrated by the DW-3 and the DW-4 that the deceased jumped out from the vehicle after seeing the truck. On the other hand, during cross-examination, both the witnesses for the defence side, namely, the DW-3 and the DW4 have deposed that they deposed for their friend. Hence, they may be categorized in the category of interested witnesses, and the Tribunal may not be faulted within not relying upon the testimony of such witnesses. As such, the finding arrived at by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal needs no interference by this appellate court. [30] The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal relied on the evidence on record in arriving at the conclusion that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. The Tribunal also has not erred in coming to the finding that the ownership of the offending vehicle has not been transferred and the registration certificate continues to show the name of appellant No. 1 as its owner. The fact that the 16 MACApp./523/2017 Page 16 appellant No. 2 was driving the said vehicle is not disputed by anyone. Hence, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal may not be faulted with in arriving at the finding of fault on the part of the appellants and directing the appellants to pay the compensation to the claimants. [31] In view of the discussions made and reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the impugned judgment passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. [32] The instant appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. [33] Send back the records of the MAC Case No. 791/2015 to the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, along with a copy of this judgment. [34] The appellants are directed to deposit the compensation amount to the claimants within a period of 6 (six) weeks from the date of this judgment. JUDGE Comparing Assistant Munmu n Boruah Digitally signed by Munmun Boruah Date: 2026.06.18 18:03:30 +05'30'