Ravindra Narayan Malap v. President, Guhagar Education Society
2016-06-06
R.D.DHANUKA
body2016
DailyLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has impugned the order and judgment dated 30th September, 2005 passed by the School Tribunal, Kolhapur Region, Kolhapur dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner. Some of the relevant facts for the purpose of deciding this petition are as under :- 2. It is the case of the petitioner that he belongs to Kunabi community which is included in Other Backward Class category by the State of Maharashtra. The respondent no.1 society is running a Secondary and Higher Secondary School at Ratnagiri district. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent no.1 decided to promote one Mr. D.M. More, a peon working with them on the post of Lab Assistant from the academic year 2000-2001 and therefore causing a clear vacancy. The respondent no.1 vide their letter dated 12th May, 2000 addressed to the District Employment and Self-Employment Guidance Centre, Ratnagiri called for the list of eligible candidates for the post of peon and other posts. In the said list, the name of the petitioner was included for the post of peon. The respondent no.1 thereafter issued an advertisement on 23rd May, 2000 inviting the applications from eligible candidates for the post of peon from the open category. After interviewing the petitioner and other candidates, the petitioner was selected for the post of peon. 3. On 27th July, 2000, the respondent no.2 appointed the petitioner as peon on clear, vacant and permanent post w.e.f. 28th July, 2000 on two years probation. It was mentioned in the letter of appointment that the said appointment was subject to the approval of the Education Department. 4. On 1st March, 2000 the Government of Maharashtra passed a resolution thereby banning the recruitment on the posts of non-teaching meant for the open categories which had became vacant due to the superannuation, voluntary retirement and death w.e.f. 1st March, 2000. 5. On 6th July, 2001, the Education Officer issued a letter to the management informing that there was ban on the recruitment of open categories on the post of non-teaching staff, which had become vacant from 1st March, 2000 and thus the appointment of the petitioner to the post of peon could not be accorded. 6.
5. On 6th July, 2001, the Education Officer issued a letter to the management informing that there was ban on the recruitment of open categories on the post of non-teaching staff, which had become vacant from 1st March, 2000 and thus the appointment of the petitioner to the post of peon could not be accorded. 6. It is not in dispute that based on the said letter dated 6th July, 2001, the management issued a letter of termination on 24th September, 2001 thereby terminating the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 23rd October, 2001. This decision of the management was impugned by the petitioner before the school tribunal by filing an appeal (100 of 2001) on 23rd October, 2001. The school tribunal granted stay of the termination by an order dated 1st November, 2001. On the basis of the said order, the petitioner was reinstated in service. The said interim order continued till disposal of the appeal by the school tribunal on 30th September, 2005. The petitioner continued the work as a peon in view of the said interim stay granted by the school tribunal till the date of disposal of the said appeal filed by the petitioner by the school tribunal vide order dated 30th September, 2005. 7. During the pendency of the appeal, the Government issued another resolution on 4th May, 2002 stating that the appointments of non-teaching employees which were made prior to 22nd December, 2000 following the roaster would be granted and approved. 8. By an order and judgment dated 30th September, 2005 the school tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner on various grounds. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner invited my attention to the Government Resolution dated 1st March, 2000 and would submit that the prior permission of the Government was required under the said circular duly only in case of the appointments to the post of having fallen vacant after 1st March, 2000 in case of superannuation, resignation, retirement or death. He states that admittedly the post of peon had fallen vacant in view of then employee who was occupying the said post was promoted to the post of Lab Assistant. He states that the said Government resolution dated 1st March, 2000 was thus not applicable and binding.
He states that admittedly the post of peon had fallen vacant in view of then employee who was occupying the said post was promoted to the post of Lab Assistant. He states that the said Government resolution dated 1st March, 2000 was thus not applicable and binding. He submits that in any event the services of the petitioner was terminated by the management only on the ground that his appointment was not approved by the Education Department. He submits that the services of the employee cannot be terminated by the management on the ground the his approval was not granted by the Education Department. In support of his submission, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of Full Bench of this court in case of St. Ulai High School vs. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh & Anr., 2007(1) Bom.C.R. 540 and in particular paragraph 12.1. 10. It is submitted by the learned counsel that though the circular was issued by the Government on 4th May, 2002 which was during the pendency of the appeal, the school tribunal placed reliance on the said circular. He submits that the petitioner has already worked as a peon for more than 5 years in view of the appointment of the petitioner made by the management and thereafter pursuant to the stay order granted by the school tribunal. He submits that the petitioner has not been paid any salary either by the Government or by the management though he worked for more than 5 years. 11. It is submitted that even if the Government has not approved the appointment of the petitioner on the ground that the management could not have appointed the petitioner on the said post in view of the resolution passed by the Government, the salary in that event will have to be paid by the management. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that admittedly the work of the petitioner was found satisfactory. This position was also not disputed by the management before the school tribunal. 12. Learned counsel for the management on the other hand does not dispute that the work of the petitioner was found satisfactory. He however submits that while appointing the petitioner on the post of the peon, it was made clear that his appointment was subject to the approval of the Education Department.
12. Learned counsel for the management on the other hand does not dispute that the work of the petitioner was found satisfactory. He however submits that while appointing the petitioner on the post of the peon, it was made clear that his appointment was subject to the approval of the Education Department. He submits that since the Education Department has refused to grant approval of the petitioner to the post of the peon, the respondent management had rightly taken cognizance of the said order passed by the Education Department and has rightly issued a letter of termination. He submits that admittedly the petitioner was appointed in the post of the open category. He submits that the school tribunal has rightly rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner and thus no interference is warranted in the order passed by the school tribunal. 13. A perusal of the Government resolution dated 1st March 2000 issued by the State Government clearly indicates that by the said resolution, the Government had imposed a condition that the post falling vacant after 1st March, 2000 due to superannuation, voluntary retirement, resignation or death, no appointment shall be made without approval of the Government. It is not in dispute that as far as the post of peon to which the petitioner was appointed had fallen vacant in view of the then employee holding the said post was promoted to the post of lab assistant by the management. In my view the said resolution dated 1st March, 2000 which was pressed in service by the Education Officer was thus not applicable in case of the appointment of the petitioner at all. 14. There is no dispute that the Education Officer has not granted the approval to the appointment of the petitioner in view of the Government resolution dated 1st March, 2000. In my view the view taken by the Education Officer thereby applying the said Government resolution dated 1st March, 2000 in the facts of this case itself was without application of mind. Be that as it may, even if the Education Officer has rejected the appointment of the petitioner to the post of peon, the management could not have terminated the services of the petitioner on the ground that the approval was refused by the Education Officer.
Be that as it may, even if the Education Officer has rejected the appointment of the petitioner to the post of peon, the management could not have terminated the services of the petitioner on the ground that the approval was refused by the Education Officer. Full Bench of this court in case of St.Ulai High School (supra) has held that there is no provision in the MEPS Act, 1997 nor the rules which mandate the grant of approval by the Education Officer as a condition precedent to a valid order of appointment. In my view since the appointment of the petitioner was made to the post of peon in a clear vacancy and the petitioner was found as a suitable candidate satisfying all the conditions, services of the petitioner could not be terminated merely on the basis of letter of Education Officer refusing to grant the approval to the appointment of the petitioner. There was no grievance about the satisfactory work of the petitioner made by the respondent management at any point of time. On the contrary it was also the case of the management before the school tribunal that the work of the petitioner was found satisfactory. The judgment of Full Bench of this court in case of St. Ulai High School (supra) squarely applies to the facts of this case. I am respectfully bound by the said judgment. 15. A perusal of the impugned order passed by the school tribunal clearly indicates that though the resolution dated 4th May, 2002 was passed much after termination of the services of the petitioner, the school tribunal has placed reliance on the said Government resolution while dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner. In my view since the Government resolution dated 1st March, 2000 itself was not applicable to the post of the peon which was filled up in view of the erstwhile employee promoted to the post of lab assistance, the government resolution dated 4th May, 2000 could even otherwise be made not applicable to the case of the petitioner. 16. The impugned order passed by the school tribunal shows perversity and is contrary to the view taken by the Full Bench of this court and thus deserves to be set aside. 17.
16. The impugned order passed by the school tribunal shows perversity and is contrary to the view taken by the Full Bench of this court and thus deserves to be set aside. 17. I, therefore, pass the following order :- (a) Impugned order dated 30th September, 2005 passed by the presiding officer of the school tribunal dismissing the Appeal No. 100 of 2001 filed by the petitioner is set aside. Appeal No. 100 of 2001 filed by the petitioner is allowed. (b) The order of termination dated 24th September, 2001 passed by the management is set aside. The management is directed to reinstate the petitioner with full back-wages with continuity of service and all incidental benefits. The order shall be implemented by the management within four weeks from today. (c) The impugned order passed by the Education Officer refusing to grant approval to the appointment of the petitioner is set aside. The approval to the appointment of the petitioner to the post of peon from the date of appointment is granted. 18. Parties to act on the authenticated copy of this order. 19. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms.