CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) Reserved on : 13.07.2026 Date of Pronouncement : 23.07.2026 Date of Uploading : 24.07.2026 Ashok Chopra (since deceased) through his LRs. ......Petitioner Vs. UCO Bank and others ......Respondents Whether only the operative part of the judgment is pronounced? NO Whether full judgment is pronounced? YES CORAM: HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA Present : Mr. Ish Puneet Singh, Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. Manoj Makkar, Advocate, Mr. Navjeet Kaur, Advocate, for Mr. Vimal Gupta, Advocate, for the respondents. **** SUDEEPTI SHARMA J. 1. The challenge in the present writ petition is to order dated 29.09.2015 as well as order dated 04.02.2016, whereby the petitioner is dismissed from service and the appeal filed by him against the dismissal order dated 29.09.2015 is also dismissed respectively. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner joined respondent-bank as Clerk in the year 1982. He was promoted as Assistant Manager in the year 2006. He was working as Additional Manager, DMCH Branch, Ludhiana, from 16.05.2013 to 31.08.2014. On 21.01.2015, show VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -2- cause notice was issued to him. He filed reply to the same. Thereafter, after taking into consideration the reply to show cause notice and the statement of allegations in the charges and the inquiry report, disciplinary authority passed order of dismissal dated 29.09.2015. He filed appeal against the same, which was also dismissed vide order dated 04.02.2016. Hence, the present writ petition. SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that no personal hearing was granted by the disciplinary authority before passing the order of dismissal. Further, that the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority did not take into account 33 years of unblemished service of the petitioner before dismissing the petitioner. And the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is not proportionate to the allegations levelled against him. He, therefore, prays that the present petition be allowed and orders dated 29.09.2015 and 04.02.2016 be set aside. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the disciplinary authority passed self-speaking detailed order of dismissal dated 29.09.2015 after following principles of natural justice and the appellate authority as well decided the appeal after taking into consideration the detailed order passed by the disciplinary authority. He, therefore, prays that the present writ petition be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the whole file of this case with their able assistance. VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -3- 6. A perusal of order dated 29.09.2015 shows that it is detailed and self-speaking order. As per the order dated 29.09.2015, the following allegations were levelled against the petitioner:- 1. Sh. Ashok Chopra scouted proposals through intermediaries namely Sh. Garish Kumar, Sh. Parveen Kumar, Sh. Lucky and Sh. Ravi Kant. On various occasions it is reported that amount has been transferred to the accounts of the above intermediaries to the debit of accounts of the parties to whom credit facilities were sanctioned by him, thus diverting the funds so lent to the borrowers. The details of these transactions are given at Sr. Nos. 1 (a) to 1(m) of Statement of Allegations. For the above transactions, the vouchers are reportedly prepared by Garish Kumar himself. Most of the vouchers are not signed by any branch officials. An amount of Rs. 2,67,207.00 has been deposited in cash on different dates in the Savings Bank account No.13400110027875 of Sh. Garish Kumar which commensurate with the dates on which the credit facilities were sanctioned by the branch to various constituents during the period 23.10.2013 to 16.10.2014, the balance in said account as on date is zero. 2. A complaint dated 27.10.2014 has been received from Sh. Jasbir Singh, Sole Proprietor of M/s Guru Nanak Enterprises, inter alia, complaining that sh. Parveen, who introduced himself as sh. Chopra's representative, had taken a loan of Rs.1.00 lac which was not returned. It is alleged that Sh. Parveen had taken blank cheque No.513152 from him. It is revealed that cash credit facility of Rs. 8.00 lacs was allowed to the party by him on 04.11.2013 and on very next day i.e. on 05.11.2013 first disbursement in the account was by way of debit of cheque no. 513152 for Rs. 1.00 lac to the account. The above was paid in cash and Sh. Chopra had authorised payment under his signature by writing "PAY CASH" on the face of the cheque. The cheque does not contain PAID CASH stamp across its body and there is no denomination detail on the back of this cheque. The cheque was verified in the system by Sh. Chopra. The above facts corroborate the content of the complaint and his collaboration with intermediaries. 3. Credit facilities to the tune of Rs.10.00 lacs was sanctioned to M/s Royal Traders under UCO Trader VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -4- scheme on 31.11.2013 which was accommodation as there are no stocks and unit is closed. 4. Credit facilities to the tune of Rs.12.00 lacs was sanctioned to M/s Sparkle Car Craze on 30.11.2013 for purchase of auto wheels/auto parts/stereo etc. which was ccommodation as there are no stocks and the same is a car washing hub. 5. Sh. Chopra sanctioned 37 car loans during his tenure in the branch and failed to obtain copies of Registration Certificate containing Bank's hypothecation clause, copies of Insurance Cover, copies of Sale Certificates in these accounts. In all the accounts there is nothing on record to suggest that contribution of the applicant in the shape of margin money has been taken before sanctioning the loans. The demand drafts were handed over to broker/agent instead of sending them directly to the dealer. End use of the funds have not been verified and he did not call for the inspection of the cars and did not prepare the inspection notes as in number of cases the cars purchased with Bank's finance is not existing. The efforts of the branch for inspecting the vehicles have failed as the borrowers are not cooperating now and it is implied that the assets are not created with Bank finance. Out of the 37 Car Loans, there are 19 Car Loans where copy of the Registration Certificate is not obtained. In 17 Car Loans copy of the Insurance Cover is not obtained and 27 Car loans where Invoice not obtained. 6. In Car Loan advanced to Sh. Vikram Gupta, the invoice evidencing sale of car is issued on 15.02.2014 before the date of disbursement of loan i.e. 28.02. 2014. The certificate of Pollution Control issued by General Motors is issued on 31.10.2013 almost four months earlier implying that fabricated documents have been accepted by him. 7. In car loan advanced to Ms. Reetu, the TR has been filed on 26.03.2014 i.e. at the time of sanctioning of loan. The Dealer has declined having issued Performa Invoice and Retail Invoice kept on record. It is informed by the dealer that said car was not sold to Ms. Reetu but to Santosh Goyal. a relative of Ms. Reetu. 8. In car loan advanced to Ms. Anita Verma, Retail Invoice 24.03.2014 whereas loan was disbursed on 19.04.2014 meaning that car was purchased one month before the disbursement of loan. The car is registered in VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -5- other name with Registration Authority other than our borrower. 9. Term loan of Rs.9.50 lacs was sanctioned under CGIMSE to M/s Sonam Enterprises on 18.6.2013 which has been declared NPA on 31.12.2013 and is a quick mortality case. It is gathered that unit was not functioning for a long period. He did not inspect the unit after sanction of the term loan and did not verify the end use. The term loan was sanctioned without recommendation of any official of the branch. 10. The current account of M/s Sharma Trading House was opened on 13.05.2013. The account opening form is partly filled. The activity of the firm could not be ascertained. An amount of Rs.64.00 lacs was received in the account on 26.09.2013 and on 07.10.2013 routed through account of M/s Best Pack Board Pvt. Ltd. and huge payments of Rs.64.00 lacs has been made to the debit of the account on 07.10.2013 through eight self cheques, the details of denomination has not been filled on the back of the cheque. The transactions were suspicious and he as Branch Head did not notice the same. 11. Many cash and clearing credit transactions are noted in account No.11020500000006 of Sh. Chopra. There are twenty two various accounts in his name as on 21.10.2014 with total deposit of Rs.28,41,215.00 and in most of the cases the deposits are withdrawn. Thereafter, the following charges were levelled against him: 1. Shri Ashok Chopra, while sanctioning and disbursing loans to borrowers allowed access to outsiders to handle the prospective loan proposals who acted as Intermediaries for scouting the loan proposals for considerations with an ulterior motive for personal gain. Thus, Shri Chopra failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity and honesty, which is violative of Regulation 3(1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, as amended. 2. Shri Ashok Chopra, in utter violation of Bank's extant guidelines allowed accommodation advances, thus Mr. Chopra had grossly abused his official position and in exercise of powers conferred on him acted otherwise than his best judgment which is violative of Regulation 3(3) of UCO Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, as amended. VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -6- 3. Shri Chopra had acted in a manner which has tarnished image of the Bank before public. He also failed to discharge his duties with utmost devotion and diligence which is unbecoming of a Bank officer and is violative of Regulation 3(1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, as amended. 4. Shri Ashok Chopra had committed breach of faith in performance of his duties. He thus, acted in a manner unbecoming of a Bank Officer which is violative of Regulation 3(1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, as amended. 7. A perusal of the file shows that thereafter, departmental inquiry proceedings were initiated against the petitioner after issuing him shows cause notice and affording him opportunity to submit his reply. Petitioner filed reply to the charge-sheet but the same was found to be unsatisfactory. Thereafter, regular departmental inquiry was conducted, wherein the petitioner was granted all reasonable opportunities to defend himself. He participated in the inquiry proceedings and cross-examined all the witnesses. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the same has been passed by taking into consideration each and every allegations/charges separately and the detailed inquiry was conducted for each allegation and even the order depicts allegation wise decision separately. A perusal of the order further shows that principles of natural justice were followed and the petitioner was granted full opportunity to defend his case and rather, he had cross-examined all the witnesses. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the principles of natural justice were not followed while passing the impugned order, is rejected by this Court. VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -7- 8. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Dalbir Singh, 2021(4) SCT 155 held as under:- “17. We find that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction while exercising the power of judicial review over the orders passed in the disciplinary proceedings which were conducted while adhering to the principles of natural justice. 18. The High Court failed to notice the fact that in the charge sheet issued on 27.6.1993, the allegation was that the writ petitioner failed to perform his fatigue duty from 9 to 10 am and was disobedient to the lawful orders issued to him. There was no allegation of use of a fire arm leading to death of Shri Harish Chander and injuries to Shri Hari Singh. 19. The writ petitioner completed his fatigue duty at 10 am and then reported for duty at the Headquarters. In the later Charge Sheet dated 25.2.2013, the departmental witnesses have uniformly deposed that the noise of firing of 15-20 gun shots was heard around 11 am on 11.4.1993. In fact, PW-6 Constable D.K. Mishra is the one who immobilized the writ petitioner when he was in the process of loading another magazine in the self- loading rifle. Still further, PW-5 Brij Kishore Singh has deposed that 3-4 soldiers had taken the self-loaded rifle of the writ petitioner. Such self-loaded rifle is the one which was issued to the writ petitioner. 20. The statement of some of the departmental witnesses was that they heard that the writ petitioner used his personal weapon but such part of the statements is hearsay evidence. It was open to the writ petitioner to lead evidence that he was not using the official weapon but a personal weapon to rebut the stand of the Department. 21. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Haryana & Anr. v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 was dealing with the issue of non-examination of passengers when the allegation against the conductor was non-issuance of the tickets. This Court held that in a domestic enquiry, strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply and that all materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -8- hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. This Court held as under: "4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The `residuum' rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence - not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. ..........." 22. This Court in Union of India & Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 had laid down the VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -9- broad parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction of judicial review. The Court held as under: "12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -10- (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." 23. In another Judgment reported as B.C Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 749, it was held that the power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. The Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. The Court is to examine as to whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. This Court held as under:- "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -11- justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued." 24. This Court in Management of Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Coimbatore) Limited v. M. Chandrasekaran, (2016) 16 SCC 16 held that in exercise of power of judicial review, the Labour Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction in reappreciating the evidence adduced before the enquiry officer and in substituting his own judgment to that of the disciplinary authority. It was not a case of no legal evidence. The question as to decision of the disciplinary authority of dismissing the respondent is just and proper could be assailed by the respondent in appropriate proceedings. Considering the fact that there was adequate material produced in the departmental enquiry evidencing that fatal accident was caused by the respondent while driving the vehicle on duty, the burden to prove that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence was on the respondent. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur squarely applies to the fact situation. The Court held as under: "11. The respondent on the other hand contends that the Commissioner has applied the well-settled legal position that there can be no presumption of VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -12- misconduct by the employees. That, charge must be proved by the Department during the inquiry. Non- examination of the material witnesses such as eyewitnesses present on the spot, conductor and passengers, travelling on the same bus was fatal. For, it entails in not substantiating the charges against the respondent and failure to discharge the initial onus resting on the Department to prove the charge as framed. According to the respondent, no fault can be found with the tangible reasons recorded by the Commissioner as noticed by the Single Judge (reproduced above); and resultantly, the conclusion of the Commissioner of not according approval to the order of dismissal is just and proper. It is submitted that the Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent and issuing direction to the appellant to reinstate him with back wages and continuity of service and all attendant benefits accrued to him." 25. This Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 764 held that the degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond reasonable doubt", he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of "preponderance of probability". It was held as under: "11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -13- proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond reasonable doubt", he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of "preponderance of probability". Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside." (Emphasis Supplied) 26. This Court in Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. NOIDA & Ors., (2007) 10 SCC 385 held that the criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public, whereas, the departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It was held as under: "11. A bare perusal of the order which has been quoted in its totality goes to show that the same is not based on any rational foundation. The conceptual difference between a departmental inquiry and criminal proceedings has not been kept in view. Even orders passed by the executive have to be tested on the touchstone of reasonableness. [See Tata Cellular v. Union of India [(1994) 6 VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -14- SCC 651] and Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh [(2004) 2 SCC 130].] The conceptual difference between departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings have been highlighted by this Court in several cases. Reference may be made to Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. T. Srinivas [(2004) 7 SCC 442 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1011], Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry [(2005) 10 SCC 471 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1605] and Uttaranchal RTC v. Mansaram Nainwal [(2006) 6 SCC 366 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1341]. "8. ... The purpose of departmental inquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offense for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in the criminal cases against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental inquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offense generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When the trial for a criminal offense is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offense as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [in short `the Evidence Act']. The converse is the case of departmental inquiry. The inquiry in a departmental proceeding relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -15- under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. ... Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental inquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defense at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances." 27. This Court in Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya & Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 699 held that in the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment. It was held as under: "7. ...There is yet another reason. The approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment , as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Penal Code, 1860, if any) are established and, if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings, to repeat, should not be a matter of course but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly delayed." (Emphasis Supplied) 28. Mr. Yadav, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted that during the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court, the appellants were given opportunity to produce the registers of the entrustment of S.L.R. to the writ petitioner. But it was stated that record was not available being an old record as the incident was of 1993. The enquiry was initiated in 2013 after the acquittal of the writ petitioner from the criminal trial. VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -16- Therefore, in the absence of the best evidence of registers, the oral evidence of use of official weapon stands proven on the basis of oral testimony of the departmental witnesses. 29. The burden of proof in the departmental proceedings is not of beyond reasonable doubt as is the principle in the criminal trial but probabilities of the misconduct. The delinquent such as the writ petitioner could examine himself to rebut the allegations of misconduct including use of personal weapon. In fact, the reliance of the writ petitioner is upon a communication dated 1.5.2014 made to the Commandant through the inquiry officer. He has stated that he has not fired on higher officers and that he was out of camp at the alleged time of incident. Therefore, a false case has been made against him. His further stand is that it was a terrorist attack and terrorists have fired on the Camp. None of the departmental witnesses have been even suggested about any terrorist attack or that the writ petitioner was out of camp. Constable D.K. Mishra had immobilized the writ petitioner whereas all other witnesses have seen the writ petitioner being immobilized and being removed to quarter guard. PW-5 Brij Kishore Singh deposed that 3-4 soldiers had taken the Self-Loading Rifle (S.L.R.) of the writ petitioner in their possession. Therefore, the allegations in the chargesheet dated 25.2.2013 that the writ petitioner has fired from the official weapon is a reliable finding returned by the Departmental Authorities on the basis of evidence placed before them. It is not a case of no evidence, which alone would warrant interference by the High Court in exercise of power of judicial review. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that there was any infraction of any rule or regulations or the violation of the principles of natural justice. The best available evidence had been produced by the appellants in the course of enquiry conducted after long lapse of time. 30. Consequently, we find that the order passed by the High Court is not sustainable. Hence, the same is set aside and the order of punishment of dismissal passed on 21.12.1996 as affirmed in appeal and revision stands restored. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.” VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-9065-2016 (O&M) -17- 9. In view of the above, once the inquiry report is detailed and disciplinary authority dealt with each and every allegation separately after affording full opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner, therefore, in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court, no interference is required by this Court. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. 10. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (SUDEEPTI SHARMA) JUDGE 23.07.2026 Virender Whether speaking/non-speaking : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No VIRENDRA SINGH ADHIKARI 2026.07.24 18:46 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document