CWP-23988-2016 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP-23988-2016 MUMTAJ KHAN .....Petitioner Versus PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, HISAR AND ANR. ....Respondents 1. The date when the judgment is reserved 14.07.2026 2. The date when the judgment is pronounced 22.07.2026 3. The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website 23.07.2026 4. Whether only operative part of the judgment is pronounced or whether the full judgment is pronounced Full 5. The date, if any, of the pronouncement of full judgment, and reasons thereof N.A. CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Present: Mr. Naveen Daryal, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Anurag Jain, Advocate, Ms.Ashika Kalra, Advocate Mr. Aamol Singh, Advocate and Ms. Dimple Jain, Advocate for respondent No.2. **** KIRTI SINGH, J. 1. This petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed for quashing the award dated 15.09.2016 (Annexure P-5) passed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Hisar in Reference No. 35 of 2015, to the extent the petitioner has been denied the relief of SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.23 15:33 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-23988-2016 -2- reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages, and has instead been awarded a lump sum compensation of Rs.30,000/-. 2. The petitioner was engaged as a Carpenter with respondent No.2- Trust with effect from 01.09.2014 and worked till 07.07.2015. His case before the Labour Court was that his services were terminated orally and illegally by the President of the Trust on 12.07.2015, without notice, without retrenchment compensation and in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; and that one Sonu, engaged subsequent to him, was retained in violation of Section 25-G of the Act. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Labour Court, having itself concluded that the petitioner's services were wrongly terminated, ought not to have denied reinstatement particularly when the management's consistent stand was that it had never terminated the petitioner, and that it was willing to take him back. Learned counsel further submits that the compensation of ₹30,000/- awarded by the Labour Court is wholly inadequate and disproportionate, having regard to the petitioner's length of service, the abrupt and illegal manner of his termination, and the fact that he was deprived of retrenchment compensation as well as wages for the period he remained on leave after suffering an injury during the course of his employment. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Jaipur Development Authority v. Ramsahai, (2006) 11 SCC 684; Vice Chancellor, Guru Nanak Dev University v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, 2015(4) RSJ 729; and Guru Jambheshwar University v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, CWP-11944-2000, decided by a Division Bench of this Court on 26.09.2000. SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.23 15:33 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-23988-2016 -3- 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent- management, while reiterating the submissions made before the learned Labour Court, submit that the petitioner, who was engaged only as a casual labourer had himself abandoned the job on 07.07.2015, that he had not completed 240 days of continuous service in the preceding calendar year, and that no junior was retained in his place in violation of the principle of "last come, first go". 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the award, this Court does not find any infirmity in the finding of the Labour Court that the petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement. 6. Before proceeding further, a gainful reference can be made to the proposition of law as discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.6511 of 2005 titled as Surendranagar District Panchayat Vs. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, relevant paras whereof reads thus:- “8. As per Section 25F, no workman who is in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer unless conditions laid therein are fulfilled. The retrenchment is defined in Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act). Under the definition termination of the service of a workman by the employer by any reason whatsoever, otherwise than, as a punishment, by way of disciplinary action, would constitute retrenchment except in cases accepted in the Section itself, they are :- i) a voluntary retirement of a workman; ii) retirement of a workman on reaching the age of superannuation; iii) termination of the service of a workman as a result of nonrenewal of the contract of employment; or iv) termination of the service on the ground of continued ill- health of the workman. Unless these reasons are existed and proved, termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason, would constitute retrenchment. Therefore, if the employer is to retrench the workmen employed in his industry who is in continuous service has to follow the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. To attract provisions of Section 25F, the workman claiming protection under it, has to prove that there exists relationship of employer and employee; that he is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act; the establishment in which he is employed is an industry within the meaning of the Act and he must have put in not less than one year of continuous service as defined by Section 25B under the employer. These conditions are cumulative. If any of these conditions are missing the provisions of Section 25F will not attract. To get relief from the court the workman has to establish that he has right to continue in service and that his service has been terminated without SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.23 15:33 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-23988-2016 -4- complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The Section postulates three conditions to be fulfilled by an employer for getting a valid retrenchment, namely:- i) One month's clear notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or that the workman has been paid wages for the period of notice in lieu of such notice; ii) payment of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof, in excess of six months; iii) a notice to the appropriate Government in the prescribed manner. 9. To attract the provisions of Section 25F, one of the conditions required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would not be not less than one year. Section 25B of the Act defines continuous service for the purposes of Chapter V-A "Lay-off and Retrenchment". The purport of this Section is that if a workman has put in an uninterrupted service of the establishment, including the service which may be interrupted on account of sickness, authorised leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lock-out or cessation of work, that is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, shall be said to be a continuous service, for that period. Thus the workman shall be said to be in continuous service for one year i.e., 12 months irrespective of the number of days he has actually worked with interrupted service, permissible under Section 25B. However, the workmen must have been in service during the period, i.e., not only on the date when he actually worked but also on the days he could not work under the circumstances set out in sub-section (1). The workman must be in the employment of the employer concerned on the days he has actually worked but also on the days on which he has not worked. The import of sub-section (1) of Section 25B is that the workman should be in the employment of the employer for the continuous, uninterrupted period for one year except the period the absence is permissible as mentioned hereinabove. Subsection (2) of Section 25B introduces the fiction to the effect that even if the workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of Clause (i) of Section 25B for the period of one year or six months he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for that period under an employer if he has actually worked for the days specified in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2). By the legal fiction of sub-section 2(a) (i), the workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service for one year if he is employed underground in a mine for 190 days or 240 days in any other case. Provisions of the Section postulate that if the workman has put in at least 240 days with his employer, immediately prior to the date of retrenchment, he shall be deemed to have served with the employer for a period of one year to get the benefit of Section 25F. 16. In Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225, it is said by this Court that before a workman can claim retrenchment not being in consonance of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, he has to show that he has been in continuous service of not less than one year with the employer who had retrenched him from service. 17. In Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 - (At Page 26, Para 3), this Court held that "In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside." SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.23 15:33 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-23988-2016 -5- 19. In the light of the aforesaid, it was necessary for the workman to produce the relevant material to prove that he has actually worked with the employer for not less than 240 days during the period twelve calendar months preceding the date of termination. What we find is that apart from the oral evidence the workman has not produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that regard was produced; no coworker was examined; muster roll produced by the employer has not been contradicted. It is improbable that workman who claimed to have worked with the appellant for such a long period would not possess any documentary evidence to prove nature of his engagement and the period of work he had undertaken with his employer. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the date of termination of his service. The Courts below have wrongly drawn an adverse inference for non production of the record of the workman for ten years. The scope of enquiry before the Labour Court was confined to only 12 months preceding the date of termination to decide the question of continuation of service for the purpose of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman has never contended that he was regularly employed in the Panchayat for one year to claim the uninterrupted period of service as required under Section 25B(1) of the Act. In the fact and situation and in the light of the law on the subject, we find that the workman- respondent is not entitled for the protection or compliance of Section 25F of the Act before his service was terminated by the employer. As regards noncompliance of Sections 25G and 25H suffice is to say that witness Vinod Mishra examined by the appellant has stated that no seniority list was maintained by the department of daily wagers. In the absence of regular employment of the workman, the appellant was not expected to maintain seniority list of the employees engaged on daily wages and in the absence of any proof by the respondent regarding existence of the seniority list and his so called seniority no relief could be given to him for non-compliance of provisions of the Act. The Courts could have drawn adverse inference against the appellant only when seniority list was proved to be in existence and then not produced before the Court. In order to entitle the Court to draw inference unfavourable to the party, the Court must be satisfied that evidence is in existence and could have been proved.” 7. Reverting to the case in hand, the Labour Court, on appreciation of the attendance register (Ex.W-1), returned a finding that the petitioner had remained absent for 85 days between 01.09.2014 and 07.07.2015, including 23 days in May 2015 and 21 days in June 2015, had last reported for duty on 07.07.2015, and had, admittedly, not completed 240 days of service in the preceding calendar year. It further held that the engagement of one Sonu, in July 2015 came after, and consequent upon, this pattern of continuous unauthorised absence, and was accordingly a case of abandonment of service by the petitioner rather than illegal termination or retrenchment in violation SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.23 15:33 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-23988-2016 -6- of Section 25-G of the Act. On these findings, the Labour Court declined reinstatement, but awarded a lump sum compensation of Rs.30,000/- based on the totality of circumstances surrounding the services of the petitioner and the subsequent termination, which, in the considered opinion of this Court, is fairly adequate, and does not require any interference. 8. Trite to say that this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, does not sit as a Court of appeal over the findings recorded by the Labour Court. Interference is warranted only when the findings suffer from patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error. No ground has been made out to warrant interference in exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court. 9. Consequently, finding no merit in the present writ petition, the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE 22.07.2026 SwarnjitS Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.23 15:33 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document