( 2016:HHC:11065 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 112 of 2016 Reserved on: 06.07.2026 Date of Decision: 20.07.2026 Ram Lal ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & another ....Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the petitioner : Ms Sheetal Vyas, Advocate. For the Respondents/ State : Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 22.04.2016, passed by Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the Judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 08.01.2016, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 ( 2016:HHC:11065 upheld ( The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the Superintendent, Open Air Jail, Bilaspur, H.P., filed a complaint against the accused Ram Lal for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 9 of H. P. Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968 (in short Prisoners Act). It was asserted that the accused Ram Lal was convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P., in Session Trial No. 78/7 of 2005 for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 396, 395, 460, 457, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) on 30.12.2009. The accused applied for 40 days' parole on 03.04.2012, which was sanctioned, and the accused was released on parole on 21.07.2012. His parole was extended for fourteen days, and he was to surrender on 15.09.2012; however, he failed to do so. A wireless message was sent to the police to arrest the accused. A telephonic message was received from the Crime Branch, Chandigarh, on 15.11.2013 that the accused was arrested by Chandigarh Police in F.I.R. 3 ( 2016:HHC:11065 No. 367 dated 15.11.2013 for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act. The custody of the accused was handed over to the Superintendent of Jail for serving the sentence. The respondent had overstayed by 1 year and 2 months on the date of his arrest. Hence, a complaint was made for taking action against the accused as per the law. 3. The Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 9 of the Prisoners Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 6 witnesses to prove its case. Bhanu Prakash (CW-1) is the complainant. Vikas Katoch (CW-2) proved that the custody of the accused was transferred from the Chandigarh Police. HC Jagdish (CW-3) brought the accused from Chandigarh to Bilaspur. SI Suheel Kumar (CW-4) arrested the accused with 220 Grams of Charas. Sohan Lal (PW-5) proved the record. ASI Jagpal (CW- 6) proved the entries in the daily diary. 4 ( 2016:HHC:11065 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedures (CrPC), admitted that he was convicted and sentenced by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin. He admitted that he had applied for 42 days' parole, which was extended by 14 days. He admitted that he was supposed to surrender on 15.09.2012. He claimed that his mother was unwell. He admitted that he was arrested in F.I.R. No. 367 of 2013, dated 15.11.2012, and thereafter he was lodged in the Open-Air Jail, Bilaspur. He stated that the complaint was filed against him because he was late in surrendering. He claimed that he was busy with the treatment of his ailing mother. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution's case was duly proved on record that the accused had overstayed his period of parole. The entry in the Daily Diary (Ext.CW6/C) showed that the accused had left the village and never contacted his parents after 14.09.2012, as per the parents of the accused. The accused was arrested in another case and could be brought to serve the sentence thereafter. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the 5 ( 2016:HHC:11065 commission of an offence punishable under Section 9 of the Prisoners Act and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 1 year, pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 1 month. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the Learned Additional Session Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused had overstayed his parole by 1 year and 2 months. The statement made by the accused under Section 313 of the CrPC corroborated the prosecution’s case. The plea taken by the accused that his mother was ill was not proved by any material on record. He was apprehended with Charas, which falsified the claim made by the accused that he had to look after his mother. The learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence, which did not require any interference from the Appellate Court; hence, the appeal was dismissed. 6 ( 2016:HHC:11065 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. The behaviour of the accused was good inside the jail. No constable had gone to take the accused in custody. The accused had himself informed the Chandigarh Police about his imprisonment in Bilaspur jail. He could not surrender to the authorities due to the illness of his mother. He was acquitted by this Court in his appeal. The benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was not extended. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The accused has been acquitted by this Court in an appeal preferred by him. The plea taken by the accused that his mother was ill was highly probable, and the 7 ( 2016:HHC:11065 accused had no intention of absconding. The learned Trial Court had imposed a severe sentence. Hence, she prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside, or in the alternative, the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court be reduced. She relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of Haryana: 2025 INSC 475 in support of her submissions. 11. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner/accused had not surrendered within the time granted to him. He was arrested by Chandigarh Police with Charas, which falsified the plea taken by him that his mother was ill and he was getting her treated. There is no infirmity in the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8 ( 2016:HHC:11065 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14 This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the 9 ( 2016:HHC:11065 power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or 10 ( 2016:HHC:11065 interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be 11 ( 2016:HHC:11065 treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 12 ( 2016:HHC:11065 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. Bhanu Prakash (CW-1) stated that the accused had applied for parole for 42 days vide application (Ext.CW1/A). 13 ( 2016:HHC:11065 The application was allowed vide letter (Ext.CW-1/C). The personal bond of the accused (Ext.CW-1/D) was received. A temporary release order was prepared, and he was released on parole with effect from 21.07.2012 till 31.08.2012. He was to surrender on 01.09.2012, but his parole was extended by 14 days. The accused was to surrender on 15.09.2012, but he failed to surrender. An intimation (Ext.CW1/G) was given to Station House Officer (SHO), Ghumarwin, District Bilapsur, H.P. A telephone call was received from Crime Branch Chandigarh on 15.03.2013, that the accused was arrested by Chandigarh Police in FIR No. 367 of 2013. The custody of the accused was handed over to the jail. The accused had overstayed his parole by 1 year and 2 months. He stated in his cross-examination that the conduct of the accused was good. He had earlier gone on parole but had surrendered on time. The accused had himself told the Chandigarh Police about his incarceration. He could not say that the accused had gone to Chandigarh for the treatment of his mother. 19. The cross-examination of this witness shows that the accused has not disputed his sentence, his release on parole, his failure to surrender after the parole and his arrest 14 ( 2016:HHC:11065 by Chandigarh police in an NDPS case. The accused also admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC. that he had applied for parole. Parole was sanctioned to him for 42 days, which was extended by 14 days, and he had not surrendered on time. He also admitted that he was arrested by the police in FIR No. 367 of 2013, and thereafter, he was lodged in the Open Air Jail, Bilaspur, H.P. He also claimed that the complaint was filed against him because he had overstayed his parole. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the statement made by the accused under Section 313 of CrPC can be used to lend assurance to the prosecution's case. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705: 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the accused recorded under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. It was observed at page 742: “51. That brings us to the question of whether such a statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is administered to the accused, the statements made by the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment if he gives false answers. Then comes sub-section (4), which reads: 15 ( 2016:HHC:11065 “313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.” Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari (1967) 3 SCR 708: AIR 1968 SC 110: 1968 Cri LJ 95. This Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M.B. 1951 SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC 468, held that an answer given by an accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 678: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730, this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the exact language in which the three-Judge bench answered the question, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at pages 684-685: “Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from 16 ( 2016:HHC:11065 the accused his version or explanation, if any, of the incident which forms the subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examination under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charged against him the court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he does not confess and in explaining circumstance appearing in the evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety.” (emphasis supplied) Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub- section (1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it now stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the presence of the accused is dispensed with, his examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with. Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub-section (4), asd the present sub-section (3) corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub-section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply with equal force.” 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but such statement 17 ( 2016:HHC:11065 cannot form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244: 27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422: (SCC pp. 357-58, para 23) “23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently improbable but is contradicted by the other evidence. According to this statement, the injury that the appellant received was caused by the appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim. This was contradicted by the statement of the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The injury found on his body when he was examined by the doctor on 13- 10-1961, negatives of both these versions. Neither of these versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which led to his washing his clothes and having a bath in River Patro, the amount of bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains being so considerable as to attract the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one as his clothes all got stained with 18 ( 2016:HHC:11065 blood, as also his books, his exercise book, his belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife which was discovered on his person was found to have been stained with blood according to the report of the Chemical Examiner. According to the post-mortem report, this knife could have been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like these, there being enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piercing the same with the other evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime.” (emphasis supplied) 21. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 213, that the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the prosecution’s case, can be used against him for recording a conviction. It was observed at page 275: - “52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to put material evidence to the accused under Section 313 CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing against him as well as to put forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution, can be used against him for rendering a 19 ( 2016:HHC:11065 conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.” 22. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to lend corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was held at page 761: - 24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement, if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be brushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held that since no oath is administered to the accused, the statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of course, shall not render himself liable to punishment merely on the basis of answers given while he was being examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section (4) says that the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953 Cri LJ 1933 held that the answers given by the accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR 678, this Court held that when the accused confesses to the commission of 20 ( 2016:HHC:11065 the offence with which he is charged, the court may rely upon the confession and proceed to convict him. 25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244, para 27) “27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction.” In this connection, reference may also be made to the judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185 and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766. The abovementioned decisions would indicate that the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt or confession as such cannot be made the sole basis for finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is not making the statement on oath, but all the same the confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of evidence since the same lends credence to the evidence led by the prosecution. 26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by the accused while examining him under Section 313, fully corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and hence the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved, and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.” 23. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned Courts below that the accused had overstayed his parole by I year and two months. 21 ( 2016:HHC:11065 24. It was submitted that no constable had visited the house of the accused to arrest him. This submission is only stated to be rejected. This Court held in State of H.P. v. Ram Lal 2006 Cri LJ 3070 that the prisoner is supposed to surrender himself to the Superintendent of jail from which he was released after the expiry of the parole, and in case of failure to surrender within 10 days without any sufficient cause, he is liable to be punished. It was observed: “7. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that the prisoner, on expiry of the period for which he is released under the Act, shall surrender himself to the Superintendent of the jail from which he was released. In case he does not surrender within 10 days from the due date, he can be arrested by a police officer without a warrant. In case the prisoner surrenders within a period of 10 days after the due date and satisfies the Superintendent of the concerned Jail that he was prevented by sufficient cause from surrendering on the due date, no action is to be taken against him. In case he fails to satisfy the Superintendent that he was prevented by any sufficient cause, he will be liable to be awarded specified penalties by the Superintendent. In case surrender was not within 10 days, the prisoner will further be liable to be punished under S. 9 of the Act. In view of the scheme of the aforesaid sections, I am of the view that the accused will be liable to be punished under S. 9 read with S. 8(2) of the Act only if he has failed to surrender on the due date without any sufficient cause preventing him from surrendering himself. However, in case the prisoner is prevented by a sufficient cause from 22 ( 2016:HHC:11065 surrendering himself on the due date, he cannot be convicted and punished under S. 9 of the Act. 25 Thus, the plea taken on behalf of the accused that the police had failed to visit his native place to take him to jail is contrary to the provisions of the Prisoners Act and will not help him. 26. The accused claimed that his mother was ill and he could not surrender because of his mother’s illness. He did not produce any evidence to support this plea. He did not file any medical evidence to show the illness of his mother. He did not examine his mother to prove this fact. The accused had not himself surrendered but was arrested by the Chandigarh Police with Charas. All these circumstances falsified the plea taken by the accused that his mother was ill and he had sufficient cause for overstaying. 27. Sohan Lal (CW-5) stated in his cross-examination that the accused was granted parole due to the illness of his mother, and this fact was verified by the police. Subsequently, it was found that the accused was getting his mother's treatment, because of which he could not surrender to jail. A heavy reliance was placed upon the part of this statement to submit that the accused had a sufficient cause for not 23 ( 2016:HHC:11065 surrendering on time. However, this submission is not acceptable. The statement made by this witness is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. If the hearsay evidence is to be admitted, the entry made in the daily diary (Ext.W6/E) and the statement of the mother of the accused (Ext.CW6/F) cannot be ignored, in which it was stated that the accused had only visited the house for one day on 07.06.2015 and not thereafter. However, both these pieces of evidence are inadmissible and will not help any party. 28. The burden to prove the sufficient cause was upon the accused. He could have discharged it by bringing on record the prescription slips or the treatment record, but he failed to do so, and the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused had overstayed his parole without any sufficient cause. 29. In Karan Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the amendment made by the legislature in the Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners Temporary Release Amendment Act, 2012, was not retrospective. It is difficult to see how this judgment will help the accused. There is no 24 ( 2016:HHC:11065 amendment in the present case, and the cited judgment does not apply to the facts of the present case. 30. Parole is a privilege granted to the accused on the assurance that he will return after availing the period of parole. It helps the accused to maintain social ties with society. Any deviation in adhering to the parole conditions can have a cascading effect because other prisoners released on parole are likely to violate the conditions of their parole, if any violation is treated with leniency. This would bring the whole penal system to its knees and would prevent the extension of benefits to the deserving candidates when the prisoners fail to surrender within the time granted to them. Therefore, no leniency can be shown in case of the violation of the parole conditions. In the present case, the accused was arrested for possession of charas during parole, and he had not surrendered even after the overstay. The accused had overstayed his parole by one year and two months. All these circumstances show that the petitioner did not deserve any sympathy, and the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court of one year is on the lesser side, which does not require any interference. 25 ( 2016:HHC:11065 31. No other point was urged. 32. In view of the above, the present revision petition fails, and it is dismissed. All the pending applications(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 33. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 20th July, 2026. (ravinder)