4 - IA-2016-2024.DOC IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2016 OF 2024 IN FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 4568 OF 2024 Girish Vithal Turki Thr. His CA Sharvari Udayshankar Keskar Applicant Versus Bhausaheb Bhikanrao Fuke Respondent _______ Ms. Harshali R. Gupte, Advocate, for Applicant. Mr. Namitkumar S. Pansare a/w Mr. Suyash S. Sule, Advocates for the Respondent. _______ CORAM: AARTI SATHE, J. DATE: 28th AUGUST 2026. P.C. 1. This Interim Application has been filed seeking condonation of delay of 1469 days in filing the present Appeal. The First Appeal challenges the order of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, dated 5th October 2019 allowing the Succession Certificate application preferred by the Respondent. The delay as sought to be excluded by learned counsel on behalf of Applicant is that they were pursuing their proceedings against the order dated 5th October 2019, passed by the City Civil Judge, Senior Division before the Hon'ble District Judge-1, Khed- Rajgurunagar, Dist. Pune in Civil Appeal No. 106 of 2019 wherein District Court passed the judgment dated 19 October 2023, the certified copy of which was obtained by them on 6 November 2023 holding that the forum for the Applicant Bharati 4 - IA-2016-2024.DOC to raise the grievance which is being challenged in the First Appeal would lie before this Court. 2. It is in these circumstances that the Applicant who was bonafidely pursuing the remedies before the above forum was unable to file the First Appeal in time. Further it has been submitted in the aforesaid application that the Applicant is suffering from medical problems, especially knee problems which create difficulty for him to travel or stand without support. The Applicant also had to undergo surgery, and on account of this, he was unable to travel to Mumbai to appoint the local advocate and give necessary instructions. 3. Learned counsel on behalf of the Applicant has also drawn attention of this Court to an order dated 24 February 2025, passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in a connected First Appeal arising from the same dispute which is under challenge in the present First Appeal where in a delay of 1469 days had been condoned in respect of the same Applicant. The order dated 24 February 2025 is reproduced below: 1. Interim Application has been preferred seeking condonation of delay of 1469 days caused in preferring the First Appeal. The First Appeal challenges the order of the Civil Judge Senior Division dated 5th October, 2019 rejecting the Appellant's Application for Probate of Will executed by one late Shailaja Fuke in favour of the Appellant. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the Applicant submits that against the order of the Civil Judge Senior Division, Khed, First Appeal was preferred before the District Court by way of Regular Civil Appeal No.105 of 2019 within time. She submits that vide judgment dated 19th October, 2023, the District Court by relying upon the decision in the case of Smt.Nola Jonathan Ranbhise vs. The Government of Maharashtra, decided on 14th February, 2024 in Writ Petition No.2777 of 2013 has returned the Appeal for filing in this Court. She submits that in view thereof, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is available to the Applicant and therefore, the period is required to be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. Page 2 of 4 Bharati 4 - IA-2016-2024.DOC 3. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent would submit that the Respondent had filed an Application for succession certificate whereas the Applicant had filed an Application for Probate. He submits that his Application came to be allowed and the Applicant's Application for probate came to be dismissed. He submits that the Respondent has preferred review of the judgment dated 19th October, 2023, as according to him, the Appeal would lie before the District Judge. He would further submit that the pleadings in the Application do not seek benefit of Section 14 of Limitation Act, the application is under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. He would submit that the delay is sought to be condoned on the ground of medical ailment which is not substantiated. 4. I have considered the submissions and perused the record. 5. The Application which has been filed seeks condonation of delay of 1469 days caused in preferring the First Appeal. Though the Application has not happily drafted inasmuch as the appropriate relief to seek is exclusion of the period spent by the Applicant in prosecuting the proceedings before the District Court, the submissions canvassed as well as the annexures to the Application would indicate that the relief which is sought by the Applicant, is in fact, an application under Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963. 6. It cannot be disputed that the Applicant had challenged the impugned judgment dated 5th October, 2019 by Filing an Appeal before the District Judge within time. By order of 19th October, 2023, the Court had returned the Appeal to the Appellant by holding that the Appeal lies before this Court and therefore, the present Application came to be filed. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which deals with the exclusion of period while computing the period of limitation provides for excluding the period where the proceedings for being prosecuted bonafide by the Applicant in a Court which for reason of defect of jurisdiction or any cause of a like nature is unable to proceed with the hearing. In the present case, what was required to be considered is the exclusion of the said period while computing the period of limitation. Even if no application would have been filed for while computing the period of limitation, the period which was spent by the Applicant prosecuting the Appeal before the District Court is liable to be excluded. The application satisfies all ingredients of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, as it is nobody's case that the Appeal proceedings before the District Court were not bonafide or that the same were not returned for defect of jurisdiction. 7. In light of the above, the Interim Application is allowed. The period during which the proceedings were pending before the District Court is liable to be excluded while computing the period of limitation for the purpose of filing the First Appeal. When so computed, the First Appeal is within time. 8. Interim Application stands disposed of in the above terms. 4. However, considering the submissions made in the Interim Application, this Court is of the view that sufficient cause has been made out to condone the delay in as much as the Applicant was bonafidely pursuing remedies before another Forum and in view of Section 14 of the Limitations Act, 1963, the Bharati 4 - IA-2016-2024.DOC period that the Applicant was pursuing the Appeal before the District Court would be liable to be excluded. Also in the order of 24th February 2025, passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in a connected First Appeal, the aforesaid delay has been condoned. 5. On the Respondent being served, the Respondent is represented by Mr. Namitkumar S. Pansare, learned counsel. There is no written opposition filed to this application. Mr. Namitkumar S. Pansare, although has orally opposed this application vehemently, he would not dispute the well settled position in law in a catena of judgments of the Supreme Court in regard to the principles to be followed on condonation of the delay and more particularly he would not dispute that, in the clear facts and circumstances of the case, as set out in the memo of the application, the Applicant ought not to suffer or be rendered remediless in pursuing the Appeal. 6. In the aforesaid circumstances, having perused the memo of the application and considering that a sufficient cause has been made out, in my opinion, the reasons as set out certainly provide for an appropriate justification by the applicant in regard to the delay in filing the appeal. It is hence in the interest of justice that the delay is condoned. 7. The Interim Application is hence allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). 8. The Appeal accordingly be listed for admission, subject to removal of objections, if any, to be removed within six weeks from today. 9. Interim application stands disposed of in the above terms. No costs. (AARTI SATHE, J.) Bharati