CriAppeal-357-2016 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 357 OF 2016 The State of Maharashtra Through Anti-Corruption Bureau, Aurangabad. … Appellant Versus Pandurang s/o Ramchandra Wamne, Age 50 years, Occupation : Block Education Officer, Gat Sadhan Kendra, Gangapur, District Aurangabad. … Respondent [Ori. Accused] ….. Mr. V. M. Jaware, APP for the Appellant-State. Mr. C. P. Sengaonkar, Advocate for the Respondent-Accused. ..... CORAM : ABHAY S. WAGHWASE, J. Reserved on : 21.04.2026 Pronounced on : 23.04.2026 JUDGMENT : 1. State hereby challenges the judgment and order dated 28.09.2015 passed by learned Special Judge, Vaijapur in Special Case (PC) No. 11 of 2012 acquitting respondent from charges under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). 2. In short, prosecution was launched against present respondent on complaint of PW1 Shinde that, for recommendation of continuation of his service as Special Teacher, there was demand of 2026:BHC-AUG:17728 CriAppeal-357-2016 -2- Rs.2,500/- by accused Wamne who was Block Education Officer. As complainant was not willing, he approached ACB and reported demand on the basis of which, trap was planned, necessary instructions were issued and on execution of trap, accused was apprehended and tried, but at trial came to be acquitted. Hence the instant appeal. 3. Learned APP submitted that, case of prosecution was proved beyond reasonable doubt. That, there was trustworthy and reliable evidence on the point of both, demand as well as acceptance. According to him, complainant and both panchas are lending support to each other. That, prior to trap, verification was got done and only thereafter trap was laid and it was also successful. According to him, essentials for attracting the charges were available but only due to incorrect appreciation, trial ended up in acquittal. He pointed out that, sanctioning authority was also examined and said authority deposed about application of mind to the papers and according sanction, but trial court has held it to be defective. According to him, too technical approach was adopted by trial court and for above reasons, he seeks interference by allowing the appeal. CriAppeal-357-2016 -3- 4. In answer to above, learned counsel for respondent accused would submit that firstly, there was no work with accused and he was not competent to make any recommendations as claimed by PW1. He pointed out that, in fact Chief Executive Officer was the appropriate authority and therefore, it is his submission that, there was no motive to put up demand or to accept money. He pointed out that, in support of ‘no work with accused’, defence witness was also examined. On this point, he seeks reliance of the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of G. V. Nanjundiah v. State (Delhi Administration) 1987 (suppl) SCC 266. 5. It is his next submission that here, it was necessary for prosecution to lend support to the testimony of complainant, who was interested witness, on the point of demand. However, according to him, here, regular pancha who had aided ACB in previous cases was made shadow pancha and as such he was not independent witness and was thus not worthy of credence. On this count, learned counsel seeks reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat through CBI v. Kumudchandra Pranjivan Shah (1997) SCC (Cri) 750. CriAppeal-357-2016 -4- 6. As regards to demand is concerned, he submitted that there was prior offer, rather than demand, in the vicinity of bus stand. He pointed out that immediate explanation of thrusting was tendered by the accused and it assumes significance and as such, defence was probabilized. 7. On the point of sanction, he submitted that sanctioning authority has itself admitted that, competent authority to accord sanction for an official below basic pay of Rs.10,650/- is Deputy Chief Minister, and for those above it, Chief Minister is the sanctioning authority and therefore, according to him, present witness was not competent to accord sanction and as such it being defective, trial court rightly held sanction to be invalid. For said reasons, he supports the judgment of acquittal and prays to dismiss the appeal for want of merits. 8. On the lines of above submissions, evidence on record is put to scrutiny and re-appreciated the same. The substratum of prosecution version is that, complainant who was engaged as Special Teacher, for further continuation of service, had tendered application for recommendation, that too, not to CEO but to accused who was Block Education Officer. Moreover, it has come in the prosecution evidence CriAppeal-357-2016 -5- itself, i.e. more particularly in the evidence of PW3 sanctioning authority that, only Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is empowered for continuation of service. Complainant himself in his cross para 16 has admitted that Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad was issuing letter of appointment. He has also admitted in same para that, accused had not given recommendation to his initial appointment and that accused was not the only Block Education Officer from the date of his appointment. Therefore, taking his such answers into consideration, as pointed out, it is clearly emerging that accused was not competent to recommend for appointment and therefore, motive to raise demand of bribe comes under shadow of doubt, more particularly when complainant himself has admitted that it was CEO who was competent. 9. On the point of demand, though there is verification of demand got done, as regards to main trap is concerned, in para 14 of chief, complainant has stated that, he himself made call to the accused and learnt about accused to be in the vicinity of bus stand. He has narrated the sequence of events that took place at bus stand in para 14 wherein he stated that, accused had asked him to come inside the bus and therefore, he entered the bus with the pancha and found accused sitting near the window of conductor seat. Here, before any CriAppeal-357-2016 -6- demand, this witness-complainant has stated that he told complainant that he has brought the amount as per directions. In fact, inside the bus or in the vicinity of bus stand, there was no demand by accused. On the contrary, going by the sequence narrated by the complainant in para 14, as stated above, prior to any demand by accused, complainant himself has stated that he has brought the amount. Therefore, crucial aspect of demand itself also comes under shadow of doubt. 10. In cases of such nature, complainant being interested witness, corroboration from independent corner is to be insisted for. But, here, shadow pancha PW2 has admitted that he has previously also acted as shadow pancha for ACB in other cases. In view of judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Kumudchandra (supra), when there is deployment of stock pancha, his testimony is looked upon with suspension. Even the learned trial Judge has noted that his testimony is full of falsehood and therefore, there cannot be said to be sound support to the testimony of complainant. 11. As regards to sanction is concerned, though PW3 has deposed about receiving crime papers, applying his mind and according sanction, in cross para 2, he has admitted about the circular issued by CriAppeal-357-2016 -7- State Government dated 02.01.2000 regarding issuance of sanction order wherein it has been mentioned that, as per salary of public servant, approval is by Deputy C.M. or C.M. and that. as accused was serving as Class-II officer, approval of Deputy C.M. was necessary. His such answer renders the very aspect of sanction to be doubtful. 12. To sum up, here, there is doubt about initial demand and there is also doubt about very motive as accused was not competent to recommend. Secondly, prior to demand there is offer. Thirdly, there is no corroboration to the complainant’s evidence and moreover services of habitual pancha are extracted. Lastly, sanction is not by proper authority. The cumulative effect of above discussion is that, prosecution has failed to bring home the charges by proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, no fault can be attributed to trial court for according acquittal. Hence, following order : ORDER The Criminal Appeal is hereby dismissed. [ABHAY S. WAGHWASE, J.] vre