LARSEN AND TOUBRO LIMITED v. LABOUR DEPT GOVT OF W B & ORS
WPA/9653/2016 · 2026-08-24
Shampa Dutt Paul
body2016
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2016 DAILYLAW 1119 (CAL) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2016 DAILYLAW 1119 (CAL) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction APPELLATE SIDE Present: The Hon‟ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) WPA 9653 of 2016 With CAN 1 of 2016 (Old CAN 5764/2016) CAN 2 of 2023 Larsen and Toubro Limited vs. Labour Department, Govt. of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Petitioner
: Mr. Soumya Majumder, Sr. Adv. Mr. Deepan Kumar Sarkar, Ms. Ashika Daga, Mr. Raunak Das Sharma, Mr. Kinnor Ghosh, Mr. Aditya Mukherjee.
For the Respondent No. 4
: Ms. Pithi Mazumder,
Mr. Saikat Pal.
Judgment reserved on
: 21.07.2026
Judgment delivered on
: 24.08.2026
2
Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:
1. The writ application has been preferred challenging an award passed by the learned Seventh Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal dated 7th January, 2016 and published on 18th March, 2016. Vide the impugned award, the learned Tribunal passed an ex-parte award against the petitioner herein and directed as follows:-
“that the case be awarded ex-parte against the O.P. company M/s. L & T Gulf Private Limited (A Joint Enterprise Of Larsen & Toubro Limited) without cost. The termination of service of the applicant Shri Somir Kumar Paul by the management of the O.P. company w.e.f 13.09.2013 is declared illegal and unjustified. The O.P. Company is directed to reinstate the applicant in service within one month from the date of publication of this award. The O.P. Company is also directed to pay all the back wages and other consequential benefits to the applicant w.e.f 13.09.2013. within 60 days from the date of publication of this award.”
2. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the writ application. 3. Initially the petitioner was L&T Gulf Private Limited, at Faridabad. Subsequently the present petitioner located at Mumbai was added as a party and L&T Gulf Private Limited was deleted as the petitioner. 3
4. The petitioner‟s case is that the respondent N. 4, Somir Kumar Paul (hereinafter referred to as the “private respondent”) joined the petitioner company at its Faridabad Office in piping Department in Managerial Grade on 16th June, 2008. It is stated that the Faridabad office of the petitioner is entirely a design engineering centre providing project management and consultancy services in the field of pipeline engineering services and the office does not have any manufacturing unit or function whatsoever. On 16th December, 2008 the service of the private respondent was confirmed. 5. The petitioner further states that after the service of the private respondent was confirmed, in 2010, he was deputed to report to one Mr. Anupam Das who was the Deputy General Manager with one Mr. Suresh Kumar being the Senior Deputy General Manager. It will appear from the ornogram of the project prepared by the private respondent himself that the nature of responsibilities bestowed on the private respondent was purely managerial in nature and he had adequate supervisory powers. 6.
During the tenure of the private respondent he was entrusted with various tasks and responsibilities, including one international assignment but unfortunately he was not able to handle the task and/or discharge his responsibility in the manner satisfactory to the customer and further was unable to complete the task he was entrusted with. The company not willing to discharge the private respondent without giving him adequate opportunities to improve his performance continued to shift his
4
responsibilities to other engineers, while entrusting some other work to the private respondent which the company expected him to discharge competently. 7. The performance of the private respondent in his 5 years of service was not up to the mark. 8. To rehabilitate the private respondent a further chance to improve his performance was given to the private respondent and to this effect he was counselled multiple times by his superiors including the Human Resource Development regarding his performance and efforts were made to give him enough opportunity to improve his performance. During one such counselling session the private respondent requested that he be transferred to EDRC, Kolkata which recommended by his Department but not considered by the competent management of the company. Thereafter the private respondent personally went met Mr. Anjan Das, S & L, L & T, Kolkata for his transfer but due to consistently poor performance his candidature was not accepted by such authority. 9. In the year 2013 due to his inadequate performance and incompetence the private respondent was again appraised of his performance and was counselled. 10. On 27th August, 2013 the private respondent finally accepted the appraisal letter which was handed over to him by the Human Resource Development of the Company. Having no other alternative the management of the
5
company was constrained to include his name in the non-performers‟ list due to his incompetence and the same was conveyed to him. 11.
On and from 13th September, 2013 the private respondent went on leave without any intimation to his superiors, HR Department or the competent authority of LTG, Faridabad. 12. On and from 25th September, 2013, many days after he had voluntarily abandoned his service without any notice whatsoever, the private respondent started sending e-mails and requested an initial leave for a period of 6 days citing that he was not in good health and therefore would be unable to attend the office. 13. On 9th October, 2013 by another e-mail the private respondent again extended the period of leave, this time citing the ill health of his father. 14. An electronic mail was addressed to the private respondent by the company directing him to respond and explain the reason of his continuous unauthorized absence within 48 hours of receipt of such electronic mail. 15. On 27th January, 2014 as a result of the private respondent not replying to the above e-mail dated 23rd January, 2014 the company issued a letter stating “voluntary abandonment of service on the part of the private respondent with effect from 13th September, 2013 since that was the date from which he went on his unexplained unauthorized leave. 6
16. After receiving such electronic mail and the termination letter via electronic mail and post, the private respondent responded and submitted purported medical documents which unfortunately was not of much relevance as the said documents were dated January, 2014 whereas the period of unexplained leave from 13th September, 2013 remained unexplained. 17. On 29th March, 2014 the company sent him a recovery letter in order to settle his dues of Rs.4,81,284/- and thereby effect full and final settlement since he was going on unauthorized absence and as he was yet to formally hand over his responsibilities. 18. In reply to the letter of 29th March, 2014 the private respondent wrote a letter dated the same day, i.e 29th March, 2014 to the company with an enclosure containing a demand notice claiming Rs.95,23,767/- as compensation. 19.
Due to the harassive nature of the electronic mails being sent to the higher officials of the company on a continuous basis and incessantly the company was constrained to block his yahoo electronic mail ID in order to prevent further harassment on the part of the company and its higher ranking officials. 20. However it did not deter the private respondent from sending e-mail as he created a new electronic mail ID and again started resending mails to staffs and employees of the company. 7
21. Thereafter the private respondent lodged two complaints against the company before the State Labour Department in Haryana- one in the month of February, 2014 and another in the month of June, 2014 regarding his termination claiming locus standi on the basis of him purportedly being a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 22. Subsequently the cases before the State Labour Department in Haryana were dismissed by the competent authorities of the Labour Department. 23. On 10th June, 2015, the Office of the Labour Commissioner, Government of West Bengal addressed a letter to M/s Larsen & Toubro Limited, the holding company of M/s L & T Hydrocarbon Engineering Ltd., of which the Petitioner is a subsidiary, enclosing a copy of a letter of the private respondent dated 2nd January, 2015. 24. A copy of the said letter dated 10th June, 2016 was forwarded to the Petitioner by M/s Larsen & Toubro Limited. The Petitioner, despite not being served a copy of the said letter to show its bona fide, replied to the said letter by its letter dated 26thJune, 2015, stating, inter alia, the grounds for which the complaint of the private respondent should be dismissed. 25. It is stated that the proceedings initiated by the Office of the Labour Commissioner are still pending and no development has taken place after
8
the Petitioner wrote its letter dated 26thJune, 2015 in reply to the aforesaid letter dated 10thJune, 2016. 26.
Being aggrieved by and/or dissatisfied with the order of the competent authority of the State Labour Department, Haryana, the private respondent, illegally and in contravention of applicable law, preferred an application on 20th July, 2015 before the 7thIndustrial Tribunal, West Bengal vide case No.4412A(2) of 2015 under Section 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, , 1947. 27. It is categorically submitted that the private respondent approached the Ld. Industrial Tribunal in complete suppression of the fact that the two complaints of the private respondent had already been dismissed by the Labour Commissioner, at Haryana after hearing both the parties, i.e. the private respondent and the company. 28. The complaint of the private respondent was termination of service by his employer and he sought orders from the Tribunal declaring the same to be illegal and praying for reinstatement of service with full back wages and consequential benefits. 29. It is stated and submitted by the petitioner that the Learned Industrial Tribunal did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the matter. 30. The learned Tribunal then heard the matter ex-parte on the observation in the award that the petitioner company had received the notice of the tribunal with an endorsement „refused‟ which was considered to be good
9
service and the tribunal held that the petitioner company was not willing to contest the case. 31. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner company did not receive any such notice at its registered office or any other office and as such there was no question and/or occasion and/or opportunity for the petitioner company to appear before the Learned Tribunal and contest the case. 32. It is stated and submitted that the address of the company as given in the cause-title of the said award of the Tribunal is incorrect and that the company does not have any office at the address mentioned in the said award or the address at which the notice was purportedly served. 33. Finally, the Tribunal passes the impugned award. 34. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal erroneously accepted the
contentions of the private respondent that he was a workman and not a Manager. It was held that the termination of service of the private respondent by the management of the petitioner company with effect from 13th September, 2013 was illegal and unjustified. Furthermore, the petitioner company was directed to reinstate the private respondent in service within one month from the date of publication of the order of the instant award. The petitioner company was also directed to pay all back wages and all other consequential benefits to the applicant, that is the private respondent herein on and from 13th September, 2013 within 60 days from the date of publication of the said award. 10
35. It is stated that the said award is erroneous and being not in accordance with law and is liable to be set aside. 36. The petitioner submits that for the first time it came to know of the award when the same was published under a cover of a letter dated 4th May 2016 and hence the writ application on the ground that the impugned award is erroneous on all findings including the satisfaction of services and as such is liable to be set aside. 37. One of the contentions of the petitioner is that the respondent No. 4 herein is presently employed at SERC (Safety Engineering and Research Centre) as a lead engineer in design and inspection. 38. It is further noticed by the petitioner that on the job portal of www.naukri.com and www.monster.com , the respondent no. 4 has also stated that he worked in Tata Steel Jamsedpur. 39. It is further stated in the affidavit that the respondent no. 4 has been/is working at the following company till date:-
Sl. No. Company Designation Period
1. SERC (Safety Engineering and Research Centre) Lead Engineer/Design & Inspection Presently
2. L & T Limited Lead Engineer/ Designer – Piping & PDMS June 2008- March 2014
3. DCPL (Development Area Lead Designer- March 2007-
11
Consultant Ltd.) Piping & PDMS June 2008
4. IOCL (Haldia) Field Engineer June 2005- February 2007
5. Toyo Engineering India Ltd. Engineer – Piping November 2004 – June 2005
6. Reliance Petroleum Limited, Jamnagar Engineer – Piping September 2002 – October 2004
7. LG Engineering & Construction Corp Engineer – Piping January 2002 – August 2002
8. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. Piping Engineer September 1998 – December 2001
9.
Toyo Engineering India Ltd. Design Engineer – Equipment & Piping August 1997 – August 1998
10. SERC Designer/Engineer December 1996
11. Splfts Drives Pvt. Ltd. Designer / Draftsman January 1995 – November 1996
12. Delkon (I) Pvt. Ltd. Designer November 1990 – December 1993
13. Caltech Engineers Equpt. & Piping Designer/Draughtsm an April 1998 – October 1990
12
40. As the information is being given from the internet, a certificate in the form of affidavit in terms of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act has also been annexed. 41. The respondent No. 4 in his supplementary affidavit, to the affidavit in opposition has stated that since the date of termination of service in spite of his best effort he could not secure any employment equivalent to his earlier employment. As such he is still in unemployment. He has to maintain his family with the help of his nearest relatives and well wisher. 42. The respondent No. 4 has again replied to an opposition filed by the petitioner to his supplementary affidavit and has categorically stated that he is unemployed and that he is unable to get a similar kind of job, considering the said stigma. 43. Written notes have been filed by the petitioner and the respondent No. 4 along with judgments replied upon. 44. Mr. Majumder, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has categorically argued that Larsen & Toubro Limited, the writ petitioner herein, is the changed name of L&T Gulf Private Limited. This amendment was allowed by this Hon'ble Court by an order dated April 28, 2023 passed in the writ petition, subsequent to amalgamation of L&T Gulf Private Limited with Larsen & Toubro Limited. L&T Gulf Private Limited had appointed the Respondent No. 4 as a Manager at Faridabad with terms and conditions mentioned in the appointment letter. 13
45.
It is submitted that on and from December 24, 2012, the Respondent No. 4 started issuing letters to the management requesting for his transfer from Faridabad to Kolkata. Such request letters were accompanied by prescriptions from physicians, which are unreliable and did not even advice bed rest to the incumbent. The Respondent No. 4 was all along posted at Faridabad, and never within the jurisdiction of West Bengal. The Respondent No. 4 not having attended duties at the Faridabad office, a show cause notice dated January 23, 2014 was issued by the management for absence. Ultimately, by an order dated January 27, 2014, the Respondent No. 4 was deemed to have abandoned his service on and from September 12, 2013; resultantly, his contract of employment with the company stood terminated. This was occasioned because the Respondent No. 4, by his conduct, clearly exhibited his refusal to work at his place of employment. 46. Mr. Majumder further submits that the initial reaction of the Respondent No. 4 was not towards reinstatement or restoration of service, but requesting for severance compensation by letter dated March 29, 2014). This is further indicator of the Respondent No. 4 not willing to continue his service with the Company. Thereafter, he raised a conciliation proceeding before the Conciliation Officer under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Conciliation Officer at Haryana. Subsequently, he also raised a dispute before the Conciliation Officer in West Bengal, which having ended in a failure, an order of reference was
14
made by the Government of West Bengal. Curiously, the dispute was referred against L&T Gulf Private Limited by mentioning its address as 3B, Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata 700 071. However, as will appear from the appointment letter and the previously mentioned show cause notice; L&T Gulf Private Limited did not have any office address at 3B, Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata - 700 071. 47.
It is stated that naturally, L&T Gulf Private Limited was not represented before the Industrial Tribunal in the adjudicatory proceeding since it did not and could not have received any notice of the proceeding at 3B, Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata 700 071. L&T Gulf Private Limited, at no point of time had any office at the said address. L&T Gulf Private Limited is a subsidiary company of Larsen & Toubro Limited; and therefore, it is a separate legal / juristic entity. 48. Mr. Majumder further argues that it is settled law that a subsidiary company is different from a holding company. (Parry‟s (Cal.) Employees‟ Union Vs. Judge, Second Industrial Tribunal, reported in 1995 SCC OnLine Cal 93, paragraph 14. The application for amendment of the writ petition clearly states how L&T Gulf Private Limited merged with Larsen & Toubro Limited in the year 2022 to acquire a different juristic entity's status. In fact, L&T Gulf Private Limited had ceased to exist on amalgamation with Larsen & Toubro Limited with effect from January 28,
2021. 15
49. Mr. Majumder further states that the learned tribunal did not consider that L&T Gulf Private Limited is different from Larsen & Toubro Limited. There is no finding recorded that L&T Gulf Private Limited had its office at 3B, Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata - 700 071. On the contrary, the appointment letter and all correspondence between L&T Gulf Private Limited and the Respondent No. 4 reveal that L&T Gulf Private Limited had its offices at New Delhi and Mumbai. The award was therefore passed ex parte without notice; and hence, a nullity. 50. It is further argued that the Respondent No. 4 was all along posted at Faridabad, and therefore Industrial Tribunal in West Bengal did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain or decide the dispute. 51. It is also argued that the finding as regards status of Respondent No.4 as
"workman" is completely perverse since it does not consider the appointment letter of the Respondent No. 4 as a “Manager”. 52.
The grant of relief was not at all addressing the fact that the Respondent No. 4 had on his own, chosen his place of employment and refused to work at Faridabad, where he had been posted, and at that place, he himself had raised a purported industrial dispute in conciliation. 53. It is stated that failure or refusal of the Respondent No. 4 to act or perform duties at his place of posting ought not to have warranted any relief and such refusal of the Respondent No. 4 to work in the company, except at his place of choice ought to have been treated as a case of abandonment of service. 16
54. The petitioner relies upon the following judgments:- i. Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Ors., 1980 (Suppl.) SCC 420. ii. Paritosh Kumar Pal vs State of Bihar & Ors. 1984 (2) LLN 617. “14. Applying the above, one of the primary tests is as to where the impugned order of the termination of service of a workman in effect operates. In Rattgavilas Motor's case (supra) the Supreme Court in terms noticed that though the original order of transfer and the subsequent order of termination of the services of the workman were passed at Krishnagiri in Kerala yet in effect it operated at Bangalore where the workman was employed Consequently the situs of the workman's employment in the case of the termination of his services is patently a paramount factor if not being wholly conclusive. It is within the aera of employment that the order of termination operates and the workman ceases to be a workman and loses his right to hold the post and receive wages therefor. Therefore on the anvil of the principle of where the impugned order operates the situs of employment of the workman is patently significant. Can it possibly be said that the order of termination of a workman dies not operate within the area of his employment?
The answer, therefore, has to be in favour of the Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over the place of work or the situs of employment. 15. Again on the second principle attached to the industrial disputes having some nexus with the territory of the State, the situs of employment of the workman assumes signal importance. Once a firm finding is arrived at that the workman was employed within a specific territory or State, the termination of his services therein has an obvious and direct nexus with such territory or such State. Consequently on the nexus test also the situs of employment of the workman has a direct connection with the territory where such employment is terminated. To put it in the converse, where the industrial dispute pertains to the termination of the employment of a workman, can it possibly be said that the situs of such employment would not have a direct nexus with the territory and the dispute? It calls for a pointed notice that in Rangavilas Motor's case (supra) their Lordships in
17
terms approved the High Court's view that this nexus has to be between [he industrial dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily with the industry or its headquarters as such. 18. However, in fairness to Mr. T.K. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 3, one must notice his lucid submissions even though they do not find favour with me. On larger principle Mr. Prasad had first attempted to contend that the concept of a cause of action under the Code and that of the Industrial Disputes Act are radically different and, therefore, Section 20 of the Code and in particular Clause (c) thereof with regard to the cause of action arising wholly or in part to confer jurisdiction would be totally alien in the arena of jurisdiction for industrial disputes. Even though the
learned Counsel was somewhat dogmatic in his stand on the point, I am unable to see any totally exclusionary line between a cause of action under the Code and an industrial dispute under the Act. It has been repeatedly held authoritatively that no exhaustive definition of the cause of action is perhaps possible yet genetically it constitutes all that bundle of facts which entitle the plaintiff to claim the legal reliefs sought for. Broadly speaking, those very considerations would be attracted in the case of an industrial dispute which would equally compass all that bundle of facts on the basis of which the workman invokes the provisions of the said Act. Without being hyper technical or going to the abstruse length of saying that the cause of action in a civil case and an industrial dispute under the Act are in any way synonymous, it must be held that in any case there is no totally sharp or exclusionary line of division between the two. This result seems to flow from the binding precedent of the final Court, already noticed above, to the effect that the well-known principle of territorial jurisdiction governing the Civil Courts (rested as they are on the concept of the cause of action) would be equally applicable to determine jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act as well.”
iii. M/s. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. vs The Workmen and Ors. (1975) 4 SCC 679. 18
iv. Deb Kumar Roy vs The learned Second Labour Court Kolkata & Ors., WPA No. 18562 of 2017, decided on 29.11.2022. 55. The respondent No. 4 by filing written notes has argued that the impugned order is a reasoned and speaking order and that the tribunal rightly held that the respondent No. 4 is a workman and passed the impugned award which is in accordance with law. 56. It is further stated that it is settled law that writ jurisdiction is not an appellate forum for re-appreciation of evidence. Findings of fact by Industrial tribunals, when based on evidence and not perverse, are not to be interfered with. 57. The respondent No. 4‟s admitted case is that he joined the petitioner‟s Faridabad office on 16.06.2008 pursuant to an offer dated 28.04.2008. His services were confirmed on 16.12.2008. 58. It is stated that the respondent No. 4 faced genuine medical and family crises, including his father‟s illness and subsequently demise.
He communicated extensions of leave via emails. The petitioner company‟s classification of his absence from 13.09.2013 as “voluntary abandonment” was arbitrary and retaliatory, especially after he had raised issues regarding performance appraisals and transfer requests. 59. It is stated that the proceedings before the Howrah Labour Authorities being the summary proceedings does not operate as res judicata as they are not fit for adjudication on merit and that the respondent No.
19
4 approaching the West Bengal Labour Authorities, is in accordance with law. 60. The respondent No. 4 further disagrees with the contention of the petitioner that the tribunal did not have the territorial jurisdiction to hear the case. 61. Regarding the case of the petitioner that it is a subsidiary company of the original company, L &T Gulf Private Limited, which had appointed the petitioner has argued that in amalgamation two or more companies are fused into one by merger or by taking over by another. Reconstruction or „amalgamation‟ has no precise legal meaning. The amalgamation is a blending of two or more existing undertakings into one undertaking, the share holders of each blending company become substantially the share holders in the company which is to carry on the blended undertakings. There may be amalgamation either by the transfer of two or more undertakings to a new company, or by the transfer of one or more undertakings to an existing company. 62. Regarding territorial jurisdiction, the private respondent submits that he joined the petitioner company at its Faridabad Office in piping Department in Managerial Grade on 16th June, 2008. It is stated that the Faridabad office of the Petitioner is entirely a design engineering centre providing project management and consultancy services in the field of pipeline engineering services, and the office does not have any manufacturing unit or function whatsoever. 20
63. The judgments relied upon by the respondent No. 4 are:- a. Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, Standard citation : AIR 1964 SC 477, Paragraph (Para 7).
“7. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by sub-ordinate court or tribunals ….but a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in writ proceedings on the ground that the relevant evidence was inadequate or insufficient. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings." b. Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union, Standard Citation: (2000) 4 SCC 245, (Para 17). "17. The intermediate evaluation of evidence by the Industrial Tribunal is final and binding on the writ court. When the management has chosen to stay away from the primary forum or has failed to produce materials to rebut the workman's case on affidavit, it is completely impermissible for the High Court under Article 226 to engage in a re-appreciation of evidence. The writ court does not sit as a court of first appeal over industrial awards; it must restrict its scrutiny to jurisdictional defects alone."
21
c. McLeod Russel India Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Standard Citation: (2014) 15 SCC 263, Paragraph (Para 28). "28. A change in management, corporate restructuring, or an internal corporate amalgamation cannot defeat the accrued statutory rights of a workman. The transferee company or the newly merged entity absorbs the legal persona of the transferor company along with its full ledger of assets and liabilities. Labor liabilities are deeply tied to the business undertaking itself. They cannot be strategically structured away or hidden behind corporate pending adjudication under industrial veils to frustrate jurisprudence."
64.
On hearing the parties and on perusal of the materials on record, the following is evident:- i. The offer of contract of employment dated 28th April, 2008 shows the respondent/employee was offered the post of a „Manager‟ at their Faridabad office. Salary was at Rs. 15,000/- per month with allowances at Rs. 25000/- per month. Admittedly the respondent no. 4 was appointed as a Manager. The allowances and perquisites to the employee was as follows:-
“Allowances & Perquisites applicable to employees in Grade M1B at Faridabad. 22
HRA Rs. 5100/- P.M. Conveyance Allowance Rs. 5500/- P.M. Education Allowance Rs. 700/-P.M. Furniture Allowance Rs. 350/-P.M. Club Allowance Rs. 100/-P.M. Special Performance Pay Rs. 3500/P.M. Special Pay Rs. 1500/-P.M. Establishment Allowance Rs. 750/-P.M. Additional Allowance Rs. 4000/- P.M. Additional Pay Rs. 3500/- P.M. H-Lisa Rs. 2600/- P.M. Telephone reimbursement Rs. 500/- P.M. LTA Rs. 25000/-P.M.
The said allowances and perquisites prima facie show, that the respondent no. 4 was not a “workman”. The petitioner‟s in its affidavit in opposition has annexed the curriculum vitae of the employee put up by him on www.naukri.com and www.monster.com, wherein he has provided his nature of work with L&T Limited (petitioner) as follows:-
“Lead Engineer / Designer - Piping & PDMS. Design & detail Engineering for Bhagyam field development-Well Pad for Cairn Energy (UK). Guiding in the Preparation of Plot Plans, Equipment Layout & Piping G.A.D & Reviewing...........” This proves that the employee was not a „workman‟ and as such could not have raised an industrial dispute. The reference is thus not maintainable. 23
ii. In their written notes the respondent no. 4 has stated as follows:-
“The Tribunal had jurisdiction under Section 2A(2) of the I.D. Act. Prior summary proceedings before Haryana Labour authorities did not operate as res judicata. Those were not full adjudications on merits. The Workman correctly approached the authorities in West Bengal, where he resides and where the dispute was raised.
Allegations of suppression or fraud are baseless and an afterthought.” Admittedly the respondent/employee was employed at and worked out side West Bengal Faridabad and not transferred to Kolkata. The petitioners have their office at Mumbai (as per supplementary affidavit filed by the employee) and L&T Gulf Private Ltd. had their office at Faridabad. The respondent employee has admitted that he had approached the labour commission at Faridabad, which admittedly has the jurisdiction in respect of the place of employment and location of the office. It is not the question of res judicata but of territorial jurisdiction. The judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench in Deb Kumar Roy (Supra) is in support of this view. iii. The issue of jurisdiction was not even considered by the tribunal as the petitioners herein were not before it to raise the issue and the
24
employee supported the fact that he had approached the labour commissioner at Hariyana, in February 2014 and June, 2014, which were dismissed/dropped by the authorities. 65. The proceedings before the learned tribunal was thus not maintainable as the employee was not a „workman‟ and the tribunal also lacked territorial jurisdiction. 66. Thus, the impugned award by the learned Seventh Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal dated 7th January, 2016 and published on 18th March, 2016, is quashed and set aside. 67. WPA 9653 of 2016 is allowed. 68. Applications, if any, connected thereto stand disposed of consequently. 69. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 70. Photostat certified copy of this Judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis upon compliance of all formalities. [Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.]