Page No.1 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015 2026:CGHC:5873-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Criminal Appeal No. 404 of 2015 [Arising out of impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.02.2015, passed in Sessions Trial No.49/2013 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Jitendra and 02 others) by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mungeli District Bilaspur (CG)] 1 – Jitendra, S/o Jagdish Patel, aged about 20 years, R/o Village Saristal, Police Station Lormi, District Mungeli (Chhattisgarh) 2 – Jagdish, S/o Makhan Patel, aged about 55 years, R/o Village Saristal, Police Station Lormi, District Mungeli (Chhattisgarh) 3 - Kunwariya Bai, W/o Jagdish Patel, aged about 50 years, R/o Village Saristal, Police Station Lormi, District Mungeli (Chhattisgarh) ... Appellants (On Bail) Versus State of Chhattisgarh, through Police Station Lormi, District Mungeli (Chhattisgarh) ... Respondent ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellants : Mr. Rakesh Jain and Mrs. Kiran Jain, Advs. For Respondent : Mr. Afroz Khan, Panel Lawyer ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Division Bench Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma Judgment on Board (02.02.2026) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J (1) This criminal appeal filed under Section 374(2) of CrPC at the SAIFAN KHAN Digitally signed by SAIFAN KHAN Page No.2 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015 instance of the accused-appellants, is questioning the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.02.2015 (wrongly mentioned in the impugned judgment as 25.02.2013), passed in Sessions Trial No.49/2013 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Jitendra and 02 others) by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mungeli District Bilaspur (CG), whereby he has been convicted for offence under Section 304-B read with Section 34 of IPC and sentenced for imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.500/- each and, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 month. (2) The case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 18.05.2013, at about 04:30 PM, at Village Saristal, which comes within the ambit of Police Station Lormi, District Mungeli (CG), the accused-appellants herein, in furtherance of their common intention, harassed Suruchi (herein after referred to as the “deceased”), tortured her mentally and physically and have also committed cruelty upon her for or in connection with demand of dowry, due to which, she died within seven years of her marriage under unnatural circumstance and, thereby, said to have committed the aforesaid offences. (3) The further case of the prosecution is that the appellant No.01 is husband of the deceased, whereas the appellants No.02 & 03 are father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased respectively. The marriage of the deceased with the appellant No.01 was solemnized in the year 2010 and she died under unnatural circumstances on Page No.3 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015 18.05.2013 (i.e. within seven years of her marriage). On account of death of the deceased, marg intimation was recorded vide Ex.P/06. Thereafter, pursuant to written complaint lodged by brother of the deceased- Chiranjiv Lal (PW-01), FIR (Ex.P/05) was recorded registered and wheels of investigation started running, in which, summons under Section 175 of CrPC were sent vide Ex.P/01 and inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P/02. Nazari naksha was prepared vide Ex.P/11. The dead-body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted by Dr. R.K. Upadhyay (PW-06) and, as per PM report (Ex.P/10), it has been opined that the cause of death of the deceased is septicemia, due to extensive burn followed by hypovolemic shock and cardiopulmonary collapse. The accused-appellants were arrested vide Ex.P/13 to Ex.P/15. After due investigation, the accused-appellants herein were also charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences in the competent criminal Court having jurisdiction, which was thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which, the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence by stating that they are innocent and have been falsely implicated. (4) The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 10 witnesses and exhibited 16 documents, whereas the appellants in support of their defence neither examined any witness nor exhibited any documents. (5) The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and Page No.4 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015 documentary evidence available on record, proceeded to convict the appellants for offence punishable under Section 304-B/34 of IPC and sentenced them as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellants-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. (6) Mr. Rakesh Jain and Mrs. Kiran Jain, learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants for the aforesaid offences. He also submits that though the death of the deceased occurred within seven years of her marriage, but there is no evidence available on record to show that soon before the death of the deceased, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellants herein for or in connection with demand for dowry and, as such, necessary ingredients to constitute offence under Section 304-B of IPC is completely missing in the present case and, therefore, the appellants deserves to be acquitted of the charges and the present appeal is liable to be allowed. (7) Per-contra, learned State counsel would submit that the prosecution has been able to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondent-State that in view of statements of prosecution witnesses coupled with other evidence available on record, the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants for the Page No.5 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015 offence under Section 304-B/34 of IPC and, therefore, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. (8) We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. (9) In order to consider the plea, raised at the Bar it would be appropriate to extract relevant provisions of Section 304-B of the IPC which relates to dowry death:- “304-B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The above provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 and came into force w.e.f. 19.11.1986. (10) In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied-  The death of a women should be caused by burn or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances. Page No.6 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015  Such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage.  Soon before the death of deceased, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her Husband or any relative of her Husband.  Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for dowry. Thus, if the aforesaid ingredients are established by the prosecution by leading appropriate reliable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and the court shall presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. (11) Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 speaks about presumption as to dowry death which reads as under:- "113B. Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation. For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." The aforesaid provision shows that if the women has been subjected to cruelty as defined in Section 498-A IPC, the court may presume that such person has caused dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides as under:- 2. Definition of "dowry". In this Act," dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- a. by one party to a marriage to the other party to the Page No.7 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015 marriage; or b. by the parents of either party to a marriage or by a other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or after the marriage us consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies." (12) To attract the provisions of Section 304B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. (13) In the matter of Appasaheb and another v. State of Maharashtra 1 it has been held by the Apex Court as under:- “9. Two essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, apart from others, are (i) death of woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, and (ii) woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for “dowry”. The explanation appended to sub section (1) of Section 304-B IPC says that “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 10. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act reads as under: “2. Definition of ‘dowry’.-In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly. (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any 1 (2007) 9 SCC 721 Page No.8 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015 time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. 11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word “dowry” any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving and taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well known social custom or practice in India. It is well settled principle of interpretation of statute that if the Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. (see Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd and Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd. v. Union of India). A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for making some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for 'dowry' as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC viz demand for dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.” (14) The Supreme Court in case of Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra 2 while considering the word "soon before her 2 2012 (11) SCC 397 Page No.9 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015 death", it has been held that term of the period which can come within the term "soon before her death" is to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question and there must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. It has been further held that if the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. (15) Keeping the above-stated principle in mind, we shall now proceed to consider the evidence led by the prosecution in the instant case qua whether ingredients for offence under Section 304-B of IPC is made out or not? (16) Admittedly, the marriage of the deceased with the appellant No.01 was solemnized in the year 2010 and she died under unnatural circumstances on 18.05.2013, i.e. within seven years of her marriage. Furthermore, as per PM report (Ex.P/10) of the deceased, the cause of death of the deceased is septicemia, due to extensive burn followed by hypovolemic shock and cardiopulmonary collapse, which is duly proved by Dr. R.K. Upadhyay (PW-06), who has conducted the postmortem of the dead-body of the deceased. As such, the two primary ingredients to constitute offence under Section Page No.10 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015 304-B of IPC i.e. (i) death of the deceased under abnormal circumstance and (ii) death has occurred within seven years of her marriage are clearly established in the present case. (17) Now, the spinal issue is as to whether the remaining ingredients to constitute offence under Section 304-B of IPC, i.e. soon before the death of the deceased, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband (i.e. appellants herein) and said cruelty and harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry, are established in the instant case or not? (18) In order to establish the aforesaid two ingredients, the prosecution has examined Chiranjiv Lal (PW-01) [brother of the deceased], Ramkali (PW-02) [mother of the deceased] and Lakhanlal (PW-03) [father of the deceased]. A careful perusal of the statement of Chiranjiv Lal (PW-01) would show that on getting information with regard to the incident in question by the appellant No.01- Jitendra, he reached to the spot and called 108 ambulance and took the deceased to the hospital. He also stated that on the way to the hospital, the deceased informed him that the appellants herein have committed marpeet with her and further the appellants poured kerosene oil on her body and set her ablaze. He also stated in Para- 17 that his statement under Section 161 of CrPC was recorded after 15 days from the date of incident. Furthermore, so far as Ramkali (PW-02) [mother of the deceased] and Lakhanlal (PW-03) [father of Page No.11 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015 the deceased] are concerned, they were informed by Chiranjiv Lal (PW-01) that the deceased has suffered burn injuries. However, the statement of Chiranjiv Lal (PW-01) cannot be relied upon for the following reasons: (i) that the incident in question is said to have taken place on 18.05.2013, whereas Chiranjiv’s (PW-01) statement under Section 161 of CrPC was recorded on 22.06.2013 i.e. after more than 30 days and the said delay in recording his statement has not been explained by the prosecution at any point of time by giving acceptable reasons; (ii) that FIR (Ex.P/05) has also been lodged at the instance of Chiranjiv Lal (PW-01) by submitting written complaint (Ex.P/04) on 17.06.2015 i.e. after a delay of about 01 month from the date of incident, which creates serious doubt in the mind of the Court, because Chiranjiv Lal (PW-01) being the brother of the deceased lodged report after a delay of one month and reported the matter to the police after marg inquiry; (iii) that even if the statement of Chiranjiv Lal (PW-01) is considered in shape of oral dying declaration given by the deceased, such a oral dying declaration cannot be accepted for the reason that the law with regard to oral dying declaration is well settled. It has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Page No.12 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015 Court that the oral dying declaration is a weak kind of evidence and it can only be made the basis of conviction, if it inspires full confidence of the Court and if the Court is satisfied that the maker of the said oral dying declaration was in a fit state of mind at the time of making it and that it was not an outcome of tutoring, prompting or imagination and where the dying declaration is suspicious and there is no other corroborative piece of evidence on record, it would be unsafe for the Court to record conviction on the solitary evidence of such oral dying declaration (See: Darshana Devi v. State of Punjab 3 ; Arun Bhanudas Pawar v. State of Maharashtra 4 and Walkom Yaima Singh v. State of Manipur 5 ). Moreover, there is no opinion of the doctor available on record to show that at the time when deceased was escorted to the hospital and she gave oral dying declaration to his brother- Chiranjiv Lal (PW-01), she was in fit state of mind to give statement. As such, on this count also, the factum of deceased oral dying declaration to his brother- Chiranjiv Lal (PW-01) is liable to be discarded and cannot be relied upon; (iv) that further Chiranjiv Lal (PW-01) has also not informed to Ramkali (PW-02) [mother of the deceased] and Lakhanlal (PW-03) [father of the deceased] that it is the appellants herein 3 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 126 4 (2008) 11 SCC 232 5 (2011) 13 SCC 125 Page No.13 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015 who have caused burn injuries to the deceased, indeed, he only informed that the deceased suffered burn injuries; (v) lastly, Investigating Officer, namely, JPN Singh (PW-09) has also admitted in his cross-examination that Chiranjiv Lal (PW-01) did not inform at the time of lodging the report that it is the appellants herein who have caused burn injuries to the deceased by pouring kerosene oil and setting her ablaze. (19) As such, for the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to rely upon the testimony of Chiranjiv Lal (PW-01) to hold that soon before the death of the deceased, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband (i.e. appellants herein) for or in connection with demand of dowry. Thus, apart from two ingredients, i.e. the death of the deceased was under abnormal circumstance and within seven years from the date of her marriage, other necessary ingredients as culled out in Para-10 of this judgment, are completely lacking/missing. There is no evidence available on record to show that at any point of time, the appellants had demanded dowry or had committed cruelty and harassment upon the deceased for or in connection with the same soon before her death. We hereby hold accordingly. (20) In view of foregoing analysis, we are unable to hold that the appellants are the authors of the crime and, therefore, they are entitled to get benefit of doubt. Accordingly, the conviction and Page No.14 of 14 IN CRA-404-2015 sentence of the appellants for offence under Section 304-B/34 of IPC as well as sentence of imprisonment for life, awarded to them by the learned trial Court, is hereby set aside. They are acquitted of the said charge on the basis of benefit of doubt. Since the appellants are already on bail, they need not to surrender. However, their bail bonds shall remain in force for a further period of six months in view of the provision contained in Section 437-A of the CrPC. (21) Consequently, the criminal appeal is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. (22) Let a certified copy of this order alongwith original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and action, if any. sd/- sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge Judge s@if